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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
Studying and thereby enhancing the understanding of the behavioral impact of the 
formula funding models used to allocate funds from the Danish municipalities to the 
local public school districts is the aim of this dissertation. In addressing the overall 
research question of how do formula funding models in the context of Danish public 
school funding affect local managerial practice, the study combines the two separate 
sets of discussions that of formula funding model design and that of incentives and 
behavioral responses. A framework for the study of formula funding model design 
and managerial practice is proposed which, based on the theoretical understanding 
of viewing a formula funding model as a package of control, puts forward that the 
joint effects of the funding model components will determine respectively the actual 
competitive pressure and level of budgetary risk brought upon the providers, and 
therefore with it the resulting managerial practice created.  
The framework is applied in two qualitative field studies carried out in two Danish 
municipalities. In each field study, the technical components of the funding model 
are analyzed, followed by a discussion of the funding model in the light of the de-
veloped framework bringing forth a discussion of the theoretical practice created by 
the specific model. Finally, the studies present an account of how school manage-
ment is actually practiced. Focusing on the guiding principles affecting the daily 
practices of the local management the accounts visualize how education concerns 
are weighted against the model’s inherent incentive structures. In this way, the dis-
sertation seeks to elucidate how the potential field of tension between education and 
budgetary related concerns is balanced when decisions are to be made. 
The study reveals that the managerial practice of the management under study is 
strongly affected by the specific formula funding model design; which influences 
and determines the scope for action but at the same time also the opportunity/danger 
for more adverse behavioral responses to be triggered. The field studies make plain 
that the level of competitive pressure and budgetary risk are very influential in en-
suring that the funding model is more than a reimbursement system, making it in-
stead a mean through which providers are encouraged to operate prudently and effi-
ciently ensuring also the quality of services. A correct balance of or mix between the 
level of budgetary risk and competitive pressure must however be found. The disser-
tation brings forth strong arguments for the importance of understanding the formula 
funding model as a full package of control, in that, the field studies reveal how the 
components may come with oppositely directed incentives, creating further potential 
positive or negative synergies. Moreover, the dissertation contributes with important 
insights into the behavioral effects of different payment types and the impact of 
different design choices in relation to the national vision of inclusion. Further, the 
dissertation brings forth important insights into the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with linking budgetary and education-related responsibilities locally. 
III 
DANSK RESUME 
Økonomi eller Faglighed? Incitamenter og praksis 
Denne afhandling har til formål at studere kommunale budgetbevillingsmodeller og 
disses indflydelse på lokal skoleledelsesadfærd. Ved at kombinere teori omkring 
budgetmodelkomponenter og teknisk design med viden omkring incitamenter og 
adfærd søger afhandlingen at besvare det overordnede forskningsspørgsmål; hvor-
dan påvirker de budgetbevillingsmodeller som benyttes på det danske folkeskoleom-
råde lokal ledelsesadfærd? I afhandlingen foreslås et teoretisk framework til analyse 
af sammenhængen mellem teknisk design og ledelsesadfærd. Frameworket er base-
ret på den teoretiske forståelse af vigtigheden af at anskue en budgetmodel som en 
samlet kontrolpakke. Der argumenteres for, at den samlede effekt af en budgetbevil-
lingsmodels kontrolkomponenter er afgørende for det samlede konkurrencepres og 
den konkrete budgetrisiko, og dermed for den følgende lokale ledelsesadfærd. Den 
teoretiske analyseramme sættes i spil i to kvalitative studier udført i to danske kom-
muner. I hvert af disse analyseres kontrolkomponenterne i den konkrete budgetbe-
villingsmodel, hvilket efterfølges af en diskussion af den teoretiske praksis som 
opstår som følge af den specifikke budgetmodel. Slutteligt følger en praksisdrevet 
analyse af den faktiske skoleledelsesadfærd i den enkelte kommune. Analysen tager 
udgangspunkt i de principper som påvirker ledelsesadfærden og forsøger at visuali-
sere hvordan faglige og pædagogiske overvejelser balanceres imod budgetbevil-
lingsmodellens finansielle incitamenter. På denne måde forsøger afhandlingen at 
belyse, hvordan det potentielle spændingsfelt mellem faglige og budgetmæssige 
overvejelser balanceres lokalt i en beslutningsproces.  
Overordnet viser afhandlingen, at den ledelsesmæssige praksis i høj grad påvirkes af 
budgetmodellens design. Et design påvirker og danner rammerne for det lokale le-
delsesrum, men også muligheden/risikoen for at uønskede adfærdsmæssige reaktio-
ner opstår. De to kvalitative studier viser med al tydelighed, at det samlede konkur-
rencepres samt budgetrisikoniveauet er centrale parametre til sikring af budgetbevil-
lingsmodellen som mere en blot end refusionsmodel, nemlig som et aktivt værktøj 
til påvirkning af lokal ledelsesadfærd. Det er dog centralt at en korrekt balance mel-
lem budgetrisiko og konkurrencepres findes. Afhandlingen fremlægger klare argu-
menter for vigtigheden af at studere og forstå en budgetbevillingsmodel som en 
samlet kontrolpakke, idet analyserne viser, hvordan budgetmodellens enkelte kom-
ponenter kan frembringe og motivere modsatrettede incitamenter, samt muligheden 
for at skabe både positive og negative synergieffekter. Afhandlingen bidrager med 
vigtig viden omkring de adfærdsmæssige konsekvenser af forskellige betalingsme-
toder, men også vedrørende effekten af forskellige designvalg i forhold til den nati-
onale målsætning om at skabe mere inklusion i den danske folkeskole. Endeligt 
bibringer afhandlingen med vigtig indsigt i fordelene og ulemperne ved at samle 
fagligt og budgetrelateret ansvar lokalt.   
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CHAPTER 1.   INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Danish Education Act § 2, specifies that the municipalities hold the responsi-
bility for the organization and funding of the Danish public school system within a 
framework set up by laws, ordinances, rules and guidelines laid down by the Minis-
try of Education. Not only is the individual municipality responsible for providing a 
satisfactory level of education, but they must also ensure that the delivery of service 
is conducted within the agreed budgets. Thus, albeit restricted by externally decided 
conditions the individual municipality is left with a high level of freedom when it 
comes to organizing and funding; making it the main actor in the governance of the 
public school system.  
In the wake of the global financial crises Danish public spending has come under 
increasing pressure and the municipal system has been subjected to strict demands 
for consolidation and budget compliance. The limited opportunities for growth in 
public spending means that developments of municipal services must be accom-
plished within a more controlled and restricted financial frame; in turn requiring the 
municipalities to prioritize and become innovative in their delivery of service. Sim-
ultaneously with this increased focus on spending and budget compliance a new 
public school reform was passed in 2013 by the Danish parliament, under the ban-
ner:”Denmark has a good public school, but it needs improvement to become even 
better” (Text of agreement 7 June 2013:1). The reform which came into force in the 
school year 2014/15 is intended to counter a renewed concern with the academic 
level of pupils and with the ability of the public school system to adequately pre-
pare them for further education. In 2012 15-17% left the public schools without 
sufficient skills in Danish and Math. It was believed that the neither the full poten-
tial of the academically weak pupils nor that of the academically gifted was realized 
and on top of this too many pupils are referred to special needs education (Text of 
agreement 7 June 2013).  
The new school reform reflects the ever-present political interest in the public 
school system and in the activities and foundations upon which it is build; an inter-
est which since 2001 has been manifested in more than 30 amendments to the Edu-
cation Act. In this potential field of tension between education-related goals and 
calls for improved productivity and efficiency the design of the municipal funding 
models used to allocate funds from the municipal level to the local school districts 
is called into question; with the recommendation that the funding models are to be 
redesigned so to support the political vision of making the public school system 
more inclusive (see e.g. Ministry of Finance 2010). The funding model constitutes 
the main mechanism for management control in that it not only specifies the basis 
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upon which funds are to be allocated but also frames the decision-making scope 
available to service providers. The transfer of resources and the accompanying 
controls in this way, Broadbent et al. (2010:507) argue, come to act as an indirect 
steering mechanism for behavior. Making the specific design of the funding model 
crucial as its function is not only to provide a budgetary allocation model, but also 
to encourage behavior in accordance with the political objectives and to discourage 
behavior which is not. This places the incentives structures of the funding models at 
the center of attention. 
The effect of financial incentives on behavior has primarily been studied in a pri-
vate sector context (see e.g. Otley 1978; Briers & Hirst 1990; Laverty 1996; Hart-
mann, 2000; Van der Stede 2000). Yet, it has also become a subject of study in the 
context of public sector governance (Oates 1999; Dixit 2002; Burgess & Ratto 
2003; Van Helden 2005; Pollitt 2006; Bevan & Hood 2006; Verbeeten 2008). In the 
research literature incentives have been found to influence behavior, also despite 
the fact that they in the public sector are directed towards specific organization-
al/governance levels and not towards the individual level per se. The focus of study, 
however, has mainly been the theoretical implications and roles of incentives from 
the standard economic Principal-Agent perspective. This theoretical perspective 
affects the overall results and conclusions, in that, more qualitative driven motiva-
tions are omitted or only scarcely discussed as theoretical behavioral responses 
stemming from the nature of the public sector (Dixit 2002).  
There is however a growing agreement in the literature that non-monetary mecha-
nisms such as social norms and professional perceptions affect the understanding of 
what constitutes correct and prudent practice in the context of public service deliv-
ery. ‘Public service’ and ‘intrinsic’ motivation are examples of factors which have 
been found to guide and motivate public sector employees; with professional norms 
for example acting as internal self-regulating control mechanisms which may ham-
per or dilute the intention of the otherwise implemented financial incentives (Peder-
sen et al. 2006:125). As a result studies are questioning whether financial incentives 
are all-explanatory when seeking to understand behavior (Dixit 2002; Burgess & 
Ratto 2003; Besley & Ghatak 2003; Verbeeten 2008; Andersen & Serritzlev 2006; 
Andersen et al. 2010). At the same time, the incorporation of financial incentives 
into the formula funding models is by itself by some considered to be a contentious 
issue, in that, the allocation of funds in their eyes should be needs-based. That is, 
driven by actual needs of the pupils with the subsequent managerial practice re-
maining unaffected by other considerations than that of meeting the actual needs of 
the pupils as appropriately as possible. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the effects of formula funding models on 
local managerial practice, seen in the light that formula funding constitutes the main 
method of allocation in the context of Danish school funding. The Danish public 
school system is a field characterized and guided by a strong presence of profes-
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sional norms, ethics and self-perceptions associated with that of being a teacher and 
a principal of school (Ratner 2009). Potentially this places the school management 
in a dilemma between the external demands for efficiency and the more internally 
driven values of the teacher profession. For this reason the design of the funding 
models becomes ever more vital for encouraging behavior which is in line with the 
service area’s objectives; making the public school system an extremely interesting-
ly setting in which to study the effects of financial incentives.  
In order to do so the dissertation proposes a theoretical framework for the study of 
formula funding model design and managerial practice. This is subsequently ap-
plied in two qualitative field studies carried out in two Danish municipalities. The 
field studies are intensive in nature and intended to provide a “rich” understanding 
of the formula funding models and the resulting managerial practice. In each field 
study, the technical components of the funding model are firstly analyzed, followed 
by a discussion of the funding model in the light of the developed framework bring-
ing forth a discussion of the theoretical practice created by the specific model. Fi-
nally, the studies present an account of how school management is actually prac-
ticed. Focusing on the guiding principles affecting the daily practices of the local 
management the accounts seek to visualize how education concerns are weighted 
against the model’s inherent incentive structures. In this way, the dissertation seeks 
to elucidate how the potential field of tension between education and budgetary 
related concerns is balanced when decision are to be made.  
The aim is to bring about both theoretical and practice/policy-related contributions. 
Through the proposed framework the dissertation brings together technical aspects 
of model design and knowledge on incentives and behavioral responses. Creating 
thereby a deeper theoretical knowledge of management control and behavior in the 
context of public sector governance by. Studying the formula funding models as a 
package of control the framework represent a unique tool for analyzing and under-
standing the relationship between funding models and managerial practice.  
The presented field studies provide a so far unique analysis of the connection be-
tween funding models and behavior, relevant from a theoretical perspective. But the 
proposed framework is also relevant from a practical perspective, in that, it eluci-
dates the effects of specific design choices to public sector decision-makers. The 
dissertation contributes with a practical relevant tool for evaluation by firstly identi-
fying the components making up a formula funding model and then by proposing a 
setup for analyzing the joint effects of the total set of model components on the 
resulting managerial practice. In situations for example where the specific mix of 
controls is to be changed, the framework may be used to evaluate how a redesign of 
specific components will influence the actual configuration of the funding model 
and with it the resulting effect on managerial practice. Thus, potentially improving 
local decision-making and increasing the awareness of the consequences of specific 
design choices. 
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1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Formula funding has been a recurrently studied subject in research communities 
such as management accounting, finance and economics (Meisinger 1976; Moss & 
Gaither 1976; Mayston 1998; Smith 2003, 2007a, 2007b). Here the focus has main-
ly been that of studying payment methods and their associated incentives in areas 
such as health care (see e.g. Aas 1995; Ellis et al. 1996; Ellis 1998; Silverman et al. 
1999; Smith et al. 2001, Smith 2008) and in the funding of higher education institu-
tions (see e.g. Heald & Geaughan 1994; Angulin & Scapens 2000; Talib 2001, 
Zierdt 2009).  
Similar when formula funding has been studied in a public school context the focus 
has been on the formula itself evaluating it in the light of the efficiency and equity 
created. See for example BenDavid-Hadar & Ziderman (2010), the UNESCO pub-
lication edited by Ross & Levačić (1999) which presented five case studies of for-
mula funding (later compared in Levačić et al. 2000) or Levacic (2007) which 
based on the same approach compared the formulae deployed in seven European 
countries. As the focus or reference point in this part of the literature has been the 
basic funding mechanism or payment method deployed this has lead to a prevailing 
use of economic/statistical approaches (e.g. Levačić 1993; Smith 2003) or that of 
more conceptual ones (e.g. Ross & Levačić 1999; Levačić 2007). Affecting again 
the type of problems addressed and not at least the type of conclusions drawn.  
A growing body of management accounting literature, applying more qualitative 
approaches, is however emerging and within school funding this has led to studies 
into the effects of funding on changing accountability patterns, analyzing also the 
effects of devolvement of decision-making on local budgeting practices (see e.g. 
Broadbent et al. 1993; Broadbent et al. 1999; Edwards et al. 1995, 1996, 1997, 
Edwards et al. 2005; Neu 2006; Bracci 2009; Ezzamel et al. 2007, 2012; Agyemang 
2010). Yet, the focus or reference point in this part of the literature has also been 
that of formula funding or the particular allocation method used more broadly and 
the studies have thus not captured or studied the effect of the full funding model.  
There is thus an important gab in the literature when it comes to understanding the 
actual behavioral impacts of formula funding models. The so far sole focus on the 
formula mechanism is problematic, Smith (2007a:152) argues, in that the formula 
mechanism on its own rarely secures all the payer’s objectives. Rather, situations 
may occur where the specific incentives springing from the broader funding model 
actually act against or hamper some of the payer’s objectives. A deeper technical 
knowledge on formula funding model design and the resulting effect on practice is 
thus needed. This is not at least so as the predominant use of economic or statistical 
approaches has meant that when the implications and effects of formula funding has 
been discussed this has mainly been done at a somewhat detached or loose basis 
through for example the use of secondary data (Aygemang 2010:84). With the im-
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plication that the field in practice has comes to be governed by anecdotal evidence 
and haphazardly attempts to control behavior. 
By bringing together the two otherwise separate discussions of technical design and 
the creation of managerial practice the dissertation seeks to amend this gab in the 
literature. Taking on a more holistic perspective focusing not exclusively on the 
payment method used to allocate funding the overall purpose of this dissertation 
becomes that of answering the question of how do formula funding models in the 
context of Danish public schools affect local managerial practice? In order to an-
swer this question a range of sub-questions, reflecting both theoretical and practical 
matters are developed. Addressing firstly that of formula funding models, their 
design and implementation in practice the following sub-questions are put forth: 
- What components make up a formula funding model?  
- How are formula funding models implemented in practice? 
- How is management control affected by formula funding model design? 
- How do different circumstances and strategies affect management control 
in a school setting?  
- How is strategy and control linked? In particular, does the policy on inclu-
sion affect the formula funding model and the ability to create inclusion? 
In relation to the second aspect concerning behavior and managerial practice this is 
addressed through the analysis of the sub-questions set forth below: 
- Which inherent incentives and behavioral responses are created by the 
control components making up a formula funding model? 
- What are the main control characteristics affecting behavior and manageri-
al practice? 
- How is the local managerial practice influenced by the incentive structures 
created by the formula funding model in place?  
- Does the formula funding model affect the local approach to inclusion and 
the types of services given to pupils with special needs? 
The next sections present in more detail the subject of study and how the disserta-
tion intends to bring together funding model design and managerial practice. 
1.3. STUDYING FORMULA FUNDING MODELS AS A PACKAGE 
OF CONTROLS 
The funding model under study is that used to allocate funds from the municipal 
administration responsible for the school system to the local school districts. In this 
context it is important to note that the furthest devolved budgetary entity is the 
‘school district’ and not the specific ’school department’. A school district may 
consist of a single department and then the ‘district’ is equal to that of the ‘school 
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department’. A district can however also be made up by several departments run 
jointly by one management team. The furthest devolved funding entity which funds 
are directly allocated by the funding model is however in all cases the district. In 
the collected data, which consists of both semi-structured interviews and different 
types of documents but also throughout the dissertation itself, the term school is 
sometimes used interchangeably when referring to the overall district or a particular 
school department. This might create confusions yet the context in which the word 
is used should make it quite clear what is actually meant.  
Figure 1.1 offers an illustrative example of how a school system may be organized, 
emphasizing the prime focus of study. As for the overall flow of funds in the Dan-
ish public sector local taxation, briefly explained, accounts for the vast bulk of 
revenues a municipality receives. Additional funding can also be obtained through 
European or private foundations (E). For example illustrated by the 2013 donation 
of one thousand millions DKR to the Danish school system from the A.P Møller 
Fonden, intended to enhance the skills and education of teachers, pedagogues and 
principals, as well as improving and rethinking the teaching methods used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Figure 1.1  Flow of funds in the public sector, from taxpayers to school districts 
The yearly negotiation between the Government and Local Government Denmark 
sets the financial frame for all municipalities as a whole, and determines the overall 
frame for taxation for the next year. Based on this and combined with other contrac-
tual conditions, block grants and harmonization subsidies are calculated and allo-
cated to the 98 municipalities. From this stage on the individual municipality enjoys 
a high degree of freedom over the setting of priorities, taxes, user’ charges and over 
how funds are to be spent across service areas. According to §82 of the Danish 
Constitution the municipalities have the right, under state supervision, to inde-
pendently manage their affairs (as set by the Law) with the Administration Act 
further declaring that the municipalities hold the final appropriation authority in 
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terms of allowing budget holders to incur revenues and expenses. The municipali-
ties are thus given a high level of freedom over how a particular service area is to 
be organized, the level of funding to be spent here, as well as over the means 
through which funding is to be allocated (subjected of course to the constraints 
imposed by Law concerning the level and nature of the public services provided).  
A range of line-items constitutes the different tasks and field of services for which a 
municipality by law is required to provide funding. In the context of school funding 
this includes funds for operating and running the public school system, subsidy 
grants to private schools and boarding schools for 14-17 year-olds, for pedagogical 
and psychological counseling (in Danish PPR), for after-school care and transporta-
tion of pupils to and from home. As well as funding for municipal special needs 
schools and special needs education supplied in the context of the Regions and 
finally also for further/supplementary training of staff.  
The main municipal task, performed through the funding model under study, is to 
provide a budgetary allocation model which specifies how much funds are to be 
devolved to the service providers, for which purposes (line-items) and to whom 
responsibility is to be assigned. The funding model, in this way, defines the princi-
ples upon which funds are to be allocated and in the process makes visible lines of 
accountability. The model accordingly not only specifies how much funds a local 
service provider is to be responsible for but is also frames the decision-making 
scope within which they can and are to act. In other words, the funding model af-
fects the options, actions, and tasks available for the service providers, making it the 
main mechanism for management control.  
A crucial assumption in this dissertation is that a formula funding model must be 
studied as a package of controls. Following the definition brought forward by 
Grabner & Moers (2013:408) a management control package is understood as the 
complete set of control practices in place in an organization. A broader, more holis-
tic understanding of what constitute control (see e.g. Malmi & Brown 2008) is thus 
adopted compared to more narrowly-focused definitions which tend to focus on 
specific aspects of control system design and use (see e.g. Covaleski et al. 2007 or 
Ferrerira & Otley 2009 for discussions on different notions of control).  
The term package also points to the fact that multiple controls are used by organiza-
tions to steer behavior and that these different management control practices are 
often introduced at different times and by different people with the result that they 
are not necessarily internally coordinated. This understanding is in contrast to a 
management control system, which, according to Grabner & Moers (2013:408), is 
designed with the intention of creating complementarity and a maximization of 
“performance” by (simultaneously) deciding on multiple control variables. The 
control package is thus understood to encompass the complete set of control prac-
tices in place, regardless of whether these are interdependent and/or the design 
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choices take interdependencies into account. A control package is thus not per se 
designed with the intention of creating interdependency and goal congruence 
among control practices. Rather it is understood to be composed of a set of man-
agement control systems and/or a set of independent management control practices 
addressing potentially unrelated control problems (Grabner & Moers 2013). New 
control practices may thus be implemented or other components re-designed with-
out taking into account possible interdependencies. Yet, when studying the resulting 
effect on behavior all practices or control components must be considered together, 
being part of the overall package of control (Grabner & Moers 2013:408).  
This understanding is crucial in relation to formula funding models, in that, these 
models are precisely characterized by being made up by different components 
which due to the nature of the public sector governance system are not necessarily 
interdependent. Depending on the individual municipality specific control compo-
nent may become subjected to recurring changes by different parties of the munici-
pal system. Overall goal congruence in situations of re-designs or changes is thus 
far from given. The specific design choice may consequently bring forward behav-
ioral responses which are potentially in- or out of line with the political set objec-
tives. This makes the definition brought forward by Grabner & Moers (2013) ex-
tremely useful when studying formula funding models.  
As a result the following relationship between political objectives, the formula 
funding model, its incentive structures and the resulting managerial practice is pro-
posed, see Figure 1.2.  
- Figure 1.2   Proposed relationship between political objectives, the formula fund-
ing model, its inherent incentive structure and the resulting managerial practice  
As seen, the political objectives of a service area are proposed to be the guiding 
principles for the process of funding with the formula funding model functioning as 
the all important mechanism for creating behavior which is in-line with these objec-
tives. This places the incentive structures of the formula funding model at the center 
of attention in that the specific design becomes all important for creating behavior 
which is in line with the political objectives, further ensuring that non-desired ac-
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tions are not encouraged. Some incentives can be said to be intended and virtuous, 
serving to ensure the fulfillment of the payer’ objectives, yet others can be more 
unintended or even adverse, potentially thwarting the overall intentions of the fund-
ing. In order to understand the full set of incentives the funding model must be 
evaluated as a whole, or as firstly suggested by Otley (1980:422) the full effect of 
the controls in place can only be understood in their entirety or “as a package which 
can only be evaluated as a whole”. 
Based on this understanding the dissertation firstly analyzes the components mak-
ing up a formula funding model and secondly discusses the incentive structures and 
behavioral responses most commonly associated with a formula funding model. 
Combining these results a framework for the study of formula funding model de-
sign and managerial practice is developed where it is put forward that the joint 
effects of the funding model components will determine respectively the actual 
competitive pressure and level of budgetary risk brought upon the providers, and 
therefore with it the resulting managerial practice created. This overall relationship 
will thus not only guide the structure of the theoretical discussion but also the con-
tent and structure of the two field studies. 
1.4. STUDYING ACCOUNTING AS PRACTICE 
An inherent intention of the dissertation is the study of accounting as practice (see 
e.g. Boland & Pondy 1983; Dent 1986; Oakes et al. 1998; Miller 2001; Ezzamel et 
al. 2012), that is, studying how accounting attempts to “intervene, to act upon indi-
viduals, entities and processes to transform them and to achieve specific ends” 
(Miller 1994:1) or as described by Ahrens & Chapman (2006a:99) studying how 
“people in organizations make specific uses of widely available solutions, how such 
solutions come to be at their disposal, and how their use might change existing 
accountings and give rise to new accounting solutions that others can use”.  
In contrast to other communities of practices accounting crosses boarders of diverse 
professions such as manufacturing, health care, education and social services, and 
in the process come to compete and intrude into the territories occupied by these 
other bodies of expertise (Miller 2001). Accounting is accordingly not a mere tech-
nical, rational service activity, separated from wider social relationships and im-
plemented in order to aid decision makers (politicians or managers) in rational deci-
sion-making (Ezzamel et al. 2008). Rather, accounting practices influence percep-
tions, change languages and infuse dialogues, or as described by Hopwood (1983) 
shape the way in which concerns, dilemmas and new options and actions are ex-
pressed and prioritized (see also Miller & O’Leary 1994; Ahrens 2009; Jonsson 
2009). Accounting practices are hence as much implicated in decision-making as in 
the processes of organizational learning, bargaining and rationalization (Burchell et 
al. 1980, see also Dent 1986).  
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In the words of Miller (2001:394), accounting practices are: “called upon not just to 
calculate costs or evaluate investment opportunities, but also to increase efficiency, 
to promote economic growth, to encourage responsibility, and to improve decision 
making and enhance competitiveness” (Miller 2001:394). Accounting thus provides 
symbolic meanings to calculations and in the process comes to affect the conduct of 
individuals so that they act freely; yet in accordance with specified economic norms 
(Miller 2001:380). This makes accounting simultaneously social and technical, or 
as described by Chapman et al. (2009:2): “the roles of accounting co-emerge with 
the social relations that it helps make possible” (see also Baxter & Chua 2009).  
The study of accounting as practice therefore entails much more than studying the 
blueprints of accounting, i.e. the accounting manuals, budget rules and expenditure 
authorizations. Rather, the study of accounting as practice entails studying how 
accounting practices become practical resources that actors can manipulate in order 
to signal intentions, motivations and achievements (Ahrens & Chapman 2007:24). 
Accordingly this type of study first truly unfolds its potential when the focus is 
directed upon the actions and the ways in which organizational members draw upon 
accounting as a shared resource (see Ahrens & Chapman 2007; Barnes 2001). 
Opening up for a study of how various actors draw upon the rules, processes, ideals, 
and targets of management control practices within a more complex field of organ-
izing practices (Ahrens & Chapman 2006a:108). 
Accounting practices are in this dissertation studied in the context of Danish public 
schools through the presentation of two qualitative field studies focusing on the 
associated effects of formula funding models. The dissertation is however not mere-
ly interested in analyzing the theoretical effect of incentives brought upon local 
providers but also in the actual practice created. In order to capture the first part the 
dissertation put forward a framework for the study of formula funding model design 
and managerial practice focusing on the effects of the associated financial incen-
tives on the managerial practice. Two control characteristics, respectively the level 
of budgetary risk and the level competitive pressure brought upon providers 
through the model are here proposed as the two central levers affecting behavior. 
Arising respectively from an internally and an externally inflicted source of uncer-
tainty/risk these two control characteristics are claimed to be the main factors influ-
encing local managerial practice, understood as the options, actions and tasks avail-
able to the local school management when performing their job. 
The introduced framework is then applied in the two field studies resulting in an 
analysis of the control components making up the specific formula models together 
with a discussion of the associated incentive structures and theoretical implication 
on the managerial practice. Yet, by developing also accounts of how school man-
agement is actually practiced the dissertation brings about opportunities to discuss 
how education concerns are weighted against the incentive structures of the funding 
model. Bringing to light situations where financial incentives may be overruled by 
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more subjective and ‘quality oriented’ concerns stemming from e.g. the profession-
al identity of being a school manager. The study thus adheres to the understanding 
that accounting practices must be studied ‘in action’ (see Chua 1986); adhering also 
to the understanding brought forward by for example Anderson & Widener 
(2007:319), that albeit the design of management accounting at the outset is guided 
by economic principles the social context and the flexibility of management ac-
counting suggests that other social sciences (e.g. sociology, psychology, political 
science) may offer equally compelling explanations for observed practice.  
1.5. CONTRIBUTIONS 
The dissertation intends to bring about both theoretical and practice-relevant contri-
butions. This duality is important as management accounting as noted by Kasanen 
et al. (1993:262): “in the end, [is] a practical field where theory without pragmatic 
implications is empty” (emphasis in the original). Although the literature on a re-
curring basis, starting with Scapens (1984) (see also Scapens 1994, 2008) and since 
then in numerous calls (Ittner & Larcker 2002; Hansen et al. 2003; Scapens 2006; 
Hoopwood 2008; van Helden & Northcott 2010; Malmi & Granlund 2009; 
Baldvinsdottir et al. 2010), has stressed the importance of placing greater attention 
on the practical relevance of accounting studies, this aspect has often been over-
looked.  When studying accounting in a public sector context the relevance to prac-
tice, van Helden & Norhtcott (2010:214) note, is however of special important, in 
that, the “academic findings have the potential to inform both managers and policy-
makers” (see e.g. Hitt 2005; Rynes & Sharpiro 2005; Sharpiro & Rynes 2005; 
Coleman 2007). Understanding the deeper relationship between formula funding 
design and behavior in a public school context is indeed relevant and a range of 
contributions to this is area is proposed in this dissertation.  
Theoretically the dissertation seeks to contribute to the growing body of research on 
management control in a public sector context (e.g. Kloot 1997; Kober et al. 2007; 
Batac & Carassus 2009; Broadbent et al. 2010, Aygemang 2010) in particular to the 
understanding of the relationship between management control and behavior (Ed-
wards et al. 2005; Neu 2006; Bracci 2009; Ezzamel et al. 2007, 2012). This is done 
through the suggested framework which brings together the otherwise somewhat 
separate discussions of formula funding model design and behavior. Contributing 
therefore with a deeper technical understanding of the components making up a 
formula funding model but also of the resulting effect on managerial practice. Such 
a framework is to the best of my knowledge not to be found anywhere else in the 
literature, making it thus an important theoretical contribution.  
By viewing the formula funding model through the lens of a package of control the 
dissertation further contributes to the growing body of research studying manage-
ment control packages (see e.g. Otley 1980; Simons 1995; Otley 1999; Chenhall 
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2003; Malmi & Brown 2008; Ferreira & Otley 2009). Using the definition of a 
package of control brought forward by Grabner & Moers (2013:408), which entails 
that the control package “represents the complete set of control practices in place, 
regardless of whether the MC [management control] practices are interdependent 
and/or the design choices take interdependencies into account”, the dissertation 
ensure that the different control components and practices making up a formula 
funding model are studied in their entirety within the broader organizational context 
in which they invariably operate (Hopwood 1983). This more holistic approach to 
management control is important, Malmi & Brown (2008) note, in that it will facili-
tate better theories and more reliable conclusions on individual control practices 
and ultimately about the design of management control packages.  
The dissertation further adheres to the call made by Broadbent & Guthrie (2008: 
151) for the need of studying the behavioral effects of risk in the context of public 
sector governance, a subject which is important due to the impact that regulation 
has on practice in the public sector. The effects and significance of risk has mainly 
been studied in the context of the private sector, through the application of econom-
ic theories relating to the relationship between principals and agents (see e.g. 
Baiman 1982, 1990; Eisenhardt 1985; Gibbons 1997; Prendergast 1999; Bonner & 
Sprinkle 2002). Furthermore, the theoretical effect of uncertainty has been studied 
as a contingency factor, understood to affect the design and use of control systems 
(see e.g. Galbraith 1973; Williamson 1975; Ouchi 1979; Chenhall 2003). Yet the 
study of Calglio & Ditillo (2008) showed that uncertainty in effect is rarely includ-
ed in contingency models or when it is, it is mainly considered subordinate to other 
variables such as ‘interdependence’ and ‘asset specificity’ (see e.g. Dekker 2004). 
A newer study into the effect of risk in a public school context is however Kominis 
& Dudau (2012), who through the application of Simons ‘Levers of Control 
Framework’ (1995), studied how a specific policy change (‘Every Child Matters’) 
led to a shift in the use of management control. Highlighting how the shift in use of 
control systems by the English government increased the risk and uncertainty im-
posed onto a local authority affecting the inter-organizational control in a way so 
that it facilitated a more interactive use of management control. This dissertation 
analyses the effect of risk in a more tangible manner in order to identify the control 
characteristics that can capture the behavioral effects of the full package of controls. 
Arising respectively from an internally and an externally inflicted source of uncer-
tainty/risk two control characteristics are proposed to be the main levers influencing 
local managerial practice, namely the level of budgetary risk and the level competi-
tive pressure brought upon providers through the model.  
This widened theoretical understanding of component design and managerial prac-
tice is in indeed relevant from a practice perspective, in that, it elucidates the effects 
of specific design choices to public sector decision-makers, illustrating for example 
the actual effects of different design choices. The dissertation contributes with a 
hopefully practical relevant tool for evaluation, by firstly identifying the compo-
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nents making up a formula funding model and then analyzing the joint effects of 
these model components on the resulting managerial practice by means of the pro-
posed framework. This approach is intended as a tangible tool for analyzing and 
understanding current practice, in that, it can help to improve local decision-making 
and increase the awareness of the consequences of specific design choices. If for 
example another mix of control is wanted the framework can be used to evaluate 
how a redesign of specific components or the introduction of new ones will influ-
ence the actual configuration of the funding model and with it the resulting effect 
on managerial practice. All in all, the framework thus can be seen as an important 
tool for understanding current practice but also the associated effects of re-designs.  
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
Table 1.1 summarizes the structure of the dissertation which as seen is divided into 
five parts; each addressing different aspects of the overall research objective.  
Part  I Chapter 2 – 4 The context in which Danish education funding operates 
Part  II   Chapter 5 – 8 Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Part  III Chapter 9 – 11 Municipality A 
Part  IV Chapter 12 – 14 Municipality B 
Part  V Chapter 15 Conclusions & Perspectives 
-  Table 1.1   Structure of the dissertation 
Building on the notion that the context is important for understanding management 
control practices (firstly suggested by Hopwood 1983) Part I presents different 
aspects which are vital for understanding the context in which Danish education 
funding operates. Divided into three chapters, Chapter 2 analyzes the main legisla-
tive developments from 1970 up until today. The core focus is on the continuous 
tension between centralization and decentralization which has characterized and 
affected the governance structures of the Danish education system. The chapter 
places this schism in a broader public governance perspective, discussing the effect 
of the legislative changes on local practice and decision-making. Chapter 3 con-
tributes to a deeper understanding of the context of education funding by focusing 
on special needs education. The chapter analyzes how the understanding and use of 
special needs education have evolved discussing also the effect of the division of 
budgetary responsibilities. Finally, Chapter 4 reviews literature on formula funding 
presenting the general rationales behind, together with the advantages and disad-
vantages associated with distributing funds in accordance to a predetermined for-
mula expressed in mathematical terms. The chapter focuses on the general aims 
associated with funding, namely efficiency, equity and managerial accountability, 
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while the more specific educational goals of the Danish school system are to be 
discussed later in connection with the two field studies. 
Part II contains the dissertation’s theoretical and methodological part. The first 
three chapters are theoretical in nature, with each chapter addressing different as-
pects of the proposed relationship between political objectives, the formula funding 
model, its inherent incentive structures and the resulting managerial practice. Fo-
cusing on the technical aspects of formula funding models, Chapter 5, identifies 
the main control components of such models and discusses formula funding models 
from the perspective of understanding them as a ‘package of controls’. Chapter 6 
discusses the incentive structures and behavioral responses most commonly associ-
ated with formula funding models. The point of departure is here the identified 
rationales for implementing formula funding, i.e. efficiency, equity, accountability. 
Questions of quality and productivity are also included. The chapter thus studies 
how intentions can be reinforced or thwarted by specific design choices. In Chap-
ter 7 the results of the two previous chapters are combined into a framework for the 
study of local managerial practice. Finally Chapter 8 presents the methodology 
adopted for the study of formula funding models in practice. Discussing the choice 
of qualitative field studies, the chapter also presents the overall research design, the 
two municipal settings as well as the type of data collected.  
Part III and IV contain the two field studies. Taking on the same form the first 
chapter in each part (respectively Chapter 9 and 12) analyzes the technical compo-
nents making up the relevant formula funding model. This includes a description of 
the political objectives of the school system and a thorough analysis of the funding 
model’s control components. The analysis is guided by the theoretical frame put 
forward in Chapter 5 on the components making up the overall package of controls 
although the content is also influenced by the findings thereby bringing life to the 
intentions behind the funding model. Building on this, Chapter 10 and 13, analyze 
the funding model in the light of the developed framework in Chapter 7. The level 
of competitive pressure and budgetary risk imposed onto the districts by the funding 
model is studied and the funding model is placed at its relevant position in the rec-
tangle of Figure 7.4. Hereafter the inherent incentive structures of the model are 
studied, thereby enabling a discussion of the theoretical practice created by the 
model. Finally in Chapter 11 and 14 accounts of how school management is actu-
ally practiced in the two municipalities are presented. Focusing on the guiding prin-
ciples affecting the local management in their daily practices these accounts intend 
to elucidate how education concerns are weighted against the models’ inherent 
incentive structures. In the concluding part of each of the two chapters the manage-
rial practice is compared against the fulfillment of the organizational objectives, in 
this way, highlighting whether or not the practice is in line with these objectives.  
Part V finally makes up the concluding part of the dissertation. The purpose of this 
part is to gather and discuss the overall findings with the purpose of answering the 
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overall research question. Chapter 15 compares and discusses the findings of the 
two field studies and in doing so the chapter addresses the proposed influence of the 
funding models on the local practice from different angles. This is done by firstly 
discussing the findings in the light of the developed framework. The core focus is 
here directed upon analyzing whether the financial incentives brought upon the two 
school systems affect the practice of school management differently in a way which 
is consistent with the different positions of the models in the given framework. 
Hereafter the chapter discusses how the choice of management control strategy 
affects the local focus and practice in the two school systems. This is followed by 
an analysis of how the impact of the formula funding model design is not at least 
visible when it comes to the more adverse behavioral aspects. The chapter con-
cludes with a discussion of how the devolvement of decision-making capabilities in 
both settings has especially been influential in affecting the managerial practice but 
also of how this practice comes to be influenced by political decision-making.  
Chapter 16 finally presents the conclusions and important findings which can be 
derived from this dissertation. This is done under the headings: 
 Does design really matter?  
 Balancing budgetary risk and the competitive pressure 
 Special needs education and inclusion – what to do? 
 Redesigns – if, how and when?  
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Part I The context in which Danish school funding 
operates 
 
Part I consists of three chapters and is built on the notion, that understanding the 
context in which a management control system operates is of vital importance when 
analyzing its’ effects (Hopwood 1983). The purpose of Part I is to present and dis-
cuss relevant aspects associated with Danish school funding operates. 
In Chapter 2 the main legislative developments in an education context from 1970 
up until today are analyzed. The core focus is on the continuous tension between 
centralization and decentralization which has characterized and affected the govern-
ance structures of the Danish education system. The chapter seeks to place this 
schism in a broader public governance perspective and discusses the effect of the 
legislative changes on local practice and managerial decision-making scope.  
Chapter 3 contributes to a deeper understanding of the context in which education 
funding operates by focusing on special needs education and its connection to man-
agerial practice. The chapter analyzes how the notion and use of special needs edu-
cation have evolved over time and discusses the effect of the division of budgetary 
responsibility in terms of use and level of expenditures used for these services. 
Chapter 4 reviews literature on formula funding models. In doing so, the chapter 
presents the general rationales behind, together with the advantages and disad-
vantages associated with distributing funds in accordance with a predetermined 
mathematical formula. The discussion focuses on the general aims associated with 
funding models, namely efficiency, equity and managerial accountability, while the 
more specific educational goals of the Danish school system are to be discussed 
later in connection with the two field studies. 
All in all, Part I thus seek to equip the reader with relevant knowledge on the Dan-
ish school system in general, the legislative developments in particular and not at 
least the important connection between special needs education and budgetary re-
sponsibilities as well as present the allocation method applied in the context of 
school funding, namely that of formula funding. 
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CHAPTER 2.     THE DANISH ‘FOLKESKOLE’ – GOV-
ERNANCE AND LEGISLATION 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The public school – in Danish called the ‘Folkeskole’ – has an important role in the 
Danish society, with the vast majority of pupils enrolled here (82% for the school 
year 2012/13, Statistics Denmark). The importance of the public school system as a 
medium for educating future generations has placed it at the center of political at-
tention and the activities and foundations upon which the school system is built 
have accordingly been in focus of much debate. According to the Danish constitu-
tion (chapter VIII, §76), all children in the age category to which mandatory school-
ing apply (6/7-16 years) are entitled to free education in school run and financed by 
the public (Education Act § 3). Since school attendance is not compulsory parents 
can choose freely between other types of teaching methods e.g. homeschooling, 
boarding schools and private or independent schooling, as long as accepted stand-
ards are met. Education, however, is compulsory, leaving the public school system 
to consist of a one-year pre-school class, nine grades and an optional 10
th
 grade.  
Over the years the core objectives of the public school system as prescribed by the 
preamble of the Education Act have remained more or less stable; namely a twofold 
aim of 1) forming the individual pupil as a loyal, self- and community respecting 
individual, and 2) providing the pupils with the needed academic skills. More pre-
cisely the preamble states that: 
“The public school is, in corporation with the parents, to provide the 
students with the knowledge and skills that will prepare them for further 
education and training and instill in them the desire to learn more; famil-
iarize them with the Danish culture and history; give them an under-
standing of other countries and cultures; contribute to their understand-
ing of other; the interrelationship between human beings and the envi-
ronment; and promote the well-rounded development of the individual 
pupil” (§ 1 The Education Act).  
Albeit, successive governments have emphasized differently the two aims, this 
duality can be traced back to the school reform of 1934. Since the change of gov-
ernment in 2001 a number of initiatives stressing the academic purpose of the pub-
lic school have been implemented. Together with a growing political demand for 
increased professionalism in school management these changes can be seen as a 
renewed emphasis placed on the part of the preamble emphasizing academic-skills 
(Ratner 2009). Today, the Education Act § 2, specifies that it is the Danish munici-
palities who are responsible for the organization and funding of the public school, 
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within a framework set up by laws, ordinances, rules and guidelines laid down by 
Ministry of Education. The distribution of responsibilities and tasks between the 
central government, municipalities, and schools has however changed considerably 
over time. In this way legislative changes have affected not only the governance but 
also the objectives and the organization of the school system.  Evolving in a tension 
between decentralization and centralization these changes have affected the distri-
bution of educational and financial responsibilities.  
Understanding this legislative development, as suggested by Edwards et al. (1999), 
is the purpose of this chapter. This entails providing an analysis of the main legisla-
tion from 1970 until today; changes which have affected the division of tasks and 
responsibilities, and ultimately the organization and funding of the public school 
system. In doing so, the analysis will present the current governance structures of 
the public school system and discuss the broader changes in the context of a wider 
reform process; a process with the general aim to ‘modernize’ the governance of the 
public sectors, with the intentions of creating “re-regulated-self governance”. The 
changes relating to special needs education are only discussed on a general level 
thus leaving a more thorough discussion to Chapter 3.  
2.2. LEGISLATION & (DE)CENTRALIZATION 1970 – MID 1980’S 
The main legislative changes from 1970 - mid 1980’s are summarized in Table 2.1. 
The table depicts the main legislative changes and their effect on the responsibilities 
and level of decision-making authority given to the relevant governing body.  
With the municipal reform of 1970 the municipalities are made financially respon-
sible for the schools; a change which according to Pors (2011) marks the first wave 
of decentralization affecting the Danish governing structures. The devolvement of 
financial responsibility was accompanied by a change in state funding from mere 
reimbursement to the introduction of block grants. When the transition was com-
pleted in 1975 the full financial responsibility was transferred from the state to the 
municipalities (LGDK 1972:186)
1
. This meant that decision-making competences 
and financial responsibility were linked at the municipal level, thereby making the 
municipal funding independent of the activities undertaken. The municipalities as 
argued by Andersen et al. (2010) could as a result decide on the size and distribu-
tion of funds independently of any funding concerns which prior to the change 
could distort the decision making process. The change from reimbursements to 
block grants was seen as a mean to incentivize the municipalities to become more 
financial responsible in their use of funds. 
                                                          
 
1 From 1970-1975 the state covered 60% of the teachers’ salaries 
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                   Decentralization                                                                                   Centralization 
Year 
School 
commission 
Municipal 
board 
County Ministry of Education 
1970 Responsible 
for pedagogi-
cal supervi-
sion of the 
school system 
in coopera-
tion with 
school coun-
cils 
Develop the 
proposals for 
school- and 
curriculum 
plans 
Made financial-
ly responsible 
for the schools 
The funding 
model of the 
municipalities 
was to be chan-
ged from reim-
bursements to 
block grants  
Responsible for 
amending scho-
ol and curricu-
lum plans 
Role reduced; 
albeit still holding 
the overall inspec-
tion rights in ter-
ms of ensuring that 
the municipalities 
are respecting the 
law 
Responsible for 
special needs 
education 
Approves school- 
and curriculum 
plans, thereby ma-
king them entitled 
to information on 
school planning  
Municipal reform  
The School Governing Act 
replaces the former School Su-
pervision Act (Act no. 44). 
Legislation on the content of the 
public school is now only speci-
fied in the Education Act. 
Final approval of school- and 
curriculum plans are made here 
1972    9 years of education is made 
compulsory (Act no. 212) 
1973    The duration of a lesson is re-
duced from 50 to 45 minutes 
1974 
  The final approval 
of school- and 
curriculum plans is 
now to be made 
here and not in the 
ministry(Act.no.121) 
 
1975  
 
 
 
 
 
The change 
from reimbur-
sements to 
block grants is 
final 
The individual 
municipality is 
given a degree 
of freedom in 
establishing 
electives 
(Act.no.312) 
 New Education Act: 
Introduction of an optional pre-
school-class and a 10th grade 
Creation of a comprehensive, uni-
fied school, although divisions 
must occur in 8th-10th in all exa-
mination subjects except Danish 
Introduction of a final school exa-
minations after both 9th and 10th 
grade (Act no. 312) 
1977 Regulation on 
the composi-
tion of school 
commissions 
and councils 
is amended 
(Act no. 656) 
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1979  Instructed to 
establish pre-
school classes 
(Act no.257) 
  
- Table 2.1   Public school legislation and (de)centralization, 1970 – mid 1980s 
With the reform, the municipalities also became responsible for the amendments of 
school- and curriculum plans. The content of these plans was described in the Edu-
cation Act which also contained regulation on the content and scope of each sub-
ject, while the local development of the plans was conducted by the local school 
commissions; a locally elected governing body responsible for the pedagogical 
supervisions of schools
2
. The plans were subsequently send to the county and the 
Ministry of Education for final approval (the latter practice abolished in 1974) 
(UVM, sector analysis 2007:6). A counterpoint to these decentralization efforts was 
however the replacement of the former School Supervision Act in 1970with a new 
School Governing Act. This new act namely comprised detailed descriptions of 
how governance of the schools was to be conducted (UVM sector analysis 2007:5) 
2.3. LEGISLATION & (DE)CENTRALIZATION MID 1980’S – 1992 
From the mid 1980’s the main actors of the education system changed. The period 
marked a change in governance from detailed regulation to management by objec-
tives. As illustrated in Table 2.2 the period was characterized by greater devolve-
ment of budgetary responsibilities to the municipalities. In 1989 the School Govern-
ing Act was abolished with all legal provisions regarding the governance of schools 
transferred to the Education Act (UVM, sector analysis 2007:6). The municipalities 
were given greater freedom to adjust budgets and to organize their school system in 
accordance with local needs. The principal role of the municipalities was empha-
sized in 1992/1993 where the full decision-making authority for hiring and firing 
school employees was transferred to the municipalities. This meant that prior state 
legislation on norms and dismissals was abolished and the negotiation right trans-
ferred from the Ministry of Finance to Local Government Denmark. The teachers in 
other words became municipal employees.  
The decision-making scope at the school level was however also enhanced, as a 
range of tasks was devolved from the municipalities to the schools. The authority of 
the principal of school was strengthened, giving these the freedom to decide upon 
specific organizational matters (Ministry of Finance et al. 1995:91). Yet, the specif-
ic level of devolution of budgetary- and pedagogical responsibilities varied greatly 
                                                          
 
2 In 1970 a commission was comprised by six members chosen by the municipal board (three 
from the board itself) and five from the parental elected school councils 
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(Ministry of Finance et al. 1995:71; Pors 2011:109) and only a few schools were 
allowed to make carry-overs or to plan freely teaching hours across school years, 
subjects or groups (Buse & Smith 1999:274).  
                   Decentralization                                                                                   Centralization 
Year School man-
agement 
School board Municipal 
board 
County Ministry of 
Education 
1988   Legislation on 
school closures & 
class size is 
modified (Act no. 
826) 
  
1989 
 
School commisi-
ons and councils 
are abolished, re-
placed by school 
boards (§42) with 
competences de-
legated from the 
municipal board  
Administrative 
rulings on com-
plaints is placed 
at the municipal 
level (Act no. 348) 
 The School 
Governing Act is 
abolished & the 
remaining statu-
tory provisions 
are transferred to 
the Education Act 
(Folkeskoleloven)  
1990 Following the 
abolishment of 
school commis-
sions their 
competences 
are devolved to 
the schools 
A larger pro-
portion of funds 
are devolved to 
schools as a 
mean to enhan-
ce local deci-
sion-making 
 Decision-making 
scope enhanced 
Schools must 
now answer 
directly to the 
municipal board 
The school direc-
tor becomes a 
municipal direc-
tor 
Role fur-
ther redu-
ced in that 
their ap-
proval of 
school and 
curriculum 
plans is no 
longer a re-
quirement. 
Main focus; 
special 
needs 
education  
Introduction of 
provisions on 
open enrollments 
(Act no. 435) 
1992   
Full decision-
making compe-
tences for hiring 
and firing is 
transferred to the 
municipalities, 
thus abolishing 
prior legislation 
set by the minis-
try on norms and 
dismissals (Act no. 
281) 
  
- Table 2.2   Public school legislation and (de)centralization, mid 1980s – 1992 
The increased devolvement of budgetary- and pedagogical responsibilities reduced 
the role of the counties and school commissions. For the counties this entailed that 
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special needs education became their only responsibility. The coordinating function 
performed by school commissions was also made superfluous, and in 1989 they 
were replaced with local school boards with parental majority. The decision-making 
scope of the school boards was enhanced, giving them the ability to decide upon 
matters of principle for their own school. Implementation however remained the 
responsibility of the school management. The introduction of schools boards can, as 
noted by Pors (2011:111), be seen as an attempt to engage parents with the inten-
tion of creating service renewal and ensuring that these would not deselect the pub-
lic school in favor of private solutions. In 1990 parental choice was further en-
hanced in that parents were allowed to choose alternative public schools in the 
municipality, if the particular school had extra capacity beyond the obligations to 
the pupils of its own district (Sørensen 1999:130). 
2.4. LEGISLATION & (DE)CENTRALIZATION 1993 – 2000 
Throughout the 1990’s the tension between centralization and decentralization 
continued, see Table 3. Following a change in government in 1993 a new Education 
Act was passed. The Act introduced the concept of a ‘comprehensive and unified 
school system’. This meant that the prior requirement for dividing older pupils into 
groups based on skills was abolished. Differentiation of teaching thereby became 
the new objective, replacing the prior idea of differentiation of pupils, and with it 
new interdisciplinary methods were introduced. Throughout the 1990’s the Educa-
tion Act was however amended 14 times. The changes primarily dealt with the 
integration and education of bilingual pupils, placing the responsibility for this at 
the municipal level (UVM, sector analysis 2007:6-7). 
The new Act of 1993 enhanced the central control of the content and organization 
of the education. The Act enhanced the existing goal provisions for the education, 
introducing provisions for vital knowledge- and skills areas in each subject. The 
introduction of recommended curriculum-plans and study guidelines further con-
tributed to a formalization of the content of the teaching given. The new Education 
Act however simultaneously emphasized that the individual schools held the full 
responsibility for pedagogical developments and for the organization and quality of 
the education provided (Ministry of Finance et al. 1995:73, 91). In this way, despite 
the enhanced central control in term of content the role of the municipalities was 
continuously emphasized, as underpinned in the ‘budget analysis’ published by the 
Ministry of Finance in 1995, which stated; 
“The central actor of the public school system is the municipal board, 
who within the frame of the Education Act, determines the level of ser-
vice…determines the specific level of devolvement of decision-making 
capabilities to school boards and local management, and decides upon 
the model of resource allocation” (Ministry of Finance et al. 1995:73) 
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The local municipal governance was to a great extent characterized by explicit goal 
setting, where the aim was to strengthen the connection between municipal policy 
decisions and the activities undertaken in the schools. The municipal decision-
making scope was further widened following the transfer of tasks previously held 
by the counties. Including for example the referral right for special needs education 
(UVM, sector analysis 2007:7). 
In the latter part of the 1990’s growing concerns about the educational skills of the 
pupils however began to arise. This resulted in a national call for a stronger culture 
of education, and an increased demand for transparency in terms of service content, 
structures of governance and of the values guiding the delivery of public service. 
Evaluation was, as described by Pors (2011), increasingly seen as a vital lever for 
making quality visible. 
                   Decentralization                                                                                   Centralization 
Year School man-
agement 
School 
board 
Municipal 
board 
County Ministry of Edu-
cation 
1993 The requirement 
to divide pupils 
in examination 
subjects in 8th-
10th is abolished 
   New Education Act 
The existing goal pro-
visions are enhanced, 
with binding objecti-
ves for central know-
ledge and skills areas 
for specific subjects 
and compulsory topics 
(the so called end-
goals) (Act no. 509) 
The number of teach-
ing lessons in the pre-
school is raised 
1996 
  In order to im-
prove bilingual 
pupil’s reading 
skills municipali-
ties are given the 
legal capacity to 
establish support 
services (Act no. 
413). Obliged to 
offer Danish as a 
second language 
for all pupils 
(pre-school-10th )  
 
 
1997 
 
Pupils and 
teachers 
are given 
voting-
rights and 
principals 
Given right to 
establish 10th 
grade schools 
(Act no. 472) 
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are allow-
ed to par-
ticipate in 
meetings 
1998   Municipalities 
must offer bilin-
gual children, not 
yet attending 
school, support 
as to enhance 
their linguistic 
skills (Act no. 486) 
  
1999     Danish, English and 
Math is made com-
pulsory in the 10th 
grade (Act no. 406) 
2000 
 
 The referral right 
for comprehen-
sive special 
needs education 
is placed with the 
child’s primary 
municipality (Act 
no. 458) 
The rate paid 
by municipal-
ities for speci-
al needs ser-
vices is raised 
in order to 
create appro-
priate, clear 
divisions of 
tasks. A 
complaint 
board for 
comprehen-
sive special 
education is 
established 
Following the estab-
lishment of ’Center 
for Videregående 
Uddannelse (Center 
for Further education) 
the rules on teacher 
qualifications are 
changed (Act no. 482) 
- Table 2.3   Public school legislation and (de)centralization, 1993 – mid 2000 
2.5. LEGISLATION & (DE)CENTRALIZATION 2001 – 2011 
The 2000s was characterized by pursuits of accountability, efficiency and transpar-
ency, as illustrated by the structural reform of 2007. This reform reduced the num-
ber of municipalities from 271 to 98 and the 12 counties were replaced with 5 re-
gions. According to Pedersen (2008:27) the reform revolved around 3 main aspects; 
namely 1) the creation of larger, more viable and financial solid units which could 
open up for efficiency gains, 2) an increased emphasis on evaluation, monitoring 
and performance measurement and 3) a focus on transparency, competition and 
open enrollment and choice. In the context of public schools the use of detailed 
process control especially came to illustrate this larger motion toward accountabil-
ity, efficiency and transparency. 
The 2001 change in government in combination with the publication of mediocre 
PISA test’ results in 2001 and 2004 (conducted in 2000 & 2003) fueled discussions 
on the public school and the educational standards of its pupils. The leadership and 
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inspection ability of the municipalities were brought into question and Local Gov-
ernment Denmark strongly encouraged the municipal boards to take a renewed 
interest in their school affairs; arguing for the necessity of assessing the governing 
practices in use (Pors 2011:130). Nationally, the call for quality and assessments 
brought with it the introduction of detailed process control and from 2001-2011 the 
Education Act was amended 28 times. Simultaneously, these amendments empha-
sized the role of the municipalities and increased central government control. 
In 2006 quality reports, in which municipalities were required to state clear policy 
objectives for their school system and subsequent monitor its performance, were 
introduced. In 2009 the statute for the Danish municipalities was amended, instruct-
ing each municipality to develop quality contracts, through which the municipality 
was also to monitor and frame the developments of the quality of service given. The 
quality contracts contained quantifiable goals for each municipal service area and 
recommendations on how to fulfill these. The contracts thus framed the scope in 
which service suppliers (here the local school management) were to work, with 
their subsequent performance monitored and reported to the municipal board (Act. 
No.136 24
th
 Feb. 2009)
3
. The quality reports and contracts underlined the crucial 
role of the municipalities. By requiring these to develop education policies, the 
political responsibility and role of the municipalities was emphasized (Hess et al. 
2009).The structural reform further enhanced the municipal decision-making scope, 
in that, the full responsibility for the organizing and funding of the special needs 
education was transferred from the now dissolved counties to the municipalities. 
Detailed process control was however also introduced at the school level. In 2006 
Student Plans, describing the ability and developments of each pupil, at all grade 
levels, were made mandatory. The content of these plans was developed by the 
ministry and so was the new so-called ‘Common Objectives’. This was/are a set of 
national binding objectives for the education system4, which was introduced with 
the intention of securing comparable, formalized teaching, so to ensure that all 
pupils acquire the needed knowledge and skills when reaching respectively the end 
of a specific form level and when concluding their overall program (Ministry of 
Education 2008). Together with the introduction of national testing, student plans 
                                                          
 
3 The requirement to develop quality contracts were abolished in 2012, as a mean to ‘give 
way for increased focus on results rather than process requirements, with the intention of 
creating room for greater professional responsibility and innovation’. The amendment stated 
that this ‘was to be seen as a part of broader strive for less state control, where regulation and 
control is replaced by trust and a focus on results’ (consolidated act no.885.29th august 2012).  
4 The ’Common objectives are more precisely regulation and objectives for the central 
knowledge- and skills areas for subjects and compulsory topics (end objectives) and for 
specific form level for explicit subjects and topics (form levels objectives). 
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were understood as vital tools for evaluating the learning outcomes of the pupil. 
They were however also seen as important tools which would enable both schools 
and municipalities to take actions when needed, and facilitate better planning, tak-
ing into account the ability of the individual pupil. 
During these years large agreements on other policy areas also affected the public 
school. These agreements further introduced new tools for control- and perfor-
mance measurement. In 2004 the so-called ‘Reform for Placements’ required all 
municipalities to develop a “coherent children’s policy” to describe how the general 
education system will co-operate with the special needs services. By requiring a 
municipality to integrate its’ services and outline the frame and standards in which 
professional individuals were to conduct their work, the aim was to ensure that all 
children would be given equal opportunities (Anbringelsesreform 2004). The “Wel-
fare Agreement” of 2006 further introduced vital performance measures for the 
school system. Here the most influential goal has shown itself to be that of ensuring 
that 95 % of a youth generation by 2015 must have accomplished further education 
(Velfærdsaftalen 2006).  
                   Decentralization                                                                                   Centralization 
Year School man-
agement/school 
board 
Municipal 
board 
County Ministry of Education 
2002  The obligation for 
mother-tongue 
education is made 
optional 
  
2003 The possibility of 
the schools to 
divide pupils 
across classes, to 
use multiple 
teacher arrange-
ments and for es-
tablishing coordi-
nated inschooling 
is enhanced 
  New Education Act 
Common national objectives for 
education is introduced together with 
binding goals for specific classes and 
age groups (form objectives) and 
specification of minimum lessons for 
specific subject areas, and for the 1th-
3th grade in Danish and Math.  
Specification of content for pre-
schools and improved in-schooling.  
English is made compulsory from the 
6th grade and Biology is made an 
examination subject 
2004  To improve lingu-
istic stimulation of 
bilingual pupils, 
referral to other 
schools than the 
home-district is 
 Geography is made an examination 
subject (Act no. 870) 
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made possible. 
(Act no. 360) 
2005    An ‘open enrolment’ clause allowing 
parents to enroll their child at any 
school of their choice (also outside 
the home-municipality) is introduced. 
Number of lessons in Danish and 
History is raised (Act no. 393) 
2006  Via quality reports 
municipalities are 
made responsible 
for the quality of 
the school system 
 Quality reports are made mandatory 
Compulsory national testing with 
content prescribed by the ministry is 
introduced, and to be used in quality 
reports and student plans (Act no. 313) 
2007 
 
With the Counties 
being closed the 
municipalities are 
assigned full res-
ponsibility for or-
ganizing and fun-
ding special needs 
education  
With the 
structural 
reform 
the coun-
ties are 
closed 
down 
Introduction of early education gui-
dance and bridge building between 
public schools and further education 
(Act no. 208) 
Specification of the content and orga-
nization of the 10th grade (Act no. 1195 
2008  Can decide on 
age-integrated in-
schooling (pre-
school-2th) and 
‘rolling school 
start’  
 10 years of education is made com-
pulsory. 
Specification of objectives and 
content descriptions for after-school 
care (Act No. 208) 
2009 
 The responsibili-
ties of these are 
further empha-
sized (Act.No. 353) 
  
- Table 2.4   Public school legislation and (de)centralization, 2001 – 2011 
2.6. PRESENT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND SCHOOL 
REFORM OF 2013 
As shown, legislation has affected the distribution of responsibilities and the levels 
of influence among the ministry, the municipalities and the schools. Today the 
system is organized so that the Ministry of Education
5
 provides the overall objec-
tives and directions on the content and management of the school system. As clari-
fied by §82 of the Danish Constitution the municipalities however has the right 
                                                          
 
5 From 2011-13 the ministry was named Ministry of Children & Education, hereafter it was 
once again re-named Ministry of Education  
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under state supervision to independently manage their affairs (as set by the Law). 
The municipalities are consequently responsible for the specific organization and 
funding of their school system and can decide upon the frame, objectives and the 
way in which funds are to be allocated to the school districts (as long as their ac-
tions do not contradict with the interests of the individual or the essential societal 
interests). The political responsibility is thus placed at the municipal level. This 
means that the specific structure and objectives of the local public school can differ 
across municipalities – also in terms of how many resources are to be spent on this 
service area. The municipalities thus constitute the main actor, and they are respon-
sible for controlling the budgets of schools, the quality of education given, for initi-
ating school development and for hiring and firing school management. 
The school boards and local school management constitutes the furthest devolved 
level of governance. Whereas school boards are responsible for setting the objec-
tives and frame of the individual school, §2 subsection 2 of the Education Act em-
phasizes, that the local school management is responsible for administrative and 
pedagogical developments (as set within the frame of the law and the decisions 
made by both the municipality and local school board). This means that the school 
management is responsible for the operations and performance of their school dis-
trict, thereby being accountable to both the school- and municipal board. A range of 
managerial- and budgetary tasks and responsibilities has further been devolved to 
the schools, including for example administrative tasks such as staffing and budg-
ets. The changes have overall meant that the school management has obtained a 
larger scope for action when it comes to prioritizing and decision-making.  
Simultaneously with this enhanced discretion detailed control exercised by the 
municipalities and state has limited the local scope for discretion. This is illustrated 
in terms of the specific education content but also in terms of the decision-making 
scope actually given to the management. As for the content of teaching the individ-
ual school management must ensure the attainment of the ‘Common Objectives’ 
(i.e. both end and form level objectives, §10 subs.2 and 3 Education Act). Albeit 
only guiding in nature curriculum guidelines for both level and end-objectives have 
also been distributed by the Ministry of Education since 2009. The management 
must accordingly describe the content of lessons and the accomplishments of the 
objectives; descriptions which must be approved by the municipal board, thereby 
making them binding for the school (Ministry of Education 2008). The school man-
agement is thereby the accountable part who must ensure that the teaching, not only 
takes the needs and qualifications of the individual pupil into account, but also is 
organized so that it ensures that the goals as set by the ministry are meet (Education 
Act § 18). 
Detailed legislation further prescribes which subjects are to be taught and make 
recommendations for the number of lessons for each grade level for each subject 
with the Law further dictating a minimum number of lessons per week for the spe-
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cific grade level (Education Act §16)
6
. The Education Act (§17) further prescribes 
that the statutory number of pupils per class at the start of a school year must not 
exceed 28 (in certain instances the municipal board is allowed to make exemptions, 
albeit the number of pupils must never exceed 30 per class). 
Overall, the legislation has evolved in a tension between decentralization and cen-
tralization. On the one hand the legislation has identified the municipalities as the 
central actor while simultaneously introducing detailed process control, formalizing 
the governance and content of the education and teaching. Although a range of 
tasks has been devolved to the school level the local decision-making scope is thus 
heavily influenced by state and municipal control, leaving at times very little room 
for discretion. For the purpose of accountability, the local management must report, 
explain and justify how resources are spent and to what effect. 
In 2013 the school system saw the passing of yet another school reform (Act no. 
665). The objective of this reform what to respond to what was described as signifi-
cant challenges facing the public school system. The academic standards of the 
pupils were especially at the center of attention, underlined by the fact that 15-17% 
of the pupils in 2012 left the public school without sufficient skills in reading and 
Math. The academic skills of both the weak and strong academically gifted children 
were not sufficiently met by the public school system and on top of this too many 
pupils was referred to special needs education. In order to counter these concerns 
three areas of focus were identified (Text of agreement 7 June 2013:2). Building on 
the premise that all pupils must realize their full potential, the focus areas were;  
- A longer and varied day of schooling with more and better teaching and learning  
- Enhancement of the professional skills of the teachers, the pedagogical staff and 
the principals.  
- Few and clear objectives and simplification of rules and regulations.  
In terms of the latter, the management by rules and processes are to be replaced 
with management by few, clear targets and knowledge of results. Overall these 
changes, it was argued, is to support the municipalities in their development of the 
quality in their public school sectors (Text of agreement 7 June 2013). Parallel with 
the reform work, a new working hour agreement for the teachers was negotiated. 
The collective bargaining process between the Danish Union of Teachers and 
LGDK resulted in a wide lockout of the teachers; a lock-out which was first ended 
after an intervention by the government. The subsequent national agreement 
changed the prior norms on teacher preparation time, the specification of a maxi-
                                                          
 
6 Respectively 30 lessons per week for 0-3rd grade, 33 lessons for 4th-6th grade and 35 for 7th- 
9th grade (Text of agreement 7 June 2013:3)  
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mum of teaching lessons for teacher over the course of a year and the placement of 
working hours. The regulation which gave teachers over 60 the right to reduced 
working hours was further to be phased out, in return for an extraordinary rise in 
teacher salary. A teacher’s working is now to take place within normal working 
hours, with the prior centrally specified norms abolished, and the full decision-
making competence instead placed with the principal. The principal today thus 
holds the full decision-making power over the distribution of tasks. The govern-
mental intervention and subsequent result was met with a great level of frustration 
and resistance from the part of the teachers who felt run over and disregarded. 
The use of goal setting (e.g. the 95% objective of further education) means that very 
similar focuses are emphasized across the Danish municipalities (Mehlbye 2010:7); 
a tendency further underlined by the new school reform which specify and simplify 
the national ‘Common Objectives’, further introducing four operative result targets 
for the entire public school system (Text of agreement June 7
th
 2013:23):  
- at least 80 % of the pupils must be good at reading and Math in the national tests, 
- the number of high performance pupils in Danish and Math must increase year by 
year 
- the number of pupil with poor results in the national tests in reading and Math 
must reduce year by year,  
- the well-being of pupils must increase.  
Together with the emphasis placed on national tests and other pupil achievement 
measurements, this illustrates the important role outcomes measures have assumed 
as tools for evaluating the successfulness and development of the educational sys-
tem. The devolvement of decision-making capabilities have in this way brought 
with it new types of regulation, standardization, evaluation and monitoring, and in 
its wake sought to establish a new form of (self-) control. 
2.7.  “MODERNIZING GOVERNMENT” BY CREATING “REGU-
LATED SELF-GOVERNANCE” 
The legislative development discussed above is neither particular for the Danish 
education system or the Danish public sector more broadly. In fact, Christensen & 
Lægreid (2007) argue, the changes in the Danish public sector are parts of a more 
broad reform process inspired by the New Public Management ideology; an ideolo-
gy which advances a focus on efficiency, structural devolution, disaggregation, 
competition, management principle and the increased use of contracts.  
New Public Management is somewhat of a hybrid, advocating for both decentrali-
zation (let the manager manage) and centralization (make the manager manage), 
making it a double-edge sword which prescribes more autonomy and more central 
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control (Hood 1991; Christensen & Lægreid 2001). In a similar manner Pedersen 
(2008:25) describes the Danish changes as government led changes which have 
emphasized the creation of strong political control, budget compliance and in-
creased use of performance contracts and evaluation, simultaneously with an in-
creased emphasis on self-governance, through the decentralization and establish-
ment of viable, financial sound units, characterized by managerial professionalism 
and strategic freedom.  
Under the term “modernization” of government (Broadbent & Guthrie 2008:152) 
similar developments have taken place in other countries, especially in Britain (see 
e.g. Ezzamel et al. 2008 for such discussions, Pedersen & Hartley 2008:327; Pors 
2011). Here, as in Denmark, methods of controls have changed towards devolution, 
decentralization, accountability and increased central and state control. In the words 
of Baker (2009:58): “reforms have moved beyond Thatcher’s market-
managerialism toward a hybrid, modernising’ version of the NPM that combines 
market mechanisms with central control to achieve policy objectives”. In the gov-
ernance of education, he argues, this has resulted in an intense focus on school 
performance; with effectiveness defined and measured through annual tests and 
published on performance tables, opening up for the results being used to compare 
results and changes across years and schools (Baker 2009).  
Devolvement and decentralization of decision-making is sought, with the intention 
of creating local accountability for results, but also as a mean to improve education 
quality, due to decisions being made closer to the users (Ouchi 2003; Hyndman 
2008). In turn, municipal management time can be ‘freed-up’, giving these the 
opportunity to focus on wider strategic issues, making also way for a more motivat-
ed and responsible local management. Yet, in the fear that education standards will 
slip if too much decision-making competences are devolved, Ezzamel et al. (2008) 
note, performance management and its’ accompanying standards are introduced: 
“a common trait with decentralization reforms is a parallel development 
of centralization of control (in that) the increasing emphasis on output 
orientation by way of performance measurement and performance audits 
may be seen as such instruments for retaining (or gaining) central con-
trol” (Ezzamel et al. 2008:3) 
In the British public sector attempts to delegate responsibilities have especially 
been accompanied by strong central control (see Rose & Miller 1992; Dean 1999; 
Newman 2001; Baker 2009). A tendency which according to Rose (1996) has been 
clearly manifested in the governance models applied in the context of education. 
Here, decentralization has been the goal, with the hope of establishing independent, 
self-sustaining units. Simultaneously, central control has been strengthened through 
the implementation of centralized legislation and an increased use of qualitative 
performance measurement systems (Rose 1996). This tension was also discussed by 
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Levačić (2008) who studied the finance system guiding the English education sys-
tem. Before 2002 the governance of education was characterized by a steadily de-
volvement of financial delegation to schools. In 2006/07 however, the introduction 
of centrally determined ‘dedicated schools grants’ meant a loss of local authority, in 
that, the former position stressing the appropriateness of ensuring that decisions on 
school funding remained with local authorities, was abandoned (Levačić 2008:230).  
This dual tension has under the term “modernization” of government led to the 
development of extensive regimes of targets and performance measures (Hood 
2006); changes which have affected the managerial practices but also the manage-
ment accounting technologies used to control organizational activities. From a type 
of budget control based on a concern with inputs, performance management and 
accounting techniques are increasingly concerned with measuring whether outputs 
and outcomes are achieved (Lapsley 1999; Guthrie et al. 1999; Verbeeten 2008). 
Political accountability for the government has, in the words of Broadbent & 
Laughlin (2003), become managerial accountability for managers of public sector 
organization. Devolution of budgets and decentralization of decision-making is 
thereby used as a mean to make the management accountable – both for education 
and budgetary developments. A range of splits, Baker (2009:58) argues, have thus 
occurred between policy and implementation, between purchasers and providers 
and between the commissioning and delivery of services.  
Regulation and control is still at the core , in fact “In this mirror-image dynamic, 
Hood et al. (1999:1999) argue increased ‘freedom to manage’ in public services at 
one level is accompanied by regulation in the form of expanded arm’s length over-
sight, or a shift from one regulatory style to another, rather than the removal of 
regulation...”. Layers of control are accordingly introduced (Clarke & Newman 
1997) with the overall aim of creating ‘regulated self-governance’ (Pedersen 
2008:25). This regulation is used as a form of indirect control in which public ser-
vice organizations are given (or rather imposed) the freedom to organize their oper-
ations while simultaneously being urged or bound to evaluate their performance and 
exert a type of reflective self-control (Dean 2006; Pedersen 2008:36). Accountabil-
ity and calculative practices have thus been linked in order to create the ‘responsi-
ble and calculating individual’ as proposed by Miller (2001:380). An individual 
who ‘acts freely, yet in accordance with the specified economic norms’ (Miller 
2001:380). In the pursuit of reflective self-control, achieving both education and 
budgetary objectives, the school management is thus made responsible for and 
given the freedom to spend resources and to balance the field of tension created by 
potentially conflicting demands. 
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CHAPTER 3.                  SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION, 
INCLUSION & BUDGETS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Education Act prescribes that the education environment of the public school 
must be orchestrated so that it to the greatest possible extend ensures that each indi-
vidual child can remain and benefit from being taught in the general/mainstream 
environment. If the needs of a particular child are so demanding that the general 
environment is insufficient in meeting these needs the child is entitled to special 
needs education (§2. subs.2). Yet, being entitled to such special needs services 
however does not mean that the general provisions regarding aims, curriculum, and 
exams ect. do not apply. Pupils with special needs are thus in principle met with the 
same expectations as any other pupil. 
Over the years the use of special needs education, its effects and with it the cost of 
such services has been a recurring subject on the Danish political agenda. In an 
international perspective, rising costs, concerns over efficiency and over the incen-
tive structures created by funding models are identified by Parrish (2002) as the 
main motivations behind special needs reforms (see e.g. Sigafoos et al. 2010). As 
the following chapter will show, such concerns were also very present in driving the 
Danish changes. Reflected for example in the 2012’ redefinition and demarcation of 
what constitutes special education. From a Statute which prescribed that: 
“Special needs education and other special pedagogical assistance must 
be provided to those pupils whose development requires special consid-
eration or support, which cannot be helped solely through the use of 
group-oriented- or differentiated teaching methods within the frames of 
the general education.” (Ministry of Education 2010 Act no. 885) 
the new amended Statute stressed, that: 
“Special needs education and other special educational assistance is pro-
vided to pupils in special classes or schools. Special educational assis-
tance is furthermore provided to pupils if their continued education in 
their home class requires additional support for more than 9 clock-hours 
per week.” (Ministry of Children & Education 2012b Act no. 379) 
Special needs education given less than 9 clock-hours/12 lessons per week was thus 
abolished. This was a part of a greater effort to make the public school system more 
inclusive, thereby countering the growing separation of the system into two sepa-
rate, parallel school systems – the general public school system and a segregated 
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system for pupils referred to and placed in special needs services (Scjerbeck et al. 
2013).  
The chapter will outline the importance of studying special needs education in the 
context of funding, focusing especially on the consequences associated with the 
division of financial responsibility. In doing so, it will analyze how the notion of 
special needs education has evolved over time. Before however, the next section 
presents some of the Danish research on the use of special needs education. This is 
included because the long-term effect of segregated special needs education has 
become one of the main motivations for seeking a more inclusive system. 
3.2. INCLUSION & DANISH RESEARCH INTO THE EFFECT OF 
SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION 
Once rarely disputed the use and effects of special needs education is increasingly 
questioned (Tomlinson 1987:33-41; Thomas & Loxley 2001; Reid 2005:180), and 
indeed substituted by a wish for inclusion. ‘Inclusion’ is here to be understood as a 
break with the earlier “paradigm of integration”; a paradigm which according to 
Alenkær (2009) is associated with “special needs education” and the marginaliza-
tion of particular pupils. Inclusion encompasses much more than retaining pupils 
with special needs within the frame of the mainstream school. Initialing instead a 
thorough rethinking of the concept of “special needs” and a questioning of the par-
ticular problem-solution constellation associated with ‘practices of integration’ 
(Ratner 2012:21). With ‘integration’ the “needs,” and problems are located within 
the pupil, and a diagnosis of for example ADHD may be followed by interventions 
which seeks to remedy the related needs and, if possible, re-integrate the pupil in 
the general school. An inclusive approach transforms this, focusing instead on the 
practices and traditions of the school (Alenkær 2009). From an understanding 
where the focus is on making the pupil fit existing practices, the focus is now in-
stead directed upon changing the practices to the benefit of all children. 
The effect of special needs education has been recurrently studied. The evidence 
however is scattered and based mainly on qualitative case studies, or limited quanti-
tative datasets. Table 3.1 summarizes some of the newer Danish findings. 
Authors Research approach 
and objective 
General findings 
Dyssegaard 
et al. (2007) 
Qualitative study of 
11 schools and their 
organization of spe-
cial needs education 
for pupils with less 
comprehensive needs  
Schools were motivated to include pupils; albeit no clear 
guidelines existed for when a pupil was referred to special 
needs education 
The schools struggled with documenting the effects of the 
special needs services given. 
The Danish An evaluation of the The schools had a high level of activity when it came to special 
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Evaluation 
Institute 
(EVA 2007) 
special educational 
efforts given to 
pupils in the general 
environment in 6 
schools in different 
municipalities.  
Studied the types of 
services given, and 
their related effect on 
the quality of the 
general education 
supplied.  
 
needs education and assistance, albeit the demarcation between 
special needs education, assistance and the general education 
was found to be fluid.  
The resources for special educational assistance were mostly 
directed towards ‘early intervention’ in the in-schooling, espe-
cially in relation to reading efforts. Being primarily given in the 
early grades meant that it was difficult to separate the specific 
support from the use of alternative teaching methods. 
The teachers ascribed the increased demand for including 
‘problem children’ in the general environment to an increase in 
pupils suffering from social and emotional difficulties. 
Despite early interventions the support was however over the 
long haul often inadequate in preparing the pupils for and 
enabling them to keep up with the education given.  
The teachers argued there to be a lack of consistency between 
the objectives and strategies set by the municipality, and actual 
options available for the schools.  
Egelund & 
Tetler 
(2009) 
Building on respec-
tively a limited data 
set of 95 pupils 
attending the 3rd – 6th 
grade in 4 schools, 
and 26 pupils receiv-
ing comprehensive 
special needs educa-
tion in special needs 
classes, schools or in 
the home-school, this 
study had a twofold 
aim.  
The first was to 
docu-ment the effects 
of special needs 
education given to 
pupils in the general 
environment.  
 
The second, to des-
cribe the efforts gi-
ven to pupils with 
severe difficulties.  
The teachers experienced a positive effect of the special needs 
education given to pupils with special needs. The effect was 
argued to be greatest for pupils with learning disabilities and 
lowest for pupils diagnosed with behavioral difficulties. The 
pupil’s perception of the educational benefit was however 
different. 25% of the pupils had a negative perception of the 
educational effects of the special needs education given.  
The parents felt that the schools were taking good care of 
pupils with disabilities, ensuring that they, retained confidence, 
self-esteem and were thriving. The academic level however 
was found to be lacking, compared to the general school and 
the segregated nature of the education contributes to isolating 
the pupils from other children. 
The pupils’ perception of the educational work in the special 
needs services was good. They felt accepted, socially and 
educationally, albeit they at times felt they had no say or influ-
ence on their situation. This was especially apparent for chil-
dren receiving comprehensive special needs education in the 
home-school.  
The teachers on the other hand felt they were lacking formal 
qualifications in terms of special educational support and they 
especially sought more practice-oriented supervision. 
Capacent 
(2009) 
Random sample of 
pupils with handi-
caps born in 1990 
Studied the transition 
of pupils with handi-
caps from the public 
school into further 
education 
A vital precondition for pupils finishing further education was 
found to be that the pupils took part in the final school exami-
nation in 9th grade. Only approximately 64% of the pupils 
diagnosed with handicaps however participated in the finals 
(with lower grades than non-handicapped pupils).  
The study concluded that being enrolled in special needs 
classes or schools, reduced the likelihood of completing further 
education, compared to having received other types of special 
needs educational assistance in the general environment. 
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Mehlbye 
(2009) 
Studying the long-
term effects of 
special needs educa-
tion, the further 
education patterns of 
128 pupils diagnosed 
with different disa-
bilities and enrolled 
in special needs 
classes or schools 
were studied 
Special needs classes and schools did not adequately prepared 
pupils for further education, especially in reading and Math. 
The pupils still continued into various educational offers im-
mediately after the 9th grade. The majority at lower-secondary-
level boarding schools, folk high schools or in production 
colleges (57 %). 13 % continued into ordinary further educa-
tion while 6% entered into work-experience-programs or other 
types of social arrangements. 
In the long run however, the picture was somewhat different. 
The number of pupils enrolled at production colleges, in work 
experience programs or who worked as apprentices, increased. 
20 % had found a job, while 17% were not engaged in any type 
of further education. 
The study concluded that the first years after the completion of 
the public school were often very turbulent, resulting in an 
unstable progression into further education. The once who did 
the best, had the mildest problems and close, persistent support 
from an adult. 
Steensgaard 
& Hallberg 
(2010) 
Survey study (not a 
representative da-
taset, response rate 
33%),  
Analyzed the educa-
tional level and 
participation rate of 
pupils in special ne-
eds classes and scho-
ols in the final exams  
These segregated services did only to a limited degree prepare 
the pupils for the final examinations. Likewise not all other-
wise compulsory subjects were offered.  
Only 4% of the pupils participated in all compulsory examina-
tions. 23% received fewer lessons per week than pupils in the 
mainstream system, 73% received the same, or more (4%).  
The teachers expressed the need for deeper, more expert 
knowledge on special needs education to be established. 
The Danish 
Evaluation 
Institute 
(EVA 2013) 
A survey (and 5 case 
studies). 
Studied how schools 
with special needs 
classes worked with 
inclusion 
The general perception was that the existence of special needs 
classes in the school strengthened the ability to create inclusive 
educational environments. The close proximity to the general 
environment promoted cooperation, and the competences of the 
special needs teachers could more easily be used in the main-
stream education as well (although it still could be improved).  
Pupils with special needs profited educationally and socially 
from being a part of the general environment, although their 
presence challenged the teaching was to be organized and 
orchestrated. 
Reintegrating special needs pupils in the general environment 
is not a guarantee for inclusion. More precise, inclusion is a 
complicated process, requiring both social and academic bene-
fits; physical presence is not sufficient to be termed inclusion.  
The practices of re-inclusion were different across the schools. 
Half of the pupils were placed in mainstream classes on full 
time; the other half primarily participated in specific subjects.  
- Table 3.1   Danish research findings on the effects of special needs education 
Albeit the research evidence is scattered, the findings indicate that being enrolled in 
for example a special needs classes or schools may be a good thing socially. But 
from an education point of view it may also be somewhat troublesome. 
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3.3. SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION 1970 – 2007 
The focus on special needs education and inclusion is by no means new. In an in-
ternational context the term ‘special needs education’ can be traced back to an in-
quiry on special education conducted in England in 1978 (Warnoch report). Next 
the use and approach to special needs education in Denmark will be discussed.  
3.3.1. 1970 – MID 1980’S 
The structural reform of 1970 brought about a change of attitude towards children 
with special needs. From focusing on the deficiencies of the child thereby primarily 
considering pupils diagnosed with physical handicaps, the notion of special needs 
began to deal with and stem from a pedagogical concern. The social and psycholog-
ical functions of the child thus became the focus of attention, and special needs 
education consequently viewed as a mean to respond to and redeem the negative 
consequences of the particular child’s needs. This conceptual change was accompa-
nied by an increase in referrals to special needs education, both within the frame of 
the general system, in observation classes and in segregated special day schools 
(Ministry of Finance 2010:39-40).  
Throughout the 1980’s different approaches, to special needs education emerged. 
This included “individual integration” of pupils with special needs, which allowed 
for example children with Down’s syndrome to be part of the mainstream environ-
ment (Ministry of Education 2003:14). Attempts were further made to reorganize 
special needs schools placing them as special needs classes in the general environ-
ment. These new practices brought about a raise in the general knowledge about 
special needs children. Yet, despite the general view that special needs education 
was only to be a temporary service, with pupils being reintegrated in the main-
stream environment again after shorter periods of time, a survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Education in 1989 revealed an extensive use of special needs education. 
The survey showed that in the school years 1984/85 to1986/87, 80 to 83 thousand 
pupils were referred to some sort of special needs education, either in their home-
school, in special classes, or in special schools (Ministry of Education 1989). In 
other words, roughly 12-13% of all pupils in the public school system received 
some sort of special needs education (Ministry of Finance 2010:43). 
3.3.2. MID 1980’S – 2007 
Except for a small drop (1%) in 1986/87 the use of the comprehensive special needs 
education continued to rise, as depicted in Figure 3.1. The vast part of special needs 
education however still took place in the general school environment (67%). How-
ever, from 1984/85 to 1994/95 the percentages of pupils receiving all types of spe-
cial needs education rose from 12.6% to 13.3% (Ministry of Education 1997; Min-
istry of Finance 2010:45). This occurred despite continuous concerns and political 
emphasis placed on the importance of retaining children in the general system. 
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Examples of such inclusive-seeking initiatives were the campaign A School for All 
initiated in 1990/91 (a collaboration between the Ministry of Education, LGDK and 
the Danish Union of teachers), a new statutory for special education introduced in 
1990 stressing the importance of teaching methods supporting the retention of pu-
pils in the general system (Ratner 2012:137), and finally the Danish accession of 
the UNESCO Salamanca Statement in 1994 which acknowledged “to be included” 
as a human right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Figure 3.1   Number of pupils (age 6-16) receiving comprehensive special educa-
tion, 1987-2007. Source: UNI•Statistik & Analyse, 14. January 2008:16. 
The actual division of financial responsibilities combined with the relative low rates 
set by the counties and paid by the municipalities when referring pupils to the com-
prehensive special needs services, was especially important (Ministry of Finance 
2010:46). The low rates in a sense incentivized municipalities to refer pupils to 
these services, as the cost of referral was much lower compared to establishing 
special needs classes. The type of pupils referred to these services also changed, 
with special needs education increasingly given to children diagnosed with social 
and emotional difficulties (EVA 2009:17); more precisely, a 7% increase (from 
11%-18%) (Ministry of Education 1997). 
In 2000, in an effort to reduce the continuous increase in use of the segregated spe-
cial needs services, the rates paid by the municipalities were raised. This was ac-
companied by a renewed focus on the importance of placing these services in close 
connection to the local environment (Ratner 2010:142). As seen in Figure 3.2 these 
efforts coincided with a drop in the referral rate; a decline with may indicate that 
financial considerations did indeed play a role for the municipalities when deciding 
whether to refer a child or not. In 2003 an evaluation conducted by The Danish 
Evaluation Institute (EVA) similarly indicated that the needs of the children were 
not the only factor which determined where a child was to receive its education; 
financial considerations and incentives, it was argued, were also present (EVA 
2003:22).  
Procent 
Year 
PART I   THE CONTEXT OF DANISH SCHOOL FUNDING       SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION, INCLUSION, & BUDGETS         
41 
The 2000’ drop however only lasted for about a year and two years later the use 
again reached the 1999’ level. Now however 29% of the pupils receiving compre-
hensive special needs education were diagnosed with socio and emotional difficul-
ties (EVA 2003:23). Overall, during the period 1994/95 - 2004/05 the referrals to 
comprehensive special needs education rose 57% (Ministry of Education 2006). 
Accordingly, despite attempts to limit the use of comprehensive special needs edu-
cation, the opposite happened. The actual practices and referral pattern however 
varied greatly across the municipalities and counties. No uniform approach existed 
for determining the type of pupils and the context in which the different needs 
should be met. One thing was however clear, the continuous increase in use of 
comprehensive special needs education, had great effects on the counties’ budgets. 
From 2002-2006 the total gross expenses increased 20%.  
3.4. SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION FOLLOWING THE STRUC-
TURAL REFORM OF 2007 
With the structural reform of 2007 the counties were dismantled. Thus, the full 
responsibilities, both financial and organizational for all special needs services 
within and outside the frame of the general environment were transferred to the 
municipalities. The structural reform meant the amalgamation of previously inde-
pendent municipalities and with it the clash of different practices. New practices 
thus had to be established. The trend however was that the municipal expenditure 
on supplying special needs services increased heavily and approximately 84.000 
pupils (14.3% of all public school pupils in the age 6-16) were now receiving some 
sort of special needs education (Ministry of Finance 2010:13). 
2007 – level = 100 
 
       Day-care services        Public Schools 
       Elderly care         Handicapped and vulnerable adults 
       Vulnerable children and youth        Special needs education 
 
- Figure 3.2   Municipal spending 2007-2009. Source: Kudahl. Momentum, nr. 
3/2010, 16. Marts 
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From 2007-2009 the cost of special needs services rose 18% (see Figure 3.2, 
Kudahl 2010). In the school year 2008/09 the total amount spent on special needs 
education amounted to 9.68 billion Danish Kroner, corresponding to a net extra cost 
of 7.94 billion DDK. That is 23.9% and 19.6% of the total expenditure on the 
school system) (Ministry of Finance 2010:14).  
The growing budgetary concerns associated with special needs education and the 
extensive use of it, once more triggered the debate over how special needs educa-
tion was given. This culminated and was documented in the report on the use and 
funding of special needs education conducted by Local Government Denmark and 
the Ministry of Finance in 2010 (Deloitte 2010/Ministry of Finance et al. 2010). In 
addition to a general analysis of the activities and resources used in the Danish 
public school system, the report studied the practices and funding models of 12 
municipalities. The report revealed an interesting pattern; the redistribution of tasks 
following the closing of the counties, had in general not been accompanied by a 
devolvement of budgetary responsibilities from the municipal administrations to the 
schools. The funding models were in general centralized placing the budgetary 
responsibility for special needs classes and schools with the municipal administra-
tion (who often held the full responsibility for pedagogical and psychological coun-
seling (in Danish called PPR), and for the cost of transportation of pupils from 
home to the special needs services). Thus the schools were only financial responsi-
ble for a very limited part of the special needs services, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.  
 
- Figure 3.3   Special needs education expenditure in total, distributed across line 
items (%), 2008/2009. Source: Adapted from the table in Deloitte 2010:26 
As seen the distribution of responsibilities meant that, 86% of all expenditure in the 
school year 2008/09, were defrayed by the municipal administration. 62% of these 
went to cover the cost of the comprehensive services, special needs classes (19%) 
and schools (43%) (Deloitte 2010:26). Thus, leaving the remaining 14% at the re-
sponsibility of the school management (i.e. special needs education given in the 
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general school environment). This division of responsibilities meant that the indi-
vidual school often incurred no expenses or additional costs when a child was re-
ferred to the comprehensive special needs services. Integrated special needs ser-
vices within the frame of the mainstream general education, on the other hand, was 
associated with considerable local budgetary effects. The report thus indicated that 
the increased use of the comprehensive, segregated services was due to the relative 
high cost incurred by a school when seeking inclusion compared to the “cost free” 
alternative of segregation (Ministry of Finance 2010:25).  
It was further documented that an inappropriate pattern had emerged, in that, spe-
cial needs education was either given in limited doses (0-6 lessons/week) or in 
comprehensive segregated services. Figure 3.4 depicts this distribution across the 
then 5 types of special needs education categories. As shown in the figure, not 
much effort was spend on establishing more extensive inclusive-seeking services. 
Implying an autonomic increase in the number of pupils referred to the comprehen-
sive, segregated services (special needs classes and schools). This skew pattern 
affected greatly the municipal budgets. In 2009, 9 out of 10 municipalities incurred 
budget overruns in relation to children with special needs (20% exceeded their 
budgets more than 25%) (Houlberg 2010). 
 
- Figure 3.4   Pupils receiving special needs education, distributed across the differ-
ent categories, 2008/09. Source: Adapted from Ministry of Finance: 2010:13. 
Furthermore, the report showed that special needs education given in the general 
public school was addressed to pupils with reading and writing difficulties. Many 
municipalities had namely implemented formal procedures and programs for read-
ing in the in-schooling. A considerable part of the children however had more gen-
eral learning difficulties ascribed to e.g. ‘delayed intellectual development’. A refer-
ral to a special needs school, however could be caused by a variety of reasons, and 
did thus not only pertain to pupils with diagnosed general learning disabilities. No 
clear or uniform practice existed in terms of which problems were to be handled 
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within the frames of the general system, or for when the pupil was to be referred to 
a special needs school (Ministry of Finance 2010:16).  
Similarly, the existence of varying practices was also shown in the survey conduct-
ed by KREVI in 2011 (Bækgaard & Jakobsen 2011). The survey compared the 
actual level of referral in 2009 with the expected level when taking into account 
socio-demographic factors and the number of private schools. The referral rate to 
special needs classes or schools ranged from 2.5% to 10.5% of the pupils (if disre-
garding the small island municipalities such as Læsø), but when adjusting for the 
socio-demographic factors and the number of private schools, the result was some-
what different. As summarized in Map 3.1 some municipalities referred 2.5 per-
centage point more pupils as expected, while others referred up to 3.1 percentage 
point less (Bækgaard & Jakobsen 2011:2). The darker the color illustrates munici-
palities with a higher than expected referral rate, while the lighter colors depict 
municipalities with a lower than expected level of referrals. Although it was argued 
that the results could not be used to conclude whether the individual municipality 
had the “correct” level of referrals, the results at least indicated that different refer-
ral practices existed. Caused by, it was argued, the different applied funding model 
vis a vis the distribution of financial responsibilities (Bækgaard & Jakobsen 
2011:31-34). 
 
- Map 3.1   Difference between actual and expected proportion of segregated pupils 
(percentage point) in 2009. Source: Bækgaard & Jakobsen 2011: 32 
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3.4.1. LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT & RECOMMENDATIONS TO ALTER 
FUNDING MODELS 
The growing public spending associated with special needs education and the 
skewed pattern of use, once more sparked discussions about the prevalence, place-
ment and use of special needs education. The taskforce behind the Ministry of Fi-
nance’ study (2010) suggested that the demarcation of what constituted special 
needs education needed to be altered. The new definition, it was emphasized, 
should more clearly express the delimitation of special needs education. The task-
force further recommended a range of other changes to take place in the municipali-
ties: The local pedagogical and psychological counseling services (PPR) needed 
revision in order to make them more demand oriented. A renewed focus on the 
development of the competences of the teachers was needed and most importantly 
the local funding models should be changed so that they would support the objec-
tive of inclusion. The latter, the report suggested, could be done by incorporating 
inclusive-enhancing incentives into the models (Ministry of Finance 2010:20ff.).  
In 2012 the definition of what constitutes special needs education was altered, once 
again underlying the importance of orchestrating the teaching so that it to the great-
est possible extend ensures that the individual child can remain and benefit from 
being taught in the general environment. As already mentioned in the introduction 
the new demarcation entailed that “special needs education” now only takes place 
in special needs classes which are placed and administrated within the frame of the 
general public school system, in special needs schools (completely segregated edu-
cation taking place outside the general environment) or as single-integrated special 
needs education given in a mainstream class when a child needs more than 12 les-
sons of support per week (Ministry of Children & Education 2012a, chapter 3:2, 
Act no. 379, 28.04.2012).  
The Education Act still emphasizes the right of a pupil to receive education which 
takes into account the pupil’s individual needs. Accordingly, if differentiation of 
teaching, group formations, two-teacher arrangements or teaching assistance is not 
sufficient, the pupil must be given additional help, in the form of supplementary 
teaching or other types of support and personal assistance. Amounting to less than 
12 lessons per week, this is however not characterized as special needs education.  
The overall objective of the amendment was to ensure that special needs education 
to the most possible extent is provided in the general system and in the immediate 
home-environment of the child (Ministry of Children & Education 2012a: chapter 
2:1). On top of this, local flexibility in terms of creating flexible and inclusive ser-
vices was to be enhanced. By abolishing the term, ‘special needs education less 
than 12 lessons/week’, official referrals or diagnosis are no longer needed in order 
to facilitate and start inclusive-seeking support. The prior need for special examina-
tion (usually conducted by special needs schools or the PPR) was thereby superflu-
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ous and not a precondition for help to start. By eliminating the link between diagno-
ses, support and funding the hope was that the potential link between funding and 
local decision-making on disabilities would be removed. The amendment was not 
accompanied by additional funds. A vital assumption for local success, the ministry 
stressed, was that the municipalities would not lower their spending. Resources 
should be retained in the system; albeit distributed according to different patterns – 
to the benefit of not only the individual pupil but to the school system as a whole.  
The renewed pursuit of inclusion has also been on the top of the agenda in the year-
ly agreements between the Government and LGDK. Since 2011 these agreements 
has contained an ongoing focus on the importance of making the public school 
more inclusive. In 2013 three objectives for the public school system in terms of 
inclusion were agreed upon. It was accepted that sustaining the well-being of chil-
dren was especially important and an indicator of the successfulness of the inclu-
sion efforts (LGDK 2013). More precisely the three objectives were formulated as: 
- by 2015 the number of pupils included in the general education must increase from 
94.4% to 96.0% . 
- by 2015, and even further by 2018, the proportion of pupils receiving the grade 2 
or less in reading, spelling and Math at their final examination must be reduced.  
- Inclusion must not come at the expense of the well-being of the children 
3.5. BUDGETARY RESPONSIBILITY AND THE USE OF SPECIAL 
NEEDS EDUCATION  
The above chapter has shown how the use and understanding of special needs edu-
cation has evolved with the chapter further trying to capture the important motiva-
tion factors behind the renewed interest and pursuit for inclusion. Questions on the 
documented effects of special needs education, together with the prevalent use and 
associated cost of special needs services have here been identified as factors which 
once again have brought about questions on the appropriateness and efficiency of so 
many pupils receiving some sort of special needs education. 
The distribution of budget responsibility, whether between the counties and munic-
ipalities or the municipal administration and schools has further been a recurring 
theme throughout the chapter. This separation of responsibility between special and 
general funding is interesting, but not unique for the Danish public school system. 
As discussed by Moore-Brown (2001) and Sigafoos et al. (2010) special needs 
funding is often separated from the remaining school budgets. As shown by Hart-
man (2001) and Horn & Tynan (2001) this can be problematic, in that, the related 
effect is that the level of spending for these services tends to increase. This has led 
Sigafoss et al. (2010) to conclude that there is a relationship between the propensity 
to refer a pupil and the financial burden incurred. This tendency is especially im-
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portant when looking at the type of pupil being referred to special needs services. 
As in Denmark studies have shown that special needs education increasingly is 
given to children diagnosed with social and emotional difficulties. This is interest-
ing, as the criteria’s for diagnosing these difficulties, as noted by Reschly (1996), 
are not always clearly or consistently applied. Low achieving pupils might as a 
result be classified as learning-disabled in order for them to be qualified for special 
education funding (Horn & Tynan 2001; Sigafoss et al. 2010).  
There is in the literature on funding of special educational needs great disagreement 
on whether funding should be allocated to pupils based on identified needs (case 
payments) or through resourcing schools using block grants based on a range of 
criteria (capitation payments) (Ferrier et al. 2007). While Chapter 4 in this disserta-
tion presents more in depth the difference between case and capitation funding the 
main characteristics of the two approaches can be described accordingly; The first 
type of funding sometimes referred to as input-based, demand-driven or categorical 
funding allocates individual funding to specific pupils depending on the severity of 
needs of that pupil. This type of funding is according to Banks et al.(2015:3) often 
associated with systems with a high proportion of children in segregated settings, 
with funds often tied to individual pupils or provided to parents who, in principle, 
are able to choose where they want to have their child educated. In this way, such 
individual budgets ‘guarantee’ that pupils receive the resources they were assigned 
with the mode of payment putting ”purchasing power in the hands of the parents” 
(Lamp 2009). On the other hand, this type of payment can threaten the ability to 
create inclusive practices, in that, it encourages labeling, promotion or even a re-
warding of the segregation of pupils with special educational needs. Thwarting so 
to say the core purpose of assessment turning it potentially into a process character-
ized by ‘diagnosis for dollars’ or ‘bounty hunting’ (Banks et al.2015). Further, 
bringing about the criticism that this disability categorization locates the problem 
within the child, conceptualizing it as a deficit or defect within the individual child 
(Topping & Maloney 2005) 
The other type of funding, often referred to as ‘through-put’ or ‘supply-driven fund-
ing’, allocates funding to municipalities, regions or schools via a lump sum and is 
considered to be more institutionally based with less emphasis on the individual 
child (Mittler 2000). The method is often census-based with funding allotted based 
on for example the number of pupils with certain weighted characteristics e.g. so-
cio-economic status, gender or the type and degree of disability. Although it un-
doubtedly gives schools flexibility this type of funding has been criticized as lead-
ing to inertia amongst school personnel because regardless of management actions, 
the funding will be provided. Questioning further the level of accountability creat-
ed, in that, it can be difficult to track the funds and thereby ensure that they are 
actually used in relation to the children for who additional resources were intended 
(Meijer 1999; Riddell et al. 2006). Lastly, the fixed budgets may also decrease the 
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local incentive to enroll pupils with special educational needs as the school will 
face the cost of providing resources to these pupils (Crawford et al. 2011). 
In this context Dhuey & Lipscomb (2009) studied how different payment methods 
affect the use of special needs education. Here, they showed how the implementa-
tion of a ‘state capitation reform’ affected the disability- and placement rates. The 
new capitation funding model lowered disability rates; a result which the authors 
noted indicated that tying funds to the individual pupil affected ‘negatively’ how 
special needs education was given. Capitation funding removed the link between 
funding and local decision-making over disability identification and placement 
which meant that the prior propensity of schools to provide special needs education 
services as a mean to be compensated for the extra costs decreased. Importantly, 
Dhuey & Lipscomb (2009) showed that this prior relationship was especially preva-
lent when it came to the more “subjectively” diagnoses categories (specific learning 
disabilities and mental retardation)
7
. This corresponds closely to the argument put 
forward by Marsh (1998:121) that “an allocation system which provides additional 
resources to any pupil who can be certified or measured as meeting the criterion 
for additional resources provides an incentive for parents and the school to secure 
the necessary identification for that pupil”. With the result that such system over 
time will be likely to generate an increase in the number of pupil eligible for extra 
funding.  
Overall, the study of Dhuey & Lipscomb (2009) showed how the capitation reform 
led to an immediate decline in the rate of less severe ‘disability diagnoses’, while 
there was a lagged response in regards to the more severe categories. The change in 
funding however affected the rate of outside school placement for pupils with se-
vere disabilities; a tendency, the authors argued, reflected an incentive-based re-
sponse since these services became more cost minimizing on the margin than 
providing services in-house (Dhuey & Lipscomb 2009:4). 
In a Danish context, Bækgaard & Jakobsen (2011) also showed that the distribution 
of budgetary responsibility had an impact on the likelihood of a child being referred 
to segregated special needs services. It was shown that when schools covered the 
full or a substantial part of the payment for special needs education, the proportion 
of pupils receiving segregated special needs education was lower compared to mu-
nicipalities where the funds were kept and paid out centrally. The use of segregated 
special needs education was also affected by the prevalence of private schools. The 
authors showed, that a high private school rate had the effect that a larger propor-
                                                          
 
7At times termed “soft” disabilities because the diagnosis of these, Parrish (2002) argues, is 
often more subjective and less medically determined compared to diagnosing impairments 
like deafness or blindness. Albeit termed “soft” this does not imply that they can’t be severe. 
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tion of the remaining public school’ pupils were enrolled in comprehensive special 
needs services (Bækgaard & Jakobsen 2011:2). Overall the results indicated the 
importance and effect of the division of budgetary responsibilities.  
Today the local funding models are undergoing changes, steadily devolving more 
and more responsibility to the school level. As a result of the legislative demarca-
tion of special needs education, funds are transferred from the specialized areas to 
the general education budget. The effect of this legislative change is still difficult to 
isolate. Statistics from Statistics Denmark however gives some early indications of 
whether these changes are affecting the use and placement of special needs educa-
tion. Table 3.2 summarizes some important indicators. 
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Total number of pupils in the public schools 590,861 578,877 577,396 
- hereof pupils in segregated services  
1) special needs schools and residential institutions  13.231  12.291 11.641 
2) special needs classes and public youth schools 20.745 18.970 18.323 
- hereof in inclusive services 
3) mainstream classes in the general public school 32.950 36.536 856 
Municipal net expenses for the public school, in 2011, 2012, 
2013 (1000 DDK) 
32,047,064 32,126,821 31,536,900 
Municipal net expenses, special needs schools, in 2011, 
2012, 2013 (1000 DDK) 
5,228,675 5,905,934 5,753,589 
- Table 3.2    Pupils in the public school, respectively in the segregated and inclusive 
services and municipal net expenses, 2011-2013. Source: Statistics Denmark 
As seen in the table, approximately 12% of the public school pupils were receiving 
some sort of special needs education in 2010/11. Since then, this proportion has 
however declined. Due to the implementation of the legislative amendment the 
numbers are not directly comparable across 2011/12 to 12/13. One exemption how-
ever is the development in the use of segregated special needs education, in that, 
these pupils still receive at least 12 lessons of special need education per week. This 
development in the period 2007 to 2013 is summarized in the Table 3.3, which also 
depict the segregation rate (i.e. the proportion of pupils receiving these services). 
From 2007/08 to 2010/11 the segregation rate steadily increased. In 2011/12 how-
ever, the segregation level dropped, something, which as earlier mentioned, has not 
taken place since 2000. As in 2000 the drop in 2012 coincided with a change in 
funding. But unlike the former situation the decreased use has continued into the 
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school year 2012/13. Even despite the fact that the number of pupils enrolled in 
private schools has increased during the same period. 
 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Pupils enrolled in 
segregated special 
needs services 
30,000 32,331 33,197 33,976 31,261 29,964 
Segregation rate  5.0 % 5.4 % 5.6 % 5.8 % 5.4 % 5,2 
- Table 3.3   Number of pupils and segregation degree in the Danish public school 
system, 2007/08 – 2011/12. Source: Statistics Denmark 
As depicted in Table 3.4 special needs education in 2013 is primarily given to pu-
pils in separate special needs classes, placed in the general public school, and to 
pupils referred to segregated special needs schools.  
Number of pupils receiving special needs education     31843 
In the public school 
 In special needs classes within the general environment 
In a mainstream class 
In private schools 
In special needs schools  
In boarding schools  
18704 
1713 
1569 
32         
   12135  
               972 
The distribution of special needs education cross grade levels 31843 
Pre-school classes 
1st  
2nd 
3rd  
4th  
5th 
1352 
1716 
2139 
2618 
2794 
3100 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
10th 
3383 
3600 
3760 
4096 
3225 
- Table 3.4   Special needs education in 2013 distributed across school types and 
grade levels. Source: Statistics Denmark  
An interesting pattern emerges, when studying the use of special needs education 
across grade levels. As seen in the table the use of special needs education is less 
prevalent in the pre-school and 1
st
 grade class. From here on however it is steeply 
rising and in the end, that is in the 9
th
 grade, more than tripled. This may indicate 
that inclusion is pursued more intensively for pupils in the beginning of their 
PART I   THE CONTEXT OF DANISH SCHOOL FUNDING       SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION, INCLUSION, & BUDGETS         
51 
schooling. But the older they get the more likely they are to be referred to segregat-
ed special needs services. It is however of course difficult to say whether this is a 
part of a new trend towards a new practice in handling special needs education. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the prevalence of special needs education in the 
context of private schools is very limited, with only 32 pupils of all private school 
pupils receiving special needs education.  Statistics from Statistic Denmark further 
show that there is a geographical and gender influence on the prevalence of special 
needs education. Special needs education is more prevalent in the ‘peripheral mu-
nicipalities’ and a disparity between boys and girls exist, in that, 7.2% of all boys 
receive some kind of special needs education, whereas the similar number for girls 
is only 3.0%. All in all, compared with the 2016’ objective of a segregation rate of 
4%, there is still some way to go. More precisely, approximately 7000 pupils’ still 
need to be included in the general environment, in order to fulfill the objective 
(Statistics Denmark).  
Overall however, the continued decrease in the segregation rate indicates that the 
division of budgetary responsibilities has affected the pattern of use, when it comes 
to special needs education. Again this indicate that the propensity to refer a pupil to 
special needs education have been linked and influenced by budgetary considera-
tions and not only determined by the needs of the children. With the legislative 
amendment official referrals or diagnoses are no longer needed in order to facilitate 
or start inclusive-seeking support, thereby eliminating the potential link between 
diagnoses, support and funding; bringing with it the possibilities for other types of 
funding mechanisms to be utilized. It is however important to note, that it is not 
possible, based on the analysis above to analyze the extent to which disabilities 
have been over-identified or over-served over the years. What can be argued is that, 
the redistribution of financial responsibilities has affected how the financial incen-
tives are aligned; once again underlining the importance of studying and under-
standing the incentives springing from the specific funding model. 
 
PART I   THE CONTEXT IN WHICH DANISH SCHOOL FUNDING OPERATES                WHAT IS FORMULA FUNDING? 
53 
CHAPTER 4.    WHAT IS FORMULA FUNDING? 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Various methods can be used to allocate funds from state/municipality to local 
service providers. This includes incremental budgeting, zero-based budgeting, pro-
gram budgeting, initiative-based budgeting or responsibility centered budgeting in 
addition to more alternative methods such as allocating according to the quality of 
local bids, on the basis of political patronage, by historical precedent, or simply by 
reimbursing actual expenditure (see e.g. Mayston 1998; Smith 2003, 2007a, Zierdt 
2009; Agyemang 2010). Depending on the nature of the task and the political objec-
tives of the service area particular funding methods have been favored. 
Formula funding, Smith (2007a) notes, has increasingly gained acceptance as a way 
of avoiding the negative consequences associated with the other methods. Incre-
mental budgeting for example may maintain “historical relativities”, albeit not 
guaranteeing resources to be allocated in accordance with actual needs. Incremental 
budgeting further complicates the ability of payers to react to changing circum-
stances, which may hamper the payer’s ability to respond to changes in needs 
(Smith 2007a:4). In contrast, zero-based budgeting assumes a zero base at the be-
ginning of each budget cycle. This implies that all budgeting decision are made as if 
they were completely new and based on a total cost analysis of each program. In 
theory this should open up for an allocation which can accommodate changing 
patterns of needs. The comprehensiveness of this approach however makes it time 
consuming and although it in principle may facilitate the discontinuation of exces-
sive programs it is in practice close to impossible to implement (Mayston 1998).  
Allocating funds according to political patronage has also been associated with a 
range of problems. Electoral or political consideration will often become so influen-
tial that the allocation will tend to be directed towards the needs of the median voter 
(Heald & Geaughan 1994) with the end result being neither efficient nor equitable. 
Such a method, Agyemang (2010) argues, will often lead to an inflation of bids and 
‘pork barrel’ politics which to a great extend will be accompanied by perceptions of 
unfairness and the potential for corruption. Lastly, if the model is based on reim-
bursements of expenditures unintended consequence may also arise. Mere reim-
bursement can namely include budget holder to overstate needs or tasks due to no 
countervailing incentive to moderate such expenses (Smith 2007a:4). Similar situa-
tions can also come about if funds are allocated based on the size of local bids; a 
type of distribution methods which according to Smith et al. (2001:218) often will 
fall short of being efficient or equitable. As a result, formula funding has become a 
widely accepted method for setting the budget of local service providers. 
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Understanding the associated effects of a particular payment method is important, 
in that, as argued by Smith (2007a:18) “precise method of paying may have im-
portant incentive effects for the recipient of funds, over and above the level of fund-
ing” (emphasis in the original). In fact, Barnum et al. (1995: 23) notes, the model of 
payment creates powerful incentives which affect provider behavior and with it the 
quality, efficiency and equitable by which outcomes are delivered. The purpose of 
this chapter is to review and present the general rationales behind, together with the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with distributing funds in accordance to a 
predetermined formula expressed in mathematical terms. The discussion focuses on 
the general aims associated with funding models, namely efficiency, equity and 
managerial accountability, while the more specific educational goals of the Danish 
school system are to be discussed later in connection with the two field studies.   
4.2. FROM FORMULA BUDGETING TO FORMULA FUNDING 
Over time the definition of what constitutes formula funding or formula budgeting 
(the terminology originally used) has changed slightly. Technically, the formula has 
consistently been understood as a decision rule of unspecified complexity and do-
main. This decision rule, Meisinger (1976) noted, is “imposed” on institutions e.g. 
public schools or institutions for higher education, by state agencies and used as a 
mean for generating and reviewing institutional budget requests or parts thereof; an 
understanding which made Meisinger conclude that the formula per se can be un-
derstood as a contract, where institutions in return for agreeing to abide by the for-
mula guidelines expect to receive funding devolved through the formula. Similar, 
Moss & Gaither (1976:550) argued, where the budget per se is the document which 
reflects the approved levels of expenditures, formula budgeting on the other hand 
serves as a mechanism to arrive at these future estimates of expenditure. 
In more resent literature the term formula funding has to a large extent replaced the 
notion of formula budgeting. The terms are similar as can be seen in the definitions 
put forward by Heald & Geaughan (1994:268) and Smith (2007a), the two sets of 
authors mostly used when defining formula funding. Where, Heald & Geaughan 
(1994:268) define formula funding as “a mechanism for the transfer of resources 
from government to public/quasi-public/private bodies which uses an explicit dis-
tribution methodology in order to ensure that the needs of the recipients are taken 
into account”. Whereas, Smith (2003, 2007a) on the other hand defines formula 
funding as “the use of mechanical rules to determine the level of public funds a 
devolved organization should receive for delivering a specified public service”.  
As the earlier definitions of formula budgeting, definitions of formula funding also 
stress the use of a mechanical distribution methodology applied as a mean to allo-
cate funds. Likewise, the definition brought forward by Smith, also stresses the 
contribution of formula funding in making the budget of the local entity; a budget 
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within which, as underpinned in the earlier definitions, the local provider is ex-
pected to fulfill their duties. The formula itself can be a simple rule which allocate 
funds based on e.g. a fixed amount per capita for a specific period of time or very 
complex taking into account a range of explanatory variables (Smith 2007a:5). This 
design decision often comes to depend on the task to be funded, the complexity of 
needs and the political considerations behind. Accordingly, Levačić (2007:209) 
notes, the specific design often boils down to a tradeoff between simplicity and 
sensitivity.  
The replacement of the term formula budgeting in favor of formula funding, ties 
into a larger change in the understanding of the purpose and objectives of public 
sector funding. From a viewpoint where formula budgeting was seen as a mean to 
enable the identification of an equitable, adequate and predictable resource base; 
formula funding increasingly has become a complicated methodology for allocating 
public funds. While, formula budgeting mostly pertained to traditional central ap-
propriation control, characterized by line-item structures restricted to one-year cy-
cles, the aim of formula funding is often ascribed to include a range of purposes, 
including the achievement of particular political goals, increased productivity and 
not at least the strengthening of local managerial accountability.  
This makes Smith (2007b:275) note that: “the overarching objective of formula 
funding [is] to offer appropriate incentives to provide those services in line with the 
payer’s objectives”. The full effect of formula funding, he accordingly notes, can 
first be established when three institutional aspects are in place. 1) The delivery of 
public service must to some extent be devolved, placing the responsibility for the 
actual spending with the devolved organization. 2) A mechanical formula, based on 
adequate data and explicit performance criteria, determining the level of funding to 
be allocated, must exist, and lastly 3) incentives must be in place so that the de-
volved entities will adhere to the financial allocation of the formula (Smith 
2007a:5-7). 
4.3. RATIONALES FOR FORMULA FUNDING 
Improved equity and access to services, high quality and the promotion of effective 
and efficient use of resources, and where appropriate cost containment are often 
ascribed as the main objectives of public sector funding. New Public Management 
inspired reforms have especially stressed the importance of constructing govern-
ance models which simultaneously enable service providers to become efficient and 
productive in their service delivery (see e.g. Hood 1991, 1995; Pollit 1995; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert 2000 for classical literature on NPM and see Lapsley 1999; Broadbent & 
Guthrie 1992; Guthrie et al. 2005 for reviews on public sector accounting reforms). 
This means that funding models are expected not only to promote equitable distri-
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DANISH PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 
56 
butions but also to establish clear lines of accountabilities, while ensuring that the 
specific performance objectives of the service area are achieved (see Fazekas 2012).  
In the context of formula funding, a range of concerns have been identified as moti-
vations for implementation. Ross & Levačić (1999) for example identify effective-
ness, efficiency, equity, integrity and accountability/transparency as main criteria’s, 
while newer literature such as Smith (2007a) and Levačić (2007) stress especially 
efficiency, equity and political arguments as the main objectives. It is these latter 
arguments for implementing formula funding which will be reviewed next.  
4.3.1. EQUITY 
“Needs” and equity are important aspects for understanding why formula funding 
has gained acceptance. In the eye of Meisinger, a main reason for implementing 
formula budgeting was to provide equity, understood as: the same funding for the 
same programs or conditions (Meisinger 1976:30). The ‘need aspect’ is also found 
in the newer definitions of formula funding. Heald & Geaughan (1994) clearly 
underpin this by arguing that formula funding implies taking into account the needs 
of recipients when allocating funds. More subtly included in Smith’s definition 
(2007a), he argues, that an objective of a payer is often to enable all local agencies 
to deliver some “standard” package of service. No matter how this standard is de-
fined, when applied to a locality it implies a certain level of expected expenditure – 
the local agency’s “spending needs” and it is this spending need that the funding 
formula seeks to estimate.  
A well-designed formula, Smith argues, allows funding to flow in proportion to the 
service provided, thus compensating the devolved entities for their users’ particular 
needs and not necessarily for service provided. This type of ‘needs based formula 
funding, Smith (2007b:275) notes, only offers the opportunity to deliver the ex-
pected standard, giving no direct incentives to secure any performance standard 
whatsoever. Nevertheless, since formula funding to a larger degree is able to re-
spond to actual patterns of needs, the actual equity of the formula often becomes a 
central evaluation criteria for judging whether a particular formula is to be deemed 
good, proper, useful or legitimate. 
Equity however is a relative concept, and studies have accordingly discussed its 
meaning and how to measure it (see e.g. Berne & Stiefel 1999:7, Baker & Green 
2008:204). Equity can be understood as, the participant’s perception of a “fair 
share” of a distribution, or as a tolerable level of funding inequality among service 
providers (Meisinger 1976:30). In relation to the first Moss & Gaither (1976:553) 
noted how formula budgeting offers the payer a way to systematically resolve com-
peting claims for limited resources. Put differently, as noted Smith et al. (2001: 
317), formula funding thus allows for a systematic treatment of the budget process 
thereby decreasing the pressure to change or redistribute funds after the budget 
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process has finished. Case-by-case scrutiny of budgets is thus made redundant; 
making the subsequent budgets seem more ‘fair’, as these are unaffected by any 
actions from the budget holder aimed at influencing how resources are allocated.  
In terms of the other ‘equity-understanding’, Mayston (1998) characterizes, formula 
funding as a method which is transparent and objective, and a mean to limit the 
degree of aggregated expenditure. The result of this, Smith (2003, 2007a) argues, is 
an allocation closer to the actual needs of the service area. Depending on the “tech-
nical correctness” of the formula, formula funding can thus facilitates comparisons 
of institutions within and outside the system (Halstead 1974) while recognizing the 
diverse financial needs of the providers (Miller 1964). Yet, the specific type of 
equity sought will depend on the focus of the payer; a focus which will also affect 
whether a distribution is more or less equitable (see e.g. Ross & Levačić 1999). 
Within education funding the notion of equity was first comprehensively addressed 
by Berne & Stiefel in 1984. Here three concepts or measures were put forward: 
equal opportunities, horizontal and vertical equity. Equal opportunities addresses 
the concern that ‘the starting line be fair’ and in particular that there is no discrimi-
nation of the basis of characteristics such as ethnicity, race, sex, income or wealth 
(Berne & Steifel 1984). Yet, in the context of funding the concern for horizontal or 
vertical equity has especially been identified as important for the payer when the 
specific formula is designed (Smith 2007a:67, Levačić 2007:209).  
Vertical equality stems from concerns with variations in outcomes and is build on 
the premise that those in need must be supported proportionately to their needs and 
characteristics. The overall objective will thus be to ensure that all users are able to 
achieve the same education standards (Smith 2007a). In a school setting vertical 
equity can be gained by compensating schools for additional costs associated with 
pupils with special needs. Schools directed towards pupils with severe needs will 
accordingly receive sufficiently more funds compared to school teaching pupils 
with lesser needs (where ‘sufficiently more’ means enough to achieve equal educa-
tional outcomes) (Baker & Green 2008:217).  
Horizontal equity in contrast means that equalization of input is pursued, i.e. equal 
treatment of equals. Input is here held equal while outcomes are unequal (Berne & 
Steifel 1994:406). In education this is done by allocating the same amount to dis-
tricts with the same characteristics e.g. characteristics relating to the cost of provid-
ing basic education such as wealth, size, and socio-demographic status. If consid-
ered to be equal schools will accordingly receive comparable levels of funding.  
Whether vertical or horizontal equity is the objective will depend on the payer’s 
interest in reducing variations in outcomes or in equalization of input (Caldwell et 
al. 1999). In practice, as noted by Smith (2007a:72), an equitable allocation is how-
ever often understood as one which reduces to a ‘reasonable level’ the disparity in 
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spending across school districts. Most formulae thus allocate funds based on a fixed 
amount per pupil (input), thereby assuming average responses to social and eco-
nomic circumstances at an average level of efficiency. 
A range of studies conducted mainly in US using regression techniques has ana-
lyzed whether school formula funding can be deemed equitable (see e.g. Gronberg 
et al. 2004, Imazeki 2007). The application of a student-weighted allocation were 
here shown to enhance the equity of the general allocation. Discussing student-
weighted allocations as an alternative to the traditional staff-based allocation, Miles 
& Roza (1996) for example showed how distributing dollars to schools using a 
student-centric formula (student-weighted allocation) served as way to increase 
equity in school spending. The funding was further made more transparent and 
ensured a greater level of flexibility and accountability for how the resources were 
spent (see also Childress & Peterkin 2004, Hill 2008, Chambers et al. 2010).  
4.3.2. EFFICIENCY 
Efficiency is also identified as a main reason for deploying formula funding. Effi-
ciency is here understood both as the ability of funding to improve allocative and 
managerial efficiency. Managerial efficiency or X-efficiency (Liebenstein 1966, 
1973) is the extent to which budget holders perform specified functions at least 
costs. Formula funding, as argued by Smith (2007a), can ensure this as it creates 
efficient management among local organizations, leading to the creation of clearly 
defined incentives and rules for the setting of budgets for local providers. Put dif-
ferently, formula funding does not only bring about the creation of proper financial 
management and business planning arrangements. When implemented alongside 
decentralization of power, the setting of clear budgetary regimes further offers or-
ganizations freedom to respond to local circumstances, to innovate, and to seek out 
economics of scale (Smith 2007b:279). 
Allocative efficiency on the other hand is the extent to which the allocation of re-
sources is in line with preferences of the society. Allocative efficiency may for 
example emerge as a result of greater parental choice possibilities, illustrating also 
the connection between formula funding and education markets (Bradley & Taylor 
2002:298). An allocative efficient distribution, in other words, can be established by 
aligning the formula’s incentive structures of the formula with the payer’s inten-
tions. The political objectives of a service area, in this way, not only come to guide 
the financial transfers but once the objectives have been set, the fundamental effi-
ciency argument for implementing formula funding, as noted by Smith (2007b), is 
that – if designed properly – it allows the payer to implement an optimal allocation 
in line with the objectives. Any deviations from this will accordingly imply a re-
duced effectiveness by which funds are used, and therefore a loss of efficiency 
(Smith 2007b:277).  
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4.3.3. POLITCAL ARGUMENTS & MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Following the above argument there is thus strong political and managerial ration-
ales for implementing formula funding with a main merit being that funding can be 
used to transfer political objectives to service providers. Formula funding has been 
shown to be a vital catalyst for change, because of its potential for providing local 
providers with specific incentives (Edwards et al.1999; Levačić & Ross 1999; 
Kominis & Dudau 2012). Formula funding can serve contrasting political objec-
tives (Heald & Geaughan 1994:167) and the key challenge thus becomes one of 
successfully designing the formula so that it incourages behavior which will fulfill 
the political set objectives. Because formula funding can be a powerful mechanism 
for motivating behavior it becomes even more important that the funding base is 
aligned with the political set  objectives; a departure from this will not only weaken 
the ability of the formula to induce desired behavior but also reduce the efficiency 
by which funds are distributed. Formula funding therefore can be used to steer local 
behavior, and in the process it can also create clear lines of accountability.  
The importance of politics more generally was present already in the earlier discus-
sions of formula budgeting. Meisinger (1976) for example argued that policy judg-
ment is unavoidable when using formulae to distribute funds, as even decisions on 
what is included in the formula are matters of policy. Formula budgeting, Meisinger 
(1976) argued, is consequently a combination of technical judgments and political 
agreement. Similar arguments are found in the literature on formula funding. 
Hanushek (2006) for example stresses the political nature of determining quality 
standards as an important part of the formula process. Likewise Smith et al. 
(2001:317) note, policy judgments which have important implications for resource 
allocation are needed at all stages of formula funding. This makes the process of 
budgeting and resource allocation, as also noted by Wildavsky in 1975, political in 
nature, especially in a public sector context where budgeting and resource alloca-
tion imply setting priorities and potentially rationing access to public services.  
Formula funding in consequence, is not a neutral and rational process which can aid 
decision-makers in rational decision making (Miller 2001). Rather, Darling et al. 
(1989) argue, formula funding often becomes an instrument of education, social and 
fiscal policies where the incentive structures of the model means that the funding 
mode itself comes to act as a vital mechanism for transferring political objectives to 
the devolved organizations (see also Smith 2007a). By acting as an indirect steering 
mechanism the allocation model can thus influence the behavior of the recipient in 
a way which hopefully is accordance with political set objectives (Broadbent et al. 
2010) Formula funding in other words, becomes a powerful mechanism through 
which the payer can stimulate behavior towards the accomplishment of political 
goals. As emphasized by Brinkman (1984:23) formula funding is thus a standard as 
much as an instrument for resource allocation; and its full contribution is first un-
derstood when also viewed as the centerpiece of bureaucratic decision-making 
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processes. If long-term commitment to a specific model can be established, formula 
funding provides a predictable base for planning and budgeting (Darling et al. 
1989:560). Only if the chosen characteristics upon which the formula is build 
change, e.g. enrollment levels, then the size of funding will change accordingly. 
The allocation thus becomes functionally independent of past resources; although 
correlation between present and past resources may exist if the relevant characteris-
tics upon which the formula is based remains stable (Heald & Geaughan 1994:268).  
If combined with performance measurements and target setting then the politicians 
and public managers should in principle be able to visualize to the public what their 
money is being spent on. Thereby, as noted by Verbeeten (2008), bringing forth 
transparency while also creating accountability for results. Lines of accountability 
are hence made visible, as the devolvement of funds ties together budgetary respon-
sibility and responsibility for actual implementation of the political set goals local-
ly. Providers are accordingly encouraged to find the best, most productive way to 
utilize the resources available and the devolvement of funds is here a crucial mean. 
Political decision-making is however still be a decisive factor in that the overall 
objectives of the service area are othen stated in laws, regulations or in curriculum 
guidelines (Hofstede 1981). However, as political objectives, as discussed by Kerr 
(1975), can be purposely vague and general in nature, not indicating the host of 
decisions and alternatives available for achieving the objectives (Kerr 1975:769), 
the actual implementation is left at discretion of the individual provider. Public 
Management inspired reforms have resulted in a shift from input control to a greater 
focus on output and outcomes (Olson et al. 1998). In a school setting the examina-
tion or tests scores are increasingly used as measures of school success. Simultane-
ously, management by objective is used to ensure the fulfillment of educational 
goal. The use of quantifiable goals has allowed for monitoring and evaluation of the 
extent to which objectives are fulfilled and value for money is achieved.  
The enhancement of central control, as discussed above, follows the general trend 
that the use of formula funding has moved away from its former empowering role 
towards a stronger focus placed upon cost reductions and refinement of central 
control (Heald & Geaughan 1994:267). In this way, formula funding gives way for 
patterns of accountability to rise through the connection of resource allocation and 
the ability of service providers to accomplish the political determined objectives. 
Overall, the resource allocation process thus not only comes to specifies the level of 
funds to be devolved, but also whom in the ‘education production process’ is held 
accountable for how resources are spent. 
4.4. WEAKNESSES OF FORMULA FUNDING  
A range of weaknesses have however also been associated with the distribution of 
funds via formula funding. The following sections present the most vital concerns. 
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4.4.1. DECREASING INPUT AND QUESTIONS OF ADEQUECY 
The linear aspect associated with enrollment dependent formulae can potentially 
pose a problem. Being advantageous for institutions in periods of increasing activi-
ty, where unit cost in general will decrease as a result of economics of scale, it has 
the opposite effect in periods of declining activities (Moss & Gaither 1976:553). 
Formula funding might here effectively prevent the development of new initiatives 
(Moss & Gaither 1976:556) because the funding on its own is only intended to meet 
current fiscal needs. Long-term efforts are accordingly often not included in the 
formula, while major commitments, such as maintenance and utilities, may not 
reduce correspondingly when enrollments decline. Budget saving adjustments may 
as a result be eroded; alongside with fiscal flexibility and at some point the quality 
of service may be compromised (Moss & Gaither 1976:556). 
Question of adequacy may also be raised. Adequacy refers to whether the specific 
allocation is adequate for meeting the intentions behind the allocation model. Here 
an important understanding, as stressed by Allan (1980), is that formula funding 
cannot self-adjust for a basic, improper level of funding. No formulae can thus in 
general resolve problems of severe inadequate funding. This, Darling et al. 
(1989:562) argue, can only be addressed on a policy level.  
School funding studies on adequacy have mainly been conducted in the US with the 
purpose of determining whether a given system provides sufficient spending for 
providing pupils with the opportunity to meet the performance standards set by the 
authorities (see e.g. Augenblick et al. 2002, 2003, Duncombe & Yinger 2000, 
Imazeki & Reschovsky 2004, Evans et al., 1999). These studies have revealed the 
existence of multiplicity of approaches to calculate what constitute an adequate 
level of funding in a given situation, a fact which, according to Downes & Stiefel 
(2008:225), can be ascribed to a lack of a proper understanding of the technology 
linking school inputs to pupil achievements. A substantial attempt to understand 
what constitute an adequate allocation is the Odden-Picus Evidence Based Model 
(Odden & Picus 2008:1). This model, which is based on randomized assignments, 
statistical procedures and best practices, seeks to specify which school level ele-
ments are required in order to improve student outcomes. 
In a UK context, studies on adequacy have mainly focused on the influence of Lo-
cal Education Authorities (LEAs) in determining the specific formula details (West 
2009; West et al. 2000; Simkins 2004; Levačić 2008). Here, as in the US, a general 
concern has been that even if public authorities can determine and allocate the ‘ade-
quate amount’ of resources to providers, factors such as devolution and block grants 
may make it unclear how schools actually spent their resources. For example in 
relation to special needs education where it may be difficult to track whether addi-
tional resources are actually spent on the pupils for which this extra funding was 
intented. Similarly, it may be unclear whether local actions are actually diluting the 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DANISH PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 
62 
original intentions of the allocation. Overall, the literature on adequacy and school 
funding has as a consequence been criticized for a lack of firm knowledge on the 
relationship between in and output (see e.g. Costrell et al. 2008; Loeb 2007; 
Hanushek 2006, 2008). 
4.4.2. QUALITY OF SERVICE  
Another weakness of formula funding is that the methodology on its own gives no 
incentives for quality improvements. In fact, as noted by Smith (2007a:117), the 
incentive structures implicit in most systems of formula funding run the risk of 
compromising the quality of services, defined as their effectiveness in securing 
desired standards. Earlier studies on formula budgeting also expressed concern over 
quest for quality. Gross (1973) for example noted how the use of formula funding 
tends to have a “leveling” effect on providers and their supplied quality. This level-
ing effect, Meisinger (1975) emphasized, occurs when otherwise different service 
providers are subjected to the same distribution methodology; a process, he notes, is 
more likely to be characterized by a leveling down than a leveling up effect.  
As formulae further are ill-suited to reflect non-quantifiable elements, service pro-
viders can be induced to focus exclusively on those things which can be modeled or 
measured in the formula, rather than on those things that “should be considered” 
(Allan 1980). The reward structure inherently built into the formula (either implicit 
or explicit) will in other words encourage certain behavior and service providers 
will in the process tend to develop programs and practices that produce the maxi-
mum results under the actual formula. Lastly, albeit this is not the fault of formula 
budgets per se, there is a tendency, Allan (1980) argues, to use formulas as a mean 
for budget control – that is to use the formula budget (in essence, a requesting de-
vise) – to exert control over the internal allocations and spending. With the conse-
quence that the budget comes to act as a straight-jacket on local managerial action. 
4.4.3. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Although formula funding appears objective and less political than other funding 
methodologies, politics are, as already mentioned, still an inherent part of formula 
funding. Although funding formulae cannot make policy decisions, they are embod-
ied. The ramifications of which are often not foreseen (Miller 1964). Formula fund-
ing, to a large degree shift the level of politics to the more technical level – a level 
associated with the mathematic relationships of the formula.  
Further albeit formula funding can make accountability patterns visible, it can also 
be a mean to devolve responsibility downwards away from the politicians; in fact 
Heald & Geaughan (1994:269) stresses “formula funding divert argument into the 
bases of distribution away from an exclusive focus upon the outcome of the distri-
bution process and allow particular outcomes to be defended on the grounds that 
the rules and procedures are ‘fair’”. The use of formula funding can accordingly 
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detach distribution decisions from decisions on aggregates, and in the process mak-
ing these operate on different time tables. Decision-makers thus distance them-
selves from the responsibility of the impact of aggregate-constraint distributions. 
Credits for the totals can thus be claimed by the payer, whilst blame for the detailed 
impact can be deflected to the funding body. This behavior is, according to Heald & 
Geaughan (1994: 269), especially pronounced in a situation of resource withdrawal.  
The payers can, in other words, to some extent decouple themselves from the con-
sequences of the allocation model, instead placing the responsibility for the subse-
quent results on the local management (see also the discussion in Weaver (1986) on 
blame avoidance as a policy motivation or Verbeeten 2008). This redefines the 
power relation between the payer and budget holder, in that, the latter is assigned a 
less secure and predictable funding base, whilst the payer is able to practice a much 
more direct structuring of incentives in light of its’ current objectives.  
The significance of power relations between the actors involved in the formula 
design was studied by Agyemang (2009, 2010) and Edwards et al. (1996). Here, it 
was shown how politicians often seek to retain discretion over the determination of 
the specific coefficients used in the formula. The power relation between the funder 
and budget holders was in this context very important for how the final result of the 
formula came to be (Levačić 1992, Edwards et al. 1997, Agyemang 2010). The 
final allocation making up the service providers formula budgets, in other words, 
came to represent both the substance and result of a political bargaining process 
(see also Cyert & March 1963). A process where different interest groups seek to 
influence both the formula design and goal setting process.  
Being a result of a political bargaining process is though not exclusively a bad 
thing, as this may also be a way to ensure long-term credibility. The payer, Smith 
(2007a:140) for example notes, will be more likely to feel ‘bound’ to the distribu-
tional rule if involved in the process. If doubts are cast about the long-term credibil-
ity of the distributional rule this will affect the ability of the formula to stimulate 
desirable behavior (Andersen et al. 2010:35). ‘Principal-Agent’ theory predicts that 
economic incentives are only expected to work if employees are convinced that the 
financial reward will be released for behavior which should trigger the reward 
(Prendergast 1999:7). Accordingly, Jan (2003:271) notes, an economic incentive is 
completely unreliable if the financial reward is triggered independently of the in-
centive scheme. Politicians should accordingly be careful with using additional 
funding schemes or make alterations affecting the actual level of funding supplied. 
In the long run such actions will not only question the credibility of the formula, but 
also the non-dispensability of it. Formula funding can, however, if the formula is 
credible and combined with relative precise forecasts of future demand, give service 
providers a relative stable base upon which to plan and if necessarily to adjust their 
spending accordingly (Christensen 2008:91).  
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4.5. PAYMENT METHODS OF FORMULA FUNDING 
So far the chapter has presented general rationales behind, together with advantages 
and disadvantages associated with formula funding. In order to conclude the chapter 
the two main payment methods (Smith 2007a:39ff) applied in the context of formu-
la funding will be presented, namely case- and capitation payments.  
4.5.1. CASE PAYMENTS 
When using a case payment approach for the distribution of funds budget holders 
are reimbursed on the basis of some measure of output, that is, a measure of the 
actual local activity, for example a count of service users. The usual approach, 
Smith (2007a:47) notes, is to reimburse according to the expected expenditure of a 
service user, which means that in order for case payments to work, specific crite-
ria’s under which a user is entitled to receive a service must be specified in ad-
vance. And this must be accompanied by a scheduled fee for such services. Provid-
ers are then reimbursed according to the fee when providing services to a user.  
Case payments are especially relevant when unambiguous indicators of service 
needs can be established. In a situation where users are reasonably homogeneous it 
may be feasible to apply a single case payment for all users – often however this is 
not the case – and case payments are accordingly often tailored to the specific needs 
of the users. This can be done by incorporating ‘risk adjustment’ schemes which 
ensure that each payment type varies according to the dependency of user’ needs 
(Smith 2007b:280). The main objectives for using case payments are to encourage 
local agencies to increase the number of service users and to implement efficiency 
improvements so as to reduce unit costs (Smith 2008:28). 
In school funding case payments are often used because the number of pupils en-
rolled, or the number of classes established, is easily verified. The aggregated for-
mula budget is accordingly found by inferring each case payment to the actual 
needs of for the pupils, giving a budget which varies with actual needs. Case pay-
ments accordingly satisfy the ‘need criteria’. Reimbursing according with the actual 
number of users has however been found to be problematic and vulnerable to the 
creation of perverse and unwanted incentives. It can for example encourage unde-
sirable stimulation of demand and the count of activity can become vulnerable to 
fraud in situations where such counts are difficult to verify. Further, since the indi-
vidual payer often does not know the demand in advance it can be difficult to con-
trol the aggregated expenditure satisfactorily.  
In a school context the use of case payments is however widespread since these 
disadvantages to a large degree can be avoided. Not only are the number of pupils 
more or less outside the control of the local school, but the reported numbers can be 
more satisfactorily verified and audited, and are predicable to a high degree of accu-
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racy by the payer (Levačić & Ross 1999). Under such circumstances, Smith 
(2007a:46) notes, it would actually be perverse of the payer to rely merely on esti-
mates of the expected number of users.  
4.5.2. CAPITATION PAYMENTS 
Smith (2007a:41) defines capitation payments as “the amount of public funds to be 
assigned to a person with certain characteristics for the service in question, for the 
time period in question”. The method reimburses according to the expected level of 
local activity, which means that the payer seeks to estimate a budget holder’s ex-
pected level of output and to reimburse accordingly. Capitation payments conse-
quently satisfy the most common objective of allocation, namely that of ensuring 
that equal funds are directed towards individuals, in equal circumstances, regardless 
of where they live.  
The most rudimentary way to pay a locality when using capitation payments is to 
reimburse an equal amount per head of that population. Making the expected level 
of activity an estimation of the actual level of service, a service provider is to pro-
vide, at a given standard of service (Smith 2007a:39). In contrast to case payments, 
which are attached to specific users, capitation payments are attached to every 
member of the population “at risk”. The payer thus seeks to fund the locality purely 
as a risk pool. This makes the allocation independent of the specific level of output 
(e.g. pupils enrolled) and providers are paid a fixed amount pr. potential user. The 
budget thus represents a spending ceiling (Aas 1995:206) or can be described as a 
block payment consisting of the aggregated capitation payments, with possible 
adjustments to the expected level of service expenditure. This fixed global budget is 
accordingly found without reference to actual service use (Smith 2007a:5). This 
gives the following equation for the budget for the devolved organization i: 
             
  
  
   . 
where, Ni is the number of clients for which organization i is responsible for, c is the 
capitation formula and   
  a vector of characteristics of client j (Smith 2003:305). 
Similar to case payments, a capitation approach, is justified when the expected 
service use is not substantial different across users, or when the socio-demographic 
profiles of budget holders are the same. As this if often not the case risk adjustment 
schemes are implemented in order to account for variations in expected spending 
needs. A modest refinement can here be to confine the population ‘at risk’ to any 
obvious demographic stratum, from which service users will be drawn. In school 
funding it is for example common to distribute in accordance with the estimated 
number of children; since this measure better captures the population to be funded. 
The payments are often further adjusted in order to account for more subtle varia-
tions in expected spending needs (Smith 2007b:284), for example by taking into 
account variations in age, gender or socio-economic characteristics of the pupils. 
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The effectiveness of the method will depend on how successfully the payer can 
adjust the capitation payment to account for variances in population characteristics 
(Smith 2007a:46). The general objective for using capitation funding is accordingly 
to reimburse budget holders for variations in needs and not so much to encourage 
efficiency among the local organizations (Smith 2007b:284). The method is thus 
often preferred as it reduces the reliance on output data provided by the budget 
holders; in turn reducing the opportunities and incentives for manipulation and 
fraud. 
In sum, case and capitation payments constitute the main methods for distributing 
funds. Yet, due to the stark incentives associated with pure case and capitation 
methods a mix of payments is often used (Barnum 1995:23). A formula may thus 
consists of different components, with the resulting formula budget being the ag-
gregated total of these discrete budgets, which may be directly related to distinct 
purposes (Levačić & Ross 1999:38). Depending on the intention of the payer a 
more or less vast part of the education funds can be allocated through the formula. 
Yet, since the major efficiency benefit arises from the presumption that schools are 
better judges of their spending needs, the effectiveness of the formula and the asso-
ciated incentive structures are likely to diminish, the more funds are to be allocated 
through other types of mechanisms. Accordingly, the larger the proportion of funds 
which is included in the formula, the greater the efficiency gains are likely to be 
(Levačić 2007:218). 
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Part II   Theoretical framework & Methodology 
 
Part II contains the dissertation’s theoretical and methodological chapters. The first 
three are theoretical chapters, each of which addressing different aspects of the 
proposed relationship between political objectives, the formula funding model, its 
inherent incentive structures and the resulting managerial practice.  
- Figure II.1   Chapter content following the proposed relationship between political 
objectives, the formula funding model, its inherent incentive structure and the re-
sulting managerial practice 
Focusing on the technical aspects of formula funding models, Chapter 5, identifies 
and discusses the main elements of formula funding models, arising respectively 
from the formula itself and from the related control components. In the final part of 
the chapter these findings are gathered and discussed within the context of under-
standing the formula funding model as a ‘package of controls’. 
Chapter 6 analyses the incentive structures and behavioral responses most com-
monly associated with the components making up formula funding models. The 
point of departure is the identified rationales for implementing formula funding, i.e. 
efficiency, equity, accountability. Questions of quality and productivity are also 
included. The chapter thus studies how otherwise intentions can be reinforced or 
thwarted by specific design choices.  
Chapter 7 combines the results of the two previous chapters into a framework for 
local managerial practice. Two control characteristics are here proposed to be the 
main levers for influencing local managerial practice, that is, the level of budgetary 
risk and the level of competitive pressure introduced.  
Chapter 8 finally presents the methodology for the study of formula funding mod-
els in practice. Discussing the choice of qualitative field studies, the chapter also 
presents the overall research design, the two municipal settings as well as the type 
of data collected.
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CHAPTER 5.       FORMULA FUNDING MODELS – A 
PACKAGE OF CONTROLS  
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The formula funding model used to allocate funds from the payer/local authority to 
the providers of public services constitutes the main mechanism for management 
control in a public sector context. Not only does the model specify the basis upon 
which funds are allocated, it also frames the decision-making scope available to 
service providers. A formula funding model is in this dissertation thus proposed to 
consist of more than the formula applied for allocating funds. Rather, it will be 
argued, that the total control package, making up the formula funding model, con-
sists of a range of different control components or practices, which in their entirety 
establishes the frame in which service providers can and are to act. The purpose of 
this chapter is to identify and discuss the main control components making up a 
formula funding model applied in a Danish education funding context. Relating to 
different parts of the funding model, some components springing from the budget-
ary part of the model, others are more internally oriented relating e.g. to the scope 
of local decision-making – both budgetary and education-related responsibilities. 
Yet, other components relate and illustrate the payer’s intention to create competi-
tion between service providers. Combining these results the final section will dis-
cuss this within the understanding of viewing the formula funding as a package of 
controls. 
It is important to note that the results are affected by the context in which they are 
studied. Firstly, as formula funding is the predominant methodology applied in a 
Danish education context, the chapter focuses entirely on this distribution method-
ology, drawing mainly from education funding literature; albeit when relevant 
themes from health care and higher education are also included. The control com-
ponents discussed do not claim to represent an exhaustive list of all possible control 
components of funding models. However based on an extensive literature search the 
components cover the main parts, with key contributions from Heald & Geaughan 
(1994), Pedersen et al. (2006), Smith (2007a), Levačić (2007) and articles from 
Handbook of Research in Education Finance and Policy (Ladd & Fiske (eds.) 
2008). Secondly, the results are affected by Danish legislation, which means that 
the findings may not be directly transferable to other service areas or countries. 
Further following the definition brought forward by Grabner & Moers (2013) a 
management control package is understood to represent the complete set of control 
practices in place in an organization, thereby mirroring the organization’s control 
environment. In contrast to a management control system which, the authors argue, 
is formed if the practices are interdependent and the design choices take these inter-
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dependencies into account, the control package represents the complete set of con-
trol practices in place, regardless of whether these are interdependent and/or the 
design choices take interdependencies into account. Where the management system 
is designed with the intention of creating complementarity and a maximization of 
“performance” by (simultaneously) deciding on multiple control variables (Grabner 
& Moers 2013:408) the control package is not per se designed with the intention of 
creating interdependency and goal congruence among control practices. Rather the 
package is understood to be composed of a set of management control systems 
and/or a set of independent management control practices addressing potentially 
unrelated control problems. In this way, management new control practices can be 
added or others re-designed without taking any interdependencies into account 
(Grabner & Moers 2013:408).   
5.2. FORMULA COMPONENTS AND DESIGN CHOICES IN 
SCHOOL FUNDING 
In shaping a school formula funding, I propose that three important design deci-
sions have to be made. Summarized in Textbox 4.1 these sub-decisions respectively 
relates to, how much of the payment is to be pupil dependent, the devolvement of 
special needs funds and the precision of the model in meeting actual needs. Each of 
these aspects is shortly review below. 
-  Payment per pupil 
-  Devolvement of funds for special educational services 
-  Model precision 
- Textbox 5.1   Design choice decisions related to the formula components 
Design decision 1 – payment per pupil 
In a Danish public school context the main unit of funding is the individual pupil, 
the ‘class’ or a combination hereof (Ministry of Finance 1995:71). The specific 
design choice thus comes to reflect the major decision, what is the object for fund-
ing? Choosing the pupil, a class or a combination hereof means that funding here, in 
opposition to for example university funding, is not tied to performance levels. In 
university funding a range of different types of funding formulae has been identi-
fied, including enrollment or staff based formulae or performance incentives formu-
lae, where funding is based on performance. Combined with other types of formu-
lae these latter allocate a part of the funds on the basis of performance (Darling et 
al. 1989:560-61).  
From an effectiveness point of view, tying funding to outcome (e.g. grades) rather 
than output (e.g. enrollments) is a mean to motivate schools to maximize their edu-
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cational effectiveness However, formulae based on outcomes have due to problems 
of deciding what an appropriate outcome measure is, taking into account the equity 
point of view, not been implemented. Yet, the payer in the context of school fund-
ing still enjoys considerable flexibility in the mode of implementation (John & 
Ward 2001:308). The specific mix of payment components can accordingly vary 
greatly between payers. The specific choice of payments is however crucial in that 
the interplay of incentives across payment modes can affect both positively or nega-
tively factors such as referral rates for special needs education and the level of cost 
in general (Barnum 1995:39).  
As seen in Diagram 4.1 the funding formulae are basically made up of two compo-
nents; a pupil dependent and one which is not, giving the formula budget equation:  
             , 
where X denotes the number of funding units (pupils or classes), that is, the coeffi-
cient, α, specify the amount a school receives each year per pupil or class while β is 
a fixed allotment independent of pupil numbers. 
 
- Diagram 5.1   Core formula components and effect of pupils numbers 
The payer can freely decide the size of α thereby implicitly determining the size of 
the allotment β, as the total resources for the general teaching in generally is fixed. 
α is often adjusted according to the particular grade form and the larger α the more 
comprehensive the budgetary effect will be of enrollment or dis-enrollments. Thus, 
depending on the payer’s intention to for example encouraging competition the first 
allotment component can be more or less vast. 
The allotment β is as mentioned independent of pupil numbers and may instead be 
allotted based on for example historical or incremental cost considerations. As 
shown by Levačić (2007) β often includes funds for administrative personnel, fi-
nancial accounting or building maintenance. Such decision can however clash with 
the intentions of creating efficiency. The major efficiency benefit from using for-
mula funding arises from the presumption that schools are better judges of their 
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expenditure patterns, thus allocating funds through fixed item appropriations may 
hamper the general effectiveness of the formula and diminish the intended incen-
tives structures. Thus, Levačić (2007:218) notes, the more funds that are pupil de-
pendent the greater the efficiency gains are likely to be. 
Design decision 2 – devolvement of special educational costs 
The second design choice relates to how much funds for special educational ser-
vices are to be devolved to schools, including for example funds for inclusive-
seeking services, for special needs education given within the mainstream environ-
ment or for special needs education provided in special needs schools or classes. 
The individual municipality can freely decide how much is to be devolved to the 
schools and thus how much is to be retained and funded by the administration.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 the division of financial responsibility for special needs 
funds is very important to consider. Because the schools through the devolvement 
of funds and responsibilities not only are expected to be able to tailor more precise-
ly their services to the needs of pupils, but their local sense of accountability in 
terms of how funds are spend is also expected to be raised.  
Design decision 3 – Model precision 
The third sub-decision addresses the general precision of the model, that is, how 
precise the allocation, whether based on case or capitation based payments, meets 
variations in actual needs. If users are reasonably homogeneous it may be feasible 
to apply the same payment for all. Often however, this is not the case. Thus, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, risk adjustment schemes can be introduced so 
that the specific case or capitation payment comes to vary according to the depend-
ency of user’ needs. This for example can be done by taking into account variations 
in age, gender or socio-economic characteristics of the pupils. When determining 
the specific patterns of responsibility, the framework conditions e.g. socio-
economic, are often adjusters of costs. Because if not taken into account, severe 
differences in equity can arise across budget holders. For example if schools are not 
compensated fairly for the severity of user needs this can come to affect the quality 
of service given (Bækgaard & Jakobsen 2011:3). 
The use of risk adjustment schemes is however not unproblematic, due to the ten-
sion between wanting to model the expected expenditure accurately against the 
desire to avoid inappropriate incentives. ‘Risk adjusters’ should consequently be 
plausible, in the sense of being manifest drivers of expenditure, that is, as argued by 
Smith (2007a), actual drivers of the associated costs of delivering the required ser-
vices. They must accordingly be outside the control of local organizations, prevent-
ing thereby illegitimate drivers of cost influenced by the organizations’ own policy 
choices.  
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5.3. COMPONENTS DETERMINING THE SCALE OF BUDGET-
ARY DEVOLVEMENT  
The specific formula design and scale of allocation is affected and reflected in the 
appropriation level chosen in the specific municipality. An appropriation refers to 
the authorization and permission to incur obligations and make payments. In a Dan-
ish public sector context the Administration Act for the Danish municipalities pre-
scribes that the municipal boards holds the final appropriation authority. This means 
that other administrative levels, whether it is the program committees or the indi-
vidual service provider may not spend or obligate more than appropriated by the 
municipal boards. Actions which will lead budget holders to incur revenues or ex-
penses not appropriated in connection with the yearly budget process may thus not 
be implemented until the board has granted the needed appropriation (§40 stk.2).  
An appropriation does not mean an actual setting aside of cash, but represents in-
stead the prescribed limit for spending in a specified period. Appropriation is thus 
the authorization for a specific budgetary unit to make expenditures or to create 
obligations, from a specific fund, for a specific purpose. Although the final authori-
zation authority is held by the municipal board, the board can choose to devolve 
their budget authority to lower levels of governance. In this way the level of appro-
priation determines the scope of decision-making power in terms of how funds are 
to be spent and who are allowed to make decisions of budgetary importance. 
Through the specific level of appropriation, the board thus determines to which 
administrative level funds and responsibilities are to be devolved.  
Danish municipalities have free range over how their organizational structure is and 
accordingly the specific level to which budgetary authority can be granted may be 
different in practice from one municipality to the other. A high appropriation level 
means that the municipal council funds on a general level without precise specifica-
tions or bindings. A program committee can for example be given an overall sum of 
funds which they subsequently can prioritize between different purposes and ser-
vice areas as they choose. The board can also choose to assign more than one allot-
ment to the committee thereby specifying which amounts are to be used for which 
purposes. Also appropriations can be assigned directly to the specific administrative 
level of the given service area or to the individual service provider, giving the spe-
cific administration or service provider the freedom to dispose over and prioritize 
how these funds are to be spent within the allotted appropriation. The competences 
and responsibility for the actual use and defrayments is thus placed on the level to 
which the appropriation is granted (Heeager & Olesen 2014:109).  
A low level of appropriation on the other hand means that the municipal council 
leaves little room for how funds are to be spent. In principle the council can specify 
how much funds to be used on each line-item. The council can for example specify 
appropriations for books at each school or require that all transfers of funds be-
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tween schools must be approved by the council before they can take place. For 
example, when pupils move between school districts within the municipality. The 
council can here decide that such transfers have to be approved before funds can 
follow the child. With a low appropriation level the council is thus involved in the 
decision-making process, potentially leaving few decisions at the hand of the pro-
gram committee or local service providers (Heeager & Olesen 2014:149ff). The 
level and scale of appropriations thus comes to influence the size of the allotments 
and how tied-up resources are to specific purposes, an aspect which will be further 
discussed later in relation to the budgeting process. 
The budgetary allocation model determined by the formula thus reflects the budget-
ary authority placed with the service providers, illustrating the scope of budgetary 
responsibility locally. Yet, it also demarcates the actual units for funding. In a 
school context this often comes down to a decision between whether it is the chil-
dren living in the district or the children enrolled in the particular school. This is 
important, in that, the funding unit frames which pupils the individual school is 
responsible for and more indirectly which pupils in principle should be enrolled in 
the school. Based on a cost containment perspective it can, if districts are assumed 
to be similar in terms of socio-economic conditions, be feasible to allocate special 
need funds on the basis of the number of children living in a district rather than 
actual enrollments. In this way the allocation comes to be based on expectations of 
need, a decision which as discussed can incentivize budget holders to be cost effec-
tive. On the other hand it can also potentially lead to a decoupling of local decisions 
over service levels and budgetary responsibilities; a decoupling which is otherwise 
often not encouraged.  
Albeit the formula at the outset illustrates the scope of financial responsibilities 
devolved, cost sharing arrangements are often implemented between the payer and 
the provider in order to share the financial risk. Such arrangements, Newhouse 
(1996) stresses, are often implemented in order to reduce the actual level of risk 
stemming from for example variations in numbers and severity of user’ needs. Cost 
sharing arrangements, in other words, basically augment the main allocation and 
transfer risk, held by the budget holder, back to the payer; this for example in order 
to avoid that the costs of specific pupils with severe needs will overburden the indi-
vidual school. Cost sharing arrangements can take many forms and vary in terms of 
coverage (Smith 2007a:107). ‘Cost matching’ for example is a type of arrangement 
through which the payer/administration pays a proportion of all incremental ex-
penditure beyond some threshold. ‘Stop-loss arrangements’ entail that the payer, 
for some ‘particular users’, retain the full responsibility for all expenditure in excess 
of a fixed amount. Lastly, so-called ‘carve outs’ revert the full financial responsibil-
ity for specific users or services to the payer (Smith 2007a:107-108). These ‘carve 
outs’ methods are often implemented when a small number of service users, with 
very severe needs, accounts for a large proportion of the unpredictable variation in 
expenditure. In a school setting the cost of pupils with severe learning disabilities 
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and handicaps is for example often covered by such arrangements. Special needs 
schools for example will often be excluded from the main allocation, with the total 
budgetary responsibility instead placed within the municipal administration. Cost 
sharing arrangements are thus important, in that, they come to change the base of 
the distribution. Any augmentations to the base allocation will introduce with it new 
incentives for the budget holder. Incentives which might have great effects on the 
behavior of these (Van de Ven & Ellis 2001). Any such arrangements should there-
fore be implemented with care and a clear understanding of the incited structures. In 
all, the specific level of appropriation and the prevalence of cost sharing arrange-
ments thus affect how much funds are actually devolved, and through this the size 
of the final allotment. 
Overall, as summarized in Textbox 4.2 this makes the specific appropriation level 
and funding object chosen as well as the scope of devolvement and the number and 
types of cost sharing arrangements important factors to consider when studying 
funding models.  
-  Appropriation levels 
-  Funding object – district children or pupils enrolled 
-  # and types of cost sharing arrangements 
- Textbox 5.2   Control components affecting the scope of devolvement  
5.4. COMPONENTS RELATED TO THE BUDGETING PROCESS 
One of the main functions performed by formula funding is, as argued by Smith 
(2007a:5), its contribution to the setting of a budget for a local service provider; a 
budget through which they are expected to fulfill their duties, either in the form of 
provision or purchasing of public services. But along with the setting of the budget 
comes a range of control related components which relates to the budgeting process 
more broadly. Inducing for example whether providers are allowed to make carry-
overs or not, the definiteness of the spending frame, the type of appropriation given 
as well as the type of budget constraints placed upon the providers. 
When the budget for the municipal accounting year is approved (no later than 15
th
 
of October) it contains the budget of authorizations for the following fiscal year as 
well as budget estimates for the next three. Appropriations are usually granted for 
one year at the time although some capital appropriations can be granted for multi-
ple years and extended in the form of a sum of money set aside each year. The 
budget also outlines the administrative level to which the appropriation is given, the 
items it is to cover and the size of the specific allotment as well as whether the 
appropriation is given as a gross or net appropriation (Heeageer & Olesen 2014: 
108). 
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Seen from a time dimension point of view one has to distinguish between the budg-
et, an appropriation and the final/annual account. While, the budget per se is the ex 
ante estimation of future expenditure and revenues for a particular accounting peri-
od, appropriations, as described in the previous section, refer to the authorization 
and permission to incur obligations and make payments and as such do not mean an 
actual setting aside of cash. The final or annual account lastly expresses the actual 
expenditure incurred in the period relevant for the appropriation.  
In a school setting, it is important to note that, the annual budget and the program 
year – here the school year – ascribes to two different time periods. The annual 
budget covers the calendar year from January to December, whereas the school year 
in Denmark begins in August, ending in June the following year. Thus, the appro-
priations are approved in October and the provisional budget or spending frame of a 
school is set at some point in the spring, prior to the upcoming school year (see 
Figure 4.1). The annual budget thus comes to encompass two different school years 
and with it possibly different funding bases. Depending on how sensitive the model 
is to actual changes in activity (e.g. enrollments) the spending frame of the school 
may have to be adjusted continuously throughout the school year. If adjustments are 
incorporated this will affect the definiteness of the preliminary spending frame and 
with it the uncertainty of the actual size of the final budget. 
 
- Figure 5.1   Time dimensions relating to budget, appropriations and annual ac-
counts in a school setting 
The budget also outlines whether appropriations are given as a gross or net appro-
priation. This refers to whether the individual budget holder is allowed to spent 
resources not included in the budget. Appropriations are usually separated into 
expenses and revenues [bruttobevillings-princippet, gross appropriations], which 
means that additional revenues not appropriated in the budget may not be retained 
by the budget holder. Unspent funds must accordingly be returned to the admin-
istration or program committee. Budget holders are thus not allowed to spend any 
amount – not even unspent funds coming from the previous year – until appropriat-
ed in the form of a supplementary appropriation by the municipal board.  
Appropriations can also be granted as net appropriations [netto-bevilling]. In con-
trast to the previous approach, this means that the amount appropriated is concerned 
with the net costs, that is, the difference between the expected expenses and reve-
nues. In situations where actual revenues exceed that of the budgeted, service pro-
Budget Annual account Period 
1/1 1/1 
Provisional budget/spending frame for the schools 
School year 
1/8 1/8 15/10 
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viders are here allowed to spend the surplus income on for example increased ex-
penses. Albeit the efficiency argument could support such appropriations, gross 
appropriations are the standard choice. Ansbøl (2014:139) attributes this to the fact 
that the way in which increased revenues is obtained can be just as politically inter-
esting as the way in which a specific appropriation is spent. Allowing providers to 
obtain increased revenues can thus from a political point of view be so vital that it 
must be made on a political level, for example is cases of increased user’ fees.  
Although the general principle of gross appropriations means that unspent funds 
must be returned, the board can permit the transfer of unspent funds to the follow-
ing budget year. That is allowing service providers to save-up unspent resources or 
allowing that additional expenses can be financed by drawing on the following 
years appropriations. Such carryovers de facto expand the otherwise appropriation 
and budget time horizon and can allow providers to accumulate or run down fiscal 
balances. Such decisions inherently reduce the associated risk of the one year budg-
et cycle, reducing the potential chock arising from sudden changes in activity or in 
the ‘severity of needs’. Allowing carry-overs can thus be a way to instill a more 
long-term budget focus with providers thereby enabling them to accumulate larger 
sums which can be used to acquire items or activities which would otherwise not be 
possible within the one year budget. On the other hand, also deficits must be carry-
forward. The precise scope of such carry-overs can, according to Smith 
(2007a:106), thus be very influential on the subsequent behavior of the budget 
holders, in that, it can be more or less attractively to spend to the limit.  
Lastly, the type of budget constraints created is important. This refers to the payer’s 
response to a lack of budget compliance from the part of the service providers. 
When setting the budget ex ante it is based on expectations of future demands. Ex 
post or during the course of the budget period it might become clear that the budget 
cannot be met. In this situation, Pedersen et al. (2006) suggest, there is in principle 
two possible responses for the payer – a hard and a soft. In a system characterized 
by hard budgetary constraints (‘hard budgets’) budget compliance is indispensable 
and providers will thus find it difficult to get remission for potential budget over-
runs (Barnum et al. 1995:30). Such systems are often characterized by tight budget 
control, a controlled intake of activity and specific sanctions following overspend-
ing. Hard constraints may therefore prompt a minimizing of costs, but may also 
affect the quality of services negatively if the amount allocated is inadequate.  
Conversely in a model characterized by soft budget constraints (‘soft budgeting’) it 
will be comparatively easier to get ‘forgiveness’ for overspending. In this instance 
the spending frame will often be viewed more symbolic than binding, reducing the 
extent to which the budget will be used as a control tool. The intended efficiency 
will thus be threatened because the local management will experience few con-
straints on resource use (Barnum et al. 1995:30. A lack of sanctions will, according 
to Smith (2007a), generally affect the effectiveness of the funding model, in that, 
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service providers who incur no consequences for exceeding the budget might not be 
so inclined to enforce strict budget control. If the general feeling of the service 
providers is that they will be saved by additional allocations, their incentive to 
comply with the budget will be small. This threatens the credibility of the entire 
budgeting process. Not only does it run the risk of becoming a mere ritual (Smith 
2007a) but it also jeopardizes the general perception of fairness, and may as a result 
affect the motivation of budget holders.  
Overall, the four identified control components relating to the budgeting process, 
see Textbox 4.3, reflect the core dilemma when constructing funding models name-
ly that the need for central control and transparency often come to clash with the 
desire for funds to be spent efficiently and with great local flexibility. Allowing 
carryovers or net appropriations may for example blur the insight into how many 
funds an organization actually has at its disposal; a factor which can easily under-
mine the otherwise informative and managerial value of the budget. Strict control in 
contrast also brings about undesired intentions in form of for example incentives to 
spend to the budget. A type of behavior which will advocate a more flexibility ap-
proach to be adopted (Christensen 2008:106).. 
-  Definitiveness of the spending frame  
-  Gross or net appropriations 
-  Carry-overs 
-  Type of budgetary constraints 
- Textbox 5.3   Relevant control components accompanying the budgeting process  
5.5. SCOPE OF LOCAL MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND AU-
TONOMY 
As discussed above, the local decision-making scope is at the outset affected by the 
type of appropriation given and the size of funding devolved. But it is also affected 
by a range of other decisions which relate to budgetary and education-matters. 
Overall, these considerations relates closely to the general discussions of the appro-
priateness associated with devolving responsibilities to lower levels of governance.  
The literature on public sector governance has brought forward advantages and 
disadvantages associated with decentralization and the devolvement of responsibili-
ties (see e.g. Pollitt 2005:377). Decentralization is often promoted as a way to en-
sure that decisions are made closer to users. This, it is argued, improves the alloca-
tive efficiency in the sense that services provided will be better matched to the pref-
erences of users (Barankay & Lockwood 2007:1198). The local management will, 
due to their closer connection to the service users, possess deeper knowledge on 
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user demands and preferences, compared to the more distant administration. As a 
result local decision-making will be more responsive and better in-tune with the 
needs of these (Ouchi 2003). Similarly Glennester (1991:1269) argues, because 
current and relevant information on budgetary, pedagogical and academic matters is 
likely to be more present at the local level, it is generally desirable to anchor the 
decision-making power locally. Competition and quality improvements are, in this 
way, also expected to emerge through the enhanced autonomy scope, in that, pro-
viders will be encouraged to develop different types of services, opening up for a 
wider range of options for the users. From the perspective of users this will improve 
the possibility of finding services which match their personal preferences. Service 
providers will in turn have an incentive to do their best and tailor their services to 
local preferences in order to reduce the probability that users will seek services 
elsewhere (Heeager & Olesen 2014:164).  
Further, by linking decision-making power and responsibility locally, accountability 
for spending can be created. This, Pollitt (2005:378) argues, will increase the flexi-
bility by which funds are used and encourage the establishment of innovative solu-
tions. Hence, although the enhancement of local decision-making power might 
imply loss of central control it is generally considered a necessary price to be paid 
(Levačić 2007). Combined with formula funding decentralization of decision-
making, Smith (2007a:31) stresses, is thus expected to improve not only allocative 
but also managerial efficiency. In that, formula funding helps promoting efficient 
management in local organizations. Along the same lines, Levačić et al. (2000) 
argue, that formula funding when combined with decentralization of responsibilities 
improves the utilization of resources and direct resources to specific learning priori-
ties, which in the end will promote not only efficiency in use, but also the general 
equity of results. Proponents of enhanced local autonomy in a school setting thus 
argue that, decentralization of responsibilities will enhance the equability, efficien-
cy and effectiveness, as well as, the general responsiveness of the education system.  
Decentralization of decision-making has however also been found to affect nega-
tively the general equitability of public services, in that, the individual user may 
experience that they, because of their geographical location or specific needs, do 
not have access to the same levels of services as others. The individual service 
provider may, due to self-interests, lose interest in the broader system, leading to 
sub-optimization at the expense of broader efficiency and municipal concerns.  
The size of the budget holders is in this context important in terms of the gains 
associated with decentralization. As the size of the budget holder decreases the need 
for prudent levels of financial balances increases, Smith (2007a:107) notes, ascrib-
ing this to fact that smaller organizations are more vulnerable to unexpected ex-
penditure shocks. Small units may further erode the benefits intended from decen-
tralization (Baxter et al. 2000), in that, economics of scale may become difficult to 
attain and transaction costs may also be greater in the smaller units. The individual 
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budget holder, here a school, might further come to experience difficulties in build-
ing up and retaining a critical mass of experts (Pollitt 2005:381). Larger organiza-
tions conversely come with the expectation of economic of scale to be created. That 
is, in terms of teaching where higher class averages are more easily obtained in 
bigger schools, but also in terms of building maintenance and cleaning (Blom-
Hansen 2004:260). Economics of scale is however not automatic, and the intended 
effects may diminish after a certain point. Larger organizational units may even be 
accompanied by extra cost in terms of additional control and coordination systems, 
intended to ensure that the desired services are supplied at a satisfactory level. In 
larger organizations the lines of accountability for both employees and service users 
may further become somewhat unclear. Thus, a tension between creating units large 
enough to bear the budgetary risk (which could favor larger organizational units) 
while simultaneously securing a strong accountability structure (which often favors 
small units) arises (Smith 2007a:115). 
An applicable mean to enhance the local decision-making scope is to allow budget 
holders to deploy line-item discretion. Line item discretion refers to whether budget 
holders are allowed to spend funds differently from what was otherwise appropriat-
ed in the budget. Proponents of line-item discretion accordingly argue that this is 
favorable precisely because the local management processes more relevant and 
current information. Line-item discretion is, according to Heald & Geaughan 
(1994), a way of reducing the risk connected tight central control and is often ad-
vanced as a tool to avoid transfers becoming a complex web of detailed grants and 
payments. Line-item discretion augments the prescriptions and appropriations and 
introduces what Heald & Geaughan (1994) term a ‘veil of ignorance’. This ‘veil’ 
allows recipients to spend resources on a somewhat different pattern (provided of 
course that the statutory and/or contractual obligations are fulfilled) thus opening up 
for a more flexible use of funds together with a softening of the impact of the fac-
tors upon which the allocation was originally made (Heald & Geaughan 1994:268).  
The local decision-making scope may however here be restricted by other factors 
such as for example municipal purchasing agreements, specifying where certain 
services or goods are to be purchased. Albeit, such arrangements are entered into 
with the purpose of coordinating public purchases so that efficiency and reduced 
transactional cost can be achieved, they can, from the perspective of the individual 
management team, come to limit the local ability to determine freely local services.  
The local decision-making scope must however also be evaluated in terms of educa-
tion related matters. Here the policy autonomy enjoyed by the service providers, 
understood as the ability to affect and decide upon the content of the services deliv-
ered, is important. Policy autonomy is, according to Smith (2007a:107), a vital 
factor in determining the risk endured by the service provider. In situations where 
service providers are subjected to hard budget-constraints combined with low poli-
cy autonomy an unexpected spending shock will leave the budget holder with two 
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choices; 1) It can continue to deliver the standard level of services, in which case it 
will overspend its budget, or 2) it can reduce its’ standard of service. With full au-
tonomy a service provider may be able to absorb imperfections in the funding for-
mula by e.g. varying its levels of service. If however the payer leaves little room for 
discretion over the services provided or from the performance standards expected, 
the financial risk will increase correspondingly.  
In a Danish school setting, a range of legislative decisions affect the local decision-
making scope in terms of content and organization, and thereby diminishing the 
actual policy autonomy enjoyed. This includes legal requirements for the content of 
education, mandatory subjects, a minimum number of weekly lessons to be taught 
and ensuring that the teaching fulfills the Common Objectives for each subject as 
specified by the Ministry of Education. Service providers may further potentially be 
subjected to a broad set of objectives and requirements set by the local municipali-
ty. Public schools are thus made accountable to both central and local authorities, in 
regards to the content of education and the organization of it. 
Textbox 4.4 summarizes the main control components, which together with the 
appropriation level chosen and the size of devolvement affect the local scope for 
managerial discretion and autonomy. 
-  Line-item discretion 
-  Purchasing agreements 
-  Level of policy autonomy 
- Textbox 5.4  Components affecting the scope of managerial discretion & autonomy 
5.6. QUASI-MARKETS & OPEN-ENROLLMENT AS MEANS TO 
COMPETITION 
The creation of competition, in the form of offering users a choice of services, with-
in a local market of providers, is often a favored mechanism for stimulating perfor-
mance improvements. With formula funding, Levačić (1995) notes, comes the dis-
tinguishing feature of a “separation of purchaser from provider” and with it the 
potential for an “element of user choice between providers” to be created (Levačić 
1995:167). In the Danish education system, competition and choice are introduced 
through for example publicly supported private schools. These receive, a part from 
permission to charge users’ fee, a public subsidy per pupil enrolled for running 
expenditures. In 2013 the subsidy amounted to 72 % of the cost of a public school 
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pupil8. This de facto voucher system, Andersen & Serritzlew (2007:340) note, 
makes private schools a competitive alternative to public providers (see also 
Steuerle et al. 2000 on the effects of vouchers on competition).  
Private schools must abide by the same standards as public schools, which mean 
that they must meet certain professional standards with respect to curricula and 
teaching. The choice of school so expanded enable parents to choose educational 
services based on specific pedagogical, religious, ideologies or political preferences 
(Andersen & Serritzlew 2007:353). In 2005 parental choice was further enhanced 
by an open enrollment clause in the Education Act which gives parents the possibil-
ity to chose any public schools, also outside the home-municipality. This, makes 
Nannestad (2004) note that the possibilities for creating ‘quasi-markets’ for educa-
tion exist in a Danish context.  
Through the separation of purchaser and providers a competitive provider or ‘quasi 
market’ for public services can be created. A market which is expected to counter 
and obviate some of the efficiency problems otherwise associated with public ser-
vice delivery (see e.g. Glennester 1991; Bartlett et al. 1998). The markets are ‘qua-
si’ in nature because they differ from conventional markets from both a demand and 
supply side perspective. Also the payer is in effect an agent of central or local gov-
ernment (Le Grand 1991). Albeit the markets consist of independent institutions 
competing for contracts, these organizations are not necessarily seeking to maxim-
ize profit, nor are they necessarily privately owned. Likewise from a demand side 
perspective the consumer purchasing power is not expressed in money-terms. Ra-
ther it takes the form of an earmarked budget or ‘voucher’ confined to the purchase 
of specific services (Le Grand 1991:1260). Lastly, being publicly financed the mar-
kets are inevitably subjected to government intervention and regulatory frameworks 
(Cutler & Waine 1997:54). Indeed quasi-markets can be established in an education 
context, in that, increasing emphasis on enhanced user choice, made possible 
through open enrollment clauses, opens up for competition to be created.  
Competition is from a theoretical perspective expected to bring forth a range of 
virtues, including decentralization, enhanced user choice, diversity of providers and 
not at least high quality of service (Cutler & Waine 1997:54). Not only is competi-
tion to extend user’ choice, giving these real power (improvement of the allocative 
efficiency). But competition is also expected to bring about a more equitable result, 
because, as Le Grand (1991:1263) words it; in the battle for resources “the unco-
operative, the insensitive and the recalcitrant will lose out, while the helpful, the 
considerate and the flexible will flourish”. Competition, Heald & Geaughan 
                                                          
 
8 The government has decided to reduce percentagewise the subsidy grant given to private 
schools from 75 % in 2010 to 71% in 2014. 
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(1994:267) suggest, is thus a mean to discipline providers, making them more effi-
cient and quality oriented (see similar arguments in Friedman 1955 on school 
choice, or Chubb & Moe 1999; Hoxby 2000; Neal 2002). Thus, through quasi-
market for public services the lack of competition usually characterizing the public 
sector may be amended (Bartlett et al.1998); creating with it, a more efficient use of 
economic resources (improvements in X-efficiency (Liebenstein 1966, 1973).  
When studying the actual effects of competition the expected merits are however 
questionable and not necessarily obtainable. Le Grand (1991) e.g. stresses, that 
privatization may in fact create an upward pressure on costs. Not only will it require 
resources when setting up the needed infrastructure, enabling these markets to oper-
ate efficiently. Competing institutions will also tend to spend resources on advertis-
ing and other measures, intended to increase their market share. Any of such cost 
may not be wasted, but the cost has to be set against any eventual gains in efficien-
cy. As quality of output moreover is difficult to assess focus on the quality or quan-
tity of inputs will often arise (Le Grand 1991:1264), which as will be discussed may 
bring along unintended, adverse behavior from the part of the budget holder.  
The ability of competition to improve allocative efficiency may further be question-
able and come to depend on whether the market actually gives parents a wider 
choice of providers. The existence of competition in one location may not neces-
sarily mean that new private providers will set up in more sparsely populated areas. 
Transportation vouchers are here often used as a tool to widen the choice of 
schools, at least geographically. In reality there may however still be considerable 
cost in terms of travel time and inconvenience, barriers which effectively restrict 
choice and therefore competition (Goodin et al. 1985). Appropriate information 
upon which informed decisions can be made is also needed in order to create the 
incentives for improved quality of service. Performance data Smith (2007b:290) 
notes, must exist; a type of data which will enable the creation of informed choice 
and the possibilities for benchmarking.  
West & Pennell (2000) showed how information made available through the publi-
cations of performance related results guided parents in their choice of schools. The 
‘threat of exit’ by parents, the authors note, encouraged schools to improve perfor-
mance. Conversely, Gill & Booker (2008) questioned, whether the ‘threat of exit’ 
was not in fact a way to undermine the political responsiveness of schools. That is, 
promoting ‘exit’ over ‘voice’ for only the most active families, while the rest which 
encompass a population of “non-choosers” were left to the public schools. These 
pupils and their schools, the authors stress, might as a result be left substantially 
worse off if all of the most motivated and best-informed families have exited to 
schools of their own choice (Gill & Booker 2008:184). Similarly Fiske & Ladd 
(2000:250-51) conclude: competition does not “lift all the ships” but has a negative 
impact on schools with the lowest performing rates, since these schools may have 
difficulties in attracting academically gifted pupils. Studies on the effect of user 
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choice have revealed similar problems. Where open enrollment in general is viewed 
as a tool and important precondition for competition (Friedman 1955) the idea of 
completely free, unlimited enrollment does not exist. Because, as noted by Bartlett 
(1993:150) “the door is firmly closed once a school [is full]”. For ‘popular’ schools 
this may encourage an increasingly ‘selective’ admission policy, which can lead to 
cream skimming and increased inequality. 
The effect of competition has also been studied in a Danish school context (see e.g. 
Nannestad 2004; Andersen & Serritzlew 2007). Similar to the studies cited above, 
these have also experienced difficulties in detecting the proposed positive effect of 
competition. Nannestad (2004) found that poor quality in public schools increased 
private school enrollments, without however finding a discernible effect back to the 
quality of the public services provided. This made him conclude that the mere ex-
istence of private providers may not in itself imply that there is actual competition. 
If the market is characterized by a sort of ‘market segmentation’ where private 
schools primarily cater to the needs of specific groups and minorities, the existence 
of actual competition is questionable (Nannestad 2004). Andersen & Serritzlew 
(2007) further found that private school competition did not improve the achieve-
ments of public school pupils. Instead, it was shown, competition in fact increased 
the public expenditure per pupil enrolled in the public school; leading the authors to 
suggest that: “when faced with competition, public schools are not able to improve 
quality but expenditure per student increases” (Andersen & Serritzlew 2007:353).  
As can be seen, diverse opinions exist on the actual effect of competition, especially 
when it comes to determining the deeper effect on the quality of public services 
delivered (see e.g. Smith 1994; Smith & Meier 1995; Wrinkle et al. 1999; Bishop 
2000). Severe methodological difficulties, relating to problems of endogeneity, 
cream skimming and choice of control variables have here, according to Andersen 
& Serritzlew (2007:336 or Jepsen 2002) affected the ability of the studies to uncov-
er these effects. Further the mere existence of private providers may not implicitly 
entail the existence of a competitive provider market.  
Competition however is often understood to be vital lever from a political point of 
view. Thus, the argument in this dissertation is that the characteristics of the specif-
ic market must be studied in order to determine whether the grounds for effective 
competition exist. Moreover, albeit not being a control component, per se, the gen-
eral competitiveness of a market is also influenced by the number of users available 
to compete over. Accordingly, the following components, see Textbox 4.5, must be 
studied when evaluating the competitiveness of an education market. 
-  Type of private school competition 
-  Open enrollment clause 
-  Geographical dispersal of school providers 
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-  Transportation costs to be covered 
-  Number of children 
- Textbox 5.5   Relevant control components affecting the general competitiveness 
5.7. SYSTEMS FOR EVALUATION AND CONTROL 
Although, formula funding is advanced due to its ability to transfer political objec-
tives to providers, the specific level of funding is rarely connected directly to educa-
tion results. Few attempts have been made to tie together directly levels of funding 
and performance outcomes. The American ‘No Child Left Behind Act’ of 2001 here 
constitutes an exemption, linking funding and pupil’ test scores requiring each state 
to assign rewards and sanctions based on whether schools made ‘adequate yearly 
progress’ in a given year (Figlo 2003). Therefore, the incentive for quality control 
must come from elsewhere. Here the payer’s objective is often to design a payment 
mechanism placing all organizations on a level playing field, giving, as noted by 
(Smith 2007a:145), them the funds needed to secure a specified performance stand-
ard so that “[p]erformance reporting and yardstick competition can then operate 
effectively, because any variations in achieved performance should be directly 
attributable to the actions of the management rather than a shortage of funding 
Thus, albeit funding is not tied directly to education results, an incentive for quality 
improvements can nevertheless be created.  
Because formula funding, as discussed above, by itself may not give direct incen-
tive for upholding quality, but rather in fact may lead to a leveling down effect in 
terms of quality provided (Meisinger 1975) other types of control and accountabil-
ity mechanisms are often implemented alongside formula funding models. This in 
order to ensure that budget holders uphold a continuous focus on the objectives and 
quality goals et by the payer. In fact, Smith (2007a:46) emphasizes, performance 
measures, quality standards or audits are vital and needed in order to ensure that the 
quality of service is not compromised. And from a political point of view Andrews 
et al. (2011) notes, information on the performance of public providers has become 
a basic political demand and tool for holding service providers accountable (see 
also Verbeeten 2008).  
Accountability is here understood as the obligation to report, explain, justify and 
answer questions about how resources have been spent and to what effect. Thus it is 
seen as a vital mean to sustain or raise quality of local services. By subjecting ser-
vice providers to external reviews the institutions are forced to examine their opera-
tions critically, with the hope of making the accountability measures work as regu-
latory devises. Thus, depending on the type of control conducted by the reporting 
institutions, accountability can be transferred to service providers. This is especially 
prevalent when combined with line-item discretion and enhanced local autonomy.  
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Problems and discussion however often rise in relation to actually measuring fac-
tors such as quality, efficiency and productivity in a public sector context. Often, as 
argued by Wilson (1989), it is easier to monitor or evaluate whether the ‘correct’ 
procedures have been implemented rather than reviewing the quality of the results 
produced. However as noted by Kaplan (2001) and Atkinson et al. (1997) qualita-
tive performance measures are needed in order maintain (or improve) the long-term 
effectiveness of the organization. It is thus crucial, as argued by Vanbeeten (2008: 
431), that the performance measurement system is able to identify (long-term) qual-
ity differences in output, ensuring that this information becomes an integral part of 
the performance measurement system (see also Henley et al. 1992). An overempha-
sis on ‘quantity performance’ (measures) may namely entail that the increase in 
quantitative performance (efficiency, number of units produced) will be achieved at 
the expense of quality performance (operational quality) (Henley et al. 1992; Carter 
et al. 1992) or innovation and long-term effectiveness (Newberry & Pallot 2004, 
2005, 206; Newberry 2002).  
The effectiveness of the implemented control system thus comes to depend on 
whether there is concordance between what is understood to be quality and what is 
actually chosen as measures of quality, and likewise whether the depth of investiga-
tion clarifies the link between effects, activities and budget size (see e.g. Bjørnenak 
(2000) for an analysis of how a cost driver concept may be applied in a school set-
ting). 
-  Quality of the control systems implemented 
- Textbox 5.6   Characteristics of the control systems implemented 
5.8. UNDERSTANDING THE FORMULA MODEL AS A PACKAGE 
OF CONTROLS 
This chapter has identified and discussed the technical components making up a 
formula funding model. Figure 5.1, summarizes these components, thereby, pre-
senting what is proposed to be the package of controls. Although so far examined 
on an individual basis the components are to be considered as a unit or package, in 
that, they can be interrelated or even interdependent, that is, one component may 
dictate the design or specification of another. Thus, corresponding to the under-
standing of what constitute a package of control, brought forward by Grabner & 
Moers (2013), the control components of a formula funding model represent the 
complete set of control practices in place, regardless of whether they are interde-
pendent and/or the design choices take interdependencies into account. Implying 
that the management control package is composed of a set of management control 
systems and/or a set of independent management control practice, addressing possi-
bly unrelated control problems (Grabner & Moers 2013:408). 
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Formula Funding model 
Formula related components 
- Payment per pupil 
- Devolvement of funds for special educational services 
- Model precision 
Components specifying the scope of budgetary devolvement  
- Appropriation levels  
- # and types of cost sharing arrangements  
- Funding object – district children or pupils enrolled 
Components relating to the budgeting process 
- Definitiveness of the spending frame 
- Gross or net appropriations 
- Carry-overs 
- Type of budget constraints 
Components affecting the scope of managerial discretion and autonomy 
- Line-item discretion  
- Purchasing agreements 
- Level of policy autonomy 
Components affecting the level of competition  
- Type of private school competition 
- Open-enrollment clause 
- Geographical dispersal of school providers 
- Transportation costs to be covered 
- Number of children 
Systems for evaluation and control 
- Quality of control systems implemented 
- Figure 5.2   The control components making up the overall package of controls 
In practice various combinations of the control components are likely to be found, 
as particular mix of controls may vary between models due to freedom of decision-
making of Danish municipalities when it comes to matters of organizing, prioritiz-
ing and funding. Depending on the specific choices made by the payer, intended or 
not, each component can take on different forms. For example, the specific level of 
appropriation may differ. However no municipality can decide not to specify the 
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level of appropriation, nor can it refrain from specifying whether line-item discre-
tion or carry-overs are to be allowed or not. Thus, it is argued, the above identified 
components are an inherent part of any formula funding model. They are thus pro-
posed to be mandatory, albeit not unchangeable or predetermined. The components 
however are proposed to constitute the basis package of control, making up a for-
mula funding model in a Danish public school context, albeit they of course are not 
claimed to be all-encompassing, in that, a funding model in practice may consist of 
other control components as well. 
The actual mix of control components will however influence the relative im-
portance and effect of the individual sub-element, in so far, that specific design 
decisions accompanied by its incentive structures may obscure the effect of other 
components. In a situation characterized by a low level of appropriations, a decision 
to allow line-item discretion over the remaining funds may influence the local be-
havior less, than if the municipal board uses a more general approach to appropria-
tions; since the former appropriation level by default has reduced the local decision-
making scope. Likewise, allowing line-item discretion in a situation characterized 
by hard budgetary constraints may reduce the relative budgetary risk placed on 
providers. Whereas a decision not to allow carry-overs will make the effect of the 
budgetary constraints relative harder as the margin for compliance becomes nar-
rower. The specific mix can consequently produce both negative and positive syn-
ergy (Jaworski 1988). The latter to such an extent that complementarity, in the 
sense that the presence of one element increases the value of others, can be created 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1992, 1995; Ennen & Richter 2010). However negative syner-
gy can also occur, in that, the intended effect of one element is decreased by the 
presence and design of another.  
All in all, this underlines the importance of viewing the formula funding model as a 
package of controls and, as argued by Pedersen et al. (2006:125), the full set of 
incentives brought upon services providers can only be understood when studying 
the components as a unit. The package-notion accordingly facilitates and ensures 
that all relevant components and incentive structures are taken into account and 
studied when analyzing the behavioral effect of the funding model. Consequently, 
the study of formula funding models cannot be confined to an analysis of individual 
control components. Rather, in order to understand the full set of incentives associ-
ated with a specific model the entire package of controls has to be addressed. If not, 
important incentive structures may be over-looked and as a result misspecifications 
may occur. 
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CHAPTER 6.     INCENTIVE STRUCTURES & BEHAV-
IORAL RESPONSES 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The policy objectives of public sector governance revolves around ensuring equity 
of and access to high quality of services and likewise the promotion of effective and 
efficient uses of resources, and if appropriate cost containment. The incentive struc-
tures created by the formula funding models are here vital, in that, specific design 
choices may encourage different behavioral responses potentially in or out of line 
with the set objectives. Some incentives can be said to be intended and proper, serv-
ing to ensure the fulfillment of the payer’ objectives, yet others however are more 
unintended and even adverse, and can potentially thwart the overall intentions of the 
model. A precondition for understanding the full set of incentives associated with a 
given formula model is thus that the incentives structures associated with the indi-
vidual control components are well understood. 
This chapter discusses the incentive structures of formula funding models. The point 
of departure is the previously identified rationales for implementing formula fund-
ing, i.e. pursuits for efficiency, equity, accountability, although questions of quality 
and productivity will also be included. The discussion does not claim to represent an 
exhaustive list of associated responses. But contains the main issues discussed in the 
context of funding and behavior, drawing upon relevant literature rooted in different 
research streams, including management control literature e.g. Covaleski et al. 
(2007) and Locke & Latham (2002), literature on formula funding (Smith 2007a), 
and when relevant literature from health care such as Hood (2006, 2007) and Peder-
sen et al. (2006). 
6.2. BEHAVIORAL THREATS TO EFFICIENCY, PRODUCTIVITY 
AND QUALITY OF SERVICE  
Productivity, efficiency and quality are high priority outcomes in the delivery of 
public services and a formula funding model may here contain incentives which 
promote such intentions. Yet, as will be discussed next the funding model may also 
bring about responses which will thwart these objectives.  
6.2.1. PRODUCTIVITY AND ACTIVITY LEVELS  
Incentives for productivity can be said to be beneficial if they encourage providers 
to become cost-effective and innovative in their service delivery. If however, pro-
viders in their quest to minimize cost and uphold a high level of productivity restrict 
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specific users from the services, this is not the case. The funding model must conse-
quently incentivize budget holders to deliver the proper level of services needed.  
The fundamental difference between case and capitation payments here creates dif-
ferent incentives. The part of the model which takes into account enrollments comes 
to resemble a case payment approach and depending on how sensitive it is to actual 
enrollment levels a direct link between local activity/output and the subsequent 
funding received can be created. The size of the pupil dependent allotment is hence 
very influential, in that, the larger the budgetary effect of an extra enrollment is, the 
more vital it is for the provider to uphold high enrollments. This case payment in-
spired approach will consequently tend to stimulate demand, as long as the payment 
received is larger than the costs associated with the extra intake. Thus, as long as the 
cost associated with an extra increased is covered this should in principle incentivize 
providers to compete over pupils. Combined with a competitive provider market 
where providers by default cannot be sure that all potential users will enroll in the 
school, a lower level of enrollments will have immediate effects on the size of the 
allotted budget. Accordingly, providers will not be concerned with investing in pre-
ventive measures or otherwise seek to keep in check local demand (Smith 2008), but 
rather be prompted to focus on enrollment numbers.  
If parts of the funding are allocated through capitation payments, e.g. funds indented 
to cover special needs education, opposite problems can arise due to the placement 
of risk. Because linked with capitation payments are incentives for prevention and 
cost control. Incentives which potentially can thwart the motivation to keep a con-
stant focus on enrollments and further endangering that all have the same access and 
that the needed services will in fact be delivered. With capitation based funding 
providers are expected to cover the needs of all potential users within the allocated 
budget and since, budget holders receive the same amount regardless of actual en-
rollment numbers the payment consequently offers no incentives to stimulate local 
demand. In fact, Smith (2007b:289) argues, it might even encourage service provid-
ers to depress the use of services as a mean to endure the strong budgetary risk.  
From a broader welfare economic point of view cost containment is beneficial if it 
prompts providers to implement cost-effective initiatives. But if legitimate service 
users are denied access or their needs not sufficiently met, this type of behavior is 
problematic. In the context of special needs education, capitation payments have 
been found to affect the delivery of local services. Studying the effect of a state 
capitation reform Dhuey & Lipscomb (2009) revealed how the new capitation pay-
ment system not only changed prior patterns of use but also affected the local incen-
tives for identification and diagnoses of needs. Again, such behavior can be said to 
be proper if leading to more precise responses to needs, but will probably be deemed 
unacceptable if it incentivizes budget holders to depress needed services. Also in 
health care examples have found where capitation funding shifts local attention from 
potentially adverse focuses on the number of cases treated, to a focus on prevention 
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of communicable diseases, for which there are clear prevention opportunities (Smith 
2008:5). Thus, designed properly the fixed budgets, associated with capitation pay-
ments, are likely to stimulate preventive measures, and a desired reduction in de-
mand for treatments.  
There are thus arguments for and against a strict focus on service activities. A blind 
increase of activity may lead to unwanted services, because this will uphold or cre-
ate a larger budget base and the spending of excessive resources on attracting poten-
tial users. Hence, an incentive for prudent resource utilization and cost-control must 
be created. It is therefore crucial that the drivers of costs are ‘legitimate, that is, not 
driven by adverse action by service providers, e.g. over identification of needs or 
excessive levels of service delivery. An important payer’ concern is here that the 
actual causes and drivers of activities can be verified. In terms of enrollments this is 
unproblematic as enrollment numbers are subjected to a high degree of accuracy and 
are easily checked. Whether prudent behavior is prompted my here rather depend on 
how closely the model takes into account changing enrollments. If however part of 
the special needs education budget is based on case payments problems concerning 
fraud or manipulation can arise (Smith 2007a:46-48). The existence of asymmetric 
information between the payer and provider, together with potentially different and 
more subjective diagnosis, may here incentivize the budget holder to provide unnec-
essary services if reimbursed with an appropriate case payment or it can lead to 
attempts to up-code pupils in order to receive the higher possible payment per pupil. 
6.2.2. EFFICIENCY & COST CONTROL – UNIT OR TOTAL COST? 
Creating virtuous incentives for efficiency and cost control are crucial from a broad-
er welfare economic viewpoint. The specific level of appropriation here becomes 
important, in that, a high appropriation level in combination with wider local discre-
tion is expected to have implications for managerial efficiency. Not only is these 
factors expected to better the utilization of resources, as the knowledge possessed by 
the management is assumed to be more in tune with user needs and preferences, but 
when coupled with competition it can motivate providers to do their best through the 
tailoring of services to local preferences (Glennester 1991). 
The two funding methods again bring with them different incentives, reflected in the 
focus and type locally conducted cost control. Under case funding budget holders 
usually have an incentive to reduce unit costs. This, Smith (2008:28) notes, is how-
ever only so if surpluses can be retained by the budget holder. Simultaneously, case 
payments will give few incentives for cost containment of total cost levels. This, 
Aas (1995:210) argues, is due to the counter incentive created for increased activity. 
The incentive to focus on total cost is conversely prevalent with capitation based 
payments. Health care literature shows how capitation schemes have been imple-
mented as a mean to change incentives from a focus on each activity, to instead a 
focus on the whole pathway, i.e. the total episode of hospital care (see e.g. Aas 
1995). Capitation payments thus tend to incentivize budget holders to reduce overall 
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cost, in that, the budgetary risk associated with the generating of costs is placed at 
the local level. Put differently, providers are, under the assumption that they are 
allowed to keep unused resources, given a financial incentive to minimize costs, in 
order to maximize the difference between revenues and expenditure. Thus, Barnum 
et al. (1995:30) argue, capitation payments can induce providers to become innova-
tive in introducing cost-reducing measures or implementing lower-cost alternative 
treatment settings and prevention measures. As such, the devolvement of funds, 
either through case or capitation payments, is expected to lead to a more efficient 
outturn, albeit with different focuses and end results.  
In the context of school funding an important aspect of cost control is that of decid-
ing on the number of pupils per class. Since the number of pupils per teacher is the 
main determinant of the economic costs of education, class size is an important 
managerial concern (Krueger 2002:7). Some funding models, as explained, allocate 
funds based on classes and here the specific size of a class may not be as influential, 
compared to a model based exclusively on the number of pupils enrolled. In fact it 
may even be preferable to establish an extra class as this will trigger extra funding. 
Much academic attention has been directed towards answering the question: what 
constitutes appropriate class size? Leading to studies on efficiency, cost-
effectiveness and quality in the context of class sizes. Some studies have concluded 
that there are no significant effect of larger class sizes on pupil’ outcomes 
(Hanushek 1998; Hoxby 2000), whereas others have demonstrated that smaller class 
sizes enhance pupil outcomes (e.g. Angrist & Lavy 1999; Krueger 1999, 2003; 
Sander 1993; Urquiola 2006; Jepsen & Rikvin 2009). Yet, other studies have found 
that small class sizes are important for specific groups of pupils and in specific sub-
jects and also from the point of view of the teachers (see e.g. Akerhielm 1995:229). 
This has made Hanuschek (2002:39) note that class size discussions have come to 
represent an important political battlefield, where the appeal of class size reductions 
depends on the perspective of the specific stakeholder. A principal of school for 
example will often see larger class sizes as means to create economics of scale, 
whereas politicians will tend to use the introduction of class size restrictions as a 
convenient policy instrument for gaining voter support (Hanuchek 1999:131; 
2002:62). From the perspective of the teachers smaller class averages will often be 
closely linked to quality with the argument that smaller class sizes will offer the 
teacher more time per pupil. But, Hanuchek (2002:29) argues, higher averages will 
at the same time also be a mean to ensure a continuous demand for teachers. 
6.2.3. QUALITY SKIMPING OR DEMAND INDUCED QUALITY 
Albeit having touched upon the fact that formula funding on its own gives no incen-
tives for quality improvements, the specific reasons for this must be studied further. 
As emphasized by Smith (2007a:117), most formula funding schemes run the risk of 
compromising the quality of service, defined as the models effectiveness in securing 
desired standards. In fact, both case and capitation payments have been found to 
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induce providers to skimp on the quality of the service provided. As pure capitation 
payments assign a set fee per pupil, regardless of their actual needs, the providers 
may become incentivized to suppress activities or skimp on quality in order to han-
dle the budgetary risk placed on them due to this uncertainty of demand and needs. 
Case payments likewise may lead to decreasing quality. Indeed, Smith (2008:30) 
notes, case payments rarely create incentives for considering the ultimate outcomes 
of the pupils, which means that the providers accordingly often are incentivized to 
stint on the quality of service delivered. This is especially prevalent if no quality 
constraints are placed on them. Regardless of the payment method, additional con-
trol systems must therefore be implemented in order to ensure that services are de-
livered to the standard expected. As discussed such measures can include perfor-
mance measures, quality standards and audits (Smith 2007a:46). 
Quality incentives can however also arise from a demand side concern, that is, in 
response to competition. Competition is, as discussed, expected to incentivize ser-
vice providers to improve quality in order to better their competitive capacity. By 
default this will of course be most effective under case payments as providers here 
are compensated for their actual enrollment/activity levels. In this context, the abil-
ity of public providers to respond to competition from private schools becomes im-
portant. If unable to change their way of operating or if decisions on curriculum, 
teaching methods and class sizes are determined centrally, the ability of the individ-
ual public school to counter competition may be hampered (Chubb & Moe 1980). In 
consequence Glennester (1991) argues, devolvement of local managerial decision-
making is a necessity, although not a sufficient condition, for a true quasi market to 
emerge, and with it, for competition to have a positive effect on quality of services. 
As discussed, the mere existence of private schools may not imply enhanced compe-
tition, especially in cases where informed choice cannot be made or where the mar-
ket is characterized by ‘market segmentation’, the connection between competition 
and service quality may not be realized. When private schools primarily cater to the 
needs of specific groups or minorities the main reason for choosing such private 
‘special purpose’ schools will often have little to do with the quality of public 
schools. Hence only creating weak, if any incentives for quality improvements. 
6.3. BEHAVIORAL THREATS TO EQUITY AND EQUAL ACCESS  
Creating equitable distributions of and ensuring equal access to services are distinct 
public sector concerns. As discussed formula funding is closely related to the pursuit 
of equity and improvements in allocative efficiency, in that, formula funding can 
ensure that the allocation of resources is in line with societal preferences, that the 
individual needs are properly addressed and that a wider choice of providers can 
exist. Allocative efficiency may here emerge through the possibility of greater pa-
rental choice made possible through open enrollment, enabling them to send their 
child to the ‘right school’ (Bradley & Taylor 2002:298). Adverse incentive struc-
tures can however also be created. As discussed below, incentives can come to com-
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promise the pursuit of equity and equal access and any such deviations from the 
original intentions will, as argued by Smith (2007b:277), imply a reduction in the 
effectiveness with which funds are used and therefore a loss of efficiency.  
6.3.1. CREAM SKIMMING 
Research, conducted mainly in an American health care context, analyzing the effect 
of payment types on user treatment has led to the study of the concept: cream skim-
ming. Cream skimming refers to the (de)selection of particular users at the expense 
of others. Studies have shown how more ‘lucrative patients’ have been treated at the 
expense of patients with severe needs (Akerhof 1970; Ellis 1998). Cream skimming 
can take on many forms, e.g. treatment selection (‘horizontal’ cream skimming) 
where only the more lucrative and less severe users are treated or through ‘vertical 
cream skimming’ where patients are selected within the aliment group (Levaggi & 
Mintefiori 2003).  
Similar behavior has been found in a school context (Gennester 1991; Bartlett & Le 
Grand 1993; Figlio & Stone 2001). In fact, Whitty (1997:14) notes, cream skimming 
is a major issue in most education markets, and represents, according to Le Grand & 
Bartlett (1993), the biggest threat to equity in quasi-markets. Because with cream 
skimming there is a clear danger that socially segregated systems may be created 
(Bradley & Taylor 2002:299), which may hamper the general equitability and equal 
access to services. In particular if test scores are used as benchmark of education 
quality, schools, which have successfully cream-skimmed academic gifted pupils, 
will appear relatively more successful. This may make them seem more attractive to 
potential users and more likely leave them with a somewhat easier and more 
straightforward task compared to the rest. The danger of cream skimming, Pedersen 
et al. (2006:66) emphasize, is thus a vital factor to consider when designing funding. 
Regardless of whether the allocation is based on capitation or case payments, formu-
la funding will when combined with open enrollment in principle induce service 
providers to cream skim users with the lowest associated cost. With capitation fund-
ing this is especially prevalent because service providers have to do with a fixed 
budget, based on expectations of needs and activities. The budget holders may ac-
cordingly be incentivized to cream skim pupils with the lowest costs in order to 
reduce the high budgetary risk placed upon them. Case payments come with the 
same set of incentives, especially if the payments attached do not compensate fairly 
user needs. Thus inadequate funding will in general prompt cream skimming behav-
ior and in turn potentially affect which pupils are enrolled (Smith 2007a).  
Whenever variations in expenditure exist, budget holders will have strong incentive 
to seek out private information about potential users, in order to enhance the credi-
bility of the estimated costs (Van de Ven & Ellis 2001). This incentive is reinforced 
as the unit of devolution decreases. Not only will the relative budgetary risk be 
greater for smaller units, but the more devolved a system becomes, so does increase 
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the potential for asymmetric information (Smith 2007a:112). As, smaller units are 
more likely to possess extensive private, informal information about potential users, 
making cream skimming more likely to occur. 
Two options are proposed as means to reduce cream skimming. The first suggests 
the introduction of pro-competitive regulation, which according to Barros (2003: 
420) involves implementing open enrollment rules in combination with case pay-
ments. The second relates to the precision by which actual needs are captures 
through e.g. adequate risk adjustment schemes including refinements of the capita-
tion payment, or through an imposition of some sort of high-risk pooling (see e.g. 
Newhouse 1998; van de Ven et al.1998). On one, side the precision by which actual 
needs are met by is important for ensuring that all potential users are equally attrac-
tive to the providers. However, the finer the gradation becomes the more the pay-
ment comes closer to mere reimbursement of providers’ actual expenditure. A type 
of funding where the other rationales for formula funding may disappear. 
In Denmark cream skimming is limited by law, in that, all public schools are obliged 
to enroll any pupil belonging to the district who applies for enrollment. Thus, insti-
tutional rules influence the local decision-making scope and public schools can 
therefore not refuse home-district pupils, making them so to say “educators of last 
resort” (Bergström & Sandström 2001:41). Open enrollment possibilities however 
affect slightly the possibility of cream skimming, in that, schools are not obliged to 
enroll pupils from other districts if the specific class is full. Private schools are how-
ever not bound by the same institutional rules, which means, that they more freely 
can influence which pupils are to be enrolled. This is often noted as important factor 
when comparing the conditions under which competition between public and private 
providers is to take place.  
Private schools engaged in cream skimming are often accused of affecting negative-
ly the quality of public services provided. In as much as private schools are focused 
on attracting the most scholarly able pupils, leaving the less able – and more de-
manding – to the public schools, the average performance of public schools will, it is 
said, thus be hampered. Moreover, Nannestad (2004:4-6) stresses, this may further 
increase the expenditure per pupil, as the proportion of pupils requiring special at-
tention and support increases. Other studies have further indicated that the academic 
results of the scholarly weaker pupils (pupils mainly associated with a lower socio-
economic strata) is improved by the presence of pupils with stronger educational 
backgrounds (see e.g. Coleman et al. 1966; Levin 1998; Hoxby 2000; Hanushek et 
al. 2001). This makes Nannestad (2004:6) conclude that the exit (or lack) of scholar-
ly strong pupils has a negative impact on the average performance levels of the pub-
lic schools (due to a ‘composition effect’) and also on the individual performance 
levels among those pupils who remain in the system (due to a ‘behavior effect’). 
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6.3.2. UP-CODING AND SHIFTING THE COST OF USERS 
Adverse behavioral responses can also arise in connection to the questions on, who 
is to hold the budgetary responsibility of particular pupils and how much is the indi-
vidual provider to be reimbursed for a particular pupil. Attempts by the budget hold-
ers to shift the cost of otherwise devolved responsibilities are, according to 
Newhouse (1998), a common mean through which budget holders can reduce the 
relative magnitude of budgetary risk. The cost of particular users can here be at-
tempted shifted onto the users or other agencies/budget holders. Cost sharing ar-
rangements may facilitate such behavior, in that, these arrangements open up for the 
responsibilities to be shared or shifted fully to other organizational unit. In this con-
text Dhuey & Lipscomb (2009:23) showed how pupils with disabilities were active-
ly referred to particular services thereby transferring the budgetary responsibilities 
and thereby diminishing the relative budgetary risk incurred. Such incentives for 
deterring users can arise regardless of whether case or capitation payments are used, 
because both methods will tend to ‘penalize’ providers who enroll users with severe 
needs, than covered by the accompanying payment. In both cases making it less 
attractive to enroll such pupils. The precision by which differences in actual needs 
are taken into account thus again becomes crucial for avoiding such behavior.  
Case payments bring forward yet another type of adverse behavior, namely that of 
up-coding. That is, seeking the maximum case payment possible for each user. Up-
coding has in general been observed in areas where front-line professionals enjoy 
considerably autonomy (e.g. in police and health care) and where independent veri-
fication is difficult (Hood 2006). In health care the case payments attached to the 
DRG (diagnosis-related group) system have been found to encourage more intensive 
treatment of patients if this leads “to an upgrading in the severity of the DRG, and 
therefore increased reimbursement“ (Smith 2008:5). Similar in American insurance 
literature it has been demonstrated how hospitals have “up-coded” Medicare patients 
to more highly reimbursed diagnoses (see e.g. Silverman & Skinner 2004; Dafney 
2005).The information asymmetry, between payer and providers, will here in gen-
eral make the verification of actual user’ needs difficult, potentially leading service 
providers to use this asymmetry in order to seek the largest possible budgetary base.  
In a school context up-coding is particular prevalent in connection to special needs 
education and support. Here the asymmetry of information and the danger of more 
subjective and ‘less medically’ determined diagnosing can come in to play (Parrish 
2002). As argued by Marsh (1998:121) “an allocation system which provides addi-
tional resources to any pupil who can be certified or measured as meeting the crite-
rion for additional resources provides an incentive for parents and the school to 
secure the necessary indentification for that pupil”. With the result that such a sys-
tem over time will be likely to generate an increase in the number of pupil eligible 
for additional funding. In relation to this, Dhuey & Lipscomb (2009) showed how 
the change from case to capitation payments removed the link between funding and 
local decision making over disability identification and placement. As school dis-
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tricts which prior were compensated for additional special needs services supplied, 
now in the new capitation payment scheme did not receive extra funds when identi-
fying children with disabilities, or when providing additional services (see also 
Banks et al. 2015).  
6.4. BEHAVIORAL THREATS TO EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
The process of budgeting and with it the incentive structures created are by default 
important aspects to consider. Through the process, managerial efficiency can be 
created and local accountability for budgetary and education-related matters can 
further emerge. But just as it were, with the other objectives the specific component 
design can also here come to compromise such goals.  
6.4.1. BUDGETS AND RIDGIDITY  
The importance of budgets in coordinating activities and providing appropriate in-
centives for employees has led to an ongoing research focus on budgeting, budgets 
and behavior (see e.g. Covaleski et al. 2003:10 or Birnberg et al. 2007 for reviews 
of the literature). The notion of budget participation has in this context been espe-
cially studied, with psychology-based research focusing on determining the effects 
of budgets and participation on the employees’ mental states, behavior and perfor-
mance (Covaleski et al. 2003:28). Participation has in general been found to be 
positively correlated with motivation and/or performance (see e.g. Hofstede 1967; 
Milani 1975; Kenis 1979; Merchant 1981). In one of the first studies on budgets and 
participation Argyris (1952, 1953) found that a lack of participation combined with 
pressure to achieve the budget could create cognitive inconsistency in the mind of 
the employees. This, he showed, resulted in stress, interpersonal conflicts and dis-
trust leading to dysfunctional behavior in the form of gaming, reduced effort and 
poor communication (see also Hansen et al. 2003; Neely et al. 2003:23).  
Critics of budgets and budgeting have argued that budgets in general can create 
rigidity, limit co-operation and reduce the ability of the local management to come 
up with creative solutions. If budgets for example become a goal in themselves – a 
sort of ‘fixed performance contract – Hope and Fraser (2003:10) note, this can lead 
to an overemphasis on short-term cost control and top-down authority. Factors 
which have been shown to encourage gaming and to affect negatively the motivation 
of employees. 
Formula funding is, as discussed, proposed to create a type of decentralization which 
offers service providers the opportunity to respond to local circumstances, to inno-
vate, and to seek out economics of scale (Smith 2008:6). Not only will such 
measures improve the managerial efficiency, but it will also enhance the local sense 
of responsibility for how resources are actually spent. If however the municipal 
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board uses a low level of appropriation or devolves only few funds, few decisions 
will be left at the hand of the local management; making them in a sense mere ad-
ministrators of the externally made decisions. This will in practice restrict the flexi-
bility of the budget holder and the budget may thus come to act as a strait-jacket on 
managerial action. Certain activities which are more beneficial in terms of the objec-
tives of the organization may as a consequence be ignored due to an absence of a 
budgetary provision or other decision may likewise be made purely because of one. 
Specific expenditure may as a result be incurred merely because they are included in 
the budget and not because the actions are required; thereby foregoing the efficiency 
benefits otherwise associated with decentralization. 
The specific payment type may also create different levels of accountability in terms 
of ensuring that the individual pupil actually receives the resources needed in ac-
cordance with that pupil’s needs. Whereas payment methods which allocate individ-
ual funding to identified pupils based on the pupil’s severity of need ensures that the 
pupils receive the resources they are assigned, capitation based funding brings with 
it questions of local accountability, in that, it can be difficult to track funds thereby 
also ensuring that they are actually used in relation to the children for whom addi-
tional resources were intended (Meijer 1999; Riddell et al. 2006; Banks et al. 2015). 
Gaming is here likely to occur if budget holders can affect adversely the size of 
future budgets, e.g. attempts to maintain high expenditure levels in order to protect 
future budgets. Excessive spending may thus occur as a mean to justify current 
spending (Smith 2007a:110). In a school setting this occurs if specific services or 
tasks can only be upheld if activity levels remain stable or increase. Special needs 
services for example may when combined with case payments motivate providers of 
such services to retain as many pupils as possible in these services as a mean to 
uphold the current budget base.  
Gaming/adverse behavior in the form of ‘spending to the budget’ is affected by 
whether net or gross appropriations are used. Gross appropriations mean that the 
individual provider is not allowed to retain unused funds, thus giving these no direct 
incentives to increase revenues by for example obtaining grants from private foun-
dations. Further, if unused funds are retained by the payer in order to balance over-
spending elsewhere it may leave little incentives for providers to leave any funds 
unspent (Smith 2007a). Net appropriations on the other hand allow providers to 
spent additional surpluses, making it profitable to come up with creative solutions. It 
may however also bring about unintended costs not otherwise authorized by the 
administration (Christiansen et al. 2014:120). Allowing carryovers may here be a 
way of lessening the effects of gross appropriations and the one year cycle attached 
to these. Combined with line-item discretion, carryovers can open up the local scope 
for decision-making and incentivize a more prudent use of resources. Allowing 
service providers to keep unused funds can thus be a mean to ensure that they are 
not induced to ‘spend to the budget’. That is, not spending the entire budget provi-
sion in fear that unused funds will be ‘lost’ to the center (Pedersen et al. 2006:118). 
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Allowing carryovers further means that budget holders remain exposed to the budg-
etary risk of unexpected deficits. A long-term budget focus may thus be created 
where cost-effectiveness will be rewarded while deficits must be explained and 
handled locally. The incentive to be innovative will of course still be affected by the 
ability of providers to influence how unused funds are to be spent. Thus if the mu-
nicipal administration retains the decision-making authority over such unused funds 
there is, as Pedersen et al (2006:118) argue, little local incentive to create surpluses. 
The size of the budget holder is in this context further important, in that, larger pro-
viders will less be vulnerable to random per capita variations and changing circum-
stances compared to smaller providers.  
6.4.2. TARGET SETTING AND MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES 
Management by objectives, understood as an approach where specific performance 
objectives are mutually agreed upon and the progress toward accomplishing them 
are periodically reviewed, has become important in the governance models applied 
by Danish municipalities. Municipal policy setting, Heeager & Olesen (2014) note, 
increasingly seeks to link quality targets and results to the general budgetary situa-
tion of the municipality, thereby making the budgetary frame visible and connecting 
it to the political objectives. In order for this to work the general objectives must be 
translated into specific actions which are to be understood at a local level. If not, the 
specific implementation may be hampered due to a lack of understanding of how 
and why specific objectives are to be implemented. 
In this context, targets and their effects are widely studied. It has been shown that 
the use of targets and goal setting as means to steer behavior has powerful behavior-
al effects (Manzoni 2010:22) on the motivation and attention of employees towards 
the specific goal. The use of goals, it is argued, increases the effort and persistence 
put into achieving them and affect employee’ actions indirectly by inducing arousal, 
feeling of discovery, and/or the use of task-relevant knowledge and strategies 
(Locke & Latham 2002; Mitchell & Daniels 2003; Pinder 1998). As suggested by 
Locke & Latham (2009:19): “A goal to which a person is committed increases ef-
fort, prolongs persistence, and cues people to search for strategies to attain it”. 
Review articles on goal setting (Locke & Latham 2002; Rodgers & Hunter, 1991) 
suggest a positive relation between clear and measurable goals and performance, 
although as acknowledged by Locke and Latham (1990) task difficulty (which is 
associated with difficult to measure goals) reduces the impact of clear and measura-
ble goals on performance. As with budgetary related goals, holding service provid-
ers accountable for specific educational objectives may thus create unintended be-
havioral responses.  
Critics of goal setting (see e.g. Degeorge et al. 1999; Jensen 2001; Schweitzer et al. 
2004) on the other hand stress the unintended behavioral consequences of goal set-
ting by showing how subjecting employees to targets can focus their attention so 
narrowly that important features of a task are overlooked. Specified short-term goals 
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may consequently be overemphasized while more long-term and maybe less clearly 
specified goals are neglected (Ordóñez et al. 2009). Short-term political attention 
directed towards specific cases may also hamper the ability and desire of providers 
to maintain a more long-term strategic focus. This is indeed common if the reward 
for improving productivity and efficiency is limited while the consequences of fail-
ure are severe. In such cases the incentive for securing efficiency and innovation 
will be small. Thus, even though accountability tools can open up for benchmarking 
of results thereby encouraging the fulfillment of policies they may also affect ad-
versely the behavior of service providers if not used properly. 
In a public sector context Hood (2006) identified three types of gaming or (adverse) 
strategic behavior arising as a result of goal setting. Namely: a ratchet effect, a 
threshold effect and output distortion/manipulation of the reported results. Whereas 
the latter pertain to misrepresentation of performance levels and/or the adoption of 
unethical methods to boost performance, the ratchet effect (gaming) occurs when 
managers restrict performance well below their production-possibilities in order to 
secure that the future requirements and targets are not tightened up. The threshold 
effect, Hood (2006) argues, further occurs in instances where a uniform output target 
is applied to all units in a system. For example he showed, how pupil-attainment 
targets on test scores, in a school setting, lead teachers to concentrate on a narrow 
band of marginal pupils close to the target threshold in order to increase the chance 
that the overall target would be met. This meant that less attention was given to 
those at the extreme ends of the ability range, or to aspects of education which lay 
beyond preparing the pupils to the tests (Hood 2006:518). No incentives were thus 
given in terms of excellence, which led Hood to conclude that the use of such targets 
actually could encourage top performers to reduce the quality and quantity of their 
performance to the minimal required level necessary to meet the target.  
Accountability tools in the form of audits or performance evaluations of examina-
tion results and national testing thus bear with them the potential for adverse behav-
ior (see also Bevan & Hood 2006). The effectiveness of these quality control tools 
will depend on the ability of the payer to keep in check the results of local manage-
ment and with the sanctions incurred for not meeting the objectives further being 
important. If no sanctions are incurred this can affect local efforts, as discussed in 
relation to budgetary targets.  
6.5. PAYER INDUCED TECHNICAL TRADEOFFS 
This chapter has discussed how the incentive structures of formula funding models 
can bring with them incentives which are not coherent or in-line with the objectives 
of the service area. Despite the powerful efficiency, equity and accountability argu-
ments for allocating funds through formula funding, the chapter has shown how 
adverse and unintended incentive structures may affect local behavior to such an 
extent that this threatens the pursuit of the original goals. This departure arises in 
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general as a result of unintended and adverse behavior. Yet, departures from these 
rationales can also emerge more deliberately, through active choices arising from 
payer-specific tradeoffs. As has been briefly touched upon tensions can, in practice, 
arise between the objectives of efficiency, equity and accountability. As discussed 
by Smith (2007, 2008), these tensions can only be resolved through specific 
tradeoffs, which by default will come to diminish the ability of the formula to secure 
the very same objectives.  
The technical accuracy of the formula (intended to promote efficiency and equity) 
may for example be countered by the desire for simplicity (intended to promote 
political accountability). As such, Smith (2008:7) notes, there is implicitly in many 
equity criteria’s: “the understanding that equity will be pursued ‘up to a point’, but 
that it must to some extent be moderated by considerations of cost and efficiency”. 
Likewise a tension may arise between the parsimony in the use of risk adjusters and 
the need to model spending needs sensitively. Simple funding mechanisms are often 
preferred because they can be more readily understood and thereby promote ac-
countability. Pure equity will as a result often not be pursued at all costs, but will 
depend on the payer’s specific intention in relation to efficiency and accountability.  
The specific balancing of simplicity and sensitivity of funding will thus often be a 
key role for the funder when determining the specific formula design. In practice, 
Smith (2007a:72) notes, differences in people’s personal production function (i.e. 
the link between the level of public services consumed by an individual and the out-
comes achieved (Smith 2007a:14)) imply that most funding mechanism seeks to 
secure a balance between pure equity and pure efficiency. The specific allocation 
thus often becomes a tradeoff between the two, since pure efficiency is only con-
sistent with the widely used equity principle (those in equal need should have equal 
access to services) if and only if individual’s ‘need’ is defined in terms of marginal 
capacity to benefit from the public service (Smith 2007a:64).  
In sum, the departure from the otherwise intended objectives can accordingly 
emerge as a result of both unintended and more intended actions by the payer. Unin-
tentionally, the design of the control components can create unintended behavioral 
responses which will affect the ability of the funding to encourage the desired be-
havior in line with the set objectives. While more intentionally the individual pay-
ers’ equity concern may also lead to departures from pure equitable and efficient 
allocations. 
 
PART II THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY             FORMULA FUNDIG MODELS & MANAGERIAL PRACTICE 
   
103 
CHAPTER 7.    FRAMEWORK: FORMULA FUNDING 
MODELS AND MANAGERIAL PRACTICE 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
So far, the previous two chapters have analyzed and discussed the components of 
formula funding models and the incentive structures associated with the individual 
control components at a somewhat separate level. From a management control per-
spective it is however important to understand the effect of the full set of incentives 
brought forward by the total package of control. Thus, it is not enough to understand 
the separate effects of the individual control components. Rather what is needed are 
broader measures or characteristics which can capture the full design of the funding 
model and with it the full behavioral impact of the package of controls in place.  
I propose that two control characteristics, the level of budgetary risk and the level of 
competitive pressure brought upon providers through the model, are the two central 
levers affecting behavior in the context of formula funding models. Arising respec-
tively from an internally and an externally source of uncertainty/risk these two con-
trol characteristics are accordingly proposed to be the main factors which influence 
local managerial practice, understood as the options, actions and tasks available to 
the local school management when performing their job. The configuration of the 
two control characteristics is proposed to come about through the specific design of 
the package of control in place. Based on the understanding of viewing the funding 
model as a package of control, the idea is thus, that the joint effects of the compo-
nents will determine the actual level of competitive pressure and the level of budget-
ary risk brought upon the providers by the funding model.  
A framework for the study of formula funding is thus proposed which ties together 
model design and behavior. From a management control perspective the framework 
can be used as a tool to clarify and analyze the managerial practice created through 
specific mix of controls. Moreover, if another mix of control is wanted the setup can 
also be used as a mean to understand how a re-design of a control component can 
come to affect the local managerial practice. The framework can thus be used to 
understand current practice as well as the effects of re-designs. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, Figure 6.1 summarizes the findings 
from Chapter 5 and 6, underlying the general relationship between political objec-
tives, the formula funding model components, its inherent incentive structures and 
the resulting managerial practice. Then, the two proposed behavioral related control 
characteristics are presented, while section 7.3 analyzes how the identified control 
components shape and affect respectively the level of budgetary risk and competi-
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tive pressure. In the final part of the chapter the proposed framework is discussed 
focusing on the four types of practice emerging from this setup.  
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7.2. CONTROL CHARACETRISTICS DECISIVE FOR MANAGERI-
AL PRACTICE 
The two central control characteristics are presented, respectively an externally 
exerted uncertainty brought upon providers as a result of the competitive pressure 
created and a more internal source of risk referring to the level of budgetary risk 
inflicted on providers. 
7.2.1. BUDGETARY RISK 
The first control characteristic proposed as a vital lever for local behavior is the level 
of budgetary risk. Budgetary risk is here understood as the unpredicted variation in 
outturn expenditure from forecast expenditure and is according to Smith (2007a: 
100) an intrinsic feature of public services. If expenditure requirements can be pre-
dicted with certainty, the problem of setting budgets would be trivial and the task for 
the devolved entity that of merely carrying out agreed policies. The existence of 
budgetary risk thus ensures that the funding becomes more than a mere reimburse-
ment system and is accordingly a mean to encourage providers to operate prudently 
and efficiently (Rice & Smith 2001).  
It is however important to note that although budgetary risk is considered a prereq-
uisite for prudent resource utilization, excessive risk can lead to unintended adverse 
responses from the part of a budget holder. Finding a satisfactory distribution of risk 
between payers, purchasers, providers and users thus becomes important in the de-
signing of a formula funding model. This balancing of risk is vital as a lack of budg-
etary risk at the one hand will destroy the intended incentives for financial discipline 
whereas excessive risk on the other hand can lead to unintended adverse responses 
from risk adverse budget holders. Budgetary risk thus becomes important for ensur-
ing that incentives for financial discipline are given, albeit not to the extent that 
providers will be induced to act in ways where they adversely will seek to avoid the 
risk or seek to shift it to other agencies or service users. 
Measured/evaluated on a scale ranging from high to low, the specific level of budg-
etary risk is thus proposed to be a vital lever for local managerial practice.  
7.2.2. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
The second control characteristic which is proposed to be decisive for local manage-
rial practice is the level of competitive pressure imposed upon the service providers.  
Whereas budgetary risk relates to an internal source of uncertainty the competitive 
pressure relates to an environmentally created uncertainty. Schools operate in what 
can be characterized as a fairly stable and structured environment. Although legisla-
tive changes may take place at continual rate, the effect of the legislative environ-
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ment is the same for all participants. The main cause of uncertainty will thus stem 
from the competitive pressure which exists on the market.  
Competition is considered important, in that, it is assumed to improve the efficiency 
by which services are delivered. Through being subjected to competition service 
providers are encouraged to minimize cost, that is, to deliver services most efficient-
ly. Even the threat of competition it also expected to incentivize providers to im-
prove the quality of the delivered services (see e.g. Glennester 1991; Levačić 1995; 
Boyne 2003). But the specific level of pressure is important as an excessive pressure 
can prompt providers to spend resources on advertising and other activities intended 
to increase their market share. All of such costs may not be wasted or harmful, but 
the amount of resources involved has to be set against any eventual efficiency gains. 
Moreover, as the quality of output can be difficult to assess this will often lead to a 
focus on the quality or quantity of inputs. The balancing of competition thus also 
becomes important in order to ensure that incentives for financial discipline are 
given, albeit not to such an extent that the providers are induced to act adversely in 
order to counter the pressure to compete. 
Again, measured/evaluated on a scale ranging from high to low, the level of compet-
itive pressure created is thus proposed to be vital lever for understanding the result-
ing behavior of service providers. 
7.3. CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS AND FORMULA FUNDING 
MODEL DESIGN 
The next two sections analyze the effect of each of the in Chapter 5 identified con-
trol components on respectively the level of budgetary risk and the level of competi-
tive pressure. The impact of each component is discussed separately and its effect is 
visualized in Figure 7.2 and 7.3. Yet, also possible synergies are included in the 
discussion. The analysis thus seeks to show how component design affects the actual 
shaping of the two control characteristics. However, it is important to remember that 
the actual configuration of the two control characteristic will ultimately be a conse-
quence of a joint effect of all control components.  
7.3.1. BUDGETARY RISK AND COMPONENT DESIGN 
Ranging from high to low the level of budgetary risk is determined through the joint 
effect of the design of the control components making up the funding model, see 
Figure 7.2. The actual level of budgetary risk is thus made up by a range of factors 
which together determines the scale position of a particular funding model. 
The choice of payment method places different levels of budgetary risk with the 
service providers. The part of the model which takes into account enrollments will 
by default resemble a case payment method and the larger the pupil dependent pay-
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ment is the higher the induced risk vis a vis variations in activity. With case pay-
ments though some of the demand risk is transferred from the providers to the payer, 
leaving the budget holder exposed only to the risk of decreasing activity levels 
(Smith 2007a:101). The magnitude of budgetary risk will be especially significant in 
situations where local cost structures include a high proportion of fixed costs to 
which the provider is committed. With case payments the budget holder also bears 
the case intensity risk, i.e. risk emerging from variations in educational needs not 
covered fairly by the case payment. The precision by which the model meets actual 
needs/variations in population characteristics thus becomes important as the lower 
the precision is, the more risk will be placed with providers, and vise versa. Regard-
less of whether this lack of precision is unintended or arises as result of a simplici-
ty/equity trade-off this it will still affect the local budgetary risk.  
As already remarked, the larger the actual payment per pupil enrolled is the higher 
the associated budgetary effect of respectively enrolling or dis-enrolling a pupil will 
be. In this context, it is however important to consider how definitive the spending 
frame actually is. That is, how accurately the model in fact takes into account fluctu-
ations in actual activity. Is the spending frame for example adjusted as enrollment 
changes occur? If no adjustments are made the spending frame becomes definitive 
thereby resembling more a capitation inspired approach, in turn affecting the other-
wise incentives associated with case payments and with it the actual level of risk. On 
the other hand, if adjustments are incorporated this affects the overall definitiveness 
of the spending frame, thus leaving providers exposed to an uncertainty stemming 
from not knowing the size of the actual spending available. Being risk adverse the 
providers will therefore prefer an early assessment of the final frame compared to 
potential reimbursement of extra intake.  
Capitation payments, which as discussed, reimburse providers on the basis of ex-
pected activity, on the other hand, place the full budgetary risk of changes in activity 
with the providers. These must accordingly not only manage the uncertainties aris-
ing from demand within the fixed budget, but also the variations in actual user’ cost. 
The capitation payment approach naturally comes into play when district children 
rather than actually enrolled pupils are chosen as the object of funding. Building the 
allocation on district pupils increases the risk placed with the providers, in that, the 
allocation necessarily comes to be based on expectations of use. On top of this, a 
potential decoupling between local decision-making and budgetary responsibility 
may further be created, if education and budgetary-related decision-making is not 
linked, in turn enhancing the budgetary risk. 
The specific level of risk is also influenced by the size of the devolvement of special 
education cost. Generally, the more funds that are devolved the larger the budgetary 
risk incurred by providers tends to be. This means that if the devolvement of special 
educational funds is low, leaving a vast part of the cost to be defrayed by the admin-
istration, the relative budgetary risk reduces. If a vast part of the funds is kept at the 
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administration level, only to be allocated outside the funding scheme, it will become 
difficult for providers to take stock over how much funds is actually to be at their 
disposal, hence affecting the level of perceived risk. This, ties in with the level of 
appropriation and use of cost sharing arrangements. The more prevalent the use of 
cost sharing is the more financial risk will be transferred from the providers to the 
payer. Furthermore, as the level of appropriation determines to which administrative 
level funds and decision-making power is to be devolved, this also becomes im-
portant for the budgetary risk incurred. A high level of appropriation will tend to 
increase the local budgetary risk. While a lower level will entail that budget holders 
have less to say over how funds are to be spent, making them to act more like ad-
ministrators. Thus, the fewer funds which are devolved the more reduced the deci-
sions scope available will be, thus reducing the level of budgetary risk.  
The ability to exert control over how resources are to be spent across line-items is 
important in determining budgetary risk. The management is with line-item discre-
tion able to freely decide how the allotted funds are to be spent, thereby reducing the 
associated risk of having to operate within the fixed limits prescribed by the budget. 
The policy autonomy is in this context also important. With full autonomy a service 
provider may be able to absorb imperfections in the funding formula by for example 
varying its levels of services, thus reducing the associated risk. If however the payer 
leaves little room for maneuver over; which services to be provided, from where 
budget holders have to buy goods or from the performance standards expected the 
financial risk will increase. The associated sanctions for not meeting the targets 
(budgetary or education-related) here also come into play. If no sanctions for breach-
ing the goals of the budget are expected, the associated budgetary risk is low. Con-
versely, it will be high in situations of ‘hard budgeting’, that is, where providers 
cannot expect to be saved by later allocations. The type of budgetary constraints will 
thus in combination with the policy autonomy enjoyed have a substantial impact on 
the risk endured.  
The decision to allow carry-overs will de facto expand the otherwise implemented 
budget time horizon, thus reducing the associated risk of a one year cycle. Potential 
shocks from changing activity levels or in severity of needs can thus be smoothened, 
making the carry-overs to act as a safety net under the providers. As the spending 
margin here is larger the associated budgetary risk will be reduced. Finally, the type 
of quality control conducted is also important. If for example, the allocation of funds 
is connected to the accomplishment of specific quality standards, there will be a 
direct connection between quality control and budgetary risk. A lack of fulfillment 
will here increase the budgetary risk. If funds and quality is not directly connected, 
the more long-term effectiveness and influence of the quality control system on the 
budgetary risk endured will depend on whether this can be used to ensure competi-
tion and informed choice.  
As for the five last components (the type of private school competition, open en-
rollment clause, the geographical dispersal of school providers, transportation costs 
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and the general number of children) their relative effect on the level of budgetary 
risk is expected to be limited. As their individual effect can be difficult to isolate the 
components are shown in brakeage in Figure 7.2. In combination however they may 
affect the ability of the providers to forecast their actual spending, creating thereby 
budgetary risk. This may especially be prevalent in highly competitive situations.  
 
 
Limited Payment per pupil Comprehensive 
Low Devolvement of special educational costs High 
High Model precision Low 
Low Appropriation level High 
Pupils enrolled Funding object District children 
Comprehensiveness Cost sharing arrangements Limited 
High  Definitiveness of the spending frame Low 
 [Gross or net app.]       
Allowed Carry-overs Not allowed 
Soft Budgetary constraints Hard 
Allowed Line-item discretion Not allowed 
Limited Purchasing agreements Comprehensive 
High Level of policy autonomy Low 
                       [ Type of private school competition ]       
 [ Open-enrollment clause ]  
 [ Geographical dispersal of school providers ]  
 [ Transportation costs ]  
 [ Number of children ]  
                   Soft Quality of the control systems implemented Hard 
- Figure 6.2   The impact of the control components on the budgetary risk created 
Low budgtary risk High budgetary risk 
Budgetary risk 
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7.3.2. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND COMPONENT DESIGN 
Again, ranging from high to low, the level of competitive pressure is determined 
through the joint effect of the design of the control components making up the for-
mula model. The actual competitive pressure is thus, as above, made up by a range 
of factors which together determines the exact scale position of a particular funding 
model. 
In terms of payment methods, capitation and case payments create different incen-
tives for competition to emerge. Similar for both payment types is however that the 
general model precision intended or not, becomes important. If needs are not cov-
ered fairly by the model this may affect the general willingness of enrolling particu-
lar types of pupils. At least those whose needs are not covered by the associated 
payment. Case payments, which as discussed earlier, apply to the pupil dependent 
part of the allocation attaches a payment per pupil enrolled, thereby rewarding pro-
viders directly for a stimulation of demands. The larger the payment attached to the 
enrollment of an extra pupil, the greater the incentive for competition will be since 
the budgetary effect of new and dis-enrollments will increase. Case payments may 
as a result stimulate competition for users, at least for those whose needs are covered 
by the associated case payment.  
Capitation payments, on the other hand, are not tied to actual enrollments; Bringing 
along an incentive to depress service activities as providers are expected to cover all 
changes within the allocated budget. Competition for pupils may thus decline since 
providers in the short run will not be reimbursed for attracting extra pupils. In this 
context, the competitive pressure will be influenced by whether district pupils are 
chosen as the funding object, in that, this capitation based approach will reduce the 
competitive pressure as the direct connection between enrollment levels and budget 
sizes is lost. Yet, this choice of funding object may however lead to a decoupling of 
responsibilities which may counter the reduced willingness to compete, giving a 
constant incentive to enroll pupils.  
The relative competitive pressure will also be affected by whether appropriations are 
given as gross or net appropriations. If separated into expenses and revenues [gross 
appropriations], then no direct incentives for competition is given, because addition-
al revenues, not appropriated in the budget, cannot be kept by providers. If however 
appropriations are granted as net appropriations then the amount appropriated is 
concerned with the net costs (the difference between the expected expenses and 
revenues) which means that providers are allowed to spend the surplus income on 
for example increased expenses; giving incentives for increased competition.  
The appropriation level implemented is in general important for determining how 
smoothly funds can be transferred between school districts, for example in case of 
pupil transfers. If increased activity is compensated without specific approval, the 
incentive for increasing enrollments will be greater affecting upwards the competi-
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tive pressure. The same argument applies for the definitiveness of the spending 
frame. If few adjustments are made the competitive pressure will be limited in that 
schools by default cannot be sure to be compensated for actual extra enrollments, 
thereby affecting the willingness to enroll additional pupils 
A competitive market consisting of both private and public providers can, as dis-
cussed, be established by tying a payment to each pupil enrolled. In the public 
school context competition can be encouraged by opening up for free-enrollment, 
that is, free choice of providers. The mere existence of private providers does, as 
earlier mentioned, not by itself imply that a competitive supplier market exists. If a 
market for example is characterized by a type of ‘market segmentation’ where pri-
vate schools cater primarily to the needs of specific groups or minorities the actual 
competitive pressure will tend to be relative low. Similarly the relative effect of 
vouchers for the purchase of education services at private schools will in this context 
be moderate. If however the market is not characterized by market segmentation, the 
use of such vouchers will, as long as the payment received covers the extra expens-
es, from a competitive point of view, be a way of creating competition for pupils.  
Parallel arguments go for transportation vouchers. The more extensive the coverage 
of the cost of transportation is the wider the choice of schools, at least geographical-
ly, will be. In principle this will therefore increase the possibility that pupils choose 
other providers than their home-district school. The geographical location of service 
providers may however in reality hinder actual free choice, thereby affecting the 
general competitive pressure created.  
Managerial discretion in terms of how resources are to be spent across line-items 
and objectives is also important, in that, it can enable providers to develop different 
services tailored more specific to the demands of the users. This opens up for a wid-
er choice of services, which from a user’ perspective will enhance the possibility of 
finding services which match individual preferences. The competitive pressure will 
thus increase, in that, service providers are expected to be incentivized to do their 
best and tailor their services to local preferences in order to diminish the chance of 
their services be de-selected. Here, the ability of the service providers to respond to 
the competition is important. If the policy autonomy is so low that they are not able 
to respond to competition, by for example changing their ways of operating, the 
competitive pressure from providers, not restricted by the same conditions, will be 
greater. The effectiveness of the quality control also becomes important since this 
can lead to benchmarking information, which can guide parents in their choice of 
school. The publication of quality related results thus does affect the competitive 
situation of a school.  
Finally, albeit not a control component per se the general development in pupil 
numbers may influence how present the need to compete for pupils is. If pupil num-
bers in general are decreasing the need to be proactive in attracting pupils will be 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DANISH PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 
112
 
greater, compared to situation where the pupil population is high and growing. As 
for the last three components (devolvement of special educational costs, budgetary 
constraints and purchasing agreements) their relative effect on the competitive pres-
sure is expected to be limited. 
 
 
 
                            Limited Payment per pupil Comprehensive 
 [ Devolvement of special educational costs ]  
                                Low Model precision High 
                    Low Appropriation level High 
           District children Funding object Pupils enrolled 
 [Cost sharing arrangements]  
                   High Definitiveness of the spending frame Low 
  Gross or net app.  Gross appropriations                       
                   Not allowed Carry-overs Allowed 
 [Budgetary constraints]  
                   Not allowed  Line-item discretion Allowed 
 [Purchasing agreements]  
                   Low Level of policy autonomy High 
Segmentation   Type of private school competition Diverse      
Restricting Open-enrollment clause Open 
High Geographical dispersal of school providers Low 
Restricted coverage Transportation costs High coverage 
High/increasing Number of children Low/reducing 
                   Soft Quality of the control systems implemented Hard 
- Figure 6.3   The impact of the control components on the competitive pressure 
Low pressure High pressure 
Competitive pressure 
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7.4. FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGERIAL PRACTICE 
Combining the two control characteristics connected to a specific formula funding 
model they can be visualized through a point in the rectangle depicted in Figure 7.4. 
Here the spectrum of the competitive pressure is marked on the horizontal axis, 
whereas the vertical axis contains that of the budgetary risk. Focusing for simplicity 
and clarity on the “corners”, that is, the four possible combinations of high (H) and 
low (L) levels of competitive pressure/budgetary risk, together with a relevant 
neighborhood of points, this is proposed to give rise to four types of managerial 
practice, each of which will be presented in the next sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Figure 7.4   Framework for managerial practice  
7.4.1. LOW COMPETITIVE PRESSURE/ HIGH BUDGETARY RISK 
The set of combinations in the second quadrant, Figure 7.3, is characterized by a low 
competitive pressure and high budgetary risk. The low pressure means that the 
school management is operating more or less as a monopolist. There may be other 
school providers but the private schools in the area will mainly be catering to a spe-
cific segment of users. The funding model is however constructed so that the budget 
holders are exposed to high level of budgetary risk. 
In terms of ensuring productivity and high activity levels the low competitive pres-
sure gives no direct incentives for the management to focus on retraining or attract-
ing pupils. Incentives to focus on quality improvements will consequently not stem 
from a demand side concern. The providers consequently have no eminent need to 
or incentive for trying to commercialize or improve the quality of services as a mean 
to for example improve their market share. Cost effectiveness and the need for 
High competitive pressure Low competitive pressure 
High budgetary risk 
Low budgetary risk 
(L,H) (H,H) 
(L,L) (H,L) 
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productivity will rather stem from the high budgetary risk, which will prompt the 
providers to create cost-effective and innovative solutions. Quality improvements 
are thus to come about through such measures.  
The pronounced risk may however adversely induce providers to skimp on the quali-
ty offered. Accordingly, instead of implementing cost effective solutions the stark 
risk may reverse the quest for quality. The latter incentives are especially pro-
nounced since the effect of quality skimping, due to the low competitive pressure, 
will have no immediate effect on enrollments and thus on the size of the allocated 
budget. Quality skimping will thus so to say only be a mean to reduce the relative 
risk placed on the providers.  
An overall tension between motivations for efficiency improvements and more ad-
verse types of behavior can further arise due to the stark risk brought upon provid-
ers. Because, the service provider bears a high level of budgetary risk they could be 
incentivized to seek to shift the cost of users to other agencies or seek to erect barri-
ers for entry of particular users. Moreover, service providers could even seek to up-
code particular pupils as a mean to lessen the relative budgetary risk if such behavior 
is possible. These behavioral responses will not only reduce the level of risk, but it 
will further better the ability of the budget holders to meet the budgetary standards 
expected. Adversely however, any of such behavior will jeopardize the efficiency by 
which funds are spent and potentially adversely affect the equitability of the model 
and where pupils are able receiving their education.  
From the perspective of the payer the effectiveness of the entire model thus comes to 
depend on whether these are able to catch unwanted behavior and to induce provid-
ers to refrain from skimping of the quality of services provided. Benchmarking of 
both educational and budgetary result must thus be possible, thereby countering the 
otherwise limited demand side pressure and instead inducing providers to improve 
or change the type and content of the services delivered. 
7.4.2. LOW COMPETITIVE PRESSURE/LOW BUDGETARY RISK 
The set of combinations in the third quadrant is characterized by a low competitive 
pressure and a low level of budgetary risk. The low competitive pressure means that 
the providers are essentially acting more or less with near-monopoly, experiencing 
very little or no competition from either private or public schools. Similar to the 
discussion above, this will consequently give few incentives for demand-side-
induced incentives for quality improvements as immediate enrollment changes, due 
to dissatisfaction, are less likely to occur.  
The lack of these demand-side induced incentives is critical as the low budgetary 
risk placed upon providers further gives no incentives for service providers to im-
prove the quality of service or to come up with cost-effective solutions. The low 
budgetary risk also gives few incentives to ensure proper resource utilization, hence 
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efficiency gains can be difficult to achieve because such immediate concerns are not 
likely to present locally on a continuous basis. Potentially, this may lead to the de-
livery of excessive services which from a broader public point of view may not be 
deemed appropriate since there are no direct budgetary incentives to constrain costs.  
Moreover, service providers may still also be induced to behave adversely through 
attempts to both up-coding and deterring users. Both types of behavior will not only 
make the budget base even more stable and secure, but the relative pressure on the 
management will be further lessened. This is of course dire because the model al-
ready has difficulties with providing proper incentives for efficiency and effective-
ness. Incentives for quality improvements and cost-effectiveness will accordingly 
not spring from the funding model and this seriously hampers and jeopardizes the 
ability of the model to create prudent and efficient resource utilization. The other-
wise benefits of using formula funding, i.e. efficiency, equity, accountability may as 
a result not be created in this situation, making the model almost similar to a mere 
reimbursement model, with the associated consequences of such models.  
As a result the ability of the payer to induce desired behavior will be limited and 
may come to depend on the effectiveness by which the control system can measure 
and compare actual spending and results or for that matter discover unwanted and 
adverse behavior. Benchmarking and cost analysis are thus essential in order to 
counter the otherwise lack of incentives for efficiency and quality assurance. 
7.4.3. HIGH COMPETITIVE PRESSURE/HIGH BUDGETARY RISK  
The set of combinations in the first quadrant is characterized by a high competitive 
pressure and a high level of budgetary risk. The competitive pressure means that 
service providers act on a highly competitive market with competition potentially 
emanating from both private and public providers. In terms of productivity and high 
levels of enrollment the competitive situation brought upon the providers, means 
that they will have a strong incentive to focus on retaining and attracting pupils.  
The competitive situation will in other words induce the service providers to seek to 
commercialize their services in order to make it appealing to potential users. The 
quality of service will thus be a local focus point. Not only can such improvements 
make it less likely that pupils are to dis-enroll, but the improved quality can also act 
as a mean to enhance the market share, making the services attractive to potential 
users. A low level of quality will when combined with the competitive pressure 
namely mean that that dis-enrollments will have a direct effect on the budgetary 
situation of the particular school district. The providers are accordingly given stark 
demand-side-induced incentives to come up with innovative solutions to the benefits 
of the users. Similar concerns can however also spring internally from the stark 
budgetary risk placed on the providers.  
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The high budgetary risk will make it ever more necessary for the service providers 
to ensure a prudent and efficient operation as a mean to respond to the expectations 
set. In relation to this there is however a danger that the magnitude of risk will be so 
vast that unwanted and adverse behavior can be created. The high level of budgetary 
risk can here come to affect the type of pupils enrolled. If the relative needs of the 
pupils are not covered fairly by the model the incentive to deter users or cream-skim 
if possible will be very stark. The relative magnitude of risk will in this context 
highly depend on whether the providers are able to respond freely to the competi-
tion. If the grounds for fair competition do not exit, due to for example cream skim-
ming from the part of private providers, this will affect heavily the ability of local 
providers to create prudent and efficient service delivery. The stark budgetary risk 
may further prompt service providers to seek to shift the cost of users or to deter 
pupils for whom the associated risk is too stark.  
The pronounced competitive pressure may also induce behavior which from a 
broader perspective is seen as more adverse. Providers can for example feel com-
pelled to spent large amounts on marketing and promotion in order to become more 
attractive and visible to potential users. Resources which from a more general cost-
benefit or welfare economic viewpoint could have been better spent elsewhere. The 
inclination to participate in such behavior may however to some extend be mediated 
by the high level of budgetary risk, which can make such spending behavior less 
desirable. On the other hand the high level of budgetary risk will make the need to 
uphold high enrollment levels even more present as a mean to lessen the budgetary 
risk, in turn making it crucial to spend resources for attracting and retaining pupils.  
The stark incentives emanating from both the high level of pressure and risk can 
thus come to threaten the general ability of the model to induce desired behavior. On 
top of this the created incentives may make many of the common adverse types of 
behavior more likely. In that, such behavior will not only be a mean for the provid-
ers to reduce budgetary risk, but it will also be a way to improve their general com-
petitiveness. As a result the effectiveness of the model can come to depend on the 
ability of the payer to monitor closely whether unethical behavior occurs and to 
secure that the needs of all pupils are met.  
7.4.4. HIGH COMPETITIVE PRESSURE/LOW BUDGETARY RISK 
The set of combinations in the fourth quadrant is characterized by a low level of 
budgetary risk combined with a high competitive pressure. The high competitive 
pressure which characterizes the market will as discussed above incentivize service 
providers to seek to commercialize their services in order to be able to compete over 
potential pupils. This means that the content and quality of service delivered will be 
a present and continuous focus from the part of the management due to the immedi-
ate enrollment and budgetary effect of dis-enrolments.  
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The providers are accordingly given stark demand-side-induced incentives to come 
up with innovative solutions to the benefits of the users, which is important as simi-
lar concerns do not spring from the budgetary risk placed on the providers. The low 
budgetary risk namely gives few incentives for prudent and efficient operations. The 
incentive for quality improvement will thus mainly arise from a demand side con-
cern, making it further likely that excessive services will be created in order to up-
hold enrollment levels. 
The high competitive pressure created by the model can as discussed induce service 
providers to spend large amounts on marketing in order to attract potential pupils. 
This can be problematic as the low level of budgetary risk will not act as a mediator 
for cost containment. The main source of uncertainty thus springs from whether the 
provider is able to attract pupils. The providers are thus subjected to a high degree of 
predictability in their operations, only affected by their ability to predict the effect of 
enrollment changes on their budgets. The service providers will as a consequence be 
given few incentives to ensure efficient management because the budgetary risk may 
be so limited that it will hamper the ability of such concerns to arise. Further albeit 
the danger for up-coding may not be so eminent in this situation such behavior could 
still occur. The same goes for the deterring of particular pupils. Both types of behav-
ior will not only make the budget base even more predictable but will also further 
lessen the relative pressure on the management.  
Overall, this may threaten the ability of the model to ensure efficiency and equity. 
From a payer’s perspective an important focus should thus be that of ensuring that 
measures are in place which can capture the extent to which funds are used efficient-
ly, that undesired behavior in terms of ensuring the allocative efficiency and equity 
do not take place and that the expected standards of services are upheld. 
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CHAPTER 8.     METHODOLOGY 
8.1. INTRODUCTION – STUDYING ACCOUNTING AS PRACTICE 
An inherent intention of this dissertation is to study management accounting as prac-
tice, with the understanding that accounting is not a mere technical, rational service 
activity, separated from wider social relationship. Studying accounting as practice 
thus entails much more than analyzing the blueprints of accounting, i.e. the account-
ing manuals, budget rules, and expenditure authorizations. Rather, it entails studying 
how accounting practices become practical resources that actors can manipulate in 
order to signal intentions, motivations and achievements (Ahrens & Chapman 
2007:24). The study of accounting practices thus opens up for studying how various 
actors draw upon the rules, processes, ideals, and targets of management control 
practices (Ahrens & Chapman 2006a:108) and such a study accordingly first truly 
unfolds its potential when the focus is directed upon the actions and ways in which 
organizational members draw on accounting as a shared resource (see Ahrens & 
Chapman 2007; Barnes 2001; Swidler 1986). With this also comes the need to con-
sider the wider social environment of the accounting phenomenon under study. That 
is, studying the practices of accounting in the context in which they operate, as first-
ly advanced by Hopwood (1983) (see also Buchell et al. 1985; Hopwood 2008; 
Khalifa & Quattrone 2008; Baxter & Chua 2009).  
Field research involves precisely the study of human practices in their natural set-
tings (for reviews see Keating 1995; Ahrens & Dent 1998; Merchant & Van der 
Stede 2006), and the qualitative field study, Chua (1986:618) emphasizes, offers 
especially “the understanding of accounting in action”. Through field research, 
typically conducted in a limited number of settings a “rich” understanding of the 
relevant phenomena can be provided (Merchant & Otley 2006:790). The qualitative 
research methodology allows the researcher to go beyond questions of what (identi-
fication) and how (explanation) and into the questions as to why certain phenomena 
exist as they do (Merchant & Otley 2006). Doing qualitative field studies in man-
agement accounting is consequently, in the words of Silverman (2006), not a ques-
tion of method but one of methodology, understood as the general approach adopted 
when studying a specific research topic (see also Ahrens & Chapman 2006b:1).  
The methodological and theoretical task for the qualitative researcher, hence, be-
comes that of expressing the field as a social object, in contrast to simply describing 
or clarifying it to the reader as a part of a given nature. As noted by Lillis (2008:242) 
the qualitative approach thereby helps extend the general insight into and the under-
standing of how accounting practices respond to real organizational settings. Fur-
ther, opening up for opportunities to explore the logic that motivates the evolution 
and adoption of practices. Through this, capturing the possible organizational ten-
sions stemming from potentially different views and constructions placed upon ac-
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counting in the organizational settings under study (Hoque et al. 2013:1175; see also 
Ahrens & Dent 1998). The ontological assumption adopted for this study of ac-
counting as practice is consequently that: “social reality is emergent, subjectively 
created, and objectified through human interactions (Chua 1986:615). Accounting 
is, in other words, understood as meanings and norms which, through complex in-
terpretive processes and structures, are transformed into an objectified social reality 
(see Boland & Pondy 1983; Berry et al. 1985; Ahrens & Chapman 2007). Albeit, 
this reality confronts individuals in a manner analogous to the real world, there is no 
neutral, objective world of facts acting as the final arbitrator (Chua 1986:614).  
The qualitative methodology thus comes with an acknowledgement that the field is 
“itself not just part of the empirical world, but is shaped by the theoretical interests 
of the researcher. This means that the definition of the field is profoundly theoreti-
cal” (Chua (986:618). The field as a social reality is in other words only sensible if 
defined with reference to theories that illuminate its activities (Hoque et al. 2013: 
1174). This makes the qualitative research methodology “inductive, emerging and 
shaped by the researcher’s experience in collecting and analyzing the data (Cres-
well 2007:19). Or as noted by Scapens (2004:264) the researcher cannot be com-
pletely independent of the case being studied. The research process therefore can 
never be a neutral, objective process (Ryan et al.2002:152). Thus, albeit as a re-
searcher I am not directly involved in the issue under study, the act of asking ques-
tions and analyzing data is in itself enough to influence the results put forward. With 
my role as a researcher, in a sense that of a visitor visiting the field and interviewing 
relevant people from the field of study, the research output comes to represent my 
interpretation of the data. Making it inevitably subjective, affected not only by the 
participants but also by the approach taken vis a vis the collection and analysis of 
data. In the remainder of the chapter the research design and the two field study 
municipalities will be presented, followed by a presentation of the data collection 
process, the type of data used and the subsequent process of coding.  
8.2. RESEARCH DESIGN & SITE SELECTION 
A qualitative field research methodology is adopted for the study of formula funding 
models and managerial practice in the context of Danish schools. For this purpose 
two municipalities are chosen as subjects of study. Through this indeed limited 
number of settings the hope is that the richness of the particular context can be re-
flected provided through the creation of a thick, holistic and contextualized descrip-
tion. Nevertheless, the study also aims to bring about broader contributions to the 
general understanding of formula funding models and behavior. The theoretical 
contributions are thus hopefully achieved through the analysis of the detailed, holis-
tic knowledge created through the analysis of multiple empirical sources rich in 
context (Telis 1997; Merchant & Otley 2006, Ahrens & Chapman 2006a, 2007).  
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In order to ensure the procedural relialibility, that is, making possible comparisons 
between the two the field studies take on the same form organized in three chapters. 
The first chapter presents a thorough description of the formula funding model used. 
This includes a presentation of the local objectives for the school system as well as 
an analysis of the control components making up the funding model in place. The 
analysis is guided by the theoretical frame put forward in Chapter 5 of the compo-
nents making up the overall package of controls but is also infused by the actual 
findings, thereby allowing a deeper, more contextual understanding of the control 
components in place to emerge. The second chapter is a theoretical analysis where 
the effect of each control component on the two control characteristics, the level of 
budgetary risk and the level of competitive pressure, is analyzed. The chapter dis-
cusses the incentive structures and with it the type of managerial practice created. 
Finally, the third chapter presents an account of how school management is actually 
practiced. The accounts focus on the guiding principles affecting the management in 
their practice of running the school. This is done without direct reference to theoreti-
cal themes. Rather, topics are allowed to emerge from the interviews, thus visualiz-
ing how education concerns are weighted against the model’s incentive structures. In 
the concluding part of these chapters the actual managerial practice is compared 
with the actual fulfillment of the political objectives, thereby opening up for a dis-
cussion of whether the practices created are in line with the core objectives.  
The two specific settings have been chosen for a set of reasons. The two municipali-
ties were some of the first, following the Structural Reform in 2007, to devolve parts 
of their special educational funds to the individual school districts. Their ways of 
doing this are different as well in structure and in speed, albeit certain similarities 
between the two also exist. Common for both was the desire to counter the increase 
in cost associated with special needs services. Choosing these two municipalities 
thus offers the opportunity to study the effects of different design structures and with 
it the effects on the resulting behavior and practice. Yet, because similarities in the 
design do exist, comparisons between the two models are, though, possible.  
Both municipalities are located in more rural parts of Denmark, making them more 
exposed to problems like declining birthrates and larger geographical distances be-
tween school departments than municipalities with profound urban areas. The spe-
cific context may in this way affect the generalizability and transferability of results 
to other school settings. Yet, it is important to note that the effect of precisely these 
factors (decreasing pupil numbers and geographical distances) is in fact included in 
the framework. A clear difference in the socio-demographical conditions however 
exists between the two, which means that the study allow for an analysis of how and 
if this factor plays a role when it comes to the actual design of funding models. All 
in all, the two municipalities thus offer excellent opportunities for the study of prac-
tice in the light of the proposed theoretical framework. Adequate hopefully also for 
the study of funding models and practice in other settings. 
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The first of the two field studies is conducted in Municipality A, a municipality 
founded as a result of the Municipal Reform of 2007 through the amalgamation of 
seven small municipalities. Located in a rural part of Denmark Municipality A is 
geographically one of Denmark’s largest. Albeit, mainly composed of smaller vil-
lage communities, two relative larger towns make up approximately half of the pop-
ulation of Municipality A. In 2013 the number of inhabitants was 43,528 (Statistic 
Denmark). The municipality is exposed to some of the ‘worst’ socio-demographic 
conditions faced by any of the 98 Danish municipalities, reflected in factors such 
income, educational level and unemployment as well as problems of debt and crime 
(Cevea 2014). Combined with a steep declining birthrate the socio- demographic 
development constitutes a significant challenge for the municipality and the school 
system in particular. A range of control related challenges are thus created which not 
only requires a stern governance structure but also an efficient use of funds. 
The second subject of study is Municipality B, a municipality also established with 
the municipal reform in 2007. The amalgamation of two previously independent 
municipalities here made Municipality B the geographical largest in its region, albeit 
being only one third of the area of Municipality A. Geographically, Municipality B 
is made up by medium size towns as well as more rural areas. The number of inhab-
itant in 2013 amounted to 40,778 (Statistic Denmark), making it comparable in pop-
ulation size with Municipality A. When comparing the ‘socio- demographic score’ 
of the Danish municipalities the score of Municipality B ranks among the top twenty 
(Cevea 2014). The municipality is though also faced with a declining birthrate and 
not at least with a very high private school enrollment rate. For the school year of 
2012/13, 33% of the children in municipality B were enrolled in private schools. A 
number being more than double the national average of 15% (Statistic Denmark). 
Due to historical circumstances no special needs schools are placed or run in Munic-
ipality B. Thus, in order to abide by the law the municipality has entered into part-
nership agreements with the surrounding municipalities. Table 7.1 compares key 
figures on the two school sectors as well as on specific economic and social indica-
tors covering the period from 2011-2013.  
 Municipality A Municipality B 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
 Population 45241 44436    43528    40603 40655 40778 
 Total number of pupils 5034 4838 4700 5546 5463 5468 
 Pupils enrolled in the public school 3516 3402 3293 3772 3717 3708 
- in main stream classes 3 453 3302 3204 3635 3586 3584 
- in special needs classes      63    100      89   137    131   124 
 Private and private independent schools 1260 1202 1177 1531 1516 1529 
 Special needs schools  101 93 90 83 65 82 
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 Boarding schools for 14-17 year-olds 157 141 140 160 165 149 
Pupils receiving special education       
 In total 462 272 202 472 265 217 
 In the public school 306 138 102 297 131 130 
- in main stream classes 243   38 13 160     0     6 
- in special needs classes   63 100 89 137 131 124 
 Private and private independent schools 34 23 0 81 57 0 
 Special needs schools  101 93 90 83 65 82 
 Boarding schools for 14-17 year-olds 21 18 10 11 12 5 
Operating account (1000 DDK) 
      
3.22.01   Public schools 255,443 248,752 213,343 237,337 247,186 238,167 
3.22.02   Joint expenses for the munici- 
               pal school system 
374 0** 0** 1 269 1274 114 
3.22.07 Special needs education in  
              regional services 
538 541 463 5408 6451 5189 
3.22.08 Municipal special needs schools  62,356 54,386 65,523 22 640 20 255 34 983 
Net expenses for the public school pr. 
pupil in the general environment, pre-
school-10th grade (index) 
72,952 
(126) 
73,910* 
(127) 
65,063 
(113) 
65,817 
(114) 
70,154 
(120) 
68,458 
(119) 
Educational cost pr. child in the age of 
7-16  (gross) (index) 
79,327 
(116) 
79,274 
(114) 
75,780 
(110) 
62,398 
(91) 
65,562 
(94) 
65,850 
(96) 
Educational cost pr. child in the age of 
7-16 (net) (index) 
74,025 
(116) 
73,739 
(115) 
71,388 
(112) 
58,888 
(93) 
62,026 
(97) 
63,517 
(99.9) 
Educational cost pr. public school pupil  
(gross) (index) 
115,088 
(135) 
115,849 
(136) 
108,713 
(129) 
94,359 
(120) 
99,268 
(116) 
99,901 
(119) 
Educational cost pr. public school pupil 
(net) (index) 
107,396 
(137) 
107,761 
(137) 
102,412 
(131) 
89,501 
(114) 
93,915 
(119) 
96,361 
(125) 
Econimic and social indicators  
Spending per capita (2013)                            
(national average = 100) 
Over 107 93-100 
Service cost per capita  (2013)                          
(total net costs – user-financed costs – net 
transfer payments)    (national average = 100) 
Over 107 100-107 
Passive income support per 17-64 (2013) Over 125 75-100 
Disposable income compared to the 
national average (2012) 
-90 105-115 
The proportion of 25 year-olders who 
has finished further education (2013) 
36-58% 58-61% 
Proportion of public school pupils’ who 3.0-3.9 % /  3.0-3.9 % /  
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failed their final examination in 
Math/Danish (2013) 2.0-2.9 % 3.0-3.9 % 
- Table 7.1   Municipal and school sector characteristics, Municipality A and Munic-
ipality B. source: LGDK 2014, ØIM Kommunale nøgletal, Statistic Denmark 20159                     
* Includes also the cost of integrated special needs pupils.                                                                  
** Due to bookkeeping routines all funds including the joint municipal expenses are entered in 
at the district level. 
As can be seen, Municipality B has a higher population of pupils, not at least be-
cause of the steeply declining birthrate in Municipality A. Moreover both are faced 
with a relative high private school rate. In this context it is important to note that 
special needs education is almost solely given in the context of the public school 
system. Although the legislative amendment of 2012 makes comparison across years 
difficult, the table shows that the type of special needs education delivered in the 
two municipalities is changing. Now primarily taking place in segregated special 
needs classes placed in the general environment of the public school or in special 
needs schools. Special needs education given in the general/mainstream classes is 
however low, albeit somewhat higher in Municipality A. When it comes to special 
needs schools the fluctuations in use in Municipality B is interesting, in as much that 
the corresponding use in Municipality A is decreasing over the course of the period.  
As for the municipal expenses the table illustrates how the general municipal spend-
ing on schools tends to decrease, simultaneously with the cost of especially special 
needs schools taking up an ever increasing part of the spending. Municipality A has 
the largest net spending per pupil in the public school. Yet, compared to the national 
average which in 2013 amounted to 57,527 DKK per pupil enrolled in public 
schools, the two municipalities are both well over the average. Finally in terms of 
net and gross education cost per 7-16 year older living in the municipality, the na-
tional amount spent amounted respectively to 68,634 and 63,569 DDK, leaving 
again Municipality A with a higher spending level. This generally higher spending 
level for example reflected itself in the cost per pupil enrolled in special needs clas-
ses and schools which in 2013 amounted to 244,571 DDK (Quality Report 2012/13 
Children & School’s Committee, CSC 18.12.13, head 4).  
8.3. DATA COLLECTION – INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS 
Field research, Baxter & Chua (1998:82) note, must resonate with the many voices 
and sources of data from the field in focus. In order to accommodate this, the two 
field studies are based on the analysis of multiple empirical sources, rich in context. 
                                                          
 
9 Due to differences in how (year vs. school year) and when Statistic Denmark and the indi-
vidual municipality adds up e.g. pupil numbers or private school rates ect., disparities may 
arise between the numbers depicted here and the ones used in the analysis where the data 
comes from municipal documents. 
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Including semi-structured interviews and different types of archival documents. The 
interviews were in each municipality conducted at multiple organizational levels, 
covering both the administration and the school level. At the administrative level 
interviews were held with managers and employees from the municipal school and 
accounting sectors, while interviews at the school level were conducted with the 
principals of school, department heads and administrative employees. By interview-
ing people employed at different levels and positions, diverse insights and perspec-
tives on the funding model came to light thus bringing forward a clearer picture of 
the managerial practice created.  
As the main focus of study is the effect of the funding model on managerial practice 
it was decided that no teachers were to be interviewed. Albeit these of course are 
those who on at first hand have to carry out and teach in environments directly af-
fected by the managerial practice created they are rarely included in discussions on 
the deeper details of the funding model. Yet, by including different managerial lev-
els within the school districts, the interviews brought the needed insights into the 
perceptions, tasks and focus areas associated with the different managerial role. 
Creating therefore an even deeper insight into the overall managerial practice exist-
ing in the particular district.  
In total 15 semi-structured interviews were carried out over the course of a month in 
the autumn of the school year 2012/13. Each interview were taped and lasted around 
1.5 to 2 hours. All but two were one-on-one, face-to-face interviews, whereas two 
were group-interviews carried out with employees at the administrational level in 
Municipality A. It is in this context important to note that the organizational struc-
ture at respectively the administration and school level highly affects the number of 
possible interviews available. In each municipality, the number of persons available 
is at the outset somewhat limited, due to the size of the organizational structure. 
Accordingly, albeit only ten plus seven persons respectively were interviewed, the 
principal actors at the administration level (school and accounting sector) were cov-
ered while approximately half of the management teams in place were interviewed. 
Providing thereby sufficient material to conduct a thorough analysis. 
In Municipality A, ten people were interviewed. At the school level interviews were 
conducted with management teams from two out of the four school districts. Each 
time respectively with the principal, the administrative coordinator and a department 
head. Interviews were hence conducted with fifty percent of school teams available 
and with the different managerial levels within the school management teams. At the 
administrative level four persons were interviewed; two managers from the school 
and two from the accounting sector. In Municipality B seven interviews were con-
ducted, again seeking to cover the principal actors at the different organizational 
levels. At the administration three persons were interviewed; a sector head, a munic-
ipal manager and a financial employee. At the school level two out of the five school 
management teams available were interviewed. Interviews were here held with the 
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two principals and respectively a department head/head of after-school care services, 
thus covering the majority of managerial levels in a particular school district.  
Table 7.2 lists the interviews, the job description of the interviewee as well as a 
letter delegated to the particular interview. The letters (A-O) and the ‘assigned job 
description’ are used to differentiate between the interviews when quotations enter 
in the analysis. The interviews are thus depersonalized due to reasons of anonymity, 
opening up for differences of opinions between local management teams and be-
tween the schools and the municipal administration to be verbalized.  
 Interview’ 
delegation 
Job title of the participant 
 A Administrative coordinator, District 1 
Municipality A B Department head, District 1 
 C Principal, District 1 
 D Administrative coordinator, District 2 
 E Department head, District 2 
 F Principal, District 2 
 G Sector head & deputy head (finance) (Group interview) 
 H Sector head & deputy head (education) (Group interview) 
 I Department head, District W 
Municipality B J Principal, District W 
 K Principal, District Z  
 L After-school head, District Z 
 M Sector head 
 N Municipal manager  
 O Financial employee 
- Table 7.2   Interview’ delegation and job description of the interviewed persons 
Prior to the two main field studies a smaller pilot study was conducted in a third 
municipality. The intention of this was to get to know the field. Interviews were here 
also conducted at both the municipal and school level; albeit on a smaller scale. This 
gave me the first ‘real-life’ insight into the area of school funding and the manage-
ment of this in particular. The experience further helped to provide a good under-
standing of the challenges and issues facing the Danish school system and became in 
this way a vital tool for developing the interview guide used in the two later field 
studies. Not only did this first glance into practice offer a good opportunity to try out 
different questions, but it also allowed me to go back and reconsider the questions in 
a more critical light, changing them if necessary in order better to captured im-
portant and even new aspects.  
The interview guide consequently came to consist of a range of semi-structured 
questions, divided into several themes. The first of these was intended to create 
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insights into the structures of the school system and with it into the local and overall 
objectives of the school system. The rest related more profoundly to the specific 
formula funding model in place and the associated processes of planning, budgeting 
and evaluation. Questions relating to budgetary and educational responsibilities as 
well as inclusion and the surrounding challenges were also included in the guide. 
Yet, the approach taken for the field interviews were heavily inspired by the ‘analyt-
ical interview’, as advanced by Kreiner & Mouritsen (2006); an approach where the 
aim is: “to explore the uncharted complexities of practice (2006:157)”. The inter-
views were thus not expected to bring about or provide ‘final answers’. Rather, as 
Kreiner & Mouritsen (2006:156) note, the analytical interview is intended to give 
input to an analytical conversation so that the field researcher “get[s] findings ‘be-
yond’ common sense, and it [the analytical interview] aims to create new insight 
rather than confirm what was already known before the interview” (Kreiner & 
Mouritsen 2006:160). Finally the guide was handled flexible enough to explore 
emerging paths during the interview, taking into account also the job position of the 
person being interviewed.  
The specific questions were unknown to the persons being interviewed, albeit they 
all had received a short description of me, my research agenda as well as the overall 
theme of the interview (through an email send by me few days before the meeting 
and/or through information given to them from other municipal employees). There-
fore the interviewees did not have time to ‘over-think’ answers before hand, neither 
being ‘clueless’ on the subject of the interview. The questions at the beginning of 
each new theme were relative open giving the interviewees the opportunity to come 
up with their immediate thoughts on or interpretation of the question being asked, 
which depending on the answer could lead to the important “follow-up question” 
(Kreiner & Mouritsen 2006:158). In turn making way for a dialogue to emerge. The 
interview guide did thus not act as a straight-jacket which tightly governed the dia-
logue. Instead, as suggested by Kreiner & Mouritsen, it functioned more as an “input 
to, and a premise for, the knowledge creation and the sense making during the inter-
view – as opposed to treating the guide as a driver for the interaction in, and a tem-
plate for the outcome of, the interview” (Kreiner & Mouritsen 2006:58). The inter-
viewees were throughout encouraged to and were in fact themselves very keen to 
give illustrative examples when answering the questions. They were in general very 
forthcoming and generous in taking their time to explain difficult issues, revisiting 
particular ones if needed, and in openly discussing their daily tasks. The interviews 
thus opened up for discussions on the interviewees’ perception of the advantages 
and weaknesses associated with the funding model as well as the significance and 
effect of being accountable also for funds for special needs education and not at least 
of their understanding of the general pursuit of inclusion. In turn giving me a deeper 
understanding of the challenges and tasks facing them in their everyday practice.  
There are of course some obvious problems/limitations associated with relying on 
interview data. In particular it can affect the participants’ inclination and willingness 
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to disclose and discuss potentially critical and contentious issues. In discussing their 
daily tasks, bringing forth perceptions of advantages and disadvantages and on the 
political and administrative decision-making (in the process potentially criticizing 
their employers or collogues), a reluctance to answer might arise in the fear of losing 
face or saying something controversial. Such concerns may be difficult or even 
impossible for the researcher to see through or interpret in the moment; thus possible 
affecting the type and content of the given answers. Although the promise of ano-
nymity may reduce the impact of such drawbacks such concerns are present. Here it 
is again important to note that the study does not aim at finding the ‘overall truth’ 
but rather acknowledges that a field study is a social construction, shaped and influ-
enced both by the persons being interviewed and the person conducting the research.   
In order to enlarge the source of material, documents in various forms were there-
fore also collected, including minutes and reports covering the period 2007-2014. 
This longitudinal perspective was chosen in order to not only ensure a thorough 
study of the changes being made, but also of the discussions and challenges facing 
the school system more broadly. The documents further gave great insights into the 
decision-making process and its’ intentions, including knowledge of the objectives 
of the school system, the type of funding chosen and with it the broader ideas behind 
the type of governing structures being applied. The minutes from the monthly meet-
ings held by the relevant committee responsible for the school system were of par-
ticular interest. As well as the content of relevant minutes from the municipal board. 
This type of data is public available and can be found at the municipality’s’ web-
page. Attached to the minutes are general reports, memorandums and policy papers 
developed by the administration in order to equip the politicians with relevant 
knowledge when decisions on the school system are to be made. The collected doc-
uments thus includes evaluation reports (e.g. the compulsory Quality Report), the 
municipality’s Coherent Children’s Policy and other strategy papers and documents 
relating to the budgetary control process (e.g. annual accounts and budgetary follow-
ups) as well as documents on the construction of the formula funding model in 
place. Lastly, data containing descriptions of the schools’ philosophy, statements of 
values and concepts of learning etc. from all the municipal schools (not only the 
ones being interviewed) were collected from the web-page of the individual school. 
Since it is often the case that no complete description of the specific formula funding 
model exist it was necessary to include many types of document. When descriptions 
do exist they often refer only to specific part of the funding model e.g. the funding 
of general or that of special needs education (often in connection with upcoming 
changes). They are in mainly presented in very condensed manners, using words and 
not formulae as will be presented in this study. Further as the funding models are 
being changed on a somewhat constant rate, parts of the documents become quickly 
outdated. A thorough and close analysis, covering a range of years, thus showed 
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itself to be needed in order to fully understand and puzzle together a solid and fair 
description of the full range of components making up the specific funding model. 
8.4. CODING OF DATA 
Prior to the analysis the interviews were personally transcribed and stored in the 
software analysis program QSR NVivo 10. A program used in the subsequent data 
analysis process. Throughout this process three types of qualitative codes were used, 
descriptive, topic and ‘analytical’ coding (see Richards 2015). Descriptive codes are 
as their name suggest descriptive in nature, which compared to the other two make 
them more like quantitative codes. These were mainly used to describe the individu-
al interviewee, as well as more formal/descriptive information about the municipali-
ty or school in question (stored as attributes).  
The second type, so-called topic codes, were used to label text pieces according to 
specific topics (stored as notes), and were therefore mainly used to code text de-
scribing specific funding model control components. Together these nodes thus 
encompassed information on the different aspects of the funding model, as well as 
their relation to each other and were primarily derived from the theoretical under-
standing of what constitutes the different funding model components. New empiri-
cally derived notes describing new control component however also emerged 
through working with the data.  
Finally, the third type of coding, the analytical codes (also stored as notes), refers to 
coding which arises from interpretation and reflection on meanings. Because, as 
Richards (2015:111) explains, the researcher in this part of the coding process, has 
to consider meanings in a broader context creating categories that express ‘how 
ideas’ about the data. Consequently, ‘analytical’ codes were used as means to under-
stand and interpret the deeper effects of the formula funding models on managerial 
practice. All in all, the above mentioned three different types of coding were used 
representing either a theoretical concept, an analytical or practical driven one or 
simply what Lewins & Silver (2010:83) term as “’interesting stuff’ or ‘data I need to 
think about more’”.  
Coding took place throughout the process of analyzing and working with the data, 
resulting in new codes being generated. In order to ensure that the coding scheme 
developed remained reliable, that is, applied in the same manner across time, the 
data was revisited following the initial coding. This was for example done by re-
coding a ‘clean’ version without looking to the prior coding of the document in 
question, ensuring both that codes were used in the same manner across time as well 
as new codes (which had emerged during the process) also being used across all 
documents. As a result data saturation, in the sense, that the coding covered the 
breath of the data was ensured. The coding process further facilitated the extraction 
of particular illustrative opinions or descriptions to be used as quotations throughout 
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the study in order to illustrate and create a deeper understanding of the intentions 
and practice created. The quotes are thus seen as means through which to resonate 
with the many voices from the field, ensuring that the reader, as Baxter & Chua 
(1998:82) explain, does not only hear the authorial voice. As all the utilized data is 
written in Danish, the quotes have been translated to English. Through this transla-
tion I have tried to capture the specific character of the language used. I hope the 
reader will bear with me in my attempts to find a balance between what is actually 
possible to express in English and the – often inventive and colorful – use of lan-
guage among Danish school practitioners.
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Part III   Municipality A 
 
Part III contains the first of the dissertation’s two field studies. The subject of study 
is Municipality A which came about through the amalgamation of seven smaller 
municipalities. Prior to the amalgamation a consultants’ report analyzed the service 
sectors in the seven original municipalities and with it the potential implications of 
the upcoming merger. The report showed that very different practices and service 
levels existed and if these differences were not addressed they would, in combina-
tion with decreasing birth rates and projections showing a negative socio-economic 
development, lead to a decrease in service quality. 
In order to counter these challenges the school system has since undergone several 
changes. Including changes in the structure of the school system in general, and not 
at least, in terms of how it is funded. Since 2009 the funding model has been contin-
uously adjusted, albeit the core focus on pupils and their needs, as the main base for 
distribution, has remained. As a consequence of the changes an ever larger part of 
the budgetary responsibilities has been devolved to the schools, in the hope of 
strengthening and renewing the amalgamated school system so that it will be able to 
meet the challenges stemming from a declining birthrate and the socio-economic 
index (see e.g. Children & School’s Committee (CSC) 12.04.07, head 42, 51, 52).  
In the words of a municipal manager, the current funding model is intended to ena-
ble the local management to “take action, establish, amalgamate, and do things 
differently compared to before the changes where they acted within very fixed limits 
(I G lin.520). The increased local decision-making scope associated with the larger 
devolvement of especially special needs funds is generally perceived favorable by 
the management. However, when combined with the steep decline in pupil numbers, 
concerns are starting to rise. In the future, an administrative coordinator notes, this 
highly pupil dependent model can become problematic:  
“If pupil numbers were stable, then I think the model is really, really 
good. If we had 20 pupils per lasses and the numbers remained stable, 
then I would almost call it brilliant. I have tried verbalizing this to the 
teachers; that in fact there are adequate resources in the system, as long 
as we generate enough business. I have often heard our staff say – ‘we 
have to save, we need to do this and we need to do that, we can’t afford 
this or that, notebooks or trips to the children – This is nonsense, because 
there is enough money for the children we have. Our problem is the con-
tinued need to adjust, not to cut-back – those two aspects are often mixed 
up; everyone is shouting ’cut spending’ – but cutbacks and adjustments 
are not the same. We need to adjust but not actually cut spending as 
such” (administrative coordinator, District 1, Interview (I) A lin.368ff). 
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Part III, is three-parted. In Chapter 9 the technical components making up Munici-
pality A’ formula funding model are analyzed. This includes a description of the 
political objectives of the school system, and a thorough analysis of the control 
components making up the formula funding model. The analysis is guided by the 
theoretical frame put forward in Chapter 5 of the components making up the overall 
package of controls. This theoretical framework thus guides and structures the anal-
ysis of the funding model, albeit the content is also influenced by the findings there-
by bringing life to the intentions behind the funding model.  
Building on this Chapter 10 analyzes the funding model in the light of the devel-
oped framework in Chapter 7. The level of competitive pressure and the level of 
budgetary risk imposed onto the districts by the funding model is studied and the 
funding model is placed at its relevant position in the rectangle of Figure 7.4. Here-
after the inherent incentive structures of the model are studied, enabling thereby a 
discussion of the theoretical practice created by the model.  
In the final chapter of Part III, Chapter 11, the study again moves away from the 
theoretical implications analyzing instead actual managerial practice. The chapter 
accordingly presents an account of how school management is actually practiced in 
Municipality A. The account focuses on the guiding principles affecting the local 
management in their daily practices. The account therefore seeks to visualize how 
education concerns are weighted against the model’s inherent incentive structures. 
In the concluding part of the chapter the managerial practice created is compared 
against the fulfillment of the organizational objectives, in this way highlighting 
whether the practice created is in line with these objectives. 
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CHAPTER 9.     FUNDING MODEL, MUNICIPALITY A 
9.1. INTRODUCTION – STRUCTURE OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM 
Following the structural reform in 2007 the new municipal administration of Munic-
ipality A, the ‘Children & School Committee’, in co-operation with the municipal 
board, decided that a new organizational structure for schools was needed (see e.g. 
the Children & School Committee (CSC) 12.04.07, head 42, 51, 52). This not only 
included restructuring the geographical placement of the school districts, introducing 
with it district management, but it also entailed reconsidering how the school system 
was to be funded:  
“Our main concern [a head of sector explains] was to create a solid 
budgetary foundation for our schools. A decreasing population meant 
that we needed to consider how to adjust budgets, and we quickly 
reached the conclusion that we needed a pupil dependent allocation” (I H 
lin.212ff.). 
The new structure meant that the fourteen original public schools and two segregat-
ed special needs schools were merged into four new districts (Town Council 
13.07.07 head 253). Each district has multiple departments, respectively 2, 3, 4, and 
5 departments. The specific department does not necessarily provide schooling for 
all grade levels (0
th
 to 10
th
). In fact, some departments function as a sort of supplier 
school, in that, they only cater to pupils attending preschool up to 4
th
 grade or pre-
school up to 6
th
. In three districts all senior classes (7
th
 to 9
th
 grade) are further gath-
ered in one department, which means that the pupils enrolled in the “supplier” de-
partments are gathered here after their in-schooling years (CSC 15.08.06, head 22).  
The two special needs schools were relocated and placed as two separate depart-
ments under the management of one of the districts. By relocating the special needs 
schools and placing them as a part of the general public school environment the 
hope was to make the special needs services a more integrated part of the public 
school system (Town Council 13.07.07 head 254). 
The introduction of district management also necessitated a change in the local man-
agement structures. As a mean to accommodate the larger organizational units each 
district was assigned a principal of school, an administrative coordinator and heads 
of department for each of the individual units in the district. Through a clear division 
of responsibilities the hope was to create a strong management team which would be 
able to focus on education, strategic and budgetary matters of the individual depart-
ments and for the district as a whole.  
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Politically, the service area is governed and administrated directly by the ‘Children 
& School Committee’ which, in co-operation with the Finance Committee, is re-
sponsible for developing and formulating proposals to the Municipal Board. At the 
municipal level the structural changes were accompanied by a merger of the previ-
ously independent organizational functions, respectively responsible for the general 
school system and for special needs education and segregated special needs services 
(I H lin.15ff). A new administrative unit, the 'School Sector’ was in turn created to 
be responsible for overseeing all matters related to education and schools.  
9.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE EDUCATION SECTOR 
With the aim of making Municipality A’ public school system one of the best in the 
country (CSC, 13.09.07, head 51), preparing the pupils and instilling in them the 
desire to learn more, the main vision of the school system is as follows: 
 “Through high quality in day-care facilities and schools, the aim is to 
break the poverty circle and raise the general education level of the 
youth, and enhance their attachment to the labor market…with the over-
all vision of raising the number of pupils who continues with further ed-
ucation”. (Political agreement 2011-2013) 
In the words of a department head from District 1, this entails placing the abilities of 
the individual child at the center of attention: 
“Our core service is proficiencies, knowledge, and skills, enhancing the 
education level of all pupils as much as possible. As we’re a socially 
burdened school we’re not in top ten grade wise, and we’ll never be. But 
we need to support the educational and social development of all children 
… preparing them with the needed knowledge. Then we have a chance to 
give them a better starting point when they finish school” (I B lin.105ff.).  
Politically, three concerns are identified as guiding principles for the delivery of 
education services in Municipality A: 1) the academic capabilities of the pupils, 2) 
the competences of the teachers and 3) the delivery of service must be orchestrated 
in a way where a continuous focus on capacity adjustments are instilled in the local 
management (CSC 02.05.13, heads 5). Based on this and combined with the five 
themes (Health & Well-being, Coherence & Continuity, Inclusion, Responsibility 
and Early & Appropriate Interventions) outlined in the municipality’s ‘Coherent 
Children & Youth Policy‘ (2012) four specific visions, underpinned by objectives 
and targets, are developed for the school system (see Table 8.1). These visions, it is 
argued, are to act as indicators of the successfulness of the management and of the 
school system as a whole (CSC 06.12.12, head 107). 
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The academic level of the pupils is to be 
equal to the national level: 
In order to improve the academic levels; so that 
95% complete further education, and 70% of 
pupils receiving special needs services pass the 
final examination in Danish and Math, the edu-
cational and social development of all children, 
their test scores, grades and reading skills must 
be a continuous focus through the curriculum. 
Performance targets  
97% of pupils finishing the final examination 
are deemed ready for further education. 
After completing 1st grade 70% of the pupils 
must be capable of reading, 85% after 2nd grade 
and 95% after 3rd 
In the in-schooling the reading abilities of bi-
lingual pupils must be equal to those of native 
speaking pupils. 
95% of the pupils enrolled in mainstream clas-
ses must pass the final examinations in all 
compulsory subjects. 
At the age of 7, 95% of all children must be 
deemed ready for school (equal to the national 
average). 
70% of pupils enrolled in special needs classes 
must pass the finals in Danish and Math. 
The grade average must be raised above what 
can be expected relative to the socio-economic 
index of the schools 
A focus on inclusion will improve the educa-
tional level and well-being of children: 
With the objective of improving learning out-
comes, the use of inclusive pedagogies and IT 
will create learning environments which ensure 
the attendance of all pupils and encourage ac-
tive participation. A focus on the social, mental 
and physical well-being of pupils is a preven-
tive factor of bullying.  
Performance targets  
The educational services and efforts must be 
orchestrated so that so that the number of pu-
pils in the general environment increases per-
centage wise compared to the previous year  
The number of pupils referred to special needs 
classes or schools must be lower compared to 
the previous year. 
The teaching plans for each subject must de-
scribe how the class works with IT. 
All pupils must receive a minimum of 30 min. 
exercise each day.  
At least 80% of all pupils must indicate that 
they are ‘satisfied’, or ‘more than satisfied’ 
with the school when answering satisfaction 
surveys.  
School absence per pupil must be less than 10 
days per year (6 sick days, 2 days of extraordi-
nary absence and 2 days of ‘illegal absence’) 
The qualifications of the teachers are high: 
The teachers’ qualifications and skills must be 
ensured, and the management must ensure a 
cost-effective management of the school.  
Performance targets  
100% of the staff must have or be in the pro-
cess of acquiring a qualifying degree. 
90% of all lessons must be taught by a teacher 
with subject specific competences or with 
competences equivalent to that. 
95% of all lessons must be taught by the per-
manent teaching staff. 
In average 36% of teachers’ gross working 
hours must be made up by actual teaching. 
A well-functioning collaboration between 
the school and home will result in high pa-
rental satisfaction: 
Active parental participation and fast, dynamic 
communication through the ‘parental intranet’ 
creates a high quality school, ensuring that the 
public school is the natural choice of the par-
ents. 
Performance targets  
90% of the parents must on a recurring basis 
use the ‘parental intranet’ 
70% of parents participating in satisfaction 
surveys must be ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’, 
with a response rate of at least 55%. 
The school board must develop principles for 
the focus areas depicted in the ‘Coherent Chil-
dren and Youth Policy´. 
- Table 9.1  Visions, objectives and targets for Municipality A’ school system 2012/13  
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The performance targets are, as seen, to a large extend measures of outcome; that is, 
measures which seek to capture the learning outcome of the pupils, the level of in-
clusiveness and parental and pupil satisfaction. Examination and test results are used 
to capture learning outcomes, while the number of pupils taught in the gen-
eral/mainstream public school environment is seen as a measure of the inclusiveness 
of the schools. Parental and pupil satisfactions scores are included as points of 
measure for evaluating the well-being of pupils and the satisfaction level of parents. 
More input-related measures are however also included. The indicator for ‘quality 
teaching’ is for example the educational level of the teachers.  
Broadly, none of these measures specify or make mandatory the precise activities or 
processes which much be implemented in order to fulfill and improve the quality of 
the education offered. Although the quality report has included a list of specific 
indicators/activities for each performance targets none of these are binding. Rather, 
they are intended to act as inspiration for the organization and planning of local 
activities. The management can thus choose freely the activities they deem appropri-
ate, as long as this of course is done within the law.  
The above objectives also include more managerial related concerns, with budgetary 
viability pinpointed as a vital indicator which must guide the delivery of local ser-
vices. Accordingly, from a political/administrational point of view the management 
must not only focus on education-related matters, but also ensure cost-effective 
management, which takes into account decreasing pupil numbers. This, it is stressed, 
entails ensuring a high percentage of actual teaching and limiting the use of non-
permanent teaching staff. Upholding high class averages is further encouraged as a 
way to ensure a cost-effective delivery of service and a stated aim is here that the 
average across districts reaches 21 pupils per class (CSC 28.12.13 head 4). From a 
political/administrative point of view, the local management is thus accountable for 
not only the education-related results but also for the budgetary developments of the 
district. This duality is also ingrained in the school management. In fact, the princi-
pal from District 2 explains, these perspectives are closely intertwined, in that, fi-
nancial viability is a precondition for attaining the other objectives: 
“It’s not like we’re only thinking; school and budgets. We’re certainly 
also thinking about development and teaching, and a firm steering of our 
financial situation will enable us to improve our education. We have the 
‘worst’ social index in the country;this influences the children we have to 
teach. We focus on inclusion – inclusion and our financial circumstances 
– these are the two main areas where we have to succeed” (I F:53ff.). 
9.3. FORMULA DESIGN, MUNICIPALITY A 
From the School Sector funds are devolved to the districts via a mix of payment 
methods. The spending frame is made up by two appropriations, one for general 
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education and one for special needs education. The formula used to allocate the total 
spending frame is intended to cover the cost of general education, additional educa-
tional support as well as special needs education supplied in the general environ-
ment, in specific special needs classes or in one of the two special needs schools.  
Prior to the allocation a part of the budget is set aside for a range of specific purpos-
es. Among other things this includes funds for bus transportation and for specific 
severe special needs services, e.g. second special needs school but also for special 
needs services given to pupils in residential institutions and special needs education 
given to newcomers to the municipality. On top of this, funds are also set aside with 
the intension of compensating schools for long-term illnesses among staff, for teach-
ers over the age of 60 and for additional training activities. These latter funds are 
distributed late in the budget year, independently of the general allocation.  
The spending allocation frame for the school year 2012/13 for a specific school 
district is set February 1
st
, based on respectively the number of pupils enrolled in 
pre-school to the 9
th
 grade, and the number of pupils February 1
st
 who are to begin in 
preschool10. The first part of the formula may be represented as:  
    
  
   , 
where the levels i = 1, 2, 3 correspond to the age categories: in-schooling (preschool 
- 3
rd 
grade), middle-school forms (4
th
 - 6
th
 grade) and senior classes (7
th
 - 10
th
 grade).  
The second part, concerning the special needs education can be written as: 
   
 
       . 
Here the   ’s represent the fixed rate per pupil enrolled in the six segregated ”special 
needs classes/schools” (CSC 16.08.12, head 62; 07.02.13, head 5) providing special 
needs education in Municipality A.    is the number of pupils in the district referred 
in agreement with the municipality referring committee to service number j. The 
part C, which is supposed to cover locally arranged and supplied inclusive seeking 
initiatives and special needs education, is a fixed allotment intended to cover the 
entire school year. It be written as a sum C1 + C2 + C3 + C4 (CSC 03.05.12, head, 30, 
16.08.12, head 62), where  
                                                          
 
10 Note that the enrollments February 1st are adjusted taking into account 50% of the average 
recorded decrease in pupil number over the last two years in the period February 1st- October 
5th. For the pupils expected to start in pre-school, this number is adjusted in accordance with 
the average private school intake of the two previous years (CSC 12.01.11, head 3) 
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C1 is a pool of funds for integrated, inclusive seeking services and initiatives (‘Inclu-
sion-funds’) and is based on the number of pupils December 2011 (CSC 16.08.12, 
head 62). This procedure is argued by the municipal sector by saying that they have 
closely monitored the field over the last couple of years and feels this to be a fair 
representation of needs).  
 
C2 a fixed allotment for special needs classes in the middle and in-schooling age 
categories. Observe that this number is common for all school districts.   
C3 an allotment based on the actual local referrals to specific special needs classes 
for the school year 2012/13; intended to enable districts to acquire externally pro-
vided services when needed.  
and  
C4 a pool of funds for individually local orchestrated arrangements, for pupils re-
ferred by the administration. 
All in all the forecast of the spending allocation frame for a district as set February 
1
st
 2012 may be represented as follows 
                              
         
 
   
 
   . 
9.3.1. COMMENTS, THE PAYMENT PER PUPIL  
The pupil dependent part of the above formula,    
       , is intended to cover the 
cost of general education, as well as the associated operating expenses and is thus 
understood as a measure of the average costs of teaching a pupil in the general edu-
cation environment. The payment per pupil of age-category i, termed p
i
, is deter-
mined by taking into account: 
- The recommended number of lessons for the specific year group August 1st 200811.  
- An average class-size of 20 pupils. 
- An average number of teaching lessons (23 lessons per teacher per week, amount-
ing to 680 clock hours per year). 
- An average measure of a teacher’s salary.  
p
i
 is, in other words, adjusted according to age and is further raised due to so called 
‘additional time/resource considerations’. The ‘additional time funds’ are to cover 
school camps, pedagogical/’resource centers’, extra division of pupil and other ar-
                                                          
 
11 The in-schooling is allocated additional lessons than the ministerial recommended number, 
resulting in 27 lessons for in-schooling, 27 for middle-school forms and 31 for senior classes. 
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rangements determined by the collective agreement, such as employee representa-
tives. Whereas, the ‘additional resource funds’, are to cover administration and man-
agement, school boards, IT, substitutes and educational training and courses. A 
special allotment is further allocated to each 9
th
 grades to cover the extra cost of 
conducting examinations. Lastly, a fixed allotment, based on historical costs is add-
ed which is to cover building maintenance, janitors, cleaning, and other expenses for 
up-keep of buildings (CSC 10.01.08, head 4; 12.01.11, head 3).  
All together, these different aspects make up the payment p
i
, which for all levels 
approximately amounts to DKK 50.000 per pupil enrolled.  
9.3.2. COMMENTS, THE DEVOLVEMENT OF SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL 
COSTS  
The devolvement of special needs education funds is quite vast, in that, only a few 
specific services for pupils with severe special needs are excluded from the alloca-
tion. In terms of the devolved funds, the two special needs components of the formu-
la take into account the severity of needs, and whether the pupil is referred to the 
special needs services locally or by the municipal referring committee. The School 
Sector has decided that 75 % of all referrals must be orchestrated at the school level 
in co-operation between the management and the PPR-team (pedagogical and psy-
chological counseling). The rest is to be conducted by the municipal Referring 
Committee although the budgetary responsibility is subsequently devolved. 
For the school year 2012/13 the allocation was based on an analysis and count of 
actual needs/referrals. 380 were found to be in need of special needs education, with 
respectively 293 referred by the schools and 87 by the committee. Accordingly: “in 
order to accommodate the intensions of the new law [Act no. 379, 28.04.2012 con-
cerning special needs education and other special educational assistance] funds are 
devolved for: 
1) Supplementary teaching, extra support, and group formations [C1] 
2) Group and individual-integrated special needs education [C1] 
3) Special needs classes in in-schooling and in the middle-school classes, [C2] 
4) The purchase of services in special needs classes at other municipal  
     schools [C3] (CSC 16.08.12, head 62) 
Through the devolvement schools are expected to be able to establish inclusive ser-
vices for integrated groups, plus specially orchestrated teaching conducted through 
the schools ‘resource center’. Each district is further expected to be able to establish 
a special needs class in the in-schooling respectively the middle-school forms and 
when needed to purchase special needs services at other municipal schools.  
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The second special needs component refers to centrally referred pupils in special 
needs classes mainly at special schools. These funds are also at the outset devolved 
and found by attaching an amount/internally set rate for having a pupil enrolled in 
the specific special needs class or class (07.02.13, head 5). If the pupil is not referred 
to services in the district, funds are immediately transferred to the district in which 
the child receives its education (CSC 03.05.12, head 30; 16.08.12, head 62).  
For the school year 2012/13 the flow of funds can be illustrated as in Figure 9.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Figure 9.1   Flow of funds and structure of Municipality A, school year 2012/13 
9.3.3. COMMENTS, MODEL PRECISION 
The model is constructed so that it is intended to accommodate both horizontal and 
vertical equity concerns. Vertical equity is addressed in terms of pupils with severe 
special needs. This is done by varying the payment, attached to a pupil, depending 
on the specific needs and the services in which it is enrolled. Horizontal equity is 
pursued by funding all districts through the same set of rules, based on an average 
cost perspective. In Municipality A this is manifested by compensating districts with 
the same payment p
i
 per pupil enrolled, and secondly by allotting all districts the 
same amount, intended for inclusive-seeking services.  
The underlying precondition and assumption associated with funding according to a 
concern for horizontal equity, is that all districts are equal along dimensions, such as 
wealth and socioeconomic status. In principle, the funds should accordingly enable 
all schools to deliver the same level of service in terms of the general education 
while taking into account differences in pupil needs. The precision by which the 
model captures the actual needs and characteristics of the pupils thus becomes im-
portant. 
School District 1 
3 departments:                         
0-6th; 0-6th; 0-10th  
Funding 
mechanism 
School District 2 
5 departments, two of which are 
special needs schools.               
0-6th; 0-6th; 7th-10th 
Administration 
Children and 
Young People 
Municipality 
School District 3 
2 departments: 0-9th; 0-9th 
School District 4 
4 departments:                          
0-4th; 0-6th; 0-9th; 0-9th  
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A general concern, as expressed by a deputy manager from the administration, is 
however that the needs of the “ordinary” pupils are in fact not the same but that they 
vary across districts. In fact, it is argued, the socio-demographic profiles of the dis-
tricts are not the same. This means that the precision by which the model reimburses 
needs is not accurate and some districts may as a result not be compensated fairly 
for the actual needs of their pupils:  
“There is a bias, that is, we have typically seen it when it comes to the 
group- and individual integrated [pupils], there are differences between 
what you get in the east compared to the west, so you can see where the 
problems are” (I G lin.569). 
Consequently, the deputy head notes, some districts may have been given preferen-
tial treatment, i.e. been overcompensated, leaving the rest undercompensated. Prior 
to the increased devolvement of special needs funds, this may have induced some to 
over-refer pupils to special needs education, both as a mean to compensate for the 
inaccurate allocation but also as a way of accumulating a larger budget base. 
9.4. SCALE OF BUDGETARY DEVOLVEMENT 
The above spending frame formula represents the general rule for the allocation of 
funds in Municipality A. The appropriation level is as seen quite high, in that, the 
budget authority to a large degree has been devolved to the School Sector, and from 
here further to the individual district. The devolvement of special needs education 
funds is also quite vast, in that, only a few specific services for severe special needs 
are excluded from the allocation. Additional cost sharing arrangements however 
modify the general setup by transferring some of the financial responsibility from 
the districts to the municipal School Sector. Table 9.1 explains the exact distribution 
of responsibilities among the schools and the administration.  
Administration Children & Young people – School Sector 
 Transportation for pupils to and from the home-district department 
Funding for a small department  
Special needs education for newcomers to the municipality  
The additional costs above the threshold price paid by the district school for pupils 
enrolled in special needs classes 
Special needs school for pupils with very severe needs 
The educational cost for pupils living in residential institutions and homes 
Outdoor up keepings, renovation and larger expansions (joint municipal team) 
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- Table 9.1   Division and devolvement of financial responsibilities 
The administration holds the budgetary responsibility for outdoor up keepings. This 
is transferred to a central municipal team which is responsible for lager rebuilding’s 
and renovations of the municipality’s buildings (Municipal Board 28.06.07, head 
205). The budgetary responsibility for bus transportation for pupils to and from 
home, is also retained at the municipal level. Transportation cost is here covered for 
pupil enrolled in a home-district department and for children who due to assess-
ments of needs are enrolled in special needs service in other districts. If however the 
child is enrolled in a department in another district or in a private school the costs of 
transportation is not covered.  
The administration further bears the cost of pupils coming from outside of the mu-
nicipality if their needs are so severe that these cannot be met within the services 
provided by the school district. The administration thus defrays the full costs of 
services given to such pupils until the next allocation takes place (CSC 12.01.11, 
head 4). Depending on when the child is enrolled considerable time can thus pass 
before the budgetary responsibility is taken over by the school. A similar carve out 
arrangement is implemented for the smallest school department. Because, it is ar-
gued, its geographic location hampers its ability to generate activity so to be finan-
cial viable. If the required academic level is to be met this, it is argued, will affect 
severely the budgetary situation of the district as a whole. Because local services are 
a political focus point a fixed allotment is thus allocated each month, under the strict 
condition that these funds are to be used exclusively here (CSC 07.06.12, head 49).  
Stop-loss arrangements for pupils with severe special needs are also established. The 
districts, as explained, receive a payment corresponding to an internally fixed rate 
for pupils enrolled in one of the six segregated special needs classes/schools (CSC 
16.08.12, head 62). The cost of these services is however higher than the price paid 
by the districts, because the administration has decided, in order to soften the budg-
etary effects of enrolling a pupil with very severe needs, to defray the remaining cost 
(CSC 16.08.12, head 62). A district is, for example, only to cover 186,000 of the 
respectively 203,000/222,000 DDK bill associated with a pupil being referred to one 
of the classes for less severe special needs education, while they must cover 235,000 
of the 345,000 DDK for having a pupil enrolled in one of the institutions for more 
severe services (07.02.13, head 5). 
Devolved to the school districts 
 Funds for ordinary teaching and general operating expenses 
Supplementary teaching, extra support and group formations 
Group- and individual integrated special needs education 
Special needs classes in in-schooling and in the middle-school classes 
The purchase of special needs services at other municipal schools 
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Finally, a carve-out arrangement further means that one of the two special needs 
schools is funded completely outside the general allocation. This school is special-
ized in teaching pupils with very severe physical, emotional and social disabilities. 
These pupils are often enrolled directly from special daycare services and as a con-
sequence they are not included in the number of special needs pupils in a district. 
With this arrangement the special needs school has its own budget, and although the 
department in organizational terms is seen as a part of the larger school district in 
which it is located it must be run as a separate unit (CSC 07.02.13, head 5).  
9.5. BUDGETARY RELATED CONTROL COMPONENTS 
Figure 9.2 visualizes the budgeting process and illustrates the important entries. As 
discussed, funds are appropriated in the expectation that they cover the spending 
needs of a school district the following school year (August to July). The annual 
budget of a district however follows the rest of the municipality with the budget 
cycle running from January to December. 
 
- Figure 9.2   Time dimensions in the budgeting process  
To determine the spending frame February 1
st
 a range of forecasts of the expected 
number of pupils to be enrolled in the districts the following school year is made in 
December. These forecasts are made in co-operation between the School Sector and 
the local management and take into account prior patterns of enrollments. The aim 
of the forecasts is to estimate 1) the number of pupils to be enrolled August 1
st
 and 
2) their associated needs. February 1
st
 the estimations are made final and the spend-
ing frame of each district is announced. The allocation is thus in principle enroll-
ment based, making it resemble a case payment approach, which usually imply that 
the payer holds the financial risk of an increase in output, i.e. numbers of pupils, 
leaving providers exposed to the effects of decreasing pupil numbers.  
Municipality A however amended this so that the administration holds all risk rising 
from variations in activities. The spending frame set February 1
st
 is namely only 
adjusted upward if enrollment number has increased by October 5
th 
(CSC 12.02.11, 
head 3). A lower level of enrollments is not accompanied by a corresponding de-
mand to return funds. Thus, if a pupil of age category i enrolls before October 5
th 
the 
district is compensated with payment, p
i
, whereas if a pupil leaves nothing happens. 
1/1 
Provisional budget for the school districts announced 
Spending frame only adjusted upwards if enrollments have increased  
1/8 1/8 School year 
1/2 
Annual account Municipal budget Period 
1/1 
5/10 
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As for the funds intended to cover special needs education and supplementary sup-
port these are, as described, allocated as a block grant. The allocation thus remains 
fixed regardless of changes in pupil’s needs, thereby resembling a capitation pay-
ment approach. Only, if the pupil is a newcomer to the municipality and has so se-
vere needs that these cannot be met within the school’s services, the accompanying 
extra costs are covered by the administration.  
This makes the spending frame announced February 1
st 
a minimum allocation, which 
is only adjusted upwards. In order to minimize potential extra costs, the administra-
tion is allowed to set the expected numbers of pupils lower than otherwise indicated 
when the spending frame is determined February 1
st
 (I G lin.71, sector manager). 
The enrollments February 1
st
 are, as explained, adjusted taking into account 50% of 
average decrease in pupil numbers over the last two years from February 1
st
 - 5
th
 
October, while the expected numbers of preschoolers is adjusted in accordance with 
the average private school intake over the last two years (CSC 12.01.11, head 3). 
The dependence of the spending frame on enrollment-numbers can thus be illustrat-
ed by a broken line as shown in Diagram 9.1 showing the budget curve of a district. 
  
- Diagram 9.1   Effects of pupil numbers on the spending frame of a district  
The x-coordinate in the point (A,B) represents the estimated number of pupils Feb-
ruary 1
st
 and the second the corresponding budgetary frame as determined through 
the given formula. D
i 
represents the additional funds due to Ei new enrolled pupils in 
category i. The slope of the non-horizontal line is p
i
, the pupil dependent rate in 
category i, while the height βi is closely related to the total payment for special needs 
education determined February 1
st
. If the p
i’s are independent of i then these two 
numbers agree. But as the p
i’s generally vary with i a diagram should be made for 
each of the three i-levels. They would however be similar of shape. As already re-
marked special needs for newcomers from outside the municipality is paid by the 
administration, making the extra funds possibly even bigger.  
The construction accordingly means that the minimum budget for a district is deter-
mined already February 1
st
. This gives a great level of security and stability for the 
0 
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school management, leaving the budgetary risk associated with activity changes 
with the administration. According to a deputy head, one of the intentions behind the 
model was to accommodate the wishes of the school management: “we wanted to 
attend to their desire for predictability in their budgets…before the special needs 
budget was adjusted each month, and this created problems, because when you hire 
staff you can’t just get rid of them immediately when children leave” (I H lin.257ff). 
The stability introduced is greatly appreciated by the management. As explained by 
the administrative coordinator of District 2, it makes planning easier and gives the 
needed time to adjust to dropping pupil’ numbers: “In other words, we know our 
budget; We can say, do we need to fire a teacher or hire new ones by August 1
st
? 
This is the greatest advantage introduced, and it means that there are no surprises 
in our financial year” (I D lin.144ff).  
Potentially however, the design implies that the municipality may be paying for 
specific pupils twice. If for example a pupil enrolls in a private school after the 
budget has been set in February he/she affects the reimbursement the administration 
is obliged to render to the private provider when these report their enrollments in 
September. The same apply if a pupil moves to another public school district. Be-
cause, as the former school is not required to return funds, the funding model design 
implies that both the new and the old provider will receive funds for this pupil. 
The principle of gross appropriations at the outset means that the budget holder is 
allowed only to incur obligations or make payments which have been appropriated 
in the budget. Steps have however been implemented with the purpose of securing a 
predictable level of services over the course of a school year. Since the annual budg-
et of a school district, as illustrated in Figure 9.2, encompasses two school years 
each district is allowed to carry forward unspent appropriations across budget years. 
This is done in order to reduce the possible restricting effects of the annual budget 
cycle. Each district is allowed to carry forward a surplus of 10% of its original 
budget and a deficit of 5%. In the case of a surplus exceeding DDK 2 million such a 
transfer, however, requires a political assessment and a supplementary appropriation 
from the Children & School Committee (Municipal Board 28.06.07, head 205). 
The otherwise stability and security introduced is, it is argued, slightly distorted by 
the use of the additional central funds distributed late in the budget year. Although 
the administration has tried to confine the use of such pools, historically represent-
ing a quite substantial part of the funds allocated, these late allocations, the adminis-
trative coordinator of District 1 notes, still complicates planning and the manage-
ment in general: 
“These funds are always distributed in the latter part of the year, and they 
‘save what is otherwise less secure’. But it’s an unhealthy way to manage 
because it gives rise to much edginess in the time up to. Because we’re 
never 100% sure how much money is in play. This depends on the num-
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ber of staff who has been sick, how many has been attending training 
courses and so on. The last two years though more funds have been in-
cluded in the main allocation, which means we have them during the 
school and budget year. This gives us a clearer picture of whether each 
month’s spending is actually the percentage it needs to be”(I A lin.318ff ) 
Similar concerns are raised by the principal from District 2, who explains how the 
uncertainties affect his abilities to utilize the resources efficiently:  
Getting these extra funds can be a good thing. But getting them in the last 
month of the year, not knowing how much we’ll actually get, is not a 
good foundation for managing – Getting 3-4-500.000 from the pools for 
long-term illness and it’s like in the last part of the year. It’s not always 
so that our budget enables us to spend them prudently – We might have 
used substitutes and other things during the year, which mean that we 
have accumulated some sort of overspending. My philosophy is however 
to manage in a way, so that, we secure a continuous balance of our budg-
ets (I F lin.125ff.). 
9.6. SCOPE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND AUTONOMY 
The division of budgetary authority means that the authority for internal decisions 
concerning the operation of the school district, in terms of both general and special 
needs education and support, to a large extend has been devolved to the districts. 
The governance model of Municipality A ascribes decentralization as its guiding 
principle for effective and efficient public service delivery, stressing that decentrali-
zation is all-important for meeting the challenges faced by the municipality: 
“The best decisions are made when decision-making authority and ser-
vice delivery is connected. It’s only through the creation of strong decen-
tralized management, which operates within the frame of the political set 
objectives, that it will be possible to create the effectiveness needed with-
in the narrow financial frame under which the municipality is subjected 
to in the forthcoming years” (Municipal Board 28.06.07, head 205). 
Building on the idea that the local management possesses a deeper understanding of 
pupil’ needs and wishes, the high appropriation level and subsequent devolvement 
of funds is understood to be a mean through which more sufficient and flexible ser-
vices are to be created. In order to create efficient local management, larger and 
more viable organizational units were however seen as a precondition.  
District management was here understood to be a cornerstone. From an administra-
tive point of view, district management brought along larger organizational entities 
which further opened up for a devolvement of larger parts of the budgetary respon-
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sibilities. District management, in this way, not only enhanced the budgetary base of 
each district, thereby better equipping them to handle decreasing pupil numbers, but 
it was also, it was argued, intended to bring about opportunities for economics of 
scale to be created (I H lin.212ff.sector manager). 
The local decision-making scope is further widened through the decision to allow 
service providers to carry out line-item discretion. Thus, as explained by a sector 
head, although the preliminary appropriation, as set in the budget, indicates a possi-
ble distribution between line items, it is the responsibility of the management to 
decide how funds are actually spent: “In principle we give them a bag of money, 
although we assign the funds, once they have them they can decide [how to spend 
it]” (I G.lin554). Line-item discretion is, from the perspective of the School Sector, 
a necessity for ensuring an efficient use of funds and as long as the educational re-
quirements are met, funds can be spent on a different pattern than what was pre-
scribed in the preliminary budget. In turn, the local management is expected to be-
come innovative in their service delivery, especially as any efficiency gains can be 
kept at a district level (at least up to 10% of the original budget). The enhanced 
scope for decisions brought about via line-item discretion, the administrative coor-
dinator of District 1 stresses, requires a range of decisions to be taken into account: 
“Our allocation model isn’t a precise model. Various sums of money are 
added up and given to us…but the management is responsible for making 
it work, which means I’m not held accountable for spending 50,000 on 
something else than what was prescribed by the model…we view it more 
holistic and are accountable for the primary goal: teaching. But we also 
have to ensure that the buildings look pretty good, are cleaned and so 
on…so everything must work together” (I A lin.407ff). 
Funds are accordingly devolved as a lump sum, making it the responsibility of the 
management to ensure that the needs of the pupils are met. The management can if 
they see fit allocate more funds to the mainstream education environment or vice 
versa to the special needs services. This was further emphasized by the 2012’ legis-
lative amendment, which removed the need for official diagnosis and referrals for 
pupils in need of support less than 12 lessons pr. week. Instead it is now the respon-
sibility of the local management to decide how and in what context, subjects or 
situations support is to be given (still upholding the requirement that he needs of the 
pupils must be met). In combination with the decision to place the responsibility for 
orchestrating and referring the majority of special needs education at a local level, 
the local room for maneuvering has increased immensely, and the management has 
been sought involved and made an accountable part of the process.  
The local decision-making scope is further enhanced through the decision to allow 
districts to establish the special needs class in both the in-schooling and middle-
school forms. The devolved budgetary authority further means that the management 
can acquire external special needs services, thus leaving the management responsi-
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ble for deciding whether a child can be sufficiently included in the local services or 
whether support at other schools must be acquired. The vast budgetary devolvement 
of funds has thus enhanced local flexibility which is valuable, the administrative 
coordinator of District 1 notes: 
“I want some scope for action; I want to be able to move resources 
around, move staff around, also during the school year. I want to be able 
to take action whenever needed and be able to move resources again lat-
er. In other words, I want flexibility, a flexibility which is given to me 
through the devolvement of funds, which means I’m in control … we can 
act and act fast to the benefits of the pupils” (I A lin.476ff). 
Being the budgetary responsible part, the administrative coordinator from District 2 
emphasizes, has many advantages, although it does not give carte blanche. Some 
decisions are still retained centrally and the management must still work within the 
frames and boundaries set by the politicians and the administration: 
“It’s a good incentive for us to work constructively, because we’re given 
full scope over how we spent our money…it’s a good way to cut our 
budget, but also to challenge us to think differently, because then they 
aren’t, of course if we start to fiddle with something politically decided. 
Otherwise we have free control over the funds. It’s a challenge but a 
good one” (I D: 43ff.).  
Albeit, the schools can develop their own strategic priorities the general policy au-
tonomy in terms of abiding by the political determined objective is quite low. Not 
only is each district expected to fulfill the general objectives of the school system 
but they must also meet the local academic standards expected. Here, more long-
term political decisions on school structure and service levels affect the local deci-
sion-making scope. The political objective of preserving local school services is an 
example of this and entails that all departments must offer all grade level from pre-
school to 3
rd 
grade (09.06.11 head 52). The management can accordingly not chose 
to close a grade level in the in-schooling, even not if they feel that funds could be 
better utilized if the children were enrolled in another of the district’s departments. 
Accordingly, albeit class optimization is verbalized as an optimal solution for effi-
cient resource utilization (CSC 06.12.07 head 127) the objective of local school 
services carries more weight.  
Local discretion is further affected by the fact that the schools are a part of a larger 
municipal system. Accordingly, a sector head notes, in order to ensure that the 
“complex puzzle across schools falls into place” (I G lin.34) the individual manage-
ment team can be forced to take into considerations factors stemming from a broader 
municipal perspective. This is especially prevalent in relation to staffing. The gen-
eral policy is here that if one district has a surplus of teachers they should if possible 
be hired elsewhere. The individual principal may thus not have completely free 
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range over which teachers are to be hired. These external decisions limit the local 
scope for discretion and make District 1’ principal question the ascribed quest for 
decentralization: 
“At festive occasions we say we have decentralized institutions which 
are the pillars of our municipal system…I still however can’t manage 
freely. I can’t for example decide where I buy office supplies; here the 
administration has signed a purchasing agreement. If I want to invest in 
IT I can’t decide myself – there is also a purchasing agreement and I 
must go through the IT department. And I’m of course subjected to gen-
eral fluctuations in the financial situation of the municipality. If the mu-
nicipality suddenly is 100 million short, then I’ll have to cut back and ad-
just like everyone else. So I think this is a sign of my financial autonomy 
being more and more restricted, because the cross sectors are take ove 
more and more” (I C lin.242ff.)  
9.7. OPEN-ENROLMENT CLAUSE & PRIVATE SCHOOL RATE 
The fact that there are only four public school districts means that each of these 
covers a considerable geographic area. Yet, the district lines are drawn so that the 
distance between school departments varies both within and across districts. District 
1 and 3 divide among them one of the two larger towns, while the other is covered 
solely by District 2. District 4 lastly covers two relative bigger towns. Furthermore 
all districts contain vast rural areas.  
The private school rate is relative high with 24.9 % of the pupils enrolled in private 
schools (05.12.13 head 412). Six private schools are present in the municipality in 
addition to five boarding schools for 14-17-year-olds. Three of the six private 
schools are located in the two larger towns (respectively two in District 1 and one in 
District 2), while the rest are sited in the rural part of District 3; a district which also 
holds three of the five boarding schools. Common for all the private schools is that 
they are located quite close to a public school department. Four out of the six private 
schools are one-entry schools offering schooling to all grade levels, while one of the 
last two is an ‘ordinary’ private school with more classes on each grade level and the 
last a school offering only schooling for older pupils with special needs. The private 
schools are all religiously-founded albeit the specific emphases vary. 
The municipality’s open-enrollment clause means that competition may also spring 
from public providers, as the clause opens up for pupils choosing other departments 
                                                          
 
12 In reporting the private school rate it seems that the municipality does not include pupils in 
boarding schools, if so, the rate is actual closer to 28% (see methodology chapter) 
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than the home-district department. The free choice is however limited, in that, a 
child can only enroll in a non-home-district department if the specific class does not 
already have more than 24 pupils enrolled. The enrollment numbers of 2012/13 
show that the average class sizes was 20.9 pupils’ pr. class (28.12.13 head 4). 
 Ps 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
District 1 17.4 18.4 20.0 18.4 18.8 18.6 18.2 20.8 17.0 18.4 
District 2 18.7 15.8 20.0 23.3 22.7 25.0 23.3 21.7 22.7 19.7 
District 3 18.3 22.3 20.3 19.3 22.0 19.8 23.0 20.5 25 24 
District 4 24.8 18.0 20.2 21.5 18.6 22.5 22.0 24.4 21.8 20.5 
- Table 9.2   Average class size across the four school districts, school year 2012/13 
Since the class sizes are registered on a district level, variations across departments 
are not visible. Actual department enrollments show that class sizes in general are 
closer to, if not above, the upper limit of 24 in the town departments. The restricting 
effect of the clause will thus be stronger here – possibly limiting the ability of the 
local management to improve further their enrollment levels. The close geographical 
proximity of districts in the town environments however makes competition from 
public and private providers more likely here. The principal of District 1 notes: 
“We’re actually in competition with both private and other municipal 
schools, and we really feel it here…the structural changes, both in the 
municipality and in the school system more generally, have meant that 
many parents have lost insight into what is actually going on in the 
schools. They have gotten scared and are choosing private solutions…in 
many ways it can be a good thing – giving parents another choice, a se-
cond opinion if things aren’t working – What is not good is that, they are 
now also allowed to choose other public schools. In this way we are kind 
of being played off against one another – who have the most colorful 
booklets – who arrange the coolest parties? “(I C lin.547ff) 
The pursuit for inclusion is a further major cause for the increased competition:  
“We feel it [the increased competition], we see that parents, actually 
quite a few, say; ‘we don’t want our child to be in a class together with 
these difficult or noisy children, so we will move to the private school’. 
Unfortunately quite a few sees it this way, and it’s difficult to manage. 
But we try to establish a shared understanding. But it’s also part of a 
larger trend, people are getting more and more self-obsessed – communi-
ty and solidarity are not as highly rated nowadays” (I C lin.589ff). 
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The de-selection of public schools affects the composition of pupils left at the re-
sponsibility of the public school system. This, the administrative coordinator of 
District 2 notes, affects the basis for fair competition and makes the task faced by 
the public school more difficult: 
“the school [the local private school] can be completely full. Then a seat 
opens up and they call-up one of ours, who is on their waiting list, and 
we get the kid they expelled because it needs extra support. This is the 
harsh reality. In my opinion we shouldn’t use it negatively. I think we 
should used it for marketing – stressing that we don’t expel children – we 
try to integrate all in our public school, and we try our best not to let an-
yone suffer from it; neither the strong nor the weak” (I D lin.340ff) 
9.8. EVALUATION AND CONTROL 
Quality and budgetary related control is also included in the funding model, together 
with procedures intended to monitor the use of special needs services. 
9.8.1. BUDGETARY CONTROL 
A range of means are employed as to ensure budget compliance, including face-to-
face meetings and quarterly accounting reports. Meetings between the administra-
tion and the principals take place on a regular basis and here, District 1’ principal 
explains, budgets and the general situation of the school system are discussed:  
“We discuss budgets, at a general level, you know, for the system as a 
whole…there I get involved at an early stage, become informed. I don’t 
have anything to say per se, but I get informed; that this or that is in the 
pipeline and that I can expect a proposal from the sector” (I C lin.123ff.) 
The budgetary situation is also a topic at the weekly meetings for the local manage-
ment team, the principal of District 2 explains: “We go through the entire budget as 
it looks at the moment; what has happened; what are our plans for the future, where 
do we for example need to adjust? If a department head has special whishes or 
needs, this is where we discuss them” (I F lin.544ff.). Involving the department 
heads in the budgetary situation is a way of giving them some scope for action and a 
sounder base upon which to make decisions, the principal stresses:  
“For the pedagogical leaders the yoke is thrown off. They can return with 
the assurance that; ‘it’s okay if we invest in textbooks for geography’ or 
‘now we know there is room for a trip in 3rd grade’. This freedom makes 
a difference for the department heads” (I F lin.212ff)  
Additional meetings are also held among the administrative coordinators. The inten-
tion is here to establish knowledge-sharing across districts. Budgets are parts of the 
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agenda, as well, as more general problems associated with the administration of 
schools. Furthermore meetings between the management and teachers are also a 
recurring thing. These are mostly devoted to pedagogical and educational discus-
sions and the budgetary situation of the school is not a regular agenda item. In fact, 
the administrative coordinator of District 2 explains: “I might include it once or 
twice a year, but that is all. If the teachers feel that things are working from day-to-
day, they are actually not that interested” (I D lin.541ff.). 
Quarterly accounting reports are further developed by the management and submit-
ted to the Children & School Committee for approval. From the perspective of the 
administration the process and subsequent approval is intended to ensure a recurrent 
local focus upon the budgetary situation of the district. In turn, the hope is that 
transparency and stability can be created. Apart from the master budget, the actual 
budget and the budget variance for each school district, the reports also contain a 
prognosis for the year based on accumulated accounts and with it an estimated 
budget variance. In case of a deficit the report contains a short description or action 
plan for how the management intend to solve this, with comments on the associated 
long-term effects. The budgetary control thus focuses narrowly on budget compli-
ance and does not directly take into account connections between actual activities 
and subsequent effects. The control process does thus neither compare nor study the 
efficiency, productivity or thrift with which resources are utilized at the individual 
school. Deeper benchmarking analysis of results is not included and the system 
measures purely the ability of the districts to comply with their budget. 
Table 9.3 summarizes the districts’ ability to comply with their budget and estimate 
their final results when conducting the follow-up in October. 
 Forecast of final results at the last budget follow-up 
in October 
Actual result 
2009 09.10.09 District 3 announces that 101% of the budget 
has already been spent. The remaining districts expect 
to comply with their budgets. 
Half of the districts end up with a 
budget deficit, while the last two 
carried forward surpluses 
2010 Three districts expect to accumulate deficits, due to 
decreasing pupil numbers and increased spending on 
special needs education 
3 districts ends up with deficits, albeit 
one lesser than expected. District 2, 
ends up with a huge surplus 
2011 All four expect to comply. One district notes that the 
prior accumulated deficit will not be brought down, 
and another that overspending will occur, but that an 
unexpected intake will lead to a surplus nevertheless. 
3 out of the 4 districts carried forward 
surpluses, one of which was relative 
high. The fourth district carries for-
ward the accumulated deficit. 
2012 Three out of the four schools expect to be able to meet 
their budget and to accumulate surpluses. District 3 
expects to comply with the budget, albeit not being 
able to bring down the accumulated deficit. 
All districts carry forward surpluses  
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2013 Due to the national lock-out all four schools have 
spent less than budgeted and thus expect to comply 
with their budgets. 
All four districts carry forward sur-
pluses. 
- Table 9.3   Budget predictions at the last budget follow-up in October and final re-
sult, 2009-13. Source: Budget follow-ups & ‘Results’, 2009-1313 
Overall, the table shows, that the districts in general have complied with their budg-
ets and been somewhat precise in estimating their final results. Since 2010 all four 
districts have carried forward surpluses. District 2 has over the course of the period 
been able to carry forward relative large surpluses (although in 2011 this was only 
due to an extra intake). As the budgetary control system only takes into account the 
districts’ ability to comply, the deeper cause for why especially this district has been 
able to continuously generate a relative larger surplus, is not examined more closely. 
As such, it is difficult to say whether this springs from more efficient or thrifty use 
of resources, or if is has something to do with the concern that differences in socio-
demographic profiles are not covered fairly by the allocation. 
The large deficit created in 2009, due to overspending on personnel, has followed 
District 3 ever since. Although the district since 2011 has complied with the budget, 
it has not been able to bring down decisively the accumulated deficit. In 2009 the 
overspending had great consequences for the management team, in that, the princi-
pal was dismissed and a new management team had to come up with a detailed plan 
for the turning around of the budgetary situation in addition to the submitting of 
monthly budgetary follow-ups to the Children & School Committee (CSC 14.01.10, 
head 4). This shows that a district cannot expect to be saved by supplementary 
grants. Rather deficits must be carried forward, and the management must explain 
how they expect to solve the related problems. In turn however, following the initial 
sanctions the school has avoided additional sanctions despite the fact the deficit has 
not been brought down. The only time that a supplementary grant has given to the 
school sector is in 2009 where a huge budget overrun, prior to the devolvement of 
special needs educational funds, was generated both centrally and locally. Here a 
supplementary grant was given in order to cover the unexpected expenses. 
9.8.2. QUALITY CONTROL 
Quality control in the form of a yearly Quality Report is considered to be the main 
control tool implemented to ensure a systematic documentation of the service quali-
ty. The content of the report is developed by the School Sector and through the re-
port a close collaboration between the political, administrative and local part of the 
                                                          
 
13 CSC 03.12.09, head 119; 02.12.10, head 128; 22.12.11, head 165; 06.12.12, head 111; 
18.12.13, head 2 & MB 29.04.10, head 56; 31.03.11, head 23; 24.04.12, head 47; 25.04.13.1; 
27.03.14, head 2 
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municipal system is intended. The report evaluates local fulfillment’ of the political 
objectives (the ones presented in section 6.2), and as a part of the control process, 
the report is presented to the school boards and the Children & School Committee, 
before being ratified by the Municipal Board. Afterwards it is then made public. 
Parts of the report is devoted to evaluating efforts taken since the last report, while 
the rest contains key-figures used as a basis for evaluating current performance. 
Information about the schools, the number of pupils, class sizes, national tests and 
examination scores, and information on special needs education and transitions into 
further education is included. Here, the figures are used to assess the individual 
districts attainment of the political objectives. This is done on a three point scale 
from “fulfilled” (green) over ”partly fulfilled” (yellow)” to ”unfulfilled” (red) and in 
connection to this the management evaluates the associated efforts taken. Accounta-
bility patterns are thus sought clarified and elucidated by making the school man-
agement explain each result and requiring them to state how they intent to improve 
the results in the future. Benchmarking across districts is further made possible alt-
hough there is not a deeper analysis between results and actual spending patterns.  
Although the quality report at the outset is intended to create transparency and ac-
countability for results, from the perspective of the management, the development 
process also entails more interactive and forward looking aspects. When explaining 
how the quality report is used, a department head from District 1 notes, how the 
process creates an opportunity for broader more factual discussions to take place: 
“Where should our focus lie, because we didn’t performance well here or 
we did really well here? In this way it’s an evaluation tool which enables 
us to see what we must address next. We’re being scrutinized and things 
become more visible. There isn’t so many “I think”, instead more con-
crete and factual matters are brought to the table” (I B lin.272ff.). 
The process thus opens up for discussions and constitutes a recurring opportunity for 
discussing strategic concerns and potential challenges in a more broad and long-term 
perspective. As a part of the process a range of meetings are held and as with the 
budgeting process, District 1’ principal explains, this opens up for a broader part of 
the organization to be included; “the principal discusses with the rest of the man-
agement team and with the employees in the Employee Committee, and lastly the 
objectives are passed on to the rest” (I C lin.154). This, he notes, facilitates debate 
and ensures that “we conduct a thorough evaluation on each of our goals and give 
us an opportunity to rethink new ones“(I C lin.147). The threat of political scrutiny 
is seen as an important, although at times complicating factor. However, without 
continuous awareness from both the administration and the politicians, a department 
head from District 2 emphasizes, the report risk losing its meaning:  
“A follow up is needed by the politicians and by the sector as well. That 
we’re held accountable for what we write…continuous evaluation is 
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needed; then it can be used as a starting point for discussions on the fu-
ture activities of the school system” (I E lin.165ff.). 
9.8.3. SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION CONTROL 
Procedures implemented in order to monitor the use of special needs education con-
stitute the final part of the formula funding model. This includes yearly reviews on 
the development of the use of special needs education, submitted to the CSC for 
assessment, and a more informal “ethical code” on what constitutes proper local 
management in relation to special needs education (07.02.13 head 5).  
The yearly review depicts the actual development in use across and within districts. 
In this way, it is possible to see in which special needs classes services are given and 
from which schools the pupils are coming. As for the so-called ‘code of ethics’, this 
is signed by the school management, who thereby agree to refrain from taking back 
pupils enrolled in special needs services at other municipal schools after the ex-
pected level of needs has been assessed in December (07.02.13 head 5). Promising, 
in fact, not to take back the child for at least the next school year (03.04.14, head 4). 
The code of ethics so to say specifies what is to be understood as good governance 
i.e. not taking measures which will compromise the budget base of other districts, or 
allowing budgetary concerns to compromise educational and pedagogical aspects. 
As a result, through the codex districts with special needs classes and schools are 
given a more predictable base upon which to plan. The codex, it is argued, is thus 
intended to create a shared sense of responsibility and trust across the management 
teams (07.02.13 head 5). It can however be argued, that the code actually goes 
against what is otherwise stated as a main objectives of the school system, namely 
that of increasing the inclusiveness of the public schools. In principle, if following 
the code strictly, it is not, the actual needs of a pupil which determine when inclu-
sion is pursued for a particular child, but rather the time of the setting of the budget. 
As such, the codex is as much, if not more, concerned with ethical treatment of 
one’s peers, than that of describing what would be considered ‘ethical treatment of 
pupils’. 
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CHAPTER 10.  BUDGETARY RISK & COMPETITIVE 
PRESSURE, MUNICIPALITY A 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the above presented formula funding model in the light of the 
framework developed in Chapter 7. The level of competitive pressure and the level 
of budgetary risk imposed onto the districts by the formula funding model are thus 
studied and the model is placed at its relevant position in the rectangle of Figure 7.4. 
Hereafter the inherent incentive structures of the model are studied, thereby enabling 
a discussion of the theoretical practice created by the formula funding model. 
10.2. LEVEL OF BUDGETARY RISK 
The formula is composed of a combination of approaches. For general education and 
pupils in special classes, referred centrally and locally, case payment inspired ap-
proaches are used, while funds for inclusive services are allocated through a capita-
tion payment. This makes the districts responsible for a substantial part of the funds, 
leaving only a few specific matters at the hand of the administration (severe special 
needs services, the cost of new comers and the cost above the threshold price paid 
per pupil in particular special needs classes). The schools are thus responsible for 
general education, for creating inclusive services (supplementary teaching, individu-
al or group integrated services) and for special needs classes as well as for deciding 
whether the needs of a particular child is better met by acquiring external services. 
The scale of budgetary devolvement together with the comprehensive payment at-
tached to each pupil enrolled in principle places vast budgetary risk with the schools. 
In that, these are not only responsible for an extensive part of the funds for education 
but the budget is also highly dependent on the pupil enrollment levels. Yet, a range 
of factors in effect lessens the level of budgetary risk. 
Case payments usually imply that the payer retains the risk of upward changes in 
activity, whilst the budget holder is exposed to downward changes. The non-
existence of downwards adjustments in Municipality A’ model however changes 
this. As illustrated in Figure 10.1 this decision profoundly decreases the budgetary 
risk, because school districts are not exposed to the risk of decreasing enrollments; 
meanwhile enjoying the full benefit of attracting additional pupils (at least so long 
that the payment p
i
 covers the associated costs of that particular pupil). With case 
payments the budget holder bears the case intensity risk, i.e. risk emerging from 
variations in educational needs not covered fairly by the accompanying payment. 
The budgetary risk associated with enrolling a particular pupil may therefore be 
influenced by the concerns raised over the precision by which the model compen-
sates patterns of actual needs. The payment p
i
 may due to the different socio-
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demographics conditions not compensate all district fairly for the actual needs of the 
pupils enrolled, making the budgetary risk to vary across districts. Moreover, with 
the introduction of district management, the management must so to say bear the 
budgetary risk associated with having to use funds across multiple departments with 
very different abilities to attract extra pupils and thus become self-financed. The 
latter risk was earlier handled at a central level.  
For special needs education case payments, which vary according to the services in 
which the child is referred, are applied. The allocation is based on actual enrollment 
numbers December 2011 and the level of allocation is not adjusted. This lack of 
adjustments means that the allocation (the same goes for the general education allo-
cation above) comes to be based on a sort of expectation of outputs, rather on actual 
enrollments or needs. The model hence comes to resemble a capitation payment 
approach, with risk adjustments schemes varying according to the needs of the pu-
pils – without however the associated risk of decreasing activity levels. All in all, the 
non-existence of downwards adjustments to the spending frame brings with a very 
definitive and stable budget base upon which school districts are to operate. In fact, 
the minimum is set already in February. This heavily reduces the budgetary risk and 
means that schools are hardly exposed to any risk stemming from the uncertainty 
connected to not knowing the size of the final spending frame.  
The funds for creating local special needs arrangements and inclusive services (sup-
plementary teaching, individual or group-integrated services or special needs clas-
ses) is allocated as a fixed amount, thus resembling a capitation payment inspired 
approach. The schools are here given the same amount for establishing internal 
special classes in the in-schooling and middle-school forms. Actual variations in 
needs are not taken into account and each district must bear the budgetary risk asso-
ciated with rises in needs. The associated risk may here however be reduced slightly 
by the ongoing drop in pupil numbers, albeit some districts, as remarked above, may 
be subjected to harder conditions due to their social- demographic profiles. All in 
all, the funding aimed to provide special needs education and inclusive services are 
thus based on an expectation of needs. Although all needs must be met within the 
fixed budget, the overall construction of the funding model means that funding can-
not fall below the originally allocated amount. The districts thus bear the risk of 
rising needs, but are protected from reimbursing funds in case of a decreasing level 
of needs. The cost sharing arrangement for new comers further reduces the risk 
associated with unexpected needs, in that, the probability of completely unforeseen 
needs cropping up is reduced. The budgetary risk is thus lessened compared to a 
pure capitation based allocation. 
The appropriation level and with it the division of responsibilities leaves a range of 
decisions at the hand of the local management. Yet, a main source of budgetary risk 
come to stem from the part associated with internal special needs services. Here the 
pursued ‘supplier-buyer’ relationship for special needs services comes into play.  
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For the ‘buyer-school’ the budgetary risk lies in the danger of not having a sufficient 
level of funds to cover the actual pattern of needs. The buyer-school must determine 
whether the externally supplied services are worth their cost or if such funds could 
be better used internally in the district. Allowing the districts to establish local spe-
cial needs classes is here vital in creating a real choice. The full budgetary risk is 
placed with the local management if the pupil attends internally provided services. 
In turn however, they avoid paying the monthly fees giving them a larger scope for 
action over how funds are to be spent. Yet, such a decision may come to affect the 
local teaching environment.  
The ‘supplier-school’ must in turn ensure that the services supplied meet the re-
quired standards in order to uphold enrollment levels and their budget base. If not, 
the choice given to the schools through the devolvement, means that they are con-
tinuously exposed to the risk of the buyer-school choosing instead to re-include 
pupils in their own services. Here however, a range of factors reduces this immedi-
ate risk considerably. For the district responsible for the two special needs schools, 
such concerns are only relevant for the department catering to pupils with “relative 
lesser needs” as the other is covered by a municipal cost sharing arrangement. The 
budgetary risk for supplier-schools thus mainly stems from the services to which 
referrals are made at the district level. Here, however, the ‘code of ethics’ may come 
to hamper the intentions of the supplier-buyer model; as the code, more or less, 
makes it a matter of ethics for a school to change its practices after the setting of 
needs in December/January. As a result the imminent risk associated with varying 
demands will decrease considerably. 
Line-item discretion and the decision to allow carry-overs further amend some of the 
risk placed with the districts. Line-item discretion for example reduces the risk of 
being accountable for the vast part of the education funds, giving the management 
the opportunity to spend funds on a different pattern than otherwise indicated by the 
original allocation without fear of subsequent budgetary implications. This is rein-
forced by the ability to carry forward funds. A more long term budget perspective 
can be created, limiting the risk of not spending all funds up front. The 10 % limit 
however means that the districts by default cannot expect to carry forward all possi-
ble funds saved. The budgetary benefit of being allowed to bring forward unused 
funds must though be weighed against also having to bring forward potential defi-
cits. Albeit the margin for sanctions in relation to overspending is widened this af-
fects the local budgetary risk upwards. Here also, very large overruns is accompa-
nied by immediate budgetary and managerial sanctions. Taken all together the budg-
etary constraints of the model are thus neither particular hard, as overspending is 
allowed, nor particular soft as the districts cannot expect to be saved by additional 
funding. The cost sharing arrangement covering the cost of the geographically re-
mote department however elucidates the fact that it is possible for service providers 
to lessen the budgetary risk placed upon them, if they can present proper arguments 
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for their case. Likewise, the quality control brings with it no immediate budgetary 
risk and will thus only act as a mean to control and monitor behavior in the long run. 
 
 
 
 Payment per pupil Comprehensive 
 Devolvement of special educational costs High 
 Model precision Low 
 Appropriation level High 
Pupils enrolled Funding object special needs education  
Comprehensiveness Cost sharing arrangements  
High Definitiveness of the spending frame  
 [Gross or net app.]       
          Allowed,      
bounded by the limit 
Carry-overs  
 Budgetary constraints  
Allowed Line-item discretion  
 Purchasing agreements Restricting 
 Level of policy autonomy Low 
 
Supplier/Buyer model High,  
but moderated by the 
Code of Ethics 
                       [ Type of private school competition ]       
 [ Open-enrollment clause ]  
 [ Geographical dispersal of school providers ]  
 [ Transportation costs ]  
 [ Number of children ]  
                    Quality of the control systems implemented  
Low budgtary risk High budgetary risk 
Budgetary risk 
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- Figure 10.1   The impact of the Municipality A’ control components on the level of 
budgetary risk created 
In sum, although the size of the devolvement together with the dependency on pupil 
enrollments at the outset places a high level of budgetary risk upon the school dis-
tricts, a range of decisions blur and may even invert the original intentions. This to 
such an extent that the budgetary risk becomes comparatively low. Although the 
management remains exposed to some budgetary risk, mainly arising from the de-
volvement of special needs funds and inclusion-related matters, the non-existence of 
budgetary adjustments to the spending frame means that the budget is determined 
extremely early; respectively in February for the general education and potentially 
already in December/January for the special needs funds. This greatly reduces the 
relative risk placed upon the providers, who not only comes to know their actual 
spending frame well in advance, but also get a stable base upon which to plan or act. 
10.3. LEVEL OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
A core merit of case payments is that they attach a payment to each pupil enrolled, 
thereby creating a direct link between enrollments and local budgets. The compre-
hensive payment, which Municipality A’ model attaches to each pupil enrolled, 
means that districts have a strong budgetary incentive to focus on upholding high 
enrollment levels. When combined with the existence of a competitive provider’s 
market consisting of both public and private competitors, the substantial amount 
attached to each pupil should in principle create the conditions needed for a com-
petitive market for education services. Through the devolvement of budgetary au-
thority such education services may not only encompass general education, but also 
more specialized services for pupils with special needs. Yet a range of decisions 
may hamper these intentions, which in the context of special needs education in-
cludes the limited number of “seats” in these services together with the ethical code.  
Firstly, the close connection between the budget size and activity level is somewhat 
lost for the public schools in Municipality A’s model. The lack of downward ad-
justments means that there is no immediate budgetary effect associated with de-
creasing enrollments (in fact this effect is completely postponed to the following 
cycle), whereas the budgetary benefit of enrolling an extra pupil depend on when the 
child is enrolled. If enrolled outside the time period from February to October the 
full budgetary effect is postponed to the next allocation cycle, whereas an enroll-
Low budgetary risk High budgetary risk 
Formula funding model 
Municipality A 
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ment within this period is immediately compensated by the payment p
i.
. The fact that 
schools are ‘only’ compensated with the payment pi may however affect their will-
ingness to enroll pupils with special needs. When combined with the potential lack 
of precision by which the allocation compensates districts for the needs of their 
pupils, this may affect the effort invested in pursuing extra enrollments, in particular 
pupils with known special needs. This is further reinforced by the fact that the rest of 
the allocation is based on a capitation principle, making it independent of actual 
needs. Consequently, all needs must be covered within the allocated budget, again 
affecting the willingness to enroll all types of pupils. Together, these factors and the 
lack of downwards adjustments mean that the model comes to be built on expecta-
tions, thereby making it resemble a capitation payment approach, and as visualized 
in Figure 10.2, these decisions affect strongly the competitive pressure.  
The scope of devolvement can, in the context of competition, be seen as a mean to 
encourage providers to develop services in tune with user’ demands, which when 
combined with the publication of education results is intended to encourage the 
district to focus on means to ensure high enrollments. The geographical placement 
of the public and private providers makes competition most likely to occur in the 
town environments, where the availability of schools and pupils is greater. This is 
not at least reinforced by the fact that all the private schools are located close to a 
public school department. The geographical distance between departments may thus 
intensify the competitive pressure, albeit the decision to only reimburse transporta-
tion costs for pupils enrolled in a home-district department, or in special schools, 
may restrict free choice for some. The latter is especially the case for pupils living 
outside the town areas where the geographical distance between departments may in 
effect affect a pupil’s ability to enroll in another public school department. Im-
portant in this context is the enrollment clause, which restricts extra intake of non-
district pupils when a class reaches 24 pupils. Albeit, the clause at the outset gives 
pupils a wider choice of providers, in casu enhancing the competitive pressure, 
‘sought-after’ schools may find that they are unable to enroll as many pupils as they 
want. In town environments where class averages are higher, the clause may in ef-
fect entail that schools are forced to turn away pupils. At the same time however the 
competitive pressure is higher here as a result of the increased choice of providers 
available. Thus, if the specific class has less than 24 pupils a competitive market for 
public schools is available for those able and willing to pay the cost of transporta-
tion. Above the limit, districts are only able to enroll home-district pupils as thee are 
not subjected to the clause, thereby making the only competitive target the number 
of home-district pupils enrolled in elsewhere. 
From a private provider’s perspective the case payment attached to each pupil en-
rolled gives a continuous budgetary reason for upholding high enrollment levels. As 
seen, the private school rate is relative high with 25% of the pupils enrolled in pri-
vate schools. This is despite the fact that some of these schools cater only to specific 
segments, either in the form of pupils with special needs or pupils seeking a more 
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religious foundation for their schooling. The availability of “seats” is further limited 
as most of the private providers are one-entry schools, with some only allowing 18 
pupils per class. All pupils wanting to enroll in a specific private school may poten-
tially not be able to do so. The competitive pressure put on the public providers thus 
stems mainly from the private schools and here it is important to note that the public 
schools feel themselves to be competing on uneven ground when it comes to private 
school competition. This may make the perceived pressure seem even higher.  
 
 
 
                             Payment per pupil Comprehensive 
 [ Devolvement of special educational costs ]  
                Potentially low Model precision  
           Appropriation level High 
                     Funding object special needs education Pupils enrolled 
 [Cost sharing arrangements]  
                   High Definitiveness of the spending frame  
  [Gross or net app.]   
                    Carry-overs Allowed,             
bounded by the limit 
 [Budgetary constraints]  
                    Line-item discretion Allowed 
 [Purchasing agreements]  
                   Low Level of policy autonomy  
 Type of private school competition Pronounced      
 Open-enrollment clause Open, but                 
only up to the limit 
Somewhat vast Geographical dispersal of school providers  
 Transportation costs Restricted coverage 
 Number of children Heavily decreasing 
                    Quality of the control systems implemented  
Low pressure High pressure 
Competitive pressure 
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- Figure 10.2   The impact of the Municipality A’s control components on the level 
competitive pressure created 
In sum, the relative high private school rate shows that the public schools are strong-
ly affected by the private providers. Yet, the design decisions come with mixed 
incentives for competition, with the lack of adjustments especially hampering the 
creation of competition and with it the competitive pressure placed upon the public 
providers. The ongoing decrease in pupil numbers, which the municipality is sub-
jected to, however become vital, in that, it may overturn the otherwise incentives, 
making it desirable from a more long term budgetary perspective to enroll additional 
pupils. The latter affects the general evaluation of the competitive pressure greatly 
and as visualized in Figure 10.2 this places the funding model in a relative or some-
what modest level of competitive pressure, a position which potentially may be 
moved to the left by the geographical placement of the specific district. 
10.4. MANAGERIAL PRACTICE - LOW BUDGETARY 
RISK/MODEST COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
The funding model thus becomes placed in the lower left quadrant of Figure 10.3; a 
position created through the combination of a low level of budgetary risk and a rela-
tive/modest level of competitive pressure. In the following section the managerial 
practice created in the light of the model’s incentive structures is discussed. A main 
point, in this context, is the non-existence of downwards adjustments as this implies 
that the allocation comes to be based on a sort of expectation of outputs, despite the 
original use of case payments. Instead the model comes to resemble a capitation 
payment approach, with risk adjustments schemes varying according to the needs of 
the pupils – without however the otherwise associated risk. The general incentives 
are thus inverted. For example the base incentive for productivity through increased 
output levels is hampered by the decision to leave districts unaffected by decreasing 
enrollments. Further, the construction also brings along the possibility that the mu-
nicipality may be exposed to adverse behavioral responses associated with both 
types of payments, possibly without the associated benefits of case payments. In the 
search for efficient use of funds this is of course problematic. 
 
 
 
Formula funding model 
Municipality A 
Low pressure High pressure 
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- Figure 10.3   Managerial practice Municipality A, created as a result of the combi-
nation of a low budgetary risk and a modest competitive pressure 
The low budgetary risk combined with the relative/modest level of competitive 
pressure created by the formula funding model brings with it few incentives for the 
providers to uphold a high level of productivity. The short-run motivation for enrol-
ling a pupil may depend on when over the course of the year a child is enrolled. If 
the associated budgetary risk is too vast, either because the model does not compen-
sate fairly actual patterns of need or due to the lack of reimbursement for extra en-
rolments outside the period of February to October, this may cause districts to re-
frain from focusing on entry levels. The management may as a result be motivated 
to erect barriers or take part in other means intended to depress the immediate access 
to services. A type of behavior otherwise only associated with capitation payments. 
Such type of behavior is especially prevalent in connection to pupils with special 
needs, in that, an extra enrollment at best is covered by the payment p
i
. The severity 
of a pupil’s needs, can therefore more broadly affect the desirability of enrolling 
particular pupils. This behavior is of course limited by the fact that districts are re-
quired by law to enroll any pupil belonging to their own district, but it may reduce 
the eagerness of bringing children with special needs back to the school. Two factors 
however have the opposite effect. The size of the p
i’s and the general decrease in 
pupil numbers. The relative high amount attached to each pupil enrolled means that 
high enrollment levels is still a vital managerial concern, which, when combined 
with the decreasing pupil numbers, may give the management a more long-term 
budget perspective, inducing them to ensure and uphold high enrollment levels. 
As for efficiency, case payments usually incentivize budget holders to act prudently 
and efficiently in their use of funds, focusing on attempts to lower unit costs. Capita-
High competitive pressure Low competitive pressure 
High budgetary risk 
Low budgetary risk 
(L,H) (H,H) 
(L,L) (H,L) 
Formula funding model 
Municipality A 
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tion payments on the other hand bring into focus that of lower total costs. The over-
all design of Municipality A’ model makes the latter type of behavior most likely, 
especially in terms of the funds intended to create inclusive services. The general 
idea is that the management through the devolvement will (re)include pupils in the 
general environment, as this gives them a greater level of freedom over how funds 
are to be spent. Although the overall budgetary risk is low the idea behind increasing 
local accountability for spending is, that this will induce the management to use 
funds more appropriately. The decisive nature of the budget is intended to force the 
management to come up with solutions tailored to the needs of the pupils. The hope 
is that the future guideline for when and in what circumstances help is to be given is 
the needs of the pupils. This is in contrast to the previous strict system where a pupil 
was allotted a fixed number of extra support lessons based on a diagnosis which 
could be quite delayed. The magnitude of this incentive is reinforced by the size of 
p
i
. The relative dependency on pupil numbers means that it becomes important for 
the management to retain pupils within the overall budget of the district. Not only 
will successful inclusion allow districts to keep the pupil dependent allotment, but 
also all funds associated with special needs services. The management can if able to 
create appropriate educational environments for inclusion meet the needs of their 
own pupils better and possibly also widen their budgetary base by offering their 
services to other schools. Failing to provide services which are not at least as good 
as the ones in which the child was previously enrolled makes re(inclusion) problem-
atic from the perspectives of the pupils. The danger is further that funds intended for 
inclusion instead is spent on pupils in local (segregated) special needs classes, mak-
ing the quest of inclusion possible more fictive than real. In this context also the 
ethical code may have a negative influence on the intentions of inclusion. Despite 
feeling prepared to re-include pupils the management may as a result of the code 
refrain from doing so thus affecting the efficiency by which funds are used and the 
responsiveness of the system in general.  
The focus on lowering total cost may bring with it another type of unwanted behav-
ior, namely that of depressing services. For the inclusive services the danger is that 
the needs of the pupils is not sufficiently met due to the restricting nature of the 
fixed budget. This is especially prevalent for services such as additional support and 
group-integrated services as these are no longer classified as special needs educa-
tion. The former regulation and rules are no longer in place, making it more difficult 
to control whether the children are receiving the needed help. Similar adverse behav-
ior could also occur in relation to pupils in special needs classes, in that, the man-
agement in the pursuit of a larger, stable budget base could be induced to refrain 
from referring pupils to the externally supplied services due to the associated cost. 
The danger is that the management, instead of acquiring external services, keeps the 
child in local services, thereby retaining full decision-making freedom over the 
funds. As discussed such behavior is beneficial if similar services can be created 
through the larger budget base. If however the needs of the pupils are not sufficient-
ly met this behavior becomes adverse in nature. 
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Adverse behavior in terms of up-coding and the shifting of cost may also be present. 
Such behavior may be created by the use of different types of payments as well as 
the existence of cost sharing arrangements which removes completely local budget 
responsibilities for particular pupils. Although the capitation allocation covering the 
major part of pupils makes the shifting of cost difficult the possibility still exist. For 
example in terms of newcomers to the municipality, since the cost of these is over-
taken by the administration if their associated needs are greater than what can be 
handled in the home-environment. The incentive structures created could thus moti-
vate providers to transfer the responsibilities for these to the administration.  
Up-coding can occur in connection with special needs classes. Since these funds are 
based on actual enrollments the district could be motivated to uphold the current 
level, instead of implementing active means to reduce the use of such services. The 
difference in the budgetary effect of having a pupil enrolled in special needs services 
covered by the district contra the administration, may bring about up-coding behav-
ior. The district must in the first case pay the fee for the particular service and on top 
of this it loses the pupil-dependent allotment because the child is no longer enrolled 
in a district service. If however the child is referred to a service where the budget 
responsibility is held by the administration, only the pupil dependent payment is 
lost. This makes these types of service relative more attractive from a budgetary 
point of view. Furthermore, if such referrals can be made and approved after the 
setting of the spending frame, the financial consequences of such decisions are fur-
ther reduced as the district’ budget is not correspondingly reduced. Thus, if schools 
before September 5
th
 succeed in referring a child to a school where the budgetary 
responsibility is held by the administration, they will not lose the pupil dependent 
allotment, the new school will be compensated, and their budget will not be reduced. 
The low level of budgetary risk brought upon the providers by the model thus gives 
few incentives for efficiency. Illustrated for example, by the upper bound on carry-
overs. This may motivate ‘spending to the budget’, as well as the fact that the ad-
ministration runs the risk of paying for the same pupil twice. In sum, while the low 
budgetary risk brings with it a stable and definitive base upon which to plan, the 
needed incentives for prudent and efficient resource utilization may not be created. 
Rather, this type of efforts together with incentives for quality improvements may be 
created by the moderate/relative level of competitive pressure inflicted upon the 
providers by the model. The long-term incentive to focus on enrollments together 
with the imminent pressure from private providers may create a more long-term 
driven motivation to focus on education-related results as a mean to uphold high 
enrollments. How present this concern is depends on the associated response from 
the side of the administration and the political system and not at least from the par-
ents and children when choosing a school. From the perspective of the public 
schools the ability of private providers to engage in cream skimming may in this 
context affect their perceptions and ability to actually counter private sector compe-
tition, and if so this will leave the public school system with a more difficult task.
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CHAPTER 11.     PRACTICING SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 
IN MUNICIPALITY A 
11.1. INTRODUCTION 
“It’s of vital importance to be geared to the future, due care, to be able to 
adapt according to the future which is already apparent” (B lin.614-15) 
So, a department head of District 1 describes, the essence of school management. 
Part III has this far studied the theoretical implications of the formula funding model 
design on managerial practice. In the light of this, the purpose of this chapter is to 
present how school management is actually practiced. The account will focus on the 
guiding principles affecting the local management in their daily practice, and will 
show how educational concerns are weighed against the inherent incentive structures 
of the model. In the concluding part of the chapter the managerial practice will be 
compared with the fulfillment of the political objectives, in this way highlighting 
whether the practice created is in line with these objectives.  
11.2. MAKING SURE PUPILS ENROLL 
Although the notion sometimes can be difficult to instill in the teachers, there is with 
the school management a clear understanding that being able to retain and attract 
pupils is a vital part of successful school management. Not only is it needed in order 
to secure the financial viability of the school, it is also, a way to maintain and create 
quality. The increased budgetary and decision-making freedom associated with 
enrolling an extra pupil, the administrative coordinator from School 1 notes, gives 
way for funds to be spent as the management see fit: 
“If we’re able to attract one extra pupil it counts for 50-55,000 DKR … 
Roughly, say we have a class with 20 pupils. Then if you are able to at-
tract two more it corresponds to 100,000-, which we don’t have to use on 
salary as this is already covered. Thus, we can spend the 100,000 on 
something else; therefore it is stupid not to try to attract” (I D.lin.357). 
Although the budget in the short run is unaffected by a pupil leaving the school, the 
need to attract pupils is precipitated by the continuous and rapid decline in pupil 
numbers. Accordingly, District 1’ administrative coordinator argues, if the district as 
a whole is not able to retain at least its “own” pupils the budget will be affected 
immensely: 
The better we perform, the more content parents are the happier the chil-
dren are, the more likely it is that people think this is a good school… 
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Each time a pupil leaves, each time we don’t succeed in creating a good 
collaboration with parents, or something else goes wrong we lose 50,000 
and 8-10 pupils correspond to one teaching post” (I A.lin.259). 
Thus, a coherent and coordinated approach for attracting pupils must be established. 
This, it is argued, includes creating high quality of service, establishing a strong co-
operation with the kindergartens and engaging parents in the life of the school. More 
broadly marketing the schools to potential users, securing that the general reputation 
of the school in the local community is good. Establishing a strong relationship with 
parents is all important, especially as a mean to prevent that the parents opt for a 
private provider. Attracting parents, who consider private schools, for other than 
religious reasons, is especially vital, a department head from School 2 stresses. As 
these parents tend to be well-resourced they often contribute and have a positive 
effect on the educational environment of the class and on the school in general. The 
strategy thus becomes that of “making them realize that they are actually not getting 
anything extra for their money, in turn, we can give their children a more diverse 
outlook” (I E lin.318).  
Being successful in upholding high enrollments however requires a good reputation, 
the principal of District 1 stresses. A bad reputation can rise very quickly if “build-
ings are ill-maintained, the academic results are bad; if the general perception in 
the community is that there are a lot of disruptions in the classes, and generally 
when specific cases [enkeltsager] reaches the press” (I C.lin.490). Maintaining a 
good reputation, being aware of how the school is perceived in the local community, 
has thus become a vital concern for the management. In the efforts to maintain a 
good reputation, marketing to potential users becomes increasingly important, the 
principal of District 2 stresses. This entails getting the good stories out to the sur-
rounding community:  
“We believe that getting people to talk about the school will have a posi-
tive effect. Hence, we’re very self-aware, ensuring that the school is in 
the media at a regular basis; with our new initiatives, activities and so on, 
communicating what’s going on” (I F lin.267). 
In this context, the teachers play a crucial role in spreading the good stories. Being 
the daily direct link between the school and parents, the teachers, District 2’ princi-
pal explains, are important ambassadors for ensuring that good stories come to reso-
nate with parents: “they’re some of the best at spreading the good stories to parents, 
from there they will disseminate further” (I F lin.273). The management team, he 
argues, is accordingly highly aware of how the employee meetings represent a vital 
opportunity for getting the good stories out to the teachers, creating a positive envi-
ronment that incites and motivates them to talk positively about the school. A good 
reputation, a department head from District 2 notes, is however not enough. Rather a 
substantial and coordinated effort is needed when potential pupils are to be attracted: 
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“We can no longer expect that parents will come to us if we sent out a 
gray piece of paper. Thus, it starts already in the kindergartens where we 
try to get in touch – sending out cool [lækre] materials, trying to coordi-
nate enrollments between the after-school care and the school, in order to 
show that we are an integrated unit. Arranging open-house events – just 
in general trying to learn from the private schools, because there are no 
doubts in people’s mind what they stand for” (I E lin.333). 
Such a coordinated, cross sectional co-operation has slowly become a key area of 
focus for the teams. The actions of other schools, being successful in attracting non-
district pupils, have affected the efforts taken in District 1, the administrative coor-
dinator explains: “now we react, last year we didn’t and we became the ‘small’ so to 
speak” (I A.lin.223). In order to counter the increasing competition their efforts now 
include collaborating with the kindergarten, arranging visits to the school and letting 
the older kids spend afternoons in the after-school care during the spring prior to 
their school start. Similar actions are taken in District 2, the principal explains. The 
intension is to make parents and children familiar with the school and its employee; 
a familiarity which hopefully will lead to the development of a sense of belonging, 
reducing the likelihood for a private solution or another municipal school being 
chosen at the expense of the local school (I F lin.299). 
The quality of education is however also important for attracting and retaining pu-
pils. In fact, District 2’ principal explains, as pupil numbers reduce, quality becomes 
a competitive element. The department structure has enabled tree out of four dis-
tricts to gather all senior pupils in the same department. This, District 1’ principal 
explains, is important in the context of quality: “the individual teacher had to decide 
whether they preferred working in the in-schooling department or in the department 
with the older pupils” (I F lin.311ff). By working with the same age group the indi-
vidual teacher attains a deeper understanding and knowledge of how to teach that 
specific level. Gathering the older pupils in fewer classes has in District 1 further 
ensured that all teachers teach in their main subjects, giving: “the needed boost, and 
for us it’s a crucial part of what can be termed quality in a public school context” (I 
F lin.365ff.). 
The department structure, District 2’ administrative coordinator notes, has further 
made it easier to retain the pupils within the budget of the overall district. If a pupil 
for some reason is having problems or does not thrive, the department structure has 
opened up for the possibility of transferring the child to another department, yet 
retaining the pupil within the same school district. This is beneficial from the per-
spective of the child who gets a fresh start, but also for the management, in that, 
these are able to retain the pupil within the larger district budget (I D.lin.419). For 
pupils with special needs similar actions can be taken as these in co-operation with 
their parents can be enrolled in another department if the services there are better 
suited to the particular needs. The department structure thus gives way for alterna-
tive solutions to emerge; solutions which are better suited to the children but which 
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also gives greater managerial flexibility. The question is however if competition in 
itself is understood as a predictor for quality and thus a competitive element. From 
the part of the schools this is especially questionable when it comes to the effect of 
competition among public schools, as voiced by the principal from District 1: 
“The idea that we need to market ourselves raises a slight concern with 
me, because we don’t invent the service we’re expected to provide. The 
Law already dictates what we must give the children. Accordingly, the 
differences across schools can’t be so great – the service provided can’t 
be that different – where we can differ is on the entertainment values and 
that’s something which I don’t want to compete on” (I C lin.570ff.). 
This is interesting in that the principal to some extend questions whether local ac-
tions are actually able to differentiate the service offered, or whether education is 
education and not something which can be affected by local initiatives and the staff. 
The other principal further stresses the importance of keeping in mind the broader 
picture when seeking to attract pupils, namely that of the general viability of the 
entire municipal school system:  
”We don’t go about stealing many pupils from our colleagues, because 
we also need to remember that it’s not only a matter of how many pupils 
I can pinch. I also have to keep in mind that the public school system as a 
whole must be able to survive” (I F lin.278).  
The district structure however means that prior patterns of attachment and co-
operation is complicated by the fact that “we so to speak became rivals, which 
makes the choice of day-care and geography – where you live and how easily you 
can get to the school – very important factors and as such it means that parents 
more frequently use their free choice” (administrative coordinator District 1, I A 
lin.214). If the overall picture is not kept in mind, District 1’ principal argues, the 
increased competition may in the long-run become a factor affecting the otherwise 
good relationship between the different school services in the community: Up until 
now we have lived in peaceful co-existence…accepting each other’s role, not slan-
dering each other…yet, I can imagine, insofar that there are fewer pupils to ‘fight’ 
over, voices will be raised (I C lin.554). 
11.3. CLASS SIZES MATTER 
Encouraging the management to think creatively and establish cost effective solu-
tions is vital from the perspective of the municipal accounting department: “we want 
them to innovate, [a deputy head explains] not just administrate” (I G lin.561). Up-
holding high class size averages are in this context an important lever. The design of 
the funding model, the deputy head emphasizes, is here a vital for securing that high 
averages remain a continuous priority for the management: 
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“If you just give the funds precisely for a class, you would never be able 
to create an incentive for improvements, for amalgamation of classes, or 
for thinking across departments. They have learned this since we started 
the process in 2008. Back then, all sort of class sizes existed. Now they 
take class size into consideration” (I G.lin.533). 
From 2009/10-2012/13, simultaneously with an 11 % drop (3762 to 3343) in the 
pupil population, the average class size rose from 18.6 to 20.5 (CSC 28.12.13 head 
4). The decreasing pupil numbers has spurred along the need to use class sizes as an 
important control tool and according to the administrative coordinator of District 1 
this involves a range of strategic considerations to be taken into account:  
“I can already see [15th of August] that we might have 50-60 less pupils 
next school year, which means that we already now have to say: ‘so 
which strategic considerations must be taken, how is our class average, is 
it possible to merge classes or to cut one away entirely?’” (I A lin.59-60) 
Forming viable classes is especially in focus in situations where natural transitions 
offer opportunities to re-amalgamate. For example at the start of school and when 
pupils reach 7
th
 grade and are gathered in one department, as is the case in three of 
the districts. These transition points are favored as amalgamations here are not 
viewed as controversial by parents or children as they otherwise tend to be. Since 
the department structure has been in place for some years, parents and pupils are 
now aware of the pending change of school, which means that it no longer comes as 
a surprise. An important focus point thus becomes that of telling pupils in the town 
department that the existing classes will be re-formed when pupils from the other 
departments join in. The amalgamations are thus sought verbalized as a natural way 
of giving all pupils a fresh start. From the managerial point of view however it also 
constitutes a vital opportunity to establish efficient averages; similar to that when a 
new year-group begins pre-school. The department structure here enables a more 
holistic, cross-departmental approach to emerge, especially, District 2’ administra-
tive coordinator explains, when the distance between departments is small: 
“In the in-schooling we focus on whether we can move [a child], that is, 
what’s appropriate in relation to where the pupils live, do they have sib-
lings, what are their wishes and so on? And then we trim it so that we at 
least reach 20 in the smaller department, while ensuring that we don’t 
surpass 28 in the other.” (I D lin.422ff) 
At times however, the department structure can also act as a barrier because the 
distances are so big that moving pupils across departments is not possible: 
“If at the beginning of the school year I see a class getting closer to 17-18 
pupils, it’s a wakeup call; adjust class sizes…but sometimes the structure 
gets in the way. The small department has relative low averages. But I 
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can’t do much, because I can’t say to town-children; ‘you have to go to 
school 15-20 km away in order to make the class size fit’” (I A: 168ff.). 
The lower averages in the small departments put pressure on the management to 
create high averages in the other departments. From a budgetary perspective this is 
the only option available for preserving and upholding the quality of the smaller 
departments. Odd pupil numbers, District 1’ administrative coordinator explains, 
may however complicate such efforts: “My problem starts if I’ve two classes with 
17, because I can’t merge them, but I don’t get enough funds for running both. Thus, 
optimization will often first take place when the pupils are gathered after 6
th
 grade” 
(I A.lin.179). In the interest of efficient resource utilization, class amalgamations 
may however also happen more unexpectedly, which may be problematic. Although 
new classes have been formed in the 7
th
 grade, many pupils leave during the older 
grades, either to enroll in private or in lower-secondary-level boarding schools. This 
may affect class averages to such a degree that additional amalgamations are needed. 
Such unexpected amalgamations, the administrative coordinator 1 explains, are not 
easily conveyed, catalyzing often further dis-enrollments. In order to counter this, 
the parents and children must be involved through close dialogue with the hope that 
their confidence with the school management can be retained. Yet upholding high 
averages is the preferred method for securing an efficient use of resources: 
“I say it’s easy [to merge classes], but this is only when compared to the 
alternative. Because I’m fully aware that parents, children and teachers 
do not always agree with amalgamation of classes…I know all the argu-
ments. But from my perspective and based on the allocation model, this 
is clearly the most gentle way to adjust” (I A lin.184ff.). 
Educational and pedagogical concerns can however weigh so heavy that amalgama-
tions will not be carried out despite low averages. If for example, the coordinator of 
District 2 explains, a department head comes-up with sound pedagogical reasons for 
why two classes should not be amalgamated is taken into account, but: 
“…then you co-teach in some subjects, and use additional group-
divisions in others. It might cost something money-wise. But if it’s the 
right educational choice, then we will support it. But they [the depart-
ment heads] must also have an idea about where to find additional funds, 
e.g. through co-teaching in other classes, thus bringing something to the 
table so to say. So they have to do their homework” (I D lin.243ff).  
11.4. ACTING IN A POLITICALLY INFLUENCED ENVIRONMENT 
A basic condition for the local management is that they are acting in an environment 
where political decisions influence the local decision-making scope; for example, 
the introduction of district management in combination with the demand to uphold 
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local services in the in-schooling in all departments. District management has further 
affected local practices, in particular the local approaches taken to ensure efficient 
resource utilization. In being responsible for multiple departments, the management 
now distributes funds across not only line-items but also departments, implying the 
need to consider and handle the fact that these have varying enrollment levels and 
abilities to become financial viable on their own. In order to uphold academic stand-
ards in all departments, the management teams have chosen to allocate a larger part 
of the budget (than otherwise indicated) to departments with lower enrollments. As 
the next quotations indicate this is perceived as the only viable way to ensure that 
education standards are also upheld here: 
“We’re one organization. Our small department doesn’t always have 
enough pupils to be self-financing. Thus, my focus has been: ‘well this 
department must have a budget that ensures that all have the same ser-
vice level’…thus, the smaller department get a relative larger share” 
(Principal, District 2, I F.lin.161ff). 
“As long as we have this structure, all children must be given a sound 
starting point - in principle the same - thereby not implying that funds 
must be equally shared, because they aren’t. Even the weakest link must 
be able to run the school properly; also in a pedagogical sense. We don’t 
have 1
st
 and 2
nd
 rate departments” (principal District 1,I C.lin.190ff) 
The decision to ‘subsidize’ the smaller departments is not always easy to convey to 
the employees at the bigger departments. In their eyes the budget is not always fairly 
distributed, making the bigger department suffer as a consequence. In District 1 the 
administrative coordinator notes, they have focused very much on building a strong 
unified culture to ensure that all departments are viewed as parts of a unified organi-
zation. Without such a culture, the coordinator argues, it is very difficult to convey 
the need and appropriateness of extra funding being used at the smaller departments, 
further stressing: “Dissatisfaction is starting to arise with our employees in regards 
to how much money we spend on running our smaller rural department, compared 
to here, and I have been forced to talk about solidarity. We’re one school and 
should be seen as such” (I A lin.333-34). Varying department sizes, the sector head 
concurs, do put pressure on some districts: 
“We’ve gone from seven municipalities, with very small production 
units, to one big. But we’re still operating with the smaller units and 
can’t borrow money so to get rid of these inefficient units and instead 
build bigger more effective ones – this is to a great extent our Achilles’ 
heel. We know our efficiency isn’t the best, when it comes to our public 
schools. We blow a fortune on bad, inefficient capacity…so to some ex-
tend it’s the politicians who set the limits for how efficient we can be and 
how good the quality of service can become” (I G lin.359). 
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The increasing budgetary strains brought upon the management by the smaller de-
partments, are a growing cause for local concern. In some sense the feeling is that 
the effect of the political decision to maintain local services has been devolved, that 
it has been placed at the school level. In the words of the management, they must 
ensure budget compliance and education-related goals within a politically deter-
mined frame. Politicians, the administrative coordinator of District 2 notes, thus play 
an important role in setting the overall frame, in that, these in the end affect the 
ability of the management to ensure efficient resource utilization. Political courage 
in terms of carrying out controversial school closures is needed in order to ensure a 
continuous proper academic quality. A downside of this is that electoral concerns at 
times can postpone such decision, affecting heavily the general system:  
“Next year is election year so certain decisions aren’t made, although it’s 
apparent that some departments are not financially viable, in fact maybe 
not even educationally viable…as a municipality facing financial prob-
lems I think we should be proactive, and the politicians ort to look at it, 
because it shouldn’t be at the expense of the pupils. Mrs. Jensen might 
think it’s nice to have a school around the corner, but if you instead get 
better school conditions, this is to be preferred.” (I D lin.594ff9) 
Another political decision affecting local practices is the decision to allow only 10% 
carry-overs. As described three schools accumulate modest surpluses and for them 
the ability to carry forward surpluses is a valuable managerial tool for ensuring a 
predictable level of service. District 2 however is at times able to accumulate sur-
pluses which reach the upper limit, and here the decision is a cause for frustration, as 
explained by the administrative coordinator of District 2. Larger investments or 
extensive renovations are often complicated; at times made practically impossible by 
the need for political decisions on the matter. This creates a perception that the dis-
tricts are treated differently and unfairly: 
“We have a good grip on our school and are generating surpluses. We all 
get the same for running the schools. The other schools spend all their 
money, which can make us a little…you know jealous…Now because we 
have money, a discrepancy arises…because we’ll not get a share of the 
extra funds for IT, which we don’t think is fair. So our incentive is, ‘we 
have a lot of things we want to get done, so we’ll start implementing, and 
then we’re down to the 2 million’…we don’t want to punish our employ-
ees for being spartan” (I D:91ff). 
Finally, with district management the budgeting practices are further slowly chang-
ing, with more people being involved. This, the principal of District 2 explains, 
entails involving the department heads in setting the budget of the particular depart-
ment:“I want the department head to say: “‘If I have to run department X with the 
service level you have prescribed, then I need this level of funding”. Further argu-
ing:  
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“You can say we’re beginning to move towards a negotiation, within the 
school where people can come and argue for how much is required to run 
the department. This transition is new and difficult as they have been 
used to me setting the budgets quite precisely – you get this many hours 
and this norm – now we’ve moved a step further and kind of turned it 
around” (I F lin.176ff.).  
As a result, District 2’ administrative coordinator explains, department heads are 
becoming more aware of the cost of for examples substitutes. Aware that savings 
here is a way of increasing the funds available for buying for example teaching ma-
terials (I D lin.210). Being an involved part of the process is positive, although a 
district head describes how matters such as teacher’s salaries and norms, at times 
can be a cause for concern. As the salary makes up the substantial part of the budget, 
setting the correct norms becomes an important challenge: “if the salaries overrun 
with 2%, then we aren’t able to manage the other items, because there is in princi-
ple no funds left”. This, he explains, leaves him with a dilemma: 
“If for education-related reasons we’ve agreed to hire more people, or if 
we due to the norms for the teachers end-up with ‘half’ a teacher too 
much, the 250,000 connected to this, means that I’ll exceed my budget. 
The other items are so relative small that I’ll not be able to find the 
250,000 there. So if I’m expected to run the school on the level intended 
by the model, my budget will be overrun” (I E lin.432ff).  
Accordingly, the department head explains, this affects how he himself orchestrates 
his own budgeting process, especially which decisions are to be further devolved to 
the teachers. The new working agreement for example entails enhanced teamwork 
and places the responsibility for planning the school year with the teams. Simultane-
ously, in order to control spending, the budgeting process is changing: 
“Four times a year they [the teachers] can hand in requests to me. It used 
to be so that each Subject Committee had its own funds. But the ‘zones’ 
simply became so small that it didn’t make sense. It could not be man-
aged probably – funds were so devolved that the needed overview did 
not exist – so in order to manage probably and spend resources where 
they are most needed I had to pull funds back up a level” (I E lin.254ff). 
11.5. CREATING INCLUSION – A PEDAGOGICAL AND MOTIVA-
TIONAL CHALLENGE 
The pursuit of inclusion is at the top of the local agenda. Successful inclusion, how-
ever, is a complicated challenge, which if not managed properly can become a vast 
cause for concern and frustration. Inclusion, the principal from District 1 notes, not 
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only affects the general teaching environment and the teachers but in fact the entire 
public school system: 
“Inclusion isn’t only related to pupils with special needs or to those mis-
behaving or having difficulties in keeping up with the teaching. It’s also 
relevant for the talented pupils. It entails including a wide range of pu-
pils. It causes difficulties for the teachers and requires reflections over 
one’s own practice – changing it so that the needs of the individual child 
are taken into account. This you can say is a clash with the old saying 
‘one teacher, one class, one subject, one class room’, where you could 
close the door and nobody cared what was going on” (I C 341ff.). 
The devolvement of special needs education funds, the administrative coordinator of 
District 1 argues, has created a better basis for inclusion to take place. Not only has 
it enabled the establishment of more inclusive services tailored to the needs of the 
pupils. It has also given way for a more flexible and efficient use of resources: 
“We can act more quickly to the benefit of the child, parents and class; 
Creating interaction, because this is not a static situation. Needing help 
sometimes doesn’t necessarily mean that the child needs help all the 
time. In some periods yes and then they should come back to the main-
stream environment and group. Because I totally agree that the public 
school is for everyone, and we must be able to include more than we’re 
actually are. But I’m also of the opinion that no single child must take 
away so much time that it will be at the expense of the other 20 pupils. In 
such cases you have to act, and it’s this ability to act, which in my opin-
ion can be done more promptly and effectively now that we have been 
given the budgetary responsibility” (I A lin. 482ff.) 
With the legislative change, the prior link between funds, the specific child and 
diagnoses has been removed. This, Districts 2’ administrative coordinator argues, 
ensures prompt action, something which in the long-run is very beneficial: 
“Prompt action is a contributing factor for securing that a child in the 
long-run will not become too demanding and we can spot them immedi-
ately. Instead of sitting around waiting a year for the funds, we wanted 
them devolved, to be used as we see fit. And now this is so” (I D.lin:49) 
The general opinion is that the devolvement of funds has brought about a more flex-
ible use of resources. This is manifested in the fact that the funds are increasingly 
tied to the larger group around the child, instead of the specific child. This new ap-
proach, it is argued, is not only more flexible, but also more resource efficient, in 
that, it reduces the likelihood for support being upheld beyond actual need. The 
specific approach taken towards creating inclusive services differs across the dis-
tricts. Some districts have established specific class tracks, in one of which the pu-
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pils with special needs are included and to which teachers with special pedagogical 
knowledge and skills are assigned (I H lin.43ff, deputy head). Other districts have 
attached extra teachers with special pedagogical competence to specific groups of 
children in the in-schooling classes. This, it is argued, ensures the flexibility needed 
for meeting the needs of the more diverse group of children. In District 2, a depart-
ment head explains, they have organized their in-schooling so that they break-up the 
classes from 1
st
 – 4th grade, teaching instead the pupils in groups based on their aca-
demic capabilities (I F lin.337ff.). Similar efforts are taken in District 1 for the older 
pupils. These pupils, the principal explains, posses a strong desire to be and stay a 
part of the general environment and in order to secure this, pupils are divided into 
groups based on their academic capabilities in the three compulsory subjects, Dan-
ish, Math and English, with an extra teacher with the specific professional capabili-
ties assigned to each group (I C lin.456ff). 
Ensuring that pupils with special needs, also leave the school with a final examina-
tion is a vital aim of inclusion, a deputy head from the administration notes: 
“We’ve had to communicate the fact that when these pupils turn 18 and 
come in contact with the labor market, they need their final examination; 
because if they don’t get it, then it’s the Employment Sector which must 
pay. The funds might come from another sector, but it’s still [Municipali-
ty A]. They have been 9 years with you – thus make sure they have their 
final examination, also even if they might end up with only 0 or 2. They 
need it – so it’s about not shutting oneself of but instead being aware of 
what is next to come” (I H lin.844ff.) 
Albeit, inclusion is a top priority for both the administration and the local manage-
ment, the general notion is that inclusion does not imply that all pupils can or must 
be included in the general environment. Inclusion efforts can indeed pose a chal-
lenge, especially for the teachers who now have to teach a broader and more diverse 
group of children. If this is not probably addressed by the management these new 
conditions can affect the motivation and well-being of the teachers. Preparing the 
teachers has accordingly become a vital concern for the administration, a sector head 
explains:  
“When I mention the teachers, it’s because it’s a persistent and national 
issue; that discussions on inclusion often bring about debates on whether 
the terms and conditions under which the teachers have to work are rea-
sonable. We’re aware of this and keep a close eye on it, including it in 
our training programs” (I H lin.651ff.). 
Extensive training programs for all employees have been organized, in order to give 
the teachers and pedagogues a broad foundation to work on. Some teachers have 
received additional education, given them new skills in mathematics or for teaching 
pupils with reading difficulties. While others have been trained to become AKT-
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DANISH PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 
180
 
councilors (an abbreviation for behavior, contact and well-being) enabling them to 
handle pupils with socially or emotionally conditioned difficulties. ‘Resource Cen-
ters’ have further been established in each department; centers which are intended to 
work as knowledge and support hubs, where additional help can be acquired when 
needed. Albeit such efforts are to better prepare the teachers to meet the changing 
needs of the pupils some are still left with frustrations. As a consequence the work-
ing environment can at times be very affected. Changing practices do not happen 
overnight and inclusion, the principal of District 2 stresses, thus remains a challenge 
for both the teachers and the management: 
“It means that the teachers to some extent have been forced to look in the 
mirror, evaluating as a team: what are we doing and why do we end up 
where we do? Is there something we can do in order to be preventive? 
This is important aspects of inclusion – moving away from ‘if only we 
‘get rid’ of little Peter everything will be okay and we’ll be able to han-
dle it’ – because we’re not okay, two others will just pop-up, that’s how 
it is” (I F lin.407ff.). 
Despite the general agreement that the devolvement of funds has provider a better 
foundation for the management to meet the vision of inclusion, the principal from 
District 1 further raises the concern, that despite all the efforts taken the challenges 
faced by the public schools might be of a kind which cannot be met entirely by the 
allocation model: “The biggest challenge for the public school today is, in my opin-
ion, disruptions in the class room. It’s simply too difficult for the teachers to get on 
with the teaching – and these behavioral difficulties aren’t something which by 
themselves triggers extra resources” (I C lin.378).  
11.6. BECOMING ‘PEDAGOGICAL MERCHANTS’ 
The intention of the funding model is to establish a clear connection between refer-
rals and budgetary responsibility. Clear budgetary incentives, the principal of Dis-
trict 2 argues, have in this context been created. Incentives which in his eyes are a 
part of a broader municipal attempt towards controlling spending across sectors: 
“Prior to the change we only lost the pupil-dependent allotment, when 
moving a child [to a segregated special needs service], but that was all. 
Now we have a financial incentive, not only losing the allotment but we 
also have to pay…this is of course done in order to integrate more chil-
dren, and with that also making it easier to control spending” (I E:49ff). 
The devolvement of funds, the deputy head from the School Sector explains, is not 
to be understood as a saving exercise per se. However, by devolving responsibilities 
the hope is that the efficiency by which resources are used will be enhanced because 
the management will be able to tailor services more precisely to the needs of pupils: 
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“I expect they will establish ‘medium’ options, that is, a little more sup-
port than before. They have the funds to do something extra for those 
who need something more specialized. That’s the whole idea. We’ll not 
take money from them, and they’ll not get any more. So they have to 
work with what they are given, and we hope we’ll not get too many 
complaints” (I H.lin.377ff.). 
Discussing the effects of the changes in relation to pupils with less severe problems, 
the deputy head further notes: “from now on, there is no need to refer them to spe-
cial education, because they’ve the money to make the needed offers” (I H.lin.342). 
The hope is thus that prior temptations to up-code pupils to group-integrated ser-
vices, as a mean to accumulating a larger budgetary base, will be removed. Albeit, 
not being seen as a saving exercise, the budgetary aspect must however not be for-
gotten, the deputy head continues. Focusing on the quality of education should con-
sequently not be seen purely as a mean to secure sound academic results, but more 
holistically also as a way to accumulate a larger budget base: “I like to use the term 
’pedagogical merchant’ – that is what a principal must be – you have to focus on the 
education [faglige pædagoiske], but you must also be a merchant” (I H: 466-447).  
The management should accordingly view their services as something on which they 
can make money. The service quality must, in other words, be so good that other 
schools are interested in buying these services. This duality, the administrative coor-
dinator of District 1 explains, is very present. At the one hand, they are aware of 
developing a strong quality of service, at the same time however they increasingly 
become aware of the rising pressure to use services provided by other schools:  
“We have to develop our areas of competence, so that, we’re actually 
making money on the model. Understanding, that we actually possess 
specific competences which can be used to make offers to other schools 
in need of such services. Creating a balance, where I don’t buy more ser-
vices outside the school, than I’m taking in. Securing that the second I 
buy services, then I need to adjust our norms – our staff…We need to be 
able to generate a surplus while withstanding the increased pressure to 
segregate pupils, which will definitely arise” (I A.lin.136ff.).  
However, the financial incentives created in connection with inclusion, raises con-
cerns with District 2’ principal, who fears a situation where budgetary incentives 
carry so much weight that educational concerns are compromised:  
“I can see some pedagogical concerns arise: A pupil might from time to 
time need to be segregated from his class, but some schools might say 
‘we’re simply not able to afford this, so we’ll create an offer at our 
school instead’. Such a service might not be of the same quality, lacking 
the knowledge and competences needed compared to a special needs 
school” (I E.lin.55ff.).  
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Although similar concerns are expressed in other management teams, it is especially 
pronounced with the management responsible for the special needs schools. A new 
practice in this field, the principal stresses, can potentially constitute a ticking time 
bomb under the budgetary base of his entire district: “It’s suddenly four schools who 
are responsible for the visitation and I can potentially find myself in a situation 
where it’s only children from our district who use the school, which means I lose 60 
% of my budget base (I F lin.582ff). Similar, the administrative coordinator notes: 
“If the children get the same services at their own school, with it reduc-
ing the time they’ve to spend on transportation, then the idea is good. 
You just have to make sure, when bringing back these pupils that you’re 
able to provide the services they need. We fear that a bit…We think our 
services are really good for these pupils, so hopefully the other schools 
will buy them. But to what extent we don’t know. It can potentially be a 
challenge for us and we risk going from 50 to 17 pupils. This will trans-
form the structure of the entire department” (I D.lin.360ff.). 
A fear that budgetary incentives will supersede educational concerns when deciding 
where a pupil should receive its education, thus exist. That is, that the other schools 
are incentivized to accumulate the largest possible budget base by taking back pupil 
with special needs. From the perspective of administration however, budgetary con-
cerns may never overweigh educational based concerns. Rather, it is argued, a cor-
rect balance between budgetary and education-related concerns must be created. 
Accordingly, although budgetary concerns, as a financial department manager states, 
are important, they must never become the overriding concern governing the 
schools: “In principle they need to get as much as possible out of their funds, but 
they must still abide by the law, still evaluate and report to us. They have been given 
the funds, but they must still account for its use (I G.lin.493-494). 
Being in a state of transition, the boundaries, he argues, are being tested. In this 
process local services are improving, but situations have also occurred where some 
have been tempted to refer pupils to services with the financial responsibility held 
by the administration. In order to avoid this, the deputy head stresses, a firm eye is 
kept on such developments:  
“…you never know if we choose to devolve the rest of the budget [not 
the budget for the second special schools, but for some of the pupils cur-
rently funded centrally], when they have gotten used to this model, they 
will maybe be able to include some of these also” (I G lin.502ff). 
11.7. CONCLUSION: PRACTICE AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
The account given in the above sections has tried to capture how school manage-
ment is practiced in Municipality A. Visualizing how educational and budgetary 
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concerns are balanced against each other, creating a potential tension between the 
two, when managerial decisions are made. A basis assumption of formula funding is 
that funds should be distributed in-line with the political objectives of the service 
area. The incentive structures should, in other words, encourage providers to act 
towards accomplishing the politically set objects, avoiding behavior hampering such 
achievements. To study this, the chapter will conclude by comparing the actual prac-
tice with the political objectives presented in Chapter 9 and the actual accomplish-
ment of these as presented in the municipality’s Quality Report for the school year 
2012/13. 
The tension between budgetary and education-related concerns is inherently present 
in the political objectives, which revolve around the academic levels of pupils, the 
skills of teachers, the inclusiveness of the public school and creating strong co-
operations with the parents ensuring the well-being of the pupils. While at the same 
time, stressing the importance of ensuring a cost-effective delivery of services. The 
actual position of the formula funding model in the lower left quadrant of Figure 
10.3 indicates that incentive for quality and efficiency improvements are expected to 
stem mainly from the relative/modest competitive pressure to which the schools are 
subjected to. Whereas the low level of budgetary risk by itself brings forward few 
incentives in this context.  
Based on the account it is clear that the main lever for ensuring these goals is the 
devolvement of funds. Through the wider decision-making scope the intention is to 
increase flexibility, the quality of education and with it the likelihood that service 
delivery will be carried out as cost-effectively as possible. The budget, so to speak, 
is not intended to act as a straight jacket on management actions, but rather an ena-
bling tool, encouraging the management to use their local knowledge so that both 
budgetary and education-related objectives are met. In other words, few elements in 
the model tie together directly financial incentives and specific objectives. Rather, 
objectives are sought achieved by enhancing the local autonomy, combining it with 
the consequences of competition and that of being held accountable through for 
example publishing results and monitoring of performance in general.  
One exception is however the quest for inclusion, in that, the model contains direct 
incentives for inclusive efforts to be taken. The capitation payment approach used to 
allocate special educational funds removes the link between local decisions on needs 
and the subsequent size of funding and brings forward incentives for ‘prevention’ 
and cost control. Diagnoses of needs are now no longer a precondition for help to be 
established for pupils with less severe needs. The distribution of risk, in this context, 
gives the management a clear incentive to include pupils in local services, in that, 
such efforts will keep funds within the district budget to be spent at the full discre-
tion of the management. Such undertakings are as discussed subjected to the danger 
that needed services will not be established in order to cope with the budgetary risk 
of having to meet all fluctuations in needs within the fixed budget; also although the 
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overall budgetary risk is low. As also case payments are used the danger of up-
coding is present.  
The account highlights how inclusion is a top priority with the management, albeit it 
at times can be a vast challenge both teachers and children. Textbox 11.1 containing 
results from the municipality’s Quality Reports shows that only one of the six relat-
ed objectives for the school year 2012/13 was met, namely that of orchestrating the 
educational services and efforts so that the number of pupils in the general environ-
ment increases (CSC 18.12.13, head 4)
14
. As for the rest only partial fulfillment is 
attained. 
1 out of 6 performance targets have been fully fulfilled 
The only performance target which is fully accomplished is that of orchestrating the ed-
ucational services and efforts so that number of pupils in the general environment in-
creases. The targets on a bringing down of the proportion of pupils in special needs clas-
ses and schools (percentagewise), IT, exercise and pupil satisfaction and absenteeism 
are only partly meet. 
- Textbox 11.1   Actual fulfillment of the objectives on inclusion & wellbeing, Quality 
Report, school year 2012/13  
The lack of accomplishment can be attributed to a range of factors. The account 
reveals that inclusion represents both an educational as well as a budgetary chal-
lenge for the schools. Not only must the services be tailored and adapted to the 
needs of the pupils, but from the teacher’s perspective inclusion constitute a chal-
lenge which if not handled properly may affect their motivation and ability to handle 
and teach a potentially very diverse group of children. This, the account showed, 
could bring forward an increased pressure to refer pupils to more comprehensive 
services. The code of ethics may here also play a role in that it indirectly turn a 
(re)inclusion of pupils with special needs into a matter of ethics. Thus, although the 
model brought forward strong incentives for the emerging of a more inclusive ap-
proach, other factors, including for example the low budgetary risk, may here come 
into play, in the actual practice of school management.  
Regarding the goals for better academic results the model gives no direct incentives 
for such improvements to come about, the allocation of funds being at the outset 
independent of academic results. Instead such a focus is to be brought forward by a 
long-term demand side concern stemming from the relative/modest competitive 
                                                          
 
14 The content of Textbox 11.1-11.3 comes from the 2012/13’ Quality Report and the results 
are a general reflection of the accomplished levels of the four districts as a whole. In order for 
a target to be deemed fulfilled at least three of the four districts must have fully fulfilled the 
specific performance target (CSC 18.12.13, head 4). 
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pressure. Where free choice combined with publications of results will induce the 
individual management team to focus on the academic results of their pupils as a 
mean to ensure high levels of enrollments. The actual fulfillment of the related tar-
gets is summarized in Textbox 11.2. Here it is seen that the reading abilities of the 
pupils have been improved to such an extent that the objective has been fulfilled. 
This is also the case for examinations results and the deeming ready of children for 
schooling. The last three targets are however only partly fulfilled. Importantly the 
objective on ‘readiness for further education’ is only partly met. This is interesting 
as this is verbalized to be a cornerstone of the public school system. It is further 
interesting that the ‘examinations score of pupils with special needs’ is also only 
partly fulfilled, suggesting that despite efforts from the administration, this area still 
lacks results. As such, although the model gives no direct incentives for academic 
improvements the results suggest that the competitive pressure may play a crucial 
role in upholding such a focus.  
4 out of 7 performance targets have been fulfilled.  
The targets on reading for both native and bi-lingual pupils have been accomplished. 
This is also the case for targets relating to ‘school readiness’ and the examination results 
for the ordinary pupils.  
The last three targets: ‘Readiness for further education’, ‘grade averages’ and the ‘exam-
ination targets for special needs pupils’ and are only partly fulfilled. 
- Textbox 11.2   Actual fulfillment of the objectives on academic level of the pupils, 
Quality Report school year 2012/13 
Improvements in pupil performance are from the perspective of the schools and the 
administration closely linked to the capabilities and skills of the teachers, as well as 
to the establishment of a close co-operation with the parents
15
. The account showed 
how the focus on parents has become a vital lever for ensuring that children remain 
in the public school. A requisition for high education quality was verbalized as the 
possibility of securing teachers to practice only in their main subjects and to pupils 
of the age-group. Textbox 11.3 shows that the teacher’s competences are generally 
improving, although not all teachers are yet teaching in their main subjects. As high-
lighted by the account the introduction of district management has been especially 
fruitful in this context. Finally, although the use of substitutes is decreasing, the aim 
concerning average time of actual teaching conducted by the teachers is still only 
partly fulfilled. 
                                                          
 
15 While the parental satisfaction target has been accomplished the other two targets (pa-
rental use of intra and the development of local principles in line the municipalities ‘co-
herent children & youth’ policy) have only been partly fulfilled (CSC 18.12.13, head 4). 
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2 out of 4 targets has been accomplished  
The targets on ‘teacher qualifications’ and ‘proportion of lessons taught by perma-
nent staff’ have been fully accomplished. 
The targets on ‘pupils being taught by teachers with subject specific competences’ 
and that of ‘36 % of the gross working hours of the teachers being made up by actual 
teaching’ are only partly fulfilled. 
- Textbox 11.3   Actual fulfillment of the objectives on teacher’ qualifications & cost-
effectiveness, school year 2012/13 
Some of the latter objectives are closely related to the local understanding of cost-
effectiveness in school management. Which according to the account is pursued 
through different means, including the establishment of viable class sizes, seeking 
out economics of scale and retaining high enrollment numbers. Especially the latter, 
due not at least to the size of the payment attached to enrollment and the decrease 
birthrate/pupil numbers. The account yet showed that this incentive is not as strong 
at the department/teacher level as the distribution of funds across departments is 
based on managerial discretion and not necessarily on the actual distribution of pu-
pils. High class averages was deemed especially preferable by the management as 
this gives way for an increased decision-making freedom over how extra funds are 
to be spent. Despite this, the account also showed how education-related concerns at 
times amend such quests; this required in turn other cost-saving suggestions to be 
proposed. Finally the district structure was seen as both as a barrier and a mean to 
ensure high averages.  
All in all, the formula funding model of Municipality A seeks to affect behavior 
through a combination of devolvement of funds, specific goal setting, accountability 
for results and specific direct financial incentives. The actual level of fulfillments 
show that there is still some way to go, especially in terms of ensuring efficient use 
of resources. The low level of budgetary risk placed upon the district gives few 
incentives for efficiency to emerge. Not only is the municipality at risk of paying for 
the same pupil twice, but the earliness by which the spending frame is made final 
further means that proper incentives are not being instilled with the management. 
Concerning inclusion the incentive structures attached to the payment type may 
become deluded and impeded by the ethical code and potential attempts to up-code. 
Moreover it may happen that funds intended for inclusive-seeking services instead 
are used in local special needs classes, which albeit being locally placed are still 
segregated services. As discussed, this may cast doubt about whether the quest for 
inclusion is possibly more fictive than real. Finally, the ability and tendency of the 
private providers to enter into cream-skimming behavior may if the increased inclu-
siveness is not handled probably, further affect the ability of the schools to compete 
over all types of pupils.  
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The presented account is very much an up-to-the minute-account influenced by the 
actual shape of the model at the time of data collection. The funding model of Mu-
nicipality A is undergoing continuous changes, especially when it comes to the divi-
sion of responsibilities for special needs education. This includes removing some of 
the cost sharing arrangements. The administration is now only holding the budgetary 
responsibility for the second special needs school catering to pupils with very severe 
special needs. Thus, from being responsible for 75 % of all special needs funds, an 
even larger part is now devolved to the districts (CSC 16.01.14, head 5).  
For the school year 2013/14 this means that each district will be allowed to establish 
a local special needs class in the older grades. That is, each district is given a fixed 
amount enabling them to establish a special needs class in the in-schooling, middle-
school forms as well as a special needs class for 12 pupils in the older grades. In 
addition to six externally provided ‘seats’ this in total corresponds to resources for 
30 ‘seats’ in local, decentralized special needs classes (CSC 07.02.13, head 5; 
03.04.14, head 4). 
For the school year 2014/15 the municipality further contemplated incorporating a 
socio-demographic aspect into the allocation of resources for inclusive enhancing 
services and special needs education. Thus, countering the concerns that funds are 
not being distributed fairly in terms actual needs. However, a consultant report on 
the socio-demographic distribution across districts concluded that no major differ-
ences in needs across districts existed. In fact it was argued, a more equal distribu-
tion of needs has rarely been seen (30.10.14, head7). 
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Part IV Municipality B 
 
Part IV contains the second field study of the dissertation. The subject of study is 
Municipality B, a municipality founded following the structural reform in 2007 
through the amalgamation of two previous independent municipalities. Large budget 
overruns in 2008 in connection with especially special needs education fueled the 
start of a multiannual development program (CC 02.09.08) aiming at tying together 
educational quality, decision-making competences and budgetary responsibility. In 
this context, the funding model was seen as a vital lever for success, since the prior 
model, it was argued (CC 06.10.09, head 106), not only limited the decision-making 
scope of the management, thereby hampering their ability to take on responsibility 
for alternative, local solutions, it also – “hindered the development of services and 
quality, and the shared responsibility meant that schools relative freely could rec-
ommend pupils for special needs education, which at the time were funded from a 
large shared pool of funds” (CC 02.09.08, head 91). With the subsequent changes 
Municipality B became one of the first in a Danish municipal context to devolve the 
budgetary authorization for a comprehensive part of the special needs budget to the 
individual school districts. An important precondition is here, a municipality manag-
er notes, that budget control on its own is insufficient:  
“It’s important to have a sound funding model and through that a good 
grip on the budgetary part of it. But the allocation part of the model can 
never stand alone, it must be buttressed by ways of organization support-
ing the funding – I actually think this has been our luck – we’ve had 
more than just one string – our principle for financial control – but also 
continuously talking about organizational control models including a 
range of municipal services, the development of local resource centers, 
and a central coordinating function evolving around the co-operation be-
tween PPR, the Referral Committee, the local organizations and us as the 
commissioner (I N lin.115ff.). 
In 2011-12 similar arguments revolving around quality and decision-making capa-
bilities were used as motivations for changes of the funding model for general edu-
cation. A new approach which further aimed at connecting local budgetary responsi-
bility and decision-making giving the local management an educational and budget-
ary motivation for retaining and attracting pupils and for orchestrating the service 
delivery in a more flexible manner, was hereafter introduced (22.11.11, head 103). 
The model, a financial employee notes, had to be pupil dependent:  
“From a model which protected smaller units, securing a level of safety 
when establishing a class, schools are now of a size making them capable 
of prioritizing – do we want to make an exemption request for a class 
consisting of 32 pupils, or do we instead allocate a larger proportion of 
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the total school budget for financing 2 classes with 16 pupils? In other 
words, it’s up to the schools to find the best solution“. (I O.lin.50ff) 
Following the initial changes to the funding of special needs education the munici-
pality has experienced an increased pressure and movement towards the externally 
supplied special needs services, where the financial responsibility is held by the 
administration. This pressure, a municipal manager argues, has necessitated a further 
devolvement of funds and responsibilities to the school level: 
”We’re seeing a pattern where pupils who were previously enrolled in 
local special needs services are being referred to external, more segregat-
ed services. We need to put a break on this. This is why we’re speeding 
up the process of creating the next model generation” (I N.lin.306-09)  
The data used to construct the following account is collected prior to this last change 
and its accompanying devolvement of responsibilities. The account thus takes as its 
point of departure the state of conditions of Autumn 2012.  
Taking on the same form as Part III, Part IV consists of three chapters. Chapter 12 
analyzes the technical components making up Municipality B’ formula funding 
model, including a description of the political objectives of the school system and a 
thorough analysis of the control components included in the formula funding model. 
The analysis is again driven by the theoretical framework from Chapter 5 concern-
ing the proposed package of control albeit the content is also influenced by the actu-
al findings thus bringing life to the intentions behind the funding model.  
Building on this Chapter 13 studies the funding model in the light of the framework 
developed in Chapter 7. The type of budgetary risk and competition imposed onto 
the districts by the funding model is identified and the position of the funding model 
in the rectangle of Figure 7.4 is determined. Hereafter the inherent incentive struc-
tures of the model are discussed, thereby enabling a description of the theoretical 
practice created by the model.  
In the final chapter of Part IV, Chapter 14, the study moves away from the theoret-
ical implications analyzing instead the actual managerial practice. The chapter ac-
cordingly presents an account of how school management is actually practiced in 
Municipality B. Again, the account focuses on the guiding principles affecting the 
local management in their daily practices trying to visualize how education concerns 
are weighted against the inherent incentive structures of the model. Finally the chap-
ter compares the the managerial practice created against the fulfillment of the organ-
izational objectives, in this way highlighting whether the practice created is in line 
with these objectives. 
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CHAPTER 12.   FUNDING MODEL, MUNICIPALITY B 
12.1. INTRODUCTION – STRUCTURE OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM 
As a part of the process leading up to the change in funding in 2012 a report study-
ing the general effectiveness of the school system projected that a steep declining 
birthrate, in combination with an inefficient school system structure, would nega-
tively affect the service delivery. Structural changes, it was stressed, were needed 
(CC 01.03.2011, head 16). All political parties agreed on that closing down local 
school services was not an option (Town Council 20.06.11, head 74). Instead the 
structural changes were, as presented in the agenda to a ‘Children’s Committee’ 
meeting held the 31.05.2011 (CC 31.05.11, head 49), to be characterized by: 
- Improved resource utilization; to the benefit of all pupils. A sustainable financial 
model which ensures the greatest level of resources possible is spent on teaching. 
- The preservation of schools in the smaller urban communities. Sound and safe 
local school services for pupils in their first years of schooling. 
- Educational and social attractive environments for the older pupils and their 
teachers. Based on the abilities and interests of the pupils the options available 
should be increased; Sound and exciting youth environment in the bigger towns.  
With the new structure the eight original public school districts were merged into 
five (Town Council 20.06.11, head 74). District management thus emerged, with all 
but one district having more than one department (respectively 1, 3, 2, 2 and 2). In 
order to adhere to the political consensus concerning local services for especially the 
younger children it was decided that the departments in the smaller communities 
were to offer schooling for children attending preschool to 6
th
 grade. Hereafter all 
pupils are gathered in the town-departments. The smaller departments, so to say, 
were to function as supplier schools (CC 31.05.11, head 49) and, in the words of the 
municipal manager, the intention of this was to “turn around the narrative – from 
having lost a school to instead having gained a coherent “Children’s Village” for 
children in the age of 0-12 years” (I N lin.462-63).  
Due to historical circumstances very specialized special needs services such as spe-
cial needs schools are not available in Municipality B. In order to abide by the law, 
ensuring that the needs of the pupil are properly addressed, the municipality has 
therefore formed partnership-agreements with the adjoining municipalities where 
such special needs schools are available. Special needs classes and group-services 
are accordingly the only form of segregated special needs services available in Mu-
nicipality B. These services are, based on the idea of “having the local special needs 
services evolving into municipal centers of competence” gathered and grouped at 
specific departments, depending on their intended purposes (CC 10.01.12, head 8). 
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At the school level the structural changes meant that the management teams came to 
consist of a principal of school, a head of afterschool care and in districts with mul-
tiple departments’ local department heads. The political oversight in Municipality B 
is held by the ‘Children’s Committee’ which, in co-operation with the Finance 
Committee, is responsible for developing and formulating proposals to the Munici-
pal Board. Finally, the ‘Center for Children & Youth’ constitutes the administrative 
entity responsible for overseeing all matters concerning children of the age 0-18.  
12.2.  OBJECTIVES OF THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR 
An important political focus point is the creation of a comprehensive, integrated 
approach across the ‘Children and Youth sector’, which not only removes ‘barriers 
of transition’ throughout the general education environment, but also supports pupils 
with special needs. Building on the premise that the schools are different and enjoy-
ing a great extent of local decision-making freedom, yet working within the political 
set frame, three main objectives for the school system are expressed in the Munici-
pality’s “Unified School Strategy 2011 – 2015” (Town Council 28.03.11, head 38): 
- Grounded in the local community, the educational, personal and all-round develop-
ment of all pupils must be secured in order to improve the overall education results 
- In order to fulfill the national objective that 95 % of all pupils complete further educa-
tion, the youth must be given the best social, all-round and educational qualifications, 
enabling them to complete further education 
- Long-term political decisions on school structure and education must ensure an effi-
cient use of resource fulfilling the core purpose of the public schools. 
- Textbox 12.1   Political objectives for the school system 2011-2015, Municipality B  
In this context five themes are identified as crucial for the development of a broad, 
coherent approach, namely ‘Educational Competences’, ‘Digitalization’, ‘Inclusion’, 
‘Learning’ and ‘Competences and Collaboration’. For each theme specific initiatives 
are outlined (Town Council 28.03.11, head 38). Due to the political presumption that 
the schools are different, each initiative is not applicable to all schools. The specific 
focus is rather to be found through dialogues between the management and the ad-
ministration. 
Initiatives – Educational Competences  
Specify and goal-set efforts which secures children’s all-round development and participation in the 
community. Develop different teaching methods (e.g. ‘learning styles’, differentiated learning and 
group work) which take into account children’s’ learning styles and competences, including focus 
on children with special needs 
Establish sound, professional settings and structures which enable educational discussions. National 
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testing for example can be starting points for discussions on education and pedagogical matters 
Initiatives – Inclusion  
A broad municipal strategy for inclusion must be developed, so that, local learning environments are 
created which enable the inclusion of as many pupils as possible in the general environment.  
These environments can include local ‘centers of competences’, opportunities for collegiate sparring 
and pedagogical guidance, networking across schools and further development of an inclusive peda-
gogy with focuses on the relational competences and well-being of the pupils.  
The quality of special needs services for pupils who cannot profit from being included in the general 
environment must be improved.  
The funding of special needs education must be changed, so that, it supports efficient and flexible 
resource utilization across the areas of general and special needs education, transferring resources 
from the special to the general environment. 
Initiatives – Digitalization 
Establish and upgrade the technical requirement for digitally supported teaching, e.g. wireless con-
nections in schools. Allow and make possible pupils to bring along and use their own laptops and 
upgrade and establish up-to-date library systems supporting the learning environments. Improve the 
employee’ competences in the practical use of digital media and the ‘new technology’.  
Initiatives – Learning 
Develop the ‘start of school’ by taking as starting point the individual child’s motivation for learn-
ing. E.g. through the introduction of ‘rolling school start’, cross functional teamwork between teach-
ers, the kindergarten heads and pedagogues and the use of teaching assistants. 
Develop learning processes and group-work across classes and grade levels, e.g. through coordinat-
ed in-schooling and reading initiatives. Develop ‘flexible planning’ for the entire schooling, intro-
duce if possible a model for ‘flexible vacations’. 
Develop the ties between teaching and afterschool services, through for example, longer days of 
school, integration of play and learning. All in all enhancing the possibilities for creating better so-
cial relations and individual power of concentration across age groups. 
Improve the organizational, educational and pedagogical content of the teaching in the older grades. 
For example through the establishment of customized ‘educational tracks’ or profiles in each district 
(e.g. sport, science or internationalization), and by creating individually orchestrated learning pro-
cesses or groupings based on capabilities or subjects. 
Initiatives – Competences and Collaboration 
Initiate a process where certain ´resource personnel’ is educated in specific subject areas (e.g. the 
use of digital media) with the purpose of creating knowledge-sharing and sparring. Develop the 
teacher’s competences in ‘relations’ and as a ‘community leader’. Develop the coupling between re-
search and local teaching, e.g. through the conducting of research-based teaching by for example co-
operating with a college of higher education. 
Develop management information and evaluation tools, so that, the evaluations of the school princi-
pals are based on educational results, the well-being of pupils and teachers and the level of parental 
satisfaction. Improving the dialogue between the management teams and the administration over re-
sults, viewed in the light of local explanations and possible initiatives for improvement.  
Develop a partnership between parents and the school building on a solid, practice-based balance of 
expectations. Enhancing the parent’s ability to contribute to the education of their children, while al-
so giving the pupils the best possible conditions for increased well-being and learning. 
- Textbox 12.2   School and sector initiatives, Unified School Strategy 2011-2015. 
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As seen, very few specific targets or output measures are explicitly pinned out. Ra-
ther the initiatives outlines the processes and efforts which from the administrative 
perspective are to guide service delivery and what so to say is to be understood as 
indicators of sound educational quality. Yet, although not included in the overall 
strategy, the municipality has also, for each unit/service area, specified specific 
points of measurement and evaluation. For the school sector this includes: ‘budget 
compliance’, ‘sickness absence’ (teachers), ‘special needs efforts and inclusion’, 
‘early intervention’, ‘class size averages’, ‘enrolments in district schools’, ‘teach-
er’s class hours’, ‘proportion of pupils in afterschool services’, ‘final grades’ and 
‘enrollment in preschool classes (CC 14.05.13, head 42; 05.11.13, head 84). The 
criteria’s are mainly measures of output. Especially in terms of those intended to 
measure the cost-effectiveness of the service delivery (i.e. through the choice of 
‘budget compliance’, ‘sickness’, ‘teacher’s hours’, ‘enrollment levels’ and ‘class 
size averages’).  
An important objective both politically and administratively is that local decision-
making on education matters are linked with budgetary responsibilities. Hence, the 
management is expected to fulfill the educational related objectives, while also en-
suring budget compliance and improved resource utilization. This duality is also 
ingrained in the school management, as articulated by the Principal of District W: 
”internal-, managerial- and political wise there is no doubt that it’s both. 
I’m pretty sure that I would be ‘short lived’ if unable to control spending. 
Then I might produce sound education results, but if it is at too high cost, 
my time as leader would be cut short…But education results are also im-
portant, principal appointments have been based on arguments that such 
results have been unsatisfactory.” (I J lin.630ff.)  
Inclusion, District Z’ principal explains, is further a top priority. Together with the 
teachers’ and pupils’ competences and skills, this is the principle which guides ser-
vice delivery in her district (I K lin.102). A new ‘strength-based’ pedagogy, the local 
head of afterschool care explains, is in this context all important, as: “we must be an 
academic inclusive school; because without a sound education level…we can’t just 
enhance the inclusiveness while ignoring the educational capabilities, it’s important 
that everyone is encouraged to do their very best no matter what ” (I L lin.172-76). 
One specific outcome measure is however included in the overall political objec-
tives, namely that of ensuring that 95% of the pupils complete further education. 
This target or objective, a department head from District W notes, is indeed crucial 
for how his team views the core objective of the school system:  
“It transcends everything. In my mind it’s the most important, more im-
portant than final grades; dear me, when all is said and done they don’t 
matter. Competences and skills are of course essential and must be 
taught, but what really matters, is that they learn how to go to school (I I 
lin.535ff.). 
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12.3. FORMULA DESIGN, MUNICIPALITY B 
The formula presented below illustrates how funds are allocated from the ‘Center of 
Children & Youth’ to the school districts. Building on a combination of actual en-
rollments and expected activity, the spending frame covers two appropriations, re-
spectively one for special needs education and one for general education. Prior to the 
allocation a part of the budget is however set aside, intended to cover among other 
things externally supplied special needs education at special schools, transportation 
costs, and specific group-service supplied in Municipality B.  
The spending allocation frame for the school year 2012/13 for a specific school 
district is set March 1
st
 2012 and consists of an allotment for general education plus 
an allotment for special needs education. The first part, covering the general educa-
tion and the associated operating expenses is based on the political premise that it 
should be possible at least to supply the recommended number of lessons per week 
as prescribed by the Ministry of Education. However, with the precondition that all 
class levels receive at least 25 lessons per week. The actual allotment of lessons for 
the school year 2012/13 can be seen in CC 13.09.13 (head 73). 
Taking into account the number of pupils enrolled in a district March 1
st
 the associ-
ated lessons are converted into funds, on top of which additional resources for man-
agement, supplementary teaching and special needs education are added. The fol-
lowing factors are important when the total budgetary frame is to be found: 
Ai   The number of pupils in the class level  i = 0,1,2,.., 10  enrolled in the district  
      March 1
st
.16 
     Number of children in age 6 to 15 living in the districts January 1st. 
Li     Number of lessons for level i. 
Sa   The average salary per hour of teachers, preschool teachers, principals- and   
      department heads. 
N     The number of permanent teacher positions in the district. 
K     Lessons for specific functions specified in the collective agreement. 
The equation for the budgeted number of lessons     can now be represented as: 
                                                          
 
16 Note that due to fluctuations in enrollments in the 10th grade, enrollment expectations are 
adjusted taking into account the average enrollment level September 1st the last three years.   
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DANISH PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 
196
 
                                        
  
   
                 . 
Here 6.47 is a number of lessons allocated pr. pupil enrolled in the school district. 
This is indented to cover the managerial costs of a district and is assigned separately 
in order to draw attention to the goal of securing an efficient use of management 
time (CC 20.09.11, head 77). The 40 and 24 lessons per permanent teacher position 
are respectively intended to cover the costs of substitutes and further/supplementary 
training and education of teachers. The constant number K takes into account specif-
ic aspects prescribed in the collective agreement, e.g. extra lessons due to teachers 
over the age of 60 (CC 22.11.2011, head 103, 05.02.09, head 20, 25.09.12, head 81). 
This budgeted number of lessons is converted into funds by first transforming it into 
gross hours by the factor 1924/1680 and then into funds by multiplying with Sa. That 
is represented by the following formula: 
        
    
  . 
On top of this, funds for boarding and supplementary teaching and support less than 
12 lessons per week are added. Denoting by    a joint pool of funds per individual, 
set aside for supplementary teaching and support, and likewise,  , a joint pool of 
funds for boarding. The following formula represents the total spending frame for 
general education and operating expenses  
        
    
                 
 
   . 
Observe that   is multiplied with    and not just by the number of pupils enrolled. 
(CC 25.09.12, head 81). 
In order to complete the formula for the total spending allocation frame, funds for 
special needs education and a number of specified purpose funds (IT, managerial 
and administrative training, specific development initiatives and long-term illness-
es), have to be described. For the part of special needs education, the formula is 
simple as it may be written as      . Where    is a joint pool of funds per individual 
for single integrated special needs education and other types of special need services 
offered in Municipality B. As for IT two separate allotments are allocated in order to 
enable districts to buy computers and licenses to the pupils respectively to acquire 
computers and broadband for the teachers. Each district is allocated an amount    
per pupil in order to cover the cost of the first type, and another amount    per 
teacher in order to cover the cost of computers and the establishment of broadband 
facilities for the teachers in their homes (04.09.12, head 70).  
Two additional pools, C and DI are intended for managerial and administrative staff 
courses and more general development initiatives. Set aside in two separate pools of 
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funds, these are assigned in collaboration between the local management and the 
administration. Finally in order to account for actual long-term illnesses (>,31 days) 
and maternity leaves they receive a collective insurance payment I based on ex-
pected needs. The funds in this insurance scheme are paid by the districts through an 
annual premium dependent on the total expenditure on wages. In order to incentivize 
the management to focus on and reduce long-term illness the insurance scheme is 
constructed so that the repayment does not cover the full cost of the ‘insurance in-
stance’, indeed only around 80%. The precise coverage is determined once a year 
and unused funds or potential deficits results in corrections of the following years 
premium (CC 22.05.07, head 57). All in all, this gives the following equation for the 
total spending allocation frame to be devolved to a district as set March 1
st
: 
                          
       
    
                         
 
   
           . 
12.3.1. COMMENTS, PAYMENT PER PUPIL 
The pupil dependent part of the formula above,  
        
    
         
 
   . 
takes as already mentioned the number of pupils enrolled in a district March 1
st
. This 
is indeed the case for the 0
th
-9
th
 class levels, whereas for the 10
th
 grade, which enters 
into Sa, the special procedure mentioned above is applied. The payment is intended 
to cover the cost of general education and boarding as well as the associated operat-
ing expenses. It is thus understood as a measure of the average costs of teaching a 
pupil in the mainstream/general environment. The payment, which is adjusted ac-
cording the age level through the corresponding number of lessons, the Li’s, 
amounts approximately to DDK 43,000 per pupil (08.09.14, head 74). 
12.3.2. COMMENTS, DEVOLVEMENT OF SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL 
COSTS 
As mentioned the administration has chosen to retain the budgetary responsibilities 
for externally supplied special needs education (special needs schools outside the 
municipality). The devolvement of special needs education in the formula i.e.  
          
is thus intended to cover internally supplied services. As the funds for externally 
supplied services are deducted first the actual size of   and    is influenced by the 
expected need for externally supplied services. This need is determined through 
estimations on the effects of price changes and changes in service levels as a result 
of pupils leaving the system due to age. Roughly speaking half of the municipal 
budget for special needs education is set aside before determining the actual value of 
  and     It is important to note, that the funds for supplementary teaching and sup-
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port has, following the legislative amendment in 2012, been transferred through   to 
the general budget. As explained by the municipal manager: 
 “Some funds for inclusion are simply transferred to the general frame. 
The overall concern is to enhance the scope for action and with it the re-
sources of the general environment. We need to create a trend towards a 
situation where the general environment is given a stronger platform, 
thereby decreasing the demand for the special needs frame” (I N 
lin.191ff). 
As noted, funds are allocated based on an expectation of needs, rather than on actual 
counts of pupils needs. The underlying thinking behind the devolvement, the munic-
ipal head describes: “is that support isn’t to be given solely to the individual child. 
The child is a part of a broader set of relation and we’re of the opinion that it’s 
these relations and not merely the particular child, who must benefit” (I M lin.71). 
Being multiplied by    the payment   +    comes into play for every child, in the 
age 6 to 15, living in a school district January 1
st
. Thereby making the allocation 
independent of actual needs. The allocation model, as described in the policy paper 
presented to the Children’s Committee, is thus:  
“build on the principle that each district is responsible for all pupils liv-
ing in the district, and decides and pays (fully or partly) for the special 
needs services given to their pupils. The model seeks to establish the 
greatest possible connection between decision-making competences and 
budgetary responsibilities”. (CC the 05.02.09, head 20) 
For the school year 2012/13 the flow of funds can accordingly be illustrated as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School District V 
1 department: 0-9th 
Funding 
mechanism 
School District X 
2 departments: 0-6th; 0-9th  
Municipality 
Center for 
Children & 
Young people 
School District W 
3 departments:                          
0-6th; 0-6th; 7th-9th 
School District Y 
2 departments: 0-6th; 0-10th 
School District Z 
2 departments: 0-6th; 0-9th 
Special needs classes and schools 
in other municipalities  
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- Figure 12.1.   Flow of funds Municipality B, school year 2012/13 
Through the devolvement schools are expected to be able to establish services for 
single or group integrated pupils, as well as acquire seats in the jointly run special 
needs classes. The individual school is not allowed to establish local special needs 
classes (CC 20.09.11, head 77, 25.09.12, head 81). The home-district accordingly 
receives funds based on the number of pupils living in the district. In turn, it must 
cover the cost of all additional support and special education services given to a 
child in the age of 6-15 living in the district. This is even so if the school has never 
had any contact with the particular child (05.02.09, head 20). The home-district must 
reimburse the associated cost of the special needs services provided, to the school in 
which the child is actually enrolled (06.10.09, head 106). The administration though 
covers fully the cost special needs services provided outside Municipality B.  
12.3.3. COMMENTS, MODEL PRECISION 
The model is constructed so that it accommodates to concerns for horizontal equity, 
i.e, equal treatment of equals. This is the case for both general and special needs 
funding. For general education it is addressed by allotting districts the same amount 
of lessons per pupil enrolled only varying with the specific age-level and concerning 
special needs education by allotting the same amount to each district. A fixed pay-
ment triggered solely by home-addresses and not the specific needs of the pupils.  
Both allotments are thus based on the understanding that the needs of the pupils are 
equally distributed across school districts, justifying an equal payment for all pupils. 
In 2009 a report, conducted as a part of the funding change efforts, measured the 
socio-demographic profiles of the then nine districts (CC 06.01.09, head 05). The 
analysis found only small differences across districts, with the proportion of pupils 
belonging to the ‘risk group’ varying from 0.9 to 5.2 %. Two districts though stood 
out with respectively a somewhat lower and a somewhat higher number of children 
belonging to the ‘group at risk’. The general feeling however was that an allocation 
based on socio-demographic parameters, would only give a relative modest re-
distribution of funds, albeit for some schools interim arrangements could be needed 
(05.02.09, head, 20). As a result the distribution of needs justified an allocation of 
special needs funds build solely on the objective indicator; the number of children in 
the age 6-15 living in the district. 
12.4. SCALE OF BUDGETARY DEVOLVEMENT 
The above presented spending frame formula represents the general rule for the 
distribution of funds in Municipality B. The appropriation level is in general high, in 
that, the budget authority to a large degree has been devolved to the Center for Chil-
dren & Young People and from here further on to the individual school district. 
Some decision-making authority is however kept at the administrative level. Table 
12.4 summarizes the precise division of budgetary responsibilities. 
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- Table 12.4   Division of financial responsibility centrally and locally 
As for special needs education the administration defrays the full cost associated 
with the externally supplied services as well as the cost of a specific internally pro-
vided special needs group-service for pupils with severe needs together with that of 
pupils living in residential institutions and homes. Two pools of funds are here set 
aside, one intended to cover the cost of sudden outside-home placements and one for 
the external special needs education, Finally, the administration also retains the 
budgetary responsibility for a specific local group-service which caters to younger 
pupils with severe special needs, making them unable to profit from being included 
in any of the internally established special needs classes (CC 06.11.09, head 106). 
On top of this, the budgetary responsibility for bus transportation for pupils from 
home to the nearest district department is retained at the municipal level (CC 
08.01.13, head 3). If however not enrolled in the nearest department the cost of 
transportation is not covered. Concerning IT a cost sharing arrangement, as de-
scribed, means that each school is given additional funds for equipping pupils and 
teachers with computers and appropriate licenses together with establishing 
broadbands in the home of the teachers (CC 04.09.12, head 70).  
12.5. BUDGETARY RELATED CONTROL COMPONENTS  
Figure 12.2 visualizes the budgeting process and illustrates the important entries. As 
discussed, funds are appropriated in the expectation that they cover the spending 
needs of a school district the following school year (August to July). Importantly, 
the municipality has decided that the accounting year of the school districts is also to 
cover this period. The financial results of each district are thus assessed after July 
Municipal Administration 
 Outdoor up-keepings, building maintenance, extra cleaning and larger expansions  
Transportation for pupils to the nearest department and IT and broadband 
Special needs education at special schools outside the municipality 
The educational cost for pupils living in residential institutions and homes  
A specific group-service for pupils with severe special needs 
Devolved to the school districts 
 Funds for general teaching, boarding and operating expenses 
Supplementary teaching, extra support less than 12 lessons per week 
Individual integrated special needs education given to pupils living in the district 
The purchase of special needs services at other municipal schools, in special needs 
classes or group-services 
PART III   MUNICIPALITY B                                                                                          FUNDING MODEL MUNICIPALITY B                          
                                                                          
                                
             
201 
School year 
31
st
, with the final account presented in November. Accordingly, the budget year do 
not follow the annual year which means that it only encompasses enrollment levels 
of one school year. The budget of the school sector however follows the rest of the 
municipality and is assessed at the end of the year, with the final account presented 
in April.  
 
 
- Figure 12.2   Time dimensions in the budgeting process 
When determining the spending frame different assessments are made. In December 
the need for externally provided special needs education is assessed, with the final 
decisions on referrals made in January. When the expected cost of this has been 
deducted, the remaining funds are, as explained, intended to cover the special needs 
services supplied within the municipality (I N lin.173; CC 06.10.09, head 106). As 
for the funds for general education registrations of up-coming preschoolers begin in 
October following the autumn vacation. Combined with forecasts on the expected 
number of pupils to be enrolled September 5
th
, a preliminary spending frame for 
general and special needs education is announced March 1
st
.  
The payment for general education is based on a case payment inspired approach 
whereas the payments for special needs education and with supplementary teaching 
and support are capitation payment approaches. A case payment usually entails that 
the payer holds the financial risk for increases in output, leaving the providers ex-
posed to the risk arising from a decreasing pupil number. In Municipality B this is 
attempted realized by adjusting the spending frame March 1
st
 with the actual enroll-
ment pattern September 5
th
. The provisional spending frame is hence adjusted in 
accordance with changing enrollments thereby taking into account the ability of the 
schools to retain and attract pupils. Yet, the effect of change in enrollments is con-
fined to pertain mainly to private school competition with the spending frame being 
adjusted only to private school related changes or when a pupil selects a boarding 
school or a public school in another municipality. Thus not all actual changes are 
taken into account.  
If able to attract a pupil previously enrolled in a private school the district is com-
pensated with additional funds corresponding to 35,000 DDK (approximately 8,000 
less than if the child had been enrolled March 1
st
 (08.09.14, head 74)). Likewise, the 
district has to reimburse funds if a pupil enrolls in a private school, a boarding 
school or in a public school outside the municipality. Enrollment changes across the 
districts are thus ignored and districts are accordingly not to reimburse funds if a 
1/1 
Annual account school sector 
5/9 
1/8 1/8 
1/3 
Municipal budget  
1/1 
Provisional budget for the school districts 
Spending frame adjusted in relation to private school changes 
Accounting year school districts 
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pupil leaves in favor of another Municipality B public school (CC 09.10.12, head 
89). The general dependence of the enrollment changes on the spending frame of a 
district can be illustrated as follows: 
 
- Chart 12.1   Effects of changing pupil numbers on a district's budgetary frame 
The first coordinate in point (A,B) represents the number of pupils enrolled in a 
district March 1
st
 and the second the corresponding spending frame. As a starting 
point the allocation of funds as computed March 1
st
 is a full and final distribution, 
except for pupils leaving for a private school or other non municipal schools. If from 
March 1
st
 to September 5
th
 a pupil leaves in favor of a boarding school, a private 
school or another public school outside the municipality the district must reimburse 
35,000 DDK. In the chart this corresponds to the slope of bold red line. If however a 
child changes it’s officially registered address to somewhere outside Municipality B 
the district is allowed to keep the funds. Likewise, if a school enrolls a pupil who 
previously was attending a private school it will receive additional funding; illustrat-
ed in the chart by the height D. To make precise, changes in enrollment patterns 
between public providers within Municipality B does therefore not affect the size of 
the final spending allocation frame.  
As for the part of funding allocated through the capitation based approach a fixed 
amount, only taking into consideration the number of children in the age 6-15 living 
in the district, is given. The spending frame is hence not affected by the actual needs 
of pupils. If however for some reason a child changes special needs services the 
district must, starting from the particular month, pay the cost of the new services. 
The spending frame for a particular year will therefore in general only exceed point 
B if the school attracts extra private school pupils. Changes in special needs for 
pupils enrolled outside their home-district may though affect the available spending 
frame both positively and negatively according to the particular school being the 
provider or payer (CC 06.10.09, head 106; 20.09.11, head 77; 09.10.12, head 89). 
Municipality B at the outset funds through the principle of gross appropriation 
meaning that the budget holder is only allowed to incur obligations or make pay-
ments which have been appropriated. Steps have however been implemented with 
0 
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the purpose of securing a predictable level of service over the course of a school 
year. This includes allowing the district to carry forward unspent appropriations 
across budget/school years. Each district is thus allowed/must carry forward full 
surpluses or deficits to the following school year (CC 31.11.12 head 95). This is 
done in order to take in to account the fact that school years may differ and is for the 
financial employee, closely linked to the devolvement of special needs funds: 
“If in one year a school has many pupils with extra needs, and a lot of re-
sources have been spent on this account resulting in a deficit, then you’ll 
have fewer resources to spend next year. We recognize that school years 
are different – you somehow have to carry it over. But the same goes for 
a good year where things have just worked out fine– giving a surplus of 
special needs funds – then they’re just carried forward” (I O lin.216ff) 
The fact that adjustments are confined to particular enrollment changes is further 
intended to give the management a level of stability when planning the activities of 
the upcoming school year (CC 08.09.14, head 74). This stability is greatly appreciat-
ed, as noted by a department head from District W, and would disappear if all pupil 
transfers were taken into account. Yet, the fact that the budget is indeed adjusted is 
crucial: “We’ve to plan with the precondition that the budget is adjusted in Septem-
ber. You could say that if all changes were considered it would be more complicat-
ed, with some experiencing huge fluctuations also across school years” (I I lin.194-
97). When planning the school year, District W’ principal notes, it becomes ex-
tremely important to remember that the provisional spending frame is not definitive 
and that changes in enrollments numbers can indeed affect the final frame:  
“In the beginning of the year we get some very preliminary numbers, that 
is, the number of lessons the different form levels are to trigger…we also 
get a preliminary allotment for special services in the school and for pu-
pils in other municipal services…but we always have to say ‘remember 
it’s only preliminary numbers’…What is crucial, in an enrollment based 
model, is retaining a firm grip on where one’s pupils are, and that they’re 
actually there. I’m very preoccupied with this; I was so also before, but 
now I really want to know how our pupil numbers are” (I J lin.147ff). 
In order to reduce the associated uncertainty the principal of District Z is also aware 
of creating a clearer picture of enrollment changes: “We try to estimate and speak to 
the pupils in 7
th
 and 8
th
 grade, asking if they are considering boarding schools?” (I 
K lin.341). Yet, the actual spending frame is also heavily affected by how many 
internally supplied services are given to children living in the district, but enrolled 
outside the home-district. In these cases the specific service decisions are not made 
by the home-district school and this, both principals argue, affect they ability to 
know the amount to be paid to other schools (I K lin.333). This, District W’ princi-
pal stresses, is not at least troublesome as changes in the services delivered to these 
children can take place at a month’s notice (I J lin.514). Overall, the financial em-
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ployee agrees, the definitiveness of the estimated frame is somewhat uncertain as 
changes in the needs or special education services: “is something which can occur 
during the year, ‘Hey! One of them just ended up in a special needs class and now 
we’ve to pay for it, where are we to find the money?’” (I O lin.470ff.).  
12.6. SCOPE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND AUTONOMY 
Management by objectives and results, combined with decentralization of decision-
making power, are ascribed to be the main principles of governance in Municipality 
B (CC 01.02.11, head 11). This is intended to encourage local innovation and with it 
better resource utilization. In fact, the financial employee argues, the large degree of 
budgetary freedom in fact comes with an expectation of and the:”freedom to be 
innovative and improving the school. In fact being obliged to do so. Of course within 
the broader municipal school frame”(I O lin. 35). Through the devolvement, the 
municipal manager notes, decision-making power and budgetary responsibility is 
connected thus countering the “complete decoupling of these [in the prior model, 
which] meant that the local management had no incentive to think differently” (I N 
lin.24ff). The more extensive devolvement is in the eye of the financial employee 
especially important in: 
“making budgets and education, go together, in that, the schools are 
stimulated to think creatively about their tasks. They have the funds, and 
will not get anything out of asking for more, because there aren’t any. 
The funds are devolved, that is actually a very crucial point…we agreed 
that we should not have any additional funds…we had to force them to 
think creatively and look at everything” (I O lin.87ff). 
The management is thus as stated in the “Unified School Strategy 2011-15, only 
“bound by the politically decided performance targets, but is otherwise in charge of 
determining how the school fulfills the specific targets (Municipal board 28.03.11, 
head 38). In order to enhance the local scope for discretion the principle of gross 
appropriations is thus modified by allowing the district to spent funds across salaries 
and other operating expenses as they see fit (CC 22.05.07, head 57) and moreover 
by allowing line-item discretion across the otherwise separate appropriations for 
general and special needs education. Accordingly, once the cost of special needs 
services supplied to home-district children enrolled in other districts has been paid, 
the management enjoys considerable freedom over how funds are to be spent. This 
freedom, the principal of District Z stresses, leaves room for maneuver. At least as 
long as the quality expectations are upheld: 
“We’re in an organization where we actually have a great level of con-
trol, within the broader frames, over how we spent our funds. I can jug-
gle with hours and staff, with funds and materials and with working 
hours and agreements. I can in fact juggle around with a lot of things, as 
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long as the municipality will not be ashamed of displaying the quality re-
port and that I have performed as promised” (I K lin.77ff.). 
An exception for this freedom is that districts running joint special needs services 
are not allowed to transfer funds from the special needs classes to the general educa-
tion environment (13.11.12, head 95). In general however, the financial employee 
explains, local purchasing and working hour agreements are some of the only things 
which in effect restrict the local decision-making scope: 
“They [the management] have limits in so far of union working hour 
agreements. Also they must comply with the central municipal purchas-
ing agreements when buying computers…Otherwise, precisely how they 
spend the funds is actually up to them. We have schools with many el-
derly teachers, a factor which may complicate their ability to fulfill the 
recommendation for the number of lessons. They might thus want to pri-
oritize more teachers, thus leaving fewer funds for other things. Other 
schools may have chosen not to fill vacancies instead investing else-
where” (I O lin.353ff.).  
On top of this, broader municipal decisions however also affect the decision-making 
scope. For example in terms of staffing where the decrease in pupil numbers reduces 
the need for teachers correspondingly. In response to this a municipal ‘job bank’ has 
been created which the intention to circulate teachers who has come to be in excess. 
Consequently, the financial employee notes: “no one is allowed to advertise for new 
positions before we have made sure that no teachers are left out due to budgetary 
concerns” (I O lin.148). Overall, District Z’ principal summarizes, the actual deci-
sion-making scope is in fact substantially affected by: 
“municipal decisions, partly financial and partly municipal policies 
which bring attention to the policy areas we’re to focus on. The admin-
istration also frames what is to happen but also financial considerations 
which say ‘if I do this, it will be this costly and I have to consider wheth-
er I can afford it’…But in many ways it’s the Children’s Committee who 
plays the biggest role, because it’s here the political debate takes place, 
on cutbacks and new policies – being as it is political it’s not always a 
1+1 equals 2 solution” (I K lin.89ff). 
Similar, District W’ principal notes, external decisions do affect her scope for mak-
ing decisions: 
“restrictions may occur when not being able to decide when the most un-
profitable department is to close. The degree of freedom is there, but nei-
ther I nor my school board can make such decisions alone, because it’s 
politics whether a local service is to remain. The managerial challenge 
thus becomes that of creating the understanding that everyone must con-
tribute (I J lin.100ff) 
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With the division of responsibilities the management is responsible for the cost of 
general education and the internally supplied special needs education (i.e. single-
integrated teaching, “IT-backpacks”, special classes and group services), while the 
cost of the severe special needs services given by externally supplied services is 
defrayed by the administration. The creation of an accountable management was a 
crucial aim of the devolvement, as seen in the proposal presented to the Children’s 
Committee on the 18.11.08. In terms of special needs education and support this 
necessitates taking into account the budgetary consequences of the decisions made: 
- all decisions made by a principal must come with a financial commitment (liability), 
- a local recommendation to the Referring Committee must have a financial commit-
ment attached 
- the principal is part of the central Referral Committee when decisions, affecting the 
financial commitments of the school, are taken (CC18.11.08, head 114).  
Instilling a budgetary focus, the municipality manager notes, is crucial and entails: 
“we don’t accept recommendations to the Referring Committee without a 
price tag – they must address the fact that finances are a part of quality – 
that is, will you get much more out of spending a million, or 300.000 
more or could the 300.000 be better spent elsewhere?” (I N lin.356-59). 
The devolvement of decision-making thus tried to connect local decisions on cost 
and educational matters, exemplified by matters of class sizes, and further giving the 
management both educational- and budgetary motivation for retaining and attracting 
pupils (CC 20.09.11, head 77). In relation to the latter the management is, in cooper-
ation with the school board, allowed to determine local guidelines for enrollments 
and for the establishment of new preschool classes (CC 25.10.11, head 90). As for 
deciding to which pupils’ special educational support and inclusive services is to be 
given the full decision-making power is placed with the management. This makes 
the ‘enrollment’-principal the final authority for deciding on matters concerning 
special educational initiatives orchestrated and conducted in the general environ-
ment. Potentially there may here exist a separation between budgetary and educa-
tional responsibility, in that, the budgetary responsibility is held fully by the home-
district, while decisions on which types education services are to be given is held by 
the district in which the child is enrolled(CC 06.10.09, head 106)..  
With regard to the more comprehensive educational services (special needs classes 
and group services) the final decision making authority for deciding which pupils 
are to be referred is on the contrary held by a Referring Committee. The principal 
though still plays an important role by holding the authority of recommendation and 
is further a part of the Referring Committee and so is the home-district principal in 
cases where the child is enrolled elsewhere. Albeit, the principal is responsible for 
recommending the child, the committee holds the full and final authority in terms of 
deciding how much and where such services are to be given (CC 18.11.08, head 
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114; 06.10.09, head 106). Upholding a central function responsible for referring 
pupils to the special needs classes or group services, the municipal manager notes, 
was very important in order to: have a place which allows for co-ordination across 
districts to take place. Otherwise we could end-up in a situation where one principal 
makes a decision for a specific service without taking into account that others might 
need it more” (I N lin.48ff.). Although the principals are not allowed to establish 
local special needs classes of their own they are included in the discussions of how 
many special needs classes are to be created and where the specific special group 
service is to be placed: “In this way [the municipal manager stresses] they’re ap-
proving our services, in turn, making them sort of obliged to support them. It’s 
something we run together. It’s not this school’ or this department’ special needs 
class, it’s [Municipality B’] (I O lin. 585ff.). 
Having been made the responsible part for a larger part of the funds has, a depart-
ment head in District W notes, affected the local managerial practice with the: “im-
pact that we’ve become more aware of what we spent our funds on, considering 
maybe more carefully what is needed for a child to thrive here or there – moving 
away from automatic reactions” (I I lin.324-26). The management the, after-school 
head of District Z notes, has become more aware of the associated consequences: 
“I like this model better because [prior] it was easier to divert our prob-
lems onto someone else. Back then we were given no responsibility at all 
at least we did not feel responsible for how the money was spent. It’s ap-
parent that after more funds have been devolved people have improved 
their ability to include. Then you might ask ‘couldn’t they do that before? 
They could, but it was just easier to say, ‘someone else must deal with 
this’, because it was not clear that it was from our frame that the money 
was taken” (I L lin.113ff.). 
Yet, as noted by District W’ principal, albeit the devolvement of funds has directed 
more attention to the ways in which resources are spent, the achievement of opening 
up for more flexible and customized services to the benefit the pupils is far from 
automatic. Rather, the success is strongly tied to the sound pedagogical practice 
existing at our school: “I think the flexibility is enhanced, in the big picture as well 
as in the individual team, but in my opinion this is only because we had a good es-
tablished practice already, an including and acknowledging practice. But also be-
cause our volume is big” (I J lin.683ff).  
12.7. OPEN-ENROLLMENT CLAUSES & PRIVATE SCHOOL RATE  
Municipality B is divided into five district with in total 10 departments making the 
distance relative big albeit the overall size is much smaller than in Municipality A. 
Six private school providers are present in Municipality B, in addition to two board-
ing schools, which each of the public school district containing at least one private 
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school. Service wise, one private school offers only schooling from preschool to 8
th
 
grade, one caters only to pupils with special needs and yet another is founded on a 
very strong religious foundation. Five out of the six private schools are one-entry 
schools, while the last is quite big with up to four class tracks on each form level.  
A clear political objective is the creation of competition among providers. The pub-
lic schools are in this context encouraged to establish different profiles. Rewarding 
the schools for their ability to retain and attract pupils, motivating them to compete 
over pupils, was, as noted by the financial employee, important considerations be-
hind the decision to change the funding model. Going from solely reimbursing 
schools for the number of classes established to a pupil dependent model. The prior 
barriers of transition are removed and the “pupil dependent model gives optimal 
incentives for schools to attract as many as possible. That is, making themselves 
interesting in the eyes of the local community, but especially directed at those en-
rolled in private schools” (I O lin.57-58) As seen in Table 12.5 it is not uncommon 
for pupils in Municipality B to be enrolled in departments outside their home-
district. For the school year 2012/13, 33% were in average enrolled in private school 
services, whereas 9% of the pupils had de-selected their own public school in favor 
for another public school. 
 District V District W District X District Y District Z Average 
Private schools  21% 28% 31% 43% 19% 33% 
Other public schools  10% 7% 12% 9% 9% 9% 
- Table 12.5   Enrollment rates in other district than the home-district  
From 2011/12 to 2012/13 the private school enrollment rate rose 2.8 percentage 
point (25.09.12, head 86). A vast challenge as noted by the financial employee: 
“Our private schools can fill all seats available. They have a fairly stable 
capacity level, the biggest has even just expanded, opening up a fourth 
track in the preschool, 1
st
, and 2
nd
 grade. They expect to be continuously 
able to fill it in the forthcoming years. There is, in other words, a stable 
increase in private school seats available combined with a decreasing 
number of children. So you can say they are taking over more and more 
intensifying the competitiveness of the environment” (I O lin.79ff) 
Private school competition is a fact and although the main focus locally is that of 
countering this type of competition, public caused competition is also increasing. As 
explained by the District Z’ head of afterschool, competition indeed also stems from 
public providers, seeking to enroll pupils not belonging to their own district: 
I won’t call it stealing, because it’s the parents’ choice. But if a school 
takes a backseat, is complacent and not proactive, then I say: ‘get into the 
game like the rest of us and become a part of the challenge!’ Otherwise 
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it’s in my mind self-imposed. Everyone has the same opportunities to get 
things in the local paper or to tell good stories. And if you don’t become 
a part of that, then you will have to deal with the effects (I L lin.727ff.). 
In this context each school management has been given free scope for formulating 
local enrollment guidelines (CC 25.10.11, head 90) and “in reality [the financial 
employee explains] they have been given green light to enroll all pupils seeking the 
school, and some of have done so” (I O lin.562). Different guidelines thus exist for 
when a pupil from another district can be enrolled. Some districts, the financial 
employee notes, have chosen to set no limit that is going to the legally prescribed 
limit of 28 pupils per class. “Partly because of the decrease in pupil numbers, but 
also because it can be seen as a sign of popularity and of a sound reputation – that 
you’re picked. Understandable they prefer pupils and parents who have chosen 
them” (I O lin.563-66). Other districts have reserved all seats above pupil number 
24 for newcomers to the district (25.09.12, head 86). Summarizing the dilemma 
surrounding such a choice District W’ principal notes: 
We’ve talked about how far we want to go – will we go above 24, how 
close to 28 will we go, will we go above because we’re on a market and 
it’s money in the bank next year? We’ve decided no common principle. 
It depends on the situation in the class and in the form grade if we are to 
enroll a pupil who isn’t actually ours. But there isn’t any doubt that we 
give a warm welcome to all new parents, who say that they’re thinking 
about changing school. They get the full showing round!(I J lin.773ff) 
Table 12.6 contains the class sizes of the school year of 2012/13. The overall 
avarage is 21.5 per class, an increase from the 20.5 average of the year before 
(13.11.2012, head 90). Since class sizes are registered on a district level, variations 
across departments are not visible. Yet, it is clear that big differences evidently exist 
across the five school districts. 
 District V District W District X District Y District Z 
Preschool 25.5 25.8 24.0 24.7 19.0 
1st 20.0 25.3 20.0 25.0 12.5 
2nd 22.0 20.2 18.3 25.0 21.5 
3rd 24.0 22.0 17.8 20.8 22.5 
4th 28.5 29.0 20.5 18.6 19.0 
5th 22.0 21.2 17.5 20.8 17.0 
6th 25.5 26.0 18.3 23.2 18.3 
7th 22.5 23.3 22.0 21.5 18.5 
8th 26.5 20.3 20.0 21.6 23.0 
9th 24.0 21.6 25.5 15.2 16.0 
Average 2011/12 23 21.4 19.7 19.8 19.3 
Average 2012/13 24,1 23.1 19.9 21.2 18.6 
- Table 12.6   Average class size, September 5th 2012 source Result Status 2012  
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DANISH PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 
210
 
12.8. SYSTEMS FOR EVALUATION AND CONTROL 
Quality and budgetary related control is also part of the funding model. This in-
cludes a Quality Report which mainly seeks to evaluate education related matters as 
well as a comprehensive evaluations report, called ‘Result Status’, which is intended 
to bring about “a sound foundation for management control at the political as well 
as the administrative level (19.02.12, head 14). On top of this each principal signs a 
‘Result Contract’ which specifies the goals he/she is committed to fulfill. 
12.8.1. BUGETARY CONTROL 
A range of means are implemented in order to ensure budget compliance, including 
face-to-face meetings and budgetary follow-ups. Meetings between the municipal 
administration and the principals take place on a regular basis and here, the financial 
employee explains, budgets and the financial situation of the school system as a 
whole is discussed. This is also on the agenda when local employee meetings are 
held and here the questions are typically on: why budgets are lower compared to last 
year. I’ve held meetings with the staff, explaining that when we have 120 pupils less. 
It influences the budget…10 pupils’ means you have to say goodbye to a colleague (I 
O lin.759ff.). Yet, the day-to-day budgetary situation is not at the forefront of the 
teachers’ mind, a department head explains: 
“Actually they don’t really care that much. They just want to know if 
they have funds at their disposal. Of course they are interested. We have 
had layoffs, and how is the situation now? And when the municipality 
announces that the Children’s Area is to be cut by 20 million then they 
become nervous – because is it us who will be at the receiving end 
again? Otherwise they aren’t that worried about it” (I L lin.92ff)  
Monthly budgetary follow-ups are conducted by the management, with the intention 
of ensuring that a continuous focus is kept on the budgetary situation of the district. 
Here the actual budgetary situation is registered, together with a prognosis of the 
expected result of the full school year. If larger surplus/deficit than 5% is expected 
the cause of this must be explained. Four times an employee from the administration 
joins in and at these meetings District Z’ principal explains: “we look at whether 
salaries are in check. Do we see things right? Where have our funds been spent and 
why so many in this particular month and not in this? And this we must be able to 
account for to the politicians; why do our results look the way they do” (I K 
lin.323ff). At a quarterly basis the results are presented to the Children’s Committee 
in the Result Status and this, the financial employee explains, opens up for:  
“them [the politicians] to see how things are going. We also use it in or-
der to ask ‘are there red flags we have to check and talk about. A couple 
of times we have experienced that a school has been in trouble and then 
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the head of the School Sector has told them to come up with a plan of ac-
tion for how they intended to solve it” (I O lin.275ff). 
Taking part in the budgetary follow-ups gives the administration a chance of gaining 
deeper insight into how resources are spent, as well as ensuring that the management 
takes all matters into consideration. This is especially important in the spring when 
the budget of the next year is to be set: 
“We try to cover the field: how is situation concerning the number of les-
sons, at the minimum or the recommended level? How is the class sizes, 
are you considering amalgamations of classes or other things in order to 
utilize resources as efficient as possible? How about funds for special 
needs services – are there any left – both for external and internal ser-
vices? So it’s a broad range of questions” (I O lin.261ff.) 
The Result Status takes on different forms depending on when it is conducted. In 
February and September the report is minor, focusing exclusively on budgetary 
control, while the reports presented in May and November are of a more compre-
hensive nature evaluating also enrollment numbers and the actual spending of funds 
dedicated to special needs education. On top of this the management also gives es-
timates of their final results, presenting also the percentage of the original appropria-
tion which has been spent so far (19.02.12, head 14).  
The budgetary control focuses narrowly on budget compliance, leaving out deeper 
analysis of the efficiency, productivity or thrift with which resources are spent at 
each school. Deeper benchmarking of results is thus not included and the system 
purely measures the ability of the districts to comply with the budget. Table 11.7 
summarizes the districts’ ability to comply with budgets and to estimate final results 
when conducting the follow-up presented at the spring Result Status. It is important 
to note that amalgamations have taken place twice over the time-period covered. 
Affecting not only the number of districts and with it the size of the budget allocated 
this also means the precise percentages may not be comparable across years.  
 Forecast of final results at the last budget 
follow-up in the spring 
Actual result of school year 
2008/09 8 of the 9 districts expect their budget to balance or 
to end up with surpluses.  
The last district expects a deficit, which is ascribed 
to a lack of efficiency gains, overestimated service 
levels and economic strains from the harmoniza-
tion efforts taken following the structural reform 
Seven districts carry-forward larger surpluses than 
expected (ranging from 2-11% of their budget).  
One district balance the budget, while the last ends 
up with a budget deficit (-6%)  
2009/10 Of the now eight districts, six expect to carry 
forward minor surpluses, while the remaining two 
expect to end up with minor deficits 
Six districts carry-forward surpluses (albeit lower 
than the previous year, 1-9%) 
Two districts end up with deficits (one which was 
not predicted, -1%). For the last district, this meant 
a rise in the existing deficit. Ascribed to one-entry 
expenses related to staff-adjustments (-9%) 
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2010/11 Four districts expect to end up with deficits, albeit 
for two these will be relative small. The four 
remaining expect surpluses, (two of which are 
relative minor) 
Four districts end up with surpluses (1-6%, two of 
which was not predicted).  
The remaining four end up with deficits (-1 to -
10%) (two of which was not predicted) 
2011/12 Five districts expect surpluses.  
 
The remaining three districts expect deficits. Two 
of them however expects to be able to run down 
some of their accumulated deficits  
Four out of the eight districts accumulate deficits. 
For two, the deficits are relative small (-1%/-2%), 
while it for the third is -6% and ascribed to under-
estimation of expenditures. As for the fourth, the 
previous accumulated deficit is cancelled, leaving 
the district only with a deficit of -1%. 
The remaining three balance their budget, and 
carry forward large surpluses (5 & 12%) 
2012/13 Of the now five districts, four expect to respective-
ly carry forward (2) or balance their budget (2). 
The last district expects a deficit, due to a previ-
ously accumulated one in one of the now amalga-
mated departments.  
All five districts carry forward surpluses (2-12%). 
This is ascribed to the national lock-out which has 
meant that all districts have spent less than budget-
ed.  
- Table 12.7   Budget predictions at the last budget follow-up in the spring and final 
result, 2009-13. Source: Result Status & Annual account school year 2009-13 17 
As seen, the ability of the management to predict the final result and comply with 
the budget is somewhat mixed. As the budgetary control takes into account only the 
districts’ ability to comply, the deeper cause of these differences is not examined 
and can thus not directly be ascribed to more or less efficient or thrifty uses of re-
sources. Yet, the two districts with respectively the lowest and next highest levels of 
children belonging to the ‘risk group’ have however continuously carried forward 
stable and at times large surpluses. Furthermore they were not affected by the 2012 
merger of schools. 
Three new districts were established in 2012. One through the merger of two dis-
tricts which until 2012 had produced somewhat modest respectively steadier sur-
pluses. The second district was established through the merger of two districts both 
carrying forward deficits, one of which amounted to 6% of the annual frame. Finally 
the third district was established through the amalgamation of two districts both 
having substantial deficits. Stemming back from 08/09 the deficit continuously grew 
until it in 2012 was cancelled in conjunction with the change in funding and the new 
structure. This was done so to give the new districts an ‘equal footing’. Here also 
any prior interim funding arrangements were cancelled (CC 20.09.11, head 77; 
22.11.11, head 103) One district has moreover over the course of the period peti-
tioned the administration for cancelations of their accumulated deficits. The petition 
                                                          
 
17 CC (26.05.09, head 56); (06.10.09, head 102); (13.04.10, head 37); (15.06.10, head 74); 
(09.11.10, head 110); (05.04.11, head 33); (25.10.11, head 89); (08.05.12, head 33); 
(13.11.12, head 95); (14.05.12, head 42); (05.11.13, head 85). 
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was handed in, in 2013 following the new structure and was ascribed to an accumu-
lated deficit in one of two previously independent schools. The administration rec-
ommended the petition to be denied, arguing that deficits and surpluses are to be 
carried forward and that the deficit established was not a result of political decisions. 
Unlike the situation described above. However the politicians overruled this dismis-
sal (CC 02.04.13, head 31) and later the administration therefore recommended also 
this deficit to be cancelled; citing the new turnaround plan which among other things 
entailed that a new principal was to be employed. The latter recommendation was 
accepted by the Children’s Committee and the otherwise recommended amount to 
be granted to the district was in fact raised (CC 14.05.13, head 45). 
This shows that supplementary grants can be awarded, albeit, it is argued, this is 
only done in cases where politically related matters have affected the district ability 
to be financial viable. The grants have however not been given without accompany-
ing sanctions, including e.g. the replacement of a principal in addition to a close 
monitoring together with the development of turnaround plans in which the man-
agement explains how they will solve the budgetary problem facing the district. 
12.8.2. QUALITY CONTROL 
Quality control is conducted through the yearly Quality Report, in the semiannual 
Result Status conducted in May and September and in the Result Contract which 
describes the areas of focus the principal is committed to. All in all, this is intended 
to ensure a systematic documentation of the service delivered. Whereas the Quality 
Report is the typical instrument used by the Danish municipalities for presenting 
evaluations of their school services, Municipality B has applied to the Ministry of 
Education for permission to present this type of data in another form as well – name-
ly in the Result Status. The Quality Report is thus somewhat downplayed function-
ing now mainly as an evaluation tool for the implementation of the municipality’s 
Unified School Strategy. Covering only the predetermined indicators identified in 
the 2012/13 Statutory Order on Quality Reports (i.e. pupil’ education levels, read-
ing, absenteeism, IT, teacher’ competences, enrollment numbers and private school 
enrollments ect.) (05.11.13, head 86). This, District W’ principal notes, makes the 
report quite retrospective and affect the actual usefulness of it: 
 “Nothing written in the Quality Report should come as a surprise. It’s 
extremely retrospective. When we get the report in the autumn it’s from 
the long-since ended school year. It shouldn’t come as a surprise for a 
headmaster that a child leaves, because you should be focused on this in 
the day-to-day work, just like the rest of the matters. What can surprise 
you, is that you may not know how things are in the neighboring school, 
and then we can begin saying ‘oh I actually thought we were quite simi-
lar, I wonder what they have done? And if their results are better you can 
start a dialog and that’s where it may become surprising” (I J lin.548ff) 
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The Result Status is in the context of the schools intended to create a solid basis for 
evaluation, providing both descriptions of the general developments of the system as 
well as deeper understandings of the individual service units. While the Result Sta-
tus’ presented in February and September take on a condensed form focusing solely 
on budgetary matters, the reports conducted in May and November are of a more 
comprehensive nature, covering both budgetary and education aspects (19.02.12, 
head 14). In 2012 and 2013 including the evaluation of the following indicators, i.e. 
‘sickness absence’ (teachers), ‘special needs efforts and inclusion’, ‘early interven-
tion’, ‘class size averages’, ‘enrolments in district schools’, ‘teacher’s class hours’ 
and ‘proportion of pupils in afterschool services’, ‘final grades’ and ‘enrollments in 
preschool classes’ (CC 14.05.13, head 42, 05.11.13, head 84,). The fulfillment of 
the goal of each indicator is evaluated on a three point scale, visualized by different 
colors. Green indicates that the goal is fulfilled or is expected to be so. Yellow that it 
is nearly fulfilled and red that the goal will not be fulfilled within the time set. In 
cases where a non-quantifiable goal is included the associated color visualizes 
whether the administration views the result to be positive or negative.  
The fact that results are made public, a department head from District W notes, af-
fects the daily work, bringing with it a public focus on the identified indicators. 
Making them even more important; “because they’re measured facts. Some parents 
may even confront us with and have opinions on it. I remember a situation where I 
attended a parents-teacher meeting in 1
st
 grade, and a father wanted to know what 
we intended to do about the grades” (I I lin.555ff.). The fact that the goals are main-
ly hard outcomes indicators, District W’ principal notes, can be problematic. “We 
need clear goals, which are tangible, also for some of the softer areas. Not neces-
sarily tangible in the sense of a quantifiable value, but still so tangible that bench-
marking can take place and so that parents and politicians can relate (I J lin.998ff). 
Until such measuring points are developed the focus on the mere focus on the hard 
outcome measures affects how the results are used and presented: 
“It isn’t because grade objectives aren’t relevant. It’s not because it isn’t 
relevant for a 1
st
 grade teacher, is’t just a long way…and although you’re 
focused on your pupils’ learning in the day-to-day work it [final grades] 
might not be precisely that you keep in mind. Rather it’s the well-being 
of pupils and if they are reading? It’s a simple way to measure quality, 
but never mind; then we must just include additional things that we find 
important. I try to make it very clear throughout the organization; ‘yes, 
yes, politicians tend to measure us on this so we need to be tentative and 
acknowledge that they do so, not be indifferent. But I know that we are 
and can much more’. It’s an important signal to send to the employees 
that this isn’t the only thing upon which they’re judged” (I J lin.1013ff). 
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CHAPTER 13.  BUDGETARY RISK & COMPETITIVE 
PRESSURE, MUNICIPALITY B 
13.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the above presented formula funding model in the light of the 
framework developed in Chapter 7. The level of competitive pressure and budgetary 
risk imposed onto the districts by the formula funding model is studied and the mod-
el is placed at its relevant position in the rectangle of Figure 7.4. Hereafter the inher-
ent incentive structures of the model are studied, thereby enabling a discussion of 
the theoretical practice created by the model 
13.2. LEVEL OF BUDGETARY RISK 
The formula is composed of respectively a case payment inspired approach for gen-
eral education and a capitation inspired payment for special educational services. 
This leaves the districts financially responsible for all decisions pertaining to pupils 
enrolled in the general environment as well as for all education cost related to inter-
nally supplied inclusive-seeking- and special needs services (i.e. single-integrated 
teaching, “IT-backpacks”, special classes and group services) given to children in 
the age 6-15 living in the district. The management is further responsible for decid-
ing whether the needs of a particular child is better met by acquiring services else-
where in special needs classes or groups. The final decision on which services the 
particular child is referred to is however made by the Referral Committee.  
The scale of budgetary devolvement means, roughly speaking, that half of the mu-
nicipal budget for special needs education is devolved through   and   , leaving the 
rest at the responsibility of the administration. This latter includes the cost of all 
special needs services acquired outside the municipality, making the devolvement of 
responsibilities for the special needs costs only somewhat comprehensive. A cost 
sharing arrangement further transfers the budgetary responsibility for one of the 
internally supplied group-services to the administration; reducing the related risk of 
enrolling pupils with more severe special needs as the budgetary responsibility in 
general is held by the administration.  
At the outset, this places only a moderate level of budgetary risk with the schools. 
Yet as visualized in Figure 13.1 a few crucial aspects indeed magnify the level of 
budgetary risk placed upon the providers. One such matter is the size of the payment 
attached to each pupil enrolled. This fairly substantial amount makes the budget 
highly pupil dependent. Combined with the fact that the budget is further adjusted 
taking into account some specific types of enrollment changes, this places a high 
level of budgetary risk with the schools. Requiring strongly the management to take 
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into account that the spending frame announced in the spring is only preliminary. 
Case payments usually imply that the payer retains the risk of upward changes in 
activity, whilst the budget holder is exposed to the downward changes. In Munici-
pality B this is sought established by adjusting the spending frame, so that, new 
enrollments from March to September to and from private, boarding, and other pub-
lic schools outside the municipality are taken into account. Enrollment changes 
between the municipality’s public schools or changes occurring during the rest of 
the year are however disregarded. This leaves the public school districts exposed 
only to specific changes in activity. Yet, it also means that all extra enrollments are 
not necessarily compensated with additional funding. Including for example new 
enrollments from other public schools, making this part of the model resemble a 
capitation payment. Since the budgetary effect of enrollment changes does not cover 
all changes, additional enrollments do indeed affect the potential risk. Moreover the 
districts bear the risk associated with situations where the actual needs of a pupil are 
not covered fairly by the attached payment. Although variations in needs have been 
documented they are accepted to be so small that varying payments are not consid-
ered necessary. Nevertheless, as the payment attached to each pupil enrolled may 
not cover the actual need the associated risk may vary across district due to differ-
ences in socio-demographic conditions. Likewise, with the introduction of district 
management the management must bear the budgetary risk associated with having to 
use funds across multiple departments with very different abilities to attract extra 
pupils and thus of becoming self-financed. This latter risk was earlier handled at a 
central level.  
The part of the formula devoted to special educational funding is allocated as a fixed 
amount, depending on the number of children in the age 5-16 living in the district. A 
capitation payment approach is thus utilized for the two relevant allotments (  and 
  ), making also this part independent of actual needs or service levels. The districts 
thus bear the full budgetary risk stemming from variations in actual needs, including 
for example variations in the associated needs of newcomers to the school. In turn, 
they are however protected from having to reimburse funds in case of decreasing 
levels of needs and unspent funds can thus be kept if efficient solutions lead the 
district to spend less than expected. Line-item discretion and full carry-overs further 
reduces some of the risk placed with the schools. Line-item discretion opens up for 
funds to be spent on a different pattern than otherwise indicated in the original allo-
cation, while the decision to allow full carry-overs is a mean to create locally a more 
long-term budgetary perspective. The management can as a result spend funds as 
they see fit, enjoying the full budgetary benefit of coming up with cost-effective 
solutions. The budgetary benefit of being allowed to bring forward unused funds 
must though be weighed against also having to bring forward potential deficits. 
Political decisions concerning budget overruns have however made the budget con-
straints imposed on the district somewhat soft, in that, additional funding has occa-
sionally been given. Thus, albeit large overruns have been accompanied by immedi-
ate budgetary and managerial sanctions expectations of additional funding may 
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arise. This affects the related budgetary risk and the creation of proper incentives for 
cost control. 
Important in this context is the choice of funding object. Whereas the object of fund-
ing for general education is ‘pupils enrolled’, it is the number of children in the age 
5-16 living in the district that determines the size of special educational funding 
given to each district. A decoupling of budgetary authority and local decision-
making power for special educational services given to pupils enrolled outside their 
home-district is thereby created. Where the ‘enrollment principal’ enjoys full author-
ity over the type of locally provided inclusive services given to all pupils enrolled, 
the budgetary responsibility lies with the home-district. Likewise for special needs 
education the ‘enrollment principal’ is responsible for making recommendations to 
the Referring Committee, who then decides the service to which the child is to be 
referred, with the budgetary responsibility remaining with the home-district. The 
individual principal is thus potentially not the key decision-maker for parts of his/her 
own budget, in that, the decoupling entails that another principal/the referral com-
mittee can make decisions affecting the district’s budget. This influences heavily the 
local budgetary risk, especially for districts with many pupils enrolled elsewhere.  
Other decisions for example municipal purchasing agreements may further restrict 
the otherwise large local decision-making scope. Moreover the individual district is 
not allowed to establish local special needs classes, in that, the existing classes offer-
ing such services are understood as joint services for the entire school system. The 
individual district thus has to buy a seat in one of these services when the needs of a 
particular child can only be met in such environments. To which service the child is 
referred is however decided by the Referring Committee. As already remarked the 
full budgetary risk (for district pupils) is placed with the local management if the 
pupil attends locally (within the district) provided services. In turn however they 
avoid paying the monthly fees for buying services from other districts, giving them a 
larger scope for action over how funds are to be spent. Yet, such a decision may 
come to affect the local teaching environment.  
For the schools organizing special needs classes the budgetary risk associated with 
variations in activities is reduced by the fact that districts are not allowed to establish 
special needs classes of their own. The “supplier schools’ must however ensure that 
the services supplied meet the required standards in order to uphold enrollment lev-
els and their budget base. If not, the enhanced decision-making freedom given 
through the devolvement of funds exposes them to the risk of the “buyer school” 
choosing instead to re-include the pupils in their own services. This risk is of course 
counterbalanced by the ban on new local special needs classes, making the budget-
ary risk associated with a decision to re-include rather heavy due to the restricted 
scope for establishing more comprehensive support locally. 
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Lastly, although schools are encouraged to develop individual service profiles, they 
must still abide by the overall objectives of the service area, making the policy au-
tonomy low. Moreover, though the quality control systems in this context provide 
thorough evaluations of education results they bring with them no direct or immedi-
ate effect on the level of budgetary risk endured. Making them act as merely a mean 
to control and monitor behavior in the long run. 
 
 
 
 Payment per pupil Quite comprehensive 
 Devolvement of special educational costs Fairly vast 
 Model precision  
 Appropriation level Somewhat high 
 Funding object special needs education District children 
Few; albeit all externally 
supplied services 
Cost sharing arrangements  
  Definitiveness of the spending frame Somewhat low 
 [Gross appropriations]  
          Allowed       Carry-overs  
It is possible to get 
remissions  
Budgetary constraints  
Allowed Line-item discretion  
 Purchasing agreements Restricting 
 Level of policy autonomy Low 
                       [ Type of private school competition ]       
 [ Open-enrollment clause ]  
 [ Geographical dispersal of school providers ]  
 [ Transportation costs ]  
 [ Number of children ]  
                    Quality of the control systems implemented  
Low budgtary risk High budgetary risk 
Budgetary risk 
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- Figure 13.1   The impact of the Municipality B’ control components on the level of 
budgetary risk created 
In sum, the dependency on enrollments together with the adjustment of the spending 
frame places at the outset a relative high level of budgetary risk upon the manage-
ment. This is even enlarged by the decision to allocate special needs educational 
funds based on addresses and not actual enrollments. Likewise as described above 
the home-district suffers great risk, in that, the liable district from a budgetary per-
spective may not be the key decision-maker for parts of their own budget. Yet, the 
decision to retain the full budgetary responsibility for all severe special needs ser-
vices at the administrative level reduces heavily this level of risk. All in all, making 
the overall budgetary risk only somewhat high. The model is therefore positioned on 
the right hand side of the risk spectrum though not close the extreme end.  
13.3. LEVEL OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
The rather substantial payment which Municipality B’ model attaches to each pupil 
enrolled means that the districts have a strong budgetary incentive to focus on up-
holding enrollment levels. When combined with the presence of a market consisting 
of both public and private providers the substantial amount attached to each pupil 
should in principle create the conditions for a competitive market for education 
services. The individual district is from a political point of view encouraged to de-
velop clear education profiles and the devolvement of funds is here seen as a vital 
tool which may enable the creation of services in tune with user’ demand. Together 
with the publication of education results these decisions are intended to encourage 
local focus on high enrollments. 
Moreover, a direct budgetary link between upholding enrollment levels in the public 
school and countering private school competition is created by the model, in that, 
school districts are allotted an extra payment for each pupil enrolled from March to 
September coming from a private or a public school in another municipality. The 
payment of 35,000 DDK attached to each extra pupil enrolled during this period thus 
gives the public schools a clear budgetary reason to focus on taking back pupils 
from the private schools. On the other hand districts must reimburse a payment of 
35,000 DDK to the administration if a child over the course of this period leaves in 
favour of a private provider. Although the payment is approximately 8,000 DDK 
less than if the child had been enrolled March 1
st 
this case payment inspired ap-
proach accordingly, as visualized in Figure 13.2, affects the competitive pressure 
Low budgetary risk High budgetary risk 
Formula funding model 
Municipality B 
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brought upon the public providers, giving them strong incentives to counter private 
school competition.  
As for public school competition the direct link between enrollment and local budg-
ets is weakened by the fact that the budgetary effect associated with specific enroll-
ment changes is postponed completely to the following budget cycle. This is the 
case if a school attracts respectively ‘looses’ a pupil to another public school in the 
municipality. Likewise, if private enrollment changes take place outside the period 
from March to September. This capitation inspired approach may affect the short-
term intensity by which additional enrollments are sought, not at least as all needs 
associated with new enrollments must be covered within the fixed budget. The actu-
al needs associated with a particular pupil may thus come in to play affecting the 
efforts invested in pursuing extra enrollments, in particular of pupils with known 
special needs. The public school related competition is therefore relative low and 
combined with the fact that the allocation of special educational funds is also inde-
pendent of actual needs, these factors, at the outset, decrease the competitive pres-
sure as so far of public school related competition.  
This is however countered by the choice of funding object, which increases the 
competitive pressure. Since special educational funds are allotted based on addresses 
and not enrollments the home-district must cover the cost of all special educational 
services given to children living in the district. This gives a clear budgetary incen-
tive for a district to ensure that as many pupils belonging to the district as possible 
are enrolled in the local school, even so if the new enrollment is not immediately 
compensated with an extra payment. This is especially so, since enrollments make 
the management the key-decision-maker for deciding what services are to be given 
to the child. The separation of education and budgetary responsibilities for those 
enrolled outside the home-district can as well make it desirable to enroll pupils from 
other districts, in that, the budgetary responsibility for special educational services is 
held elsewhere. The district thus incurs no financial liabilities associated with having 
enrolled a non-district pupil, at least if the cost paid by the other district covers the 
actual cost of including the pupil in local services. Likewise when enrolling pupils 
with severe needs in that the budgetary responsibility for all special needs education 
is here either held by the home-district school or the administration. The choice of 
funding object thus affects heavily the level of competitive pressure created. 
The geographical placement of public and private schools means that competition is 
not confined solely to larger town environments. The competitive situation is present 
everywhere and the individual public school can almost by default not expect that a 
pupil will de-select a private school or another pupil school for that matter. As for 
public school related competition the districts have been given free rein over their 
local enrollment guidelines. This has resulted in different policies for how many 
non-district pupils are allowed to enroll above the official class rate of 24 per class. 
Below 24 a full competitive market exists for those willing and able to pay the cost 
PART IV   MUNICIPALITY B                                       BUDGETARY RISK & COMPETITIVE PRESSURE, MUNICIPALITY B 
221 
of transportation. Above, districts are only able to enroll home-district pupils as 
these are not subjected to the clause, thereby making the only competitive target the 
number of home-district pupils enrolled elsewhere. The publication of education 
related results may here increase the competitive pressure, whilst the decision only 
to reimburse transportation costs for pupils enrolled in a home-district department or 
in special schools restrict the actual free choice, thus limiting the pressure created.  
From the perspective of the private providers the case payment attached to each 
pupil enrolled gives a continuous budgetary reason for upholding high enrollment 
levels. The competition created from the private schools is substantial with 33% of 
the pupils in Municipality B enrolled with private providers. This is even so alt-
hough some of these schools cater only to specific segments; either in the form of 
pupils with special needs or pupils seeking a more religious foundation for their 
schooling. Five out of the six private schools are further one-entry schools, giving 
them only a limited number of seats available. The last private school is however 
very large with up to 4 class tracks on each grade level. All in all, this means that the 
competitive pressure stems mainly from the private schools, albeit the choice of 
funding object also encourages public-driven competition. Again though, it is im-
portant to note that the public schools feel themselves to be competing on uneven 
ground when it comes to private school competition. This may make the perceived 
pressure seem even higher.  
 
 
 
                             Payment per pupil Quite comprehensive 
 [ Devolvement of special educational costs ]  
                                 Model precision  
           Appropriation level High 
                     Funding object special needs education District children 
 [Cost sharing arrangements]  
                   High Definitiveness of the spending frame  
  [Gross appropriations]   
                    Carry-overs Allowed              
 [Budgetary constraints]  
                    Line-item discretion Allowed 
Low pressure High pressure 
Competitive pressure 
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 [Purchasing agreements]  
                   Low Level of policy autonomy  
 Type of private school competition  Pronounced           
 Open-enrollment clause Different across districts, 
some with no limit  
Quite vast Geographical dispersal of school providers  
 Transportation costs Restricted coverage 
 Number of children Heavily decreasing 
                    Quality of the control systems implemented  
 
- Figure 13.2   The impact of the Municipality B’ control components on the level of 
competitive pressure created 
In sum, the control components create oppositely directed incentives. Four decisions 
however are important for determining the actual level of competitive pressure, 
namely the private school competition, the relative substantial amount attached to 
each pupil enrolled, the choice of funding object for special educational funds and 
finally not at least the general drop in pupil numbers. The on-going drop in pupil 
numbers may indeed overturn the otherwise incentives, making it desirable from a 
more long-term budgetary perspective to enroll additional pupils. Even if these are 
not immediately compensated. All together these components make the competitive 
pressure relative high. Although not the far right-end as not all enrollment changes 
are taken into account. 
13.4. MANAGERIAL PRACTICE – FAIRLY HIGH BUDGETARY 
RISK/RELATIVE HIGH COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
The above analysis means that the funding model is placed in the upper right quad-
rant of Figure 13.3; a placement which reflects the combination of a fairly high level 
of budgetary risk and a slightly higher level of competitive pressure. The following 
section discusses the managerial practice created in the light of the model’s incen-
tive structures. The main points, in this context, are the choice of funding object and 
the division of budgetary authority for special needs education. The bounded scope 
of enrollment-related adjustments further means that this part of the allocation 
comes to be based on a sort of expectation of outputs, inverting some of the intended 
Formula funding model 
Municipality B 
Low pressure High pressure 
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incentives. The base incentive for productivity, through increased output levels, may 
for example be hampered. Further, the construction also brings along the possibility 
that the municipality may be exposed to adverse behavioral responses associated 
with both types of payments, possibly without the associated benefits of case pay-
ments. In the search for efficient use of funds this is of course problematic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Figure 13.3   Managerial practice, Municipality B, created through the combina-
tion of a relative high budgetary risk and a relative high competitive pressure 
The fairly high budgetary risk combined with the relative high competitive pressure 
created by the model brings with it a strong incentive for the districts to uphold a 
high productivity level. This is not at least spurred along by the substantial payment 
attached to each pupil enrolled as well as the choice of funding object for the alloca-
tion of special educational services. Albeit the decision to compensate only particu-
lar enrollment changes in principle may affect the short-run motivation for enrolling 
a pupil, the separation of budgetary and education-related decision-making may 
more than counter this. The districts are thus given a continuous incentive to uphold 
enrollments by seeking to attract pupils enrolled in both private and other public 
schools. The quality of service is in this context a vital managerial mean to uphold 
high enrollment levels, making high quality of service important from both a com-
petitive and budgetary perspective. This may motivate the management to seek to 
‘commercialize’ their services in order to appeal to potential users.  
The fairly high level of budgetary risk also brings with it the need to ensure that the 
service delivery is characterized by cost-effectiveness. The incentive for creating an 
efficient use of funds is enforced by the fact that the preliminary spending frame is 
adjusted in September. Albeit only some enrollment changes are considered the 
High competitive pressure Low competitive pressure 
High budgetary risk 
Low budgetary risk 
(L,H) (H,H) 
(L,L) (H,L) 
Formula funding model 
Municipality B 
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management must take this into account in their planning. In turn prompting the 
management to act more prudently and not spent, allocate or earmark all funds up 
front. The ability to predict/control enrollments thus becomes important for how 
reliable the preliminary spending frame actually is. The fairly high level of budget-
ary risk brings with a range of incentives intended to encourage a prudent use of 
funds, not at least reinforce by the fact that districts are allowed to bring forward full 
surpluses. The soft budgetary constraints may however modify the continuous focus 
to keep within the budget.  
As parts of the model in connection to efficiency are based on capitation payments 
the most likely response will be that of focusing on attempts to lower total costs. 
This is especially the case in terms of funds allocated for inclusive-seeking services 
and special needs education. The basic idea is that the management through the 
devolvement will (re)include pupils in the general environment, as this gives them a 
greater level of freedom over how funds are to be spent. The fairly high budgetary 
risk precipitates this, further inducing the management not to over-spent. In turn 
tailor-made solutions are expected to be created in response to the fixed nature of the 
allocated budget. The hope is that the future guideline for when and in what circum-
stances help is to be given will be the needs of the pupils. This is in contrast to the 
previous applied strict system where a pupil based on diagnoses (which could be 
quite delayed) was allotted a fixed number of extra support lessons. Successful in-
clusion will thus entail that the management can retain the pupil dependent allotment 
within the district. The general idea behind the devolvement of special needs funds 
is to link budgetary and education-related responsibilities. By being accountable for 
a larger part of the funds the management is expected to be incentivized to utilize 
funds more appropriately, as they are now accountable for its use. Further giving 
them a direct incentive to (re)include pupils in the general environment thus enhanc-
ing their own discretion over how funds are to be spent. Not only will successful 
inclusion mean that the district keeps the pupil dependent allotment but it also re-
tains full control over the associated funds for special needs services. Thus, if a 
district is able to create sound educational environments where inclusion can take 
place the needs of the pupils will be better, while also creating a more solid budget-
ary base thereby decreasing the immediate budgetary risk.  
Adversely, the focus on lowering total cost may bring with it the incentives to de-
press services. For the inclusive services the danger is that the needs of the pupils is 
not sufficiently met due to the restricting nature of the fixed budget. This is especial-
ly prevalent for services such as additional support and group-integrated services as 
these no longer are classified as special needs education making it more difficult to 
control whether children are receiving the needed help. Depressing of services may 
also take place in relation to pupils in special needs classes, in that, the management 
in the pursuit of a larger, stable budget base could be induced to refrain from refer-
ring pupils to the externally supplied services due to the associated cost. Instead of 
acquiring external services the management may decide to keep the child, thereby 
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retaining full decision-making freedom over the funds. As discussed such behavior 
is beneficial if similar services can be created through the larger budget base. If 
however the needs of the pupils are not sufficiently met this becomes adverse in 
nature. The ban on creating local special needs classes also play a role in that it may 
increase the likelihood that funds intended for the establishment of inclusive-
enhancing services in the local environment is actually used for other purposes. For 
example on acquiring special needs services elsewhere, thus decreasing the amount 
available for inclusion in the general environment.  
Moreover, the model may lead to a shifting of user’ cost and not at least up-coding. 
This is connected to the choice of funding object and the division of budgetary re-
sponsibilities. The latter, which makes the administration responsible for all exter-
nally supplied special needs education, may motive up-coding behavior in that the 
management can lessen the immediate budgetary risk placed upon them, if succeed-
ing to refer a child to such services. Although the specific referrals are decided by 
the Referring Committee the ‘enrollment principal’ still holds an important position, 
in that, he/she holds the authority of recommendation. Thus, if the principal can 
argue for the appropriateness of referring, the financial responsibility shifts to the 
administration. Creating a direct connection between up-coding and a potentially 
sounder budgetary base and a lower level of budgetary risk. The same is true for the 
less comprehensive special educational services if the particular child in need comes 
from another district. The decision-making power for assigning this type of support 
is in this situation held solely by the ‘enrollment-principal’ while the cost is paid by 
the home-district. Because support is increasingly given to the group, and not the 
specific child, this may even buttress further the incentive to allot support to these 
children. Thus, although the capitation payment inspired approach at the outset 
makes up-coding difficult, the potential separation introduced by the division of 
responsibility creates incentives for up-coding.  
The incentive for up-coding pupils to services where the budgetary responsibility is 
held by the administration exists regardless of whether the child is enrolled in the 
home-district or not. As long as the cost associated with a child being included in the 
general environment or in a special needs class is perceived to be too great, the 
home-district school as well as the ‘enrollment school’ will have an incentive to 
seek an up-coding of needs. If ‘successful’, the ‘enrollment-school’ namely only 
stands to lose the pupil dependent allotment, which from a cost perspective may be 
low compared to the actual cost. At the same time, the home-district avoids paying 
the cost of any special needs services given to the child while even retaining the 
payments p1 and p3 due to the fact that the child lives in the district. For both schools 
a successful referral is thus attractive from a budgetary point of view. Further if the 
referral happens after the setting of the spending frame they even keep the pupil 
dependent allotment. Adverse behavioral responses may thus affect the overall effi-
ciency of how funds are used risking thus that it is not the needs of the pupils which 
determines the type of services given.  
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The division of budgetary responsibilities may further slow down the efforts taken 
by the management in terms of inclusion and appropriate support. The scaling-down 
of services is complicated as it may entail a transfer of responsibilities from the 
administration to the home-district. This may for example happen if a child no long-
er needs the services provided in a special needs school but can be sufficiently 
helped in a special needs class. Giving therefore the home-district schools few in-
centives for making such scaling-down-decisions. Thus, albeit the combination of 
budgetary risk and competition strongly incentivizes prudent and efficient use of 
funds the magnitude of risk may be so great that the mentioned adverse behavioral 
responses may occur. Engaging in such behavior will namely not only reduce the 
budgetary risk, but also be a mean to improve the general competitiveness of the 
district. The perceived risk may further be larger as the public providers feel them-
selves unable to freely respond to competition from private providers, engaging in 
cream-skimming behavior. Again affecting heavily the ability of local providers to 
create prudent and efficient service delivery.  
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CHAPTER 14.    PRACTICING SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 
IN MUNICIPALITY B 
14.1. INTRODUCTION 
“I’m for sure an actor on a market, that’s why I’m very focused on mar-
ket the school, being aware of only selling something I can vouch for” 
So does the principal of District W describe her role as a principal of school (I J 
lin.760). Part IV has until now analyzed the theoretical implications of Municipality 
B’ funding model on managerial practice. In the light of this, Chapter 14 presents an 
account of how school management is actually practiced. The account focuses on 
the guiding principles affecting the management and seeks therefore to visualize 
how education concerns are weighted against the model’s incentive structures. In the 
final part the managerial practice is compared with the political objectives, opening 
up for a discussion of whether the created practice is in line with these objectives. 
14.2. EDUCATIONAL BRANDING AND ENROLLMENTS 
The competitive situation in which the schools find themselves fuels a focus on high 
enrollments, District W’ principal stresses, as this is an important indicator of quali-
ty: “it’s a very crucial measure of quality, knowing who are punching out and why? 
Is it because they’re moving away or are they displeased? (I J lin.174), it is in other 
words a “measure of satisfaction and quality; are the parents happy, are the chil-
dren?” (I J lin.206). Countering private school competition, the afterschool head in 
District Z emphasizes, is of special importance and “collectively as schools we agree 
that we need to focus on how to take back our children from the private schools. We 
do this in different ways, with our different profiles – what is it we want to be known 
for?” (I L lin.722). Politically, she notes, each school has been encouraged to: “de-
velop a strong profile so that parents have the opportunity to choose your school” (I 
L lin.755).  
Branding, the financial employee emphasizes, is an ingrained part of a pupil de-
pendent model, in that, it must be: “profitable [for the schools] to be visible and 
market themselves and of course deliver a sound quality - branding without quality 
is obviously not enough” (I O lin.60). As a part of these efforts, the principal of 
District Z explains, the management focuses on creating clear guidelines, describing 
for example the “pedagogic we’re aspiring to; we apply different teaching methods 
in the older classes too – that is, making clear statements, establishing a sort of 
profile” (I K lin. 629). Having a clear education profile with an overall pedagogy 
shared by the both the school and the afterschool services is a vital mean to make the 
school stand out in the eyes of the parents: 
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“We want to be a school with a unified pedagogy, which is visible, giv-
ing us a ‘shared’ language. I expect it will create a spillover effect on 
how we get on with each other. In turn I hope the parents will say: ‘Yes! 
They’ve actually thought about this, rather than it being just haphazardly 
attempts’ – I expect it to become our trademark” (I K lin.156ff) 
By having a clear pedagogical profile the school can elucidate what private schools 
are not providing, District W’ principal explains. For example telling parents about 
the staffed homework-cafés, in general accentuating the broader afterschool services 
available, because: “in a private school, pupils go home at 1 or 2 o’clock and then 
they’re home alone all day, because there is no after-school offer. But with me there 
is”(I J lin.815). Likewise, District Z principal notes, our afterschool care has a sport 
profile, and this we stress at every given opportunity (I K lin.632). In this way seek-
ing to verbalize that parents by choosing them, not only; “get a better after-school 
service but also free-schooling, which some already have witnessed is at least of the 
same quality” (I J lin.818).  
In the attempt to ensure that the home-school is picked in the first place partnerships 
with the kindergartens are established the head of after-school care explains:“Our 
‘bridge building’ with the kindergartens is gold; because it’s with them the good 
stories must start. They’re the first step towards we becoming a success or a failure; 
because it’s here you decide whether to choose us or a private school” (I L 
lin.436ff.). These partnerships, District W’ principal explains, provide opportunities 
for the children to meet the teachers, to get to play on the playground and in general 
become familiar with the school. In turn, making it self-evident for the child to fol-
low friends to the school. Thus; you have to be a tough cookie if as a parent you 
say: ‘no it isn’t important that my child goes to a place with familiar adults, I rather 
uproot it and enroll it where it doesn’t know anybody” (I J lin.850ff). New organiza-
tional models such as ‘flexible’ and ‘age mixed’ school start are further to make: 
“the de-selection of the public school even harder compared to today where parents 
make the decision without ever having set foot in the school” (I J lin.837).  
Being accessible and telling the good stories is also crucial, District Z’ principal 
explains, and albeit it can be time-consuming, being proactive, taking the time to 
hear the concerns expressed by the parents, is all important in defusing potential 
conflicts. Simultaneously, it also brings with it opportunities for once again making 
parents aware of the practices and mindset of the school: “it’s worth having them 
say, ‘well I can always take it up with the principal; she’s always available’. I par-
ticipate in all meetings around school start; explaining who we are, verbalizing that 
we do a proper pedagogical and educational piece of work” (I K lin.613ff.). Getting 
the good stories out in the media is further vital and with the new ‘Children Villag-
es’, communication becomes more important than ever, District Z’ principal notes. 
Leading them even to consider if they should hire a person to handle the communi-
cation aspect of branding: “we’ve gone so far to seriously consider whether we can 
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afford this, given that we have a person on the board who we could hire 5 hours per 
week. We probably can’t, but we’re very aware of its importance (I K lin.622). 
In the focus on enrollments an essential aspect is ensuring that pupils remain until 
the end of 9
th
 grade. Traditions on boarding and private schools however are particu-
lar hard to break. Yet, as the older pupils are now gathered in the town departments 
sort of “junior high – youth environments” have been created; giving the young 
people an ‘aha experience’ otherwise only associated with the start of further educa-
tion thus making the public school more attractive (I J lin.944). The range of elec-
tives has further been widened with the merger of schools rendering also possible 
that specialized subjects are taught by teachers with subject-specific skills (I O.723). 
Motivating schools to develop attractive schooling for older pupils, the financial 
employee stresses, is a clear municipal strategy, which focuses on “bringing togeth-
er incentives by saying ‘if you want a lot of money to make an exciting school for the 
older pupils, you need to make sure you have a lot of pupils” (I O lin.196).  
The teachers play an important role in retaining and attracting pupils. Although high 
class averages from the perspective of the teachers is a complex issue, their mindset, 
a department head from District W notes, is slowly changing: “All haven’t funda-
mentally understood it yet, but most have…in the olden days there was always oppo-
sition when a new child arrived: ‘No, must we have a new kid’. It isn’t so today, but 
back then 25 years ago it was a huge problem…today it’s almost a gift”(I I 
lin.582ff.). Old patterns however are hard to break the financial employee notes: 
“Pupils and their parents are of course free to choose whether a boarding 
school is the right choice. But there is no reason for us to encourage them 
to do so. We’ve actually had examples where the management had to tell 
teachers to refrain from tapping pupils on the shoulder, asking if they 
aren’t contemplating [a boarding school], either because they’re fed up 
with them or so on. That just doesn’t work, because it’s simply draining 
funds right out the system and funds equal opportunities!”(I O lin.778ff.). 
The competitive situation further brings with it new challenges, District W’ depart-
ment head explains, e.g. in relation to how the increased choice of schools is used:  
“The challenge is pupils drippling around, go shopping from one district 
to the next, often carrying a lot of baggage with them. I strongly feel that 
if we had the opportunity, we could put a stop to this, because it isn’t in 
the interest of the child – thinking that problems can be solved better 
elsewhere. We would be very interested in working together, securing 
that the child remains where it is.” (I I lin.444ff) 
Unity and co-operation is however difficult and not naturally created in situations of 
great competition. The dilemma, District W’ principal explains, is “how can we 
help, and share knowledge and simultaneously uphold some business secrets?”(I J 
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lin.890). For her the dilemma was once manifested when she, along with the other 
schools, was invited to a meeting discussing a talent program with the local gymna-
sium. No one but her showed up and, she explains; “I have to admit, I asked no one 
else if they wanted to join, because it’s a sales point, I want the best ‘out-
schooling’“(I J lin.891). When however the local private school became interested 
she contacted one of the other public schools, because: “It isn’t good if [name of the 
private school] gets it and they don’t. So now we’re two schools offering it. Actually 
I thought ‘oh well the geographical distance means that we’re not really in competi-
tion anyway’. But as for the rest they don’t have to join in for my sake” (I J lin.909 
ff.). The management, District Z’ head of afterschool care explains, is walking on a 
tightrope: “competing over pupils, simultaneously being careful not to steal or profit 
on the expense of others. It’s a balancing act. But there isn’t any doubt that we try to 
tell the good stories so that they hopefully will come to us” (I L lin.710). Therefore, 
District W’ principal notes, the management must themselves also be managed: 
 “We try talking about them as our children, but there is a risk of sub-
optimization. So management of the principals is required. They have to 
managing us as a team, challenging us – are we doing this for personal 
gain or for the rest as well? Because you can of course always argue that 
‘it’s better that they enroll with me than with a private school’ – but that 
is somewhat a little pseudo argument” (I J lin.916ff.). 
14.3. MANAGING UNCERTANITY – ESTIMATIONS & RESTRAINT 
Besides being an indicator of quality, enrollment changes are also important due to 
their effect on the spending frame available by September. This prompts a focus on 
enrollments as a mean also to ensure a stable, sound base for planning and staffing. 
For District W’ principal, this entails being briefed when a pupil considers leaving 
the school: “For me it’s crucial that it doesn’t come as a surprise that we’ll be 10 
pupils less. Thus, we must be proactive towards the older pupils and their parents; 
how far are you in your plans? Creating a clearer picture of where we stand” (I J 
lin.162ff). With imprecise estimations comes namely the danger of overstaffing 
magnifying the associated backlash if things go wrong: 
“If a principal now is in a situation where he is surprised that there is 10 
pupils less than expected, then it’s really difficult to turn things 
around…When I had to do it here I simply had to lay-off more than was 
actually the plan, because with periods of notice of 3,6 9 months, it takes 
most of a year before you finish. You must go further than what an oper-
ating situation without a backlog would indicate.”(I J lin.221ff.) 
The fact that the funding is based on an average measure of salary, the principal 
explains, further spurs along the need to be innovative in the utilization of funds.  
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 “We look at the tasks at hand, ensuring firstly that the lessons fit, saying 
‘how many man-years do we need at the departments?’ Here we’re faced 
with a dilemma which isn’t related to the model being so pupil depend-
ent, but rather to the fact, that it’s also build on an average teacher salary. 
The model clearly states the lessons the particular class is to have, but lo-
cally I get the lessons at an average cost, based on the entire municipali-
ty. If I have teachers with longer-servings and a higher salary then it is 
somehow two different calculations; the lessons and the salary bill. These 
don’t always go together. It’s this jigsaw we try to solve in the spring. 
We want and must deliver that level of lessons” (I J lin.264ff.). 
From the administration’s point of view, the financial employee explains, the main 
task becomes that of ensuring that precise estimations are used by the schools for 
planning (I O lin.304). For District W’ principal, the planning process entails setting 
as precise a budget as possible, remembering to set aside funds for staff related mat-
ters such as substitutes. The goal, she explains, is to: “get estimations which hold up 
when we enter the accounting year. Maybe not cutting to the bone, but setting a 
budget which I think will last and will ensure that we aren’t forced to fire people 
over the course of the year” (I J lin.214ff). The fact that schools are conservative in 
the planning: “expecting 5 pupils more to leave, just in case [the financial employee 
explains] means that we actually have schools with too many funds set aside. We’ve 
a couple of schools with too much money in the bank” (I O lin.203ff). Although the 
new district structure at first affected the ability of the management to predict en-
rollment changes (I J lin.210 DW), the larger entities together with the devolvement 
of funds have prompted better resource utilization, the municipal manager notes. 
The larger units reduce fluctuations across years: “but I have to say that larger units 
are a precondition; otherwise there is too much money which doesn’t come into 
play. You can say it’s a downside of decentralization; it creates a lot of small pock-
ets in which funds can be set aside” (I N lin.266). 
Because there is no limit on how much funds the individual district is allowed to 
carry forward, large amounts have at times been brought forward. This, the depart-
ment head of District Z emphasizes, is problematic because they should in principle 
be spent on the children for whom they were intended. If not they should at least be 
earmarked to for example a: “playground, but then you must also act accordingly. 
Because this is the whole idea behind devolving funds, that they must be used this 
year, on these pupils and these employees” (I L lin.258ff). As a result, the financial 
employee explains, the challenge left at the hand of the local management becomes 
that of finding the correct level of staffing:  
 “firing is very expensive, there are periods of notice, hearings, holiday 
pays and so on…it’s just so vital that they aren’t hiring too many, actual-
ly it’s almost better if they are a bit on the lower side and then find a 
young person who can help them as a substitute if necessary. However 
you should not consistenty underbudget the size of staff because it’s nei-
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ther prudent practice to be in a constant shortfall, then you should proba-
bly just hire that extra teacher” (I O lin.304ff.). 
In District W, the department head explains, a top priority has been to utilize the 
staff already employed (I I lin.283). An important aspect, District Z’ principal em-
phasizes, is to make sure that “teachers are actually giving the required class hours; 
that they [the teacher’s working hours] don’t become blurred in all sorts of other 
activities”(I K lin.44). The teachers are further obliged to cover ‘planned’ or ab-
sence due to sickness if possible (I K in.52). In this context, the department head 
from District W explains, the use of substitutes for ‘planned’ absence, where the 
teacher is out of the school receiving training or participating in school trips, is a 
prominent focus point (I I lin.77). The development of ‘flexible planning’, which 
brings with it different schedules from week-to-week, is here a vital tool to reduce 
planned absence. On top of the educational advantages associated with being able to 
establish condensed project weeks, flexible planning has in District W reduced the 
use of external substitutes substantially (I I lin. 123).  
The funding model brings with it another challenge in relation to the number of man 
years set aside for management in the allocation. The district as a whole, District W’ 
principal explains, is allotted only 3.4 man years. But with four members on the 
management team she herself has to teach an elective- Albeit this subject is not 
normally offered in the public school and therefore can be used positively in the 
promotion of the ‘out-schooling’ it takes time away from her main task as a princi-
pal, and this is worrisome: “I’m not sure it provides better quality management wise 
or educationally for that matter. I think it’s fun and I want to do it. But I’m not sure 
I actually become a better leader by not doing it full-time. Not being accessible at 
all times because I’m teaching” (I J lin. 390ff). The teachers, District Z’ principal 
explains, are further slowly becoming aware of the tight financial situation and this 
affects the way they approach her with new ideas. Illustrated for example in a situa-
tion during the spring where the physics teachers came to her with a proposal for 
new needed books; “which hadn’t been affordable. But they’d figured out that if 
they were frugal, with a small contribution from me, they would be able to buy one 
set now and the other next year, and then, ‘maybe in 3 years they would have 
enough for a book’” (I K lin.502ff) and because the school at the time had some 
unspent funds set aside she decided to respond favorable to the request. Overall, it is 
essential to be aware of what is in effect driving cost, District W’ principal stresses, 
and albeit “firing is never easy” staff constitutes the main driver. Thus, “I always 
become a ‘bit’, when other municipalities’ principals say they can’t afford school 
camps. It’s not these 900-, pr. pupil which is expensive, it’s the employees. But it’s 
always these 900-, which are axed”. This is problematic, she emphasizes: “apropos 
of what’s understood as quality, then school camps are valuable. Objectively it 
might seem a bit laughable, my god its only two weeks out of a 10 year school pro-
cess, but what is it you remember yourself? It’s these camps” (I J 1085ff). 
PART IV   MUNICIPALITY B                                                   PRACTICING SCHOOL MANAGEMENT IN MUNICIPALITY B 
233 
14.4. RETHINKING SCHOOLING IN A POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Political decision-making, District Z’ principal explains, affects the content of and 
the setting in which teaching is given. IT is an especially illustrative example of how 
politicians have;”set the agenda, almost unconsciously, that we must have more IT, 
and wupti wapti we all have IT. It’s a huge expense and all classes now have new E-
boards”. Such swift decisions, she notes, have “major spill-over effects on our core 
service, and I’m not completely sure that it has been thoroughly thought through, 
how huge this revolution actually is (I K lin.676). With the wish to integrate more IT 
into the teaching comes namely a range of implicit changes of how teaching is to be 
conducted affecting not only the content of the teaching but also the teachers: 
“Suddenly all employees are handed out computers and expected to teach 
using an interactive whiteboard. This is some demand. There’s Mrs. Jen-
sen who, within memory of man, has had the most beautiful handwriting 
and now she has no black board, but a pen for an interactive board…I 
think this will have a much larger effect than expected”(I K 685) 
Another example of how political decisions influence the situation is the introduc-
tion of district management. At the one hand, the decision-making scope brought 
forward is widened. The drawback however is that of being also responsible for 
smaller departments, which due to their geographical location are rarely self-
financing (I J lin.367ff). This creates a dilemma, the department head from District 
W explains, because subsidizing the smaller departments is not a viable long-term 
solution; “Simultaneously however, we can’t leave them behind. We have to make 
sure they work” (I I lin.175). Thus, the principal of District W explains, where the 
prior model, compensating the schools for the number of classes established, also 
gave preferential treatment to smaller schools, district management now means that 
this decision is placed locally: 
The bigger departments with larger class averages do finance the ones 
with lower. This was also so before. But then it was just individual 
schools and I never saw the money, because they were allotted by the 
administration. Now I have them and I’ve to distribute them further until 
we adapt to the new structure by e.g. co-teaching across year groups. We 
do this for educational but also for control-related reasons (I J lin.137ff.).  
Albeit district management has opened up for teachers teaching in more depart-
ments, the drop in pupil numbers, the principal continuous, may imply that such 
measures are not sufficient: “the long-term quality is threatened. I can say that they 
[the teachers] must teach there one lesson three times a week and then drive back. I 
can do that, it’s my right. But it just doesn’t add up. It’ll be more expensive and of 
inferior quality” (I K lin.535). The lower pupil numbers, the financial employee 
concurs, constitute a vast challenge, manifested especially in the efficiency by which 
the existing building stock can be run. The fixed expenses tied up in buildings, 
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cleaning and management remain the same, she notes, regardless of pupil numbers: 
“the proportion of fixed costs makes up an ever more vast part of the cost pr. pu-
pil…we’ve a lot tied up in buildings, dead money we call it, as it’s not necessarily 
something from which the individual child benefits (I O lin.427). With the strong 
political desire to continue offering local services, in times of dropping pupils num-
bers, this become problematic, District Z’ principal explains: “how can we give them 
something which approximately correspond to decent teaching and gives scope for 
social leeway? My god it’s 40 children in total across 3rd, 4th, and 5th grade, how 
exciting to be a teenager! (I K lin.530). Because enrollments are not always easily 
influenced the quality of service delivered can come to depend on the geographical 
placement of the school: 
“You aren’t always in a situation where you can affect enrollments…thus 
we can end up in a situation where we have really, really different condi-
tions – which I’m not a big fan of – where if I’m really cleaver I can 
pinch pupils. For me this isn’t what public schooling is about… Home 
addresses shouldn’t matter; local touches are of course okay. But when it 
comes to lessons, then it’s something which I don’t think should be dif-
ferent, but it’s becoming a reality and that is why I focus on saying: 
‘okay, which cleaver pedagogical solutions can we make?’”(K lin.194ff). 
For District Z’ principal it is however clear that decisions on school closure are 
political;”It’s not for me to decide. I can present the hard facts and I do this to the 
school board by saying: ‘we have a bottle neck and here is the problem’. I can come 
up with suggestions and then it’s for the political system to decide” (I K lin. 789). 
School closure, the head of after-school care notes, is a contentious issue which 
requires political courage: “My hope was that they, this time around, would have 
drawn the conclusion and closed the schools needed, instead of applying the ‘salami 
technique’…instead we’re now slowly killing ourself” (I L lin. 773). Similar con-
cerns are raised by the financial employee: 
“There are many feelings involved and it takes a lot of guts to make such 
decisions, because it’s almost easier to say; ’okay then, we’ll leave it as it 
is’. This will give you many pats on the back; ‘Yes, you have listened to 
the communities ect.’ It takes courage to look ahead saying: ‘well with 
the pupil numbers we have this isn’t realistic’” (I O lin.626ff) 
As a result, the principal of District W explains, it becomes essential to make the 
problem areas visible to the management team and although the departments are to 
be understood as a unified whole a valuable tool is to make separate department 
accounts. These not only elucidate the problems, but the surrounding discussions 
may create a common understanding of the challenges facing the district:”I meet 
with them on a regular basis in order to stress that we’re one school. We can’t have 
one department consuming all resources. We keep emphasizing this and I challenge 
the local heads on why pupils are leaving (I J lin.424ff.). Having the support of the 
PART IV   MUNICIPALITY B                                                   PRACTICING SCHOOL MANAGEMENT IN MUNICIPALITY B 
235 
school board is in this context of utmost importance for District Z’ principal and: 
”luckily the school board is sympathetic to the fact that it’s a business enterprise 
we’re running; one school. If one department is not financially viable the other one 
will not be either (I K lin. 528ff.). Establishing the sense of a unified school is how-
ever a longitudinal process requiring the merger of different cultures and traditions; 
“There’s so much tradition, culture and feelings” District Z’ principal explains 
“and how is the town to survive if it doesn’t have a local school? (I K lin.526).   
Class-sizes, District W’ principal explains, are here important and the main way: “in 
which we can make the most out of our funds” (I J lin.310). These efforts are spurred 
along by the decreasing pupil numbers, bringing with it a more long-term focus; 
“it’s about looking ahead. Seeing how we can make it work now, but also how do we 
think things will look next year?” (I J lin.324). At times, pedagogical concerns how-
ever trump. Following the merger the new 9
th
 grades for example remained un-
touched: “we thought, or the school board decided, that because of the upcoming 
finals educational concerns weighted more heavy. But we did this with open eyes, 
knowing that it costs 1½ full-time position” (I J lin.314). Geographical concerns 
may though act as a barrier for establishing efficient class sizes: If I should optimize 
fully, then I would be forced to move kids from one department to another, and this, 
parents aren’t keen about. So there are limits to how far optimizations can go on the 
specific class level.” The management is thus faced with the choice; retain the pupil 
at the expense of inefficient class averages:  
“I might be able to say: ‘well let’s just make one class’. This would be 
the least extensive, and I might have to move 5 children each year to the 
other department. In my opinion this would mean that some would de-
select the school, and I would afterall rather have them with me. Again 
I’m dependent on pupil numbers, so as long as they are retained in my 
fold I’ll have more freedom. If they enroll in another public or private 
school I reduce my own scope, so it becomes a tradeoff” (I J lin.363ff.) 
Since pupil numbers decrease across classes and grade levels the efforts are compli-
cated. New ways of thinking about classes and teaching, moving away from tradi-
tional age-based classes, District W’ principal notes, are thus needed:  
“Our focus is on looking across grade levels. An example: I have roughly 
30 kids on each grade level in [name of the department] this is a rotten 
number. It’s too much for one class and far too little for two. Well it’s 
not way too much it’s too much the gap up to 44 where it balances is too 
wide. But instead if I look at 0,1
st
, 2
nd
 together I have 100 pupils. Right 
now I have roughly 6 classes, which is far too costly, but looking across I 
would be able to make 4 appropriate groups” (I J lin.339ff.) 
Albeit such initiatives cannot be established as permanent classes there is a political 
acceptance for making such arrangement on a more loosely basis combining it also 
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with other initiatives such as ‘rolling school-start’. Educationally however these 
initiatives constitute a complete paradigm shift in the teachers’ methodology: “be-
cause when a pupil starts at the age of 6 you aren’t able to say: ‘today we all learn 
about the letter A’. Because there might sit an eight-year-older who is reading Har-
ry Potter” (I J lin.856).  Because such initiatives furthermore can create problems 
when channeling children into the middle’ school grades the principal of District Z 
contemplates handing in an application for a continuation of the division; “it could 
solve the problems of class-sizes, but also we think it will be profitable educationally 
for the children, being together with someone who is just a tat further, isn’t as old or 
gifted”(I K lin.257ff). Albeit mainly used in the smaller departments the decrease in 
pupil numbers, District W’ principal notes, even spurs along such initiatives in the 
larger departments making the changes somewhat driven; “on the grounds of financ-
es. But it’s not only budgetary driven, because we also find it interesting from an 
educational perspective: what happens when we have kids at the age of 6 and 8 in 
the same group, are they able to learn from each other?” (I J lin. 353). 
The introduction of ‘Children Villages’ constitutes a new opportunity to counter the 
effects of decreasing pupil numbers. But with it also comes a necessity to rethink 
services establishing a closer co-operation between day-care and schools and the 
different professions employed here. Locating the daycare and kindergarten facilities 
in the same buildings as the school and after school services the Children Villages, 
the sector head explains, bring along the opportunity for “the specialized and gen-
eral environment [to be] located in the same cadastre, with a management team 
responsible for all children (I M lin.328) and with the children enrolled into: a sort 
of unbroken process which will make the selection of the public school natural and 
the choice of a private school that more difficult. We create this cohesion from 
which it is difficult to break out” (I M lin.390). Locally, the head of afterschool 
service explains, these new initiatives are eagerly awaited: 
It’s important for the smaller kids to be close to their home-environment, 
so it makes sense to have 0,1
st
, 2
nd
 in [department name]. Our challenge 
is to create sound services because this isn’t the case if we have just one 
class in a ‘ghost school’. So could we imagine it being placed in the af-
terschool-building with the rest of the buildings sold off? Or could we 
imagine taking the group, which almost makes up a class, placing them 
in the preschool class room? I don’t know, but we’re busy, trying to 
come up with innovative ideas (I L lin.789ff.). 
14.5. INCLUSION – A CHANGE IN MINDSET 
Creating teaching environments which are educationally and socially inclusive is a 
top priority, District Z’ head of afterschool care notes. Successful inclusion however 
requires a unified pedagogy and a new mindset affecting the approach taken towards 
children and their parents; “We speak about them in a more inclusive manner. 
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There’s still some way to go before all employees get past the story about: ‘her 
brother was also like that, and moreover I think and so on’, all these ‘I feel’ and ‘I 
think’”(I L lin.474). Successful inclusion, the department head from District W con-
curs, to a great extent comes down to how children are approached and the type of 
co-operation created with the parents: “rather than just coming up with a number of 
hours of support. The mechanism is always the same; it sounds like any of the 5 
worst in any class, when a boy is said to need extra support” (I I lin.381ff.). As a 
result the management themselves have been instrumental in needs being upheld and 
with it for how support was given. Creating expectations among parents, like:“if 
Oliver gets this type of support or an IT-backpack all problems will be solved. In-
stead of looking at Oliver in a different light, perhaps demanding something from 
how he behaves”(I I lin.405), support had become a sort of quick-fix solution: 
“The culture was that the second someone was perceived to be taxing 
support was needed and all would be fine. Thus, you create need, often 
completely unreflective and without moving anything at all…I’ve no-
ticed a certain up-keeping of problems, where instead of challenging the 
children, they are shielded off from ‘what they are not’…of course there 
are children where it’s an irreconcilable task [including them in the gen-
eral environment]. But I think much support would be superfluous if we 
just looked differently at the pupils’ problems. There are many self-
fulfilling prophecies where the need is almost self-created” (I I lin.409ff.) 
Changing the mindset on inclusion and of how needs are most appropriately met has 
been a a vital municipal concern, the sector head explains, and the intention has been 
to say: “some kids may face more challenges than others, but they’re completely 
normal children, and this we must be able to handle in the general environment by 
for example having pedagogues with motion, movements and speech skills, you 
name it” (I M.136). Inclusion thus inverts the process, the municipal manager ex-
plains, requiring the starting point to be that of “not sending pupils away, but ‘what 
can we do locally to succeed?’” (I N.91). Inclusion is thus closely linked to educa-
tion quality, in that, inclusion ensures that the education is given; “as close to the 
general environment of the child as possible, both geographically but also function-
ally. Quality is also the creation of learning environments where differences are 
appreciated” (I N.198). The latter is important, she stresses, because “if too many 
different education environments are established where all are alike, a lot more 
societal and structural problems are likely to be created (I N lin.201ff.). 
The larger financial scope given to the schools has paved way for new solutions to 
be created and enabled the management to act much faster; a precondition for suc-
cessful inclusion as noted by the department head from District W: “because there is 
no doubt that much exclusion can be avoided if we act in due time and in the right 
manner (I I lin.361). Following the legislative amendment, the sector head explains, 
resources and lessons are no longer so closely tied to the specific child (I M lin. 
71ff), which means that support may be used more broadly on the larger group. 
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Importantly, the municipal manager notes, it is now the responsibility of the man-
agement to decide when and how resources are to be spent “in 6A where Sofia is. 
And then it’s not because Sofia is there and her mom will not receive a letter saying: 
‘Sofia has been allotted 7 lessons of support’.” Rather a more comprehensive plan 
must be developed so that the letter instead explains “that a plan for Sofia has been 
made and an extra resource has been allotted to Sofia’ group or class, with the 
overall goal of this or that (I N lin.478ff.). This, the head of after school care in 
District Z explains, constitutes a shift in how and when support is given: 
 “We’ve inverted it by saying: individual support does not exist, cyber-
netic pedagogy is out…Support is given to the group, and then the child; 
opening up for the child to get help when needed. Unless the child is in a 
wheelchair, blind or deaf, no one needs constant support. The special 
needs assistant should thus therefore not always be present, giving the 
child the opportunity to take of this ‘overcoat’. Instead there might be 
other children in need of help (I L lin.486ff.). 
Diagnoses, District W’ principal notes, are thus no longer decisive factors for sup-
port to start, in fact: “I try short-circuiting the process, saying ‘let’s allocate more 
resources to the class. It isn’t important whether Victor has ADHD or not.” From a 
parental point of view this may be difficult to understand.Yet, the principal explains: 
 “We have done this in relation to pupils with reading and writing disa-
bilities. Prior, our reading instructor thoroughly tested – a precondition 
for triggering an IT-backpack. Today, all our computers come with a 
program for children needing things to be read aloud. We never say no, 
because there’s no reason to do so. If we think it’ll help, then we don’t 
need a 10 hour reading test. Let’s just test if the kid may profit from the 
computer. It’s actually cheaper giving them a 3000-, computer than hav-
ing our reading instructor perform 10 hours of testin followed by a com-
prehensive program. So it’s about looking at the money, saying: ‘hold on 
to your coins but let the pennies roll’. A computer is chattels compared to 
man hours. It’s a constant balance” (I J lin.709ff.). 
Support is instead allotted by the management on a quarterly basis followed by as-
sessments on “finances, but also in terms of quality and the specific effort. The child 
may require more help at certain times or situations. Other times they work in ways 
which reduces this need. In this way it’s closely tied to our objective of a flexible 
school” the municipal manager explains (I N lin.478ff.). This approach, District W’ 
principal notes, has opened up for:“extra resources to be used in new manners or 
instead being saved for times where it’s important that Nicklas sits still on his chair. 
This gives larger flexibility, both in a broader perspective and for the individual 
team” (I J lin.685ff.). The devolvement of funds, District Z’ principal explains, has 
thus been instrumental in shifting the management’s perception of inclusion, yet: 
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”I think it’s a combination. Partly because we’ve been given wider finan-
cial scope but also it’s a question of attitude. We’ve seen a change in 
leadership on multiple levels parallel with the change in attitude. Several 
pedagogues and teachers have been trained to make it possible. It has 
been verbalized that this is what is expected of the public school. So 
many elements have affected the new mindset and finances are of course 
one of them” (I K lin.399ff.). 
Inclusion, the principal of District W concurs, is not a given with the devolvement of 
funds, because: “it’s also due to our existing practice; our inclusive and apprecia-
tive approach and the fact that our volume is large” (I J lin.690ff.). Rethinking what 
support is and where it is to be given is further not a straight forward process, but 
requires the backing of both teachers and parents. The narrative must be turned 
around and with it also the way in which the parents are viewed. From seeing them 
as annoying and loud, the parents, the municipal manager notes, must become an 
involved part, in that it: “means a lot in terms of prevention. They must always be 
included. The plan of action states what the school is to do, what the child is to focus 
on and how the parents are to support these efforts. Because we can’t do it without 
their support (I N lin.520ff.). The parents, the after-school head explains, must in 
turn let go of the deeply-rooted understanding that diagnoses are triggers of support, 
thereby decoupling the tight connection between inclusion, support and diagnoses: 
“It’s a challenge to make parents understand that ‘precisely my child 
with Asperger’s isn’t to be enrolled in a special needs school. I’ve also 
sat down with parents who complained: ‘he got 12 lessons last year and 
now he only gets 8’. We need to turn it around, saying ‘well the goal is 
that your child comes to suffice without support… because no parents 
want their child to be in need for the rest of their life if they in any way 
can learn to make do without” (I L lin.482ff.). 
The fear of complaints, following the first devolvement of responsibility, has shown 
itself to be unfounded. Because decisions and dialogues, the municipal manager 
explains, now take place much closer to the child and parents, these become more 
involved, compared to: “before where it was those people at the administration who 
had decided something. This made it easier to complain. Now it’s ‘my child’s prin-
cipal, I’ve been involved and can actually understand the decision and have confi-
dence in it” (I N lin.83ff.). As with the children inclusion also entails not focusing 
exclusively on the parents of the children with special needs. Rather the whole group 
of parents must be included. Although these do not have a say in whether inclusion 
is sought for a particular child their concerns must be taken serious, the afterschool 
head explains. Because if not it can lead to the child being excluded anyway: 
“It’s extremely important to be aware of things brewing or starting on 
‘intra’. It must be taken seriously and parents must be contacted immedi-
ately so to hear their concerns – which are often well-founded…because 
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it’s important that it’s safe to go here. We of course have to explain all 
the advantages of having these kids here – what they bring, profiting all 
further in life. My experience is that if we take it seriously they lower 
their shoulders. But if we don’t, they become frustrated and start talking 
without us…we’ve been forced to move a child to a special offer because 
the parent group simply excluded the child and its parents so that we 
were left with no other choice” (I L lin.601ff.).  
Inclusion, District Z’ principal explains, is difficult and it is a challenge to make 
“diversity and inclusion profitable for all. We still have a tendency to say ‘Hugo hit 
Sofia again, so Hugo must go’. It’s an art form to get to where the child can stay 
part of the class. When they’re first there, I don’t feel that they are dissociated by 
the parents (I K lin.762ff.). Conveying the merits of inclusion to the teachers may be 
difficult, the municipal manager notes. She is often met with the attitude that inclu-
sion is just a new way of cutting cost: “then I’ve to repeat: ‘No it’s a conscious 
funding model. We’ve to be aware of how we spend funds, how they are best used 
for the kids’. Actually I don’t think it’s so wrong talking about finances. It’s a part of 
a broader quality debate” (I N lin.364ff). Teacher support, the head of after-school 
care stresses, is however all important and entails training and equipping the teach-
ers with the needed competences for meeting a more diverse set of needs: “I think 
there will always be teachers and pedagogues saying; ‘this is an immeasurable 
task’. But the question is whether it stems from the child being difficult or from the 
individual employee not being sufficiently equipped (I L lin139). In gaining the sup-
port of the teachers District Z’ principal focuses on making visible the: “extra re-
source at the start of the year and then help them organize and use it. This is a great 
managerial task for our department heads and in the long run I think it will lead to 
fewer internal referrals” (I J lin.749ff.). Yet, although two-teacher arrangements and 
experts with specialized knowledge have consulted the individual teams inclusion, 
the municipal manager explains, remains a challenge: 
“I acknowledge that resources are under pressure and that we face a vast 
diversity task, because it’s not enough to teach the middle group hoping 
that the academic talented will find ways to challenge themselves, and 
the weaker likewise. We must be able to apply differentiated teaching 
while the funding for the general environment is under pressure…We 
have to start thinking about learning environments as something else than 
the traditional class. Otherwise we’ll not succeed” (I N lin.385ff.). 
14.6. INCLUSION & EXCLUSION – WHERE ARE THE PUPILS? 
“Without doubt it’s most advantageous for the home-district to retain their own 
children. Getting the power over which services are to be provided, but also over the 
costs” (I O lin.533). So explicates the financial employee the main rationale behind 
the decision that the funding object for special educational funds is home-addresses 
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and not enrollments. Being financial liable for pupils enrolled elsewhere has 
prompted a focus on ensuring that district pupils enroll in the local school, the de-
partment head from District W explains. It has “opened our eyes to how many pupils 
are actually receiving services…pupils we didn’t know belonged to our school. 
You’re mainly preoccupied with those who’re here and not the ones who could have 
been here” (I I lin.340). At times, District Z’ principal explains, the management 
find themselves in situations where they are forced to accept initiatives or referrals 
without really having a say in the matter. “If the child isn’t at my school, I have no 
say at all. It’s difficult when you don’t know the background. So you have to trust 
others that when they make a referral it’s actual needed” (I K lin.369ff.). Actively 
objecting in such situations is impossible; “and it wouldn’t be decent if I said ‘you 
know what, forget those 12 lessons. Come home and we’ll take a look at it’. That 
doesn’t measure up. So I’ve to pay until the bitter end; with the expectation that only 
children in needs are in the system” (I K lin.388ff.). 
That the decoupling of responsibilities should tempt someone to assign superfluous 
support to a specific pupil is, from the perspective of the head of after-school care, 
both unacceptable and not likely: “if another leader says that this child needs sup-
port, then it’s so. I don’t believe that anyone would charge other schools without 
cause. We haven´t caught any in doing so. I think it’s the mutual respect. It’s theft. I 
don’t believe anyone would do it” (I L lin.516ff). An internal survey has however 
showed that children receiving support are more likely to be enrolled outside the 
home-district. The financial employee explains: “I can’t remember if it was twice or 
three times as likely compared to children not in need of special support” (I O lin. 
519). Prior, she continuous, there was a general feeling that some children were sort 
of passed around [challenge cup, vandrepokal] with the attitude that “maybe it would 
be better if Peter found service offer at the neighboring school” (I O lin.523ff.). By 
having made the home-district financial responsible, including the principals in the 
broader decision-making process the administration hopes to have put a stop to this. 
Locally however the perception is that the financial liable principal is not always 
included. If consulted, District Z’ principal explains: it is often of a mere informa-
tive nature: “Our agreement is that we should consult each other. Let me put it like 
this; we’re practicing. In reality I can only say ‘oh’ when a school tells me that a 
child from my district needs a reading class. ‘Oh well 115,000 in total, you’re wel-
come, hope it’ll help her’”(I K lin.349ff.).  
It is clearly stated that the home-district principal must be consulted when decisions 
affecting the financial commitments of the school are taken. Yet, this does not al-
ways happen and this, the financial employee explains, is a mistake: “They might not 
have the educational knowledge into the child. But they’re financially responsible. 
Hence they must be a part of the decision. I understand the frustration that arises if 
looking at your account ‘Hey! I had 200.000 more last month, what happened?” (I 
O lin.479ff.). The local budgetary scope, District Z’ principal explains, is greatly 
influenced by having home-district pupils enrolled elsewhere and it; “would proba-
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bly have looked different if we’d had them from the beginning…we would probably 
have referred some. But with the educational experience we have today I’m sure we 
would’ve been able to include some” (I K lin.369ff.). Prior attitudes and approaches 
to special needs education thus affect current operations, reducing the funds availa-
ble for new initiatives at the schools. Yet, the principal stresses, as the situation is 
now: 
“I just have to accept: ‘well it’ll be really great when I don’t have to pay 
250,000-, out of house’. If I could retain the funds with the same number 
of pupils, ‘whoosh! What couldn’t we do!’ So at the moment I hope that 
what we have done in the in-schooling with minus 250,000-, will contin-
ue into the middle-school forms so that we’ll not be forced to send more 
pupils away” (I K lin.405ff.) 
With the devolvement of funds and the renewed attitude towards inclusion ‘exclu-
sions’ in the in-schooling have been avoided. Bettering the financial situation of the 
school. Swift and more tailored services have been established, leading to a further 
rethinking about the interplay between the general and special needs areas.  
”A quick calculation says: if a teacher costs 450,000, I would within my 
4.5 million-, budget for special needs education, be able to hire another 
10. I have 30 now so I would be able to hire one third more if we’re able 
to include all pupils in the general environment. This is of course utopian 
because not all can be included. Nevertheless a lot of money is in 
play…this entail rethinking inclusion so it also encompasses being taught 
in other settings with another type of staff, in the local community, being 
included here instead of being gathered centrally” (I K lin.865ff.).  
The pursuit of inclusion regardless of any economics advantageous associated with 
it, the principal of District W emphasizes, must however never mean that all pupils 
are sought included or that already referred pupils are brought back for that reason: 
 “I don’t look at these funds thinking: ‘I’ve to take back these kids the 
day after tomorrow, and then I’ll have the funds available here’. I’m 
very, very aware that the law makes me responsible for ensuring that the 
individual child gets the right offer. So my strategy is not to take all chil-
dren back … rather it’ll be that of preventing i.e. confining the number of 
pupils who are referred, so that it’ll only be when I think it’s the only 
sound solution for the child, when all other options have been exhausted. 
Here economics must of course not stand in the way” (I J lin.655ff.). 
That inclusion must not be perused at all costs is also emphasized by the head of 
after-school care. Finances, she argues, must never supersede the meeting of actual 
needs. If a pupil is to be re-included the school must make sure that the services “are 
at least as good as the one in which the child is in now. Otherwise keep the hands 
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off. One thing is that you’re able to supply a sound service, but are you also able to 
give the needed level of safety? (I L lin.544ff.). In her district this dilemma appeared 
when a family was interested in having their child re-included in the general envi-
ronment. On the one hand “we were thinking: ‘how great it would be to take him 
back – 170,000 down our pocket’. At the same time however it raised the question 
of “whether we would actually be able to rise to the challenge with the 170,000, 
because this isn’t even enough to hire one teacher” (I L lin.591ff). Such decisions 
are dangerous to embark on; “you don’t send kids away, just to bring them back. If 
we’re to refer pupils then it’s what we’re going to do” (I L lin.545), further noting: 
“All research and evidence tells us that included academically weak pu-
pils are able to suffice fairly good in the in-school. But they lose their 
grip in the middle grades and especially in the older. This is when they’re 
really left behind, because socially these kids also become a challenge 
for the other pupils and then they will be excluded anyway…so it’s cata-
strophic to take back pupils and then just re-exclude them all over again 
two years later. This we won’t do, not even for 170,000-,. We are talking 
about pupils. Then rather get a deficit on the frame (I L lin.545ff.). 
Another obstacle in the context of matching needs and services is created by the 
division of responsibilities among districts and the administration. Since all external-
ly supplied special needs services are paid by the administration, the individual 
district bears no financial costs when a pupil is referred to such services. This, the 
municipal manager notes, creates inexpediencies closely corresponding to those 
sparking the first devolvement of special needs funds: “Budgetary and education-
related responsibilities aren’t linked. When a child has so severe needs that local 
services have difficulties in matching it, then the management are left with few op-
tions as the funds for acquiring external services are retained centrally” (I N 
lin.58ff.). The decoupling of responsibilities in fact makes it beneficial for the 
school to refer a a child to these external services. This, accordingly to the municipal 
manager, creates an increasingly strong pressure for ‘exclusions’ as was revealed 
after the visitation-process had ended in the spring: 
”A pattern emerged after we finalized the visitation in January/February. 
We drew-up the budget and devolved the funds – a more comprehensive 
devolvement than last year. Then additional referrals to the external ser-
vices began ticking in. As we don’t want to take back funds it actually 
meant that we had underfunded the central frame for external services. 
This behavior is adverse, albeit perhaps understandable.” (I N lin.287ff.) 
The decreasing pupil numbers further magnifies the increased pressure for exclu-
sions to take place. The special need schools she notes:  
“are under pressure and are looking for business. This comes to the ears 
of the parents, and there is, in a way, no incentive for the schools to 
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counter this pressure. If the school has a child in a local service the cost 
is 200,000, but if it can be argued that the needs of the child will be bet-
ter met in one of the external special schools then the school bears no 
cost. You might say, I’m rude accusing them of thinking in terms of 
budgets. But of course they do. This inexpediency we have to set a stop 
to” (I N lin.67ff.). 
That the special needs schools are turning on the charm, thereby creating pressure 
from the parents “now that a seat has opened up. Why can’t my child get it?” (I O 
lin.103), is in the eyes of the municipal manager problematic: 
 “Yesterday we had a case where a special school for pupils with autism 
simply announced open house in the paper. A mother and her son went 
there and got the impression: ‘Wow this is exactly what we want’… But 
we know we’re able to arrange something which means that he wouldn’t 
have to be excluded at the age of 15. It is completely outrageous because 
they make it seem as if there is open enrolment here also” (I N.lin.313ff). 
Also the scaling back of services, when these are no longer needed, is complicated 
by the decoupling. In a situation where a child had finished treatment in a residential 
institution and was ready to be re-included in a local services, it: “actually constitut-
ed a financial challenge [the municipal manager explains]…because suddenly a bill 
had to be given to the principal because the child of course still needed some help 
and this was now to be paid by the school” (I N lin.95ff.). Such situations have 
speeded up the process for a new funding model, the financial employee notes: 
“we’ve been forced to think in a second generation model…Maybe we’re not devel-
oping our own offers quickly enough. Nevertheless the process is definitely being 
turbocharged in order to ensure that schools have the needed funds to react” (I O 
lin.188ff.). Albeit it has led to some inexpediency the two parted devolvement of 
funds has, according to the municipal manager, not been unfruitful: 
“Actually I think the decision to make the process two parted was good. 
The schools have become familiar with it, and it has improved the gen-
eral skills in terms of decision-making. This is vital, because the princi-
pals get a new set of responsibilities and are forced to make decisions af-
fecting the lives of these more vulnerable kids too. This means they must 
be better equipped both legally and managerially” (I N lin.73ff.).  
14.7. CONCLUSION: PRACTICE AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
The account presented above has tried to capture how school management is prac-
ticed in Municipality B. Visualizing how education and budgetary concerns are 
balanced against each other, creating a potential tension between the two, when 
managerial decisions are to be made. As in the first field study, this concluding part 
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of the chapter will analyze the actual practice in light of the political objectives (see 
Chapter 12) discussing the actual accomplishment of these as presented in the mu-
nicipality’s Result Status and Quality Report for the school year 2012/13. 
The tension between budgetary and education-related concerns is present in the 
political objectives, with indicators of success expressed as ‘educational competenc-
es’, ‘digitalization’, ‘inclusion’, ‘learning’ and ‘competences and collaboration’, in 
the end measured through the objective that 95% of the pupils are to fulfill further 
education. Simultaneously stressing the importance of ensuring efficient utilization 
of resources. The actual position of the formula funding model in the upper right 
quadrant of Figure 13.3 indicates that incentives for quality and efficiency are to 
stem from both the fairly high budgetary risk and the even higher level of competi-
tive pressure. With respect to inclusion and productivity, the latter improved through 
high enrollments, direct incentives are given by the model, whereas for the rest there 
are no direct financial incentives. Rather, these are to be achieved through the wide 
local autonomy scope, combined with the effect of the fairly high budgetary risk and 
the consequences of competition and that of being held accountable through the 
publishing and monitoring of performance. The main lever for achieving the politi-
cal goals is thus the devolvement of funds. Not only is this to equip the management 
with the needed financial scope, enabling them to meet the needs of the pupils bet-
ter, but it is also seen as a precondition for encouraging different educational pro-
files. Again, the budget is not to act as a straight jacket on management actions but 
rather as a tool enabling them to use their local knowledge to achieve both budgetary 
and education-related objectives.  
The account highlights how inclusion is given top priority by the local management. 
Elucidating however that it in reality constitutes a vast challenge for teachers, chil-
dren and management. The capitation payment approach applied to allocate special 
educational funds at the outset removes the link between local decisions on needs 
and the subsequent size of funding, bringing forward incentives for ‘prevention’ and 
cost control. At least for pupils enrolled in the home-distinct school. Diagnoses of 
needs are now no longer a precondition for help to be established for pupils with less 
severe needs. Due to the ban on the establishment of local special needs classes, 
funds for special educational services can only be spent on acquiring services in one 
of the jointly run special needs classes, for locally established inclusive efforts or for 
paying services given to district pupils enrolled elsewhere. The distribution of risk 
gives the management a clear incentive to include pupils in local services, in that, 
this will ensure funds to be kept within the district budget to be spent at the full 
discretion of the management. Such undertakings are as discussed subjected to the 
danger that needed services will not be established. Especially because the distribu-
tion of risk entails that all fluctuations in needs has to be met within the fixed budget 
and as services given to pupils elsewhere must be paid straight away.  
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Importantly, the account showed how adverse behavioral responses were created in 
the context of special educational services, in that, the choice of funding object in 
combination with the division of responsibilities created critical decoupling of edu-
cation and budgetary responsibilities. Textbox 14.1 contains relevant results, taken 
from the municipality’s Quality Report for the school year 2012/13, on the external-
ly provided special educational services. From 2012/13 to 2013/14 the proportion of 
pupils, referred to the special needs services, rose from 5.1% to 5.4% (12 extra pu-
pils). Leading to a substantial pressure on the central municipal budget set aside to 
cover these services. For the school year 2013/14 this is expected to result in budget 
overruns amounting to approximately 4.8 million DDK. 
Increased pressure on the municipal frame for special educational services. The proportion of pupils 
‘excluded’ to external services has increased and more than expected have been referred to special 
needs schools. On top of this more pupils than expected have been referred to external services after 
having been enrolled in internally supplied municipal special needs services.  
 
The school districts have experienced unforeseen expenditures after the referring committee has cho-
sen a local service, rather than an external service. Likewise some districts have further endured extra 
cost for pupil coming back after finishing treatment in external special needs services. 
- Textbox 14.1   External special needs education, school year 2012/13. Source: 
Quality Report 2012/13 (05. 11.13, head 84) and Result Status 4 2013 (covers also 
the first part of the school year 2013/14) (05. 11.13, head 84;86). 
The account clarifies why such behavior occurs. Firstly, the choice of funding object 
and the division of responsibilities leads to a decoupling for pupils enrolled outside 
the home-district, giving rise to potential attempts for up-coding these to inclusive-
seeking or special needs education services provided in the district. Incentives which 
are especially prevalent as these types of support more and more are given to the 
group and not the individual child. Albeit the home-district is to be consulted when 
decisions on more comprehensive services are made the account highlighted how 
this is often not the case. Resulting in grave frustration.  
Secondly, a decoupling was also created for pupils enrolled in externally provided 
special needs schools, in that, the ‘enrollment-school’ if ‘successful’ in referring a 
child to these services only stand to lose the pupil dependent allotment, which from 
a cost perspective may be low compared to actual cost. At the same time such a 
referral entails that the home-district avoids paying the cost of any special needs 
services given to the child, receiving still the payments p1 and p3 allocated to the 
district due to the child living there. Thus for home-district, the ‘enrollment’ and the 
receiving special needs school a successful referral is attractive from a budgetary 
point of view. No incentives for inclusion therefore exist to counter the increasing 
efforts taken by special needs schools in attracting potential customers.  
Lastly, the account also highlighted how the division of responsibilities leads to 
districts incurring unexpected budget strain when a child, following the end of 
treatment, returns to less comprehensive services, where the budgetary responsibility 
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is placed locally. All in all, the model brings forward conflicting incentives for in-
clusion affecting not only the pursuit inclusion but also the overall efficiency by 
which funds are used. Clear incentives for inclusion though are given for pupils 
enrolled in a home district department, albeit affected by the amount available when 
the cost of externally supplied services has been covered. For non-home enrolled 
and for pupils with somewhat severe needs inclusion efforts may be impeded, a 
tendency amplified by the fairly high level of budgetary risk.  
Concerning improving academic results the model gives no direct incentives, being 
as it is at the outset independent of academic results. Instead such a focus is to be 
brought forward by a long-term demand side concern stemming from the high com-
petitive pressure. Where free choice combined with publications of results will in-
duce the management teams to focus on the education level of the pupils as a mean 
to ensure high enrollments. The account showed that competition is an acute and 
imminent factor, bringing with it an urgent need to focus on enrollments. Competi-
tion is however also seen as an important motivator for developing unique profiles 
so to set the school apart from the competitions. Including both education, pedagog-
ical and after-school care profiles. The actual fulfillment of the related targets for the 
school year 2012/13 is summarized in Textbox 14.2. As seen there is still some way 
to go before the targets are met although the reading results, especially, are attribut-
ed to have been negatively affected by the teacher lockout. Yet, it is difficult to 
isolate the effect of the competitive pressure, and the general conclusion from the 
administration is that a renewed focus is needed.  
Final grades: The grade levels vary across schools and subjects. Overall however, the general con-
clusion is that continuous focus on improving the educational level of pupils is needed. 
 
Reading: Only two schools fulfill the targets on reading for pupils in 1st and 2nd grade. For the 3rd and 
4th grade, none of the schools fulfill the goals. The results indicate a need for a renewed effort directed 
especially towards 4th graders. 
 
Pupil absenteeism: The reason for absence varies across schools, the general tendency is however 
that pupil’ absenteeism has increased, especially ‘illegal absence’ and ‘general illnesses’. 
  
Transition into further education: 35% continuous in 10th grade (a 5% decrease), 44.9% in “gym-
nasium” educations (a 1.2% decrease) and 12.4% in vocational training (a 2.4% increase). 
- Textbox 14.2   Educational levels, reading results and pupil’ absenteeism, school 
year 2012/13. Source: Quality Report 2012/13 (05. 11.13, head 84) 
The improvements of academic results is from the perspective of the schools and the 
administration closely linked to the skills of the teachers, an increased use of IT and 
the establishment of a close co-operation with parents. The account shows how a 
precondition for high education quality is verbalized as ensuring that teachers teach 
only in their main subjects. With also the creation of a close relationship with the 
parents emphasized as all important for countering private school competition, en-
suring improvements in the pupils’ performance and for gaining support for local 
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inclusion-efforts. Textbox 14.3 summarizes the teacher related targets. From the 
account it is clear that the use of IT constitutes a vital political focus area material-
ized in the swift introduction of E-boards in all classrooms. In terms of the teacher’s 
skills these have improved, while the proportion of the actual teaching has also in-
creased. Although the number of cancelled lessons is low, the use of substitutes has 
increased in the school year 2012/13. 
IT: A sharp decline in the number of new computers. E-boards have been installed in all classrooms.  
 
Teachers’ skill: 89% of the teaching-staff is fully-qualified teachers, a 5% increase from 11/12 
 
Use of substitutes: In contrast to last year the use of substitutes is increasing. The number of can-
celled lessons is very low. As a result the schools must continue their work with flexible planning.  
 
Proportion of actual teaching: The proportion of the teacher’s workload actually devoted to teach-
ing has increased 0.8 percentages.  
- Textbox 14.3   IT, teacher’ skills, use of substitutes and proportion of actual teach-
ing, school year 2012/13. Source: Quality Report 2012/13 (05. 11.13, head 84) 
These latter matters are closely linked to the local understanding of cost-
effectiveness, with flexible planning emphasized by one school as an important tool 
for decreasing the use of substitutes. Class sizes were further identified as important 
to ensure a more efficient resource use and for gaining a broader financial scope. As 
seen the average class size is slowly increasing, albeit the account also highlights 
how education-related concerns and the department structure in some occasions 
makes such efforts difficult. Making the multiple department structure simultaneous-
ly a barrier and a mean to uphold high averages, affecting the ability to obtain the 
desired efficiency gains through economics of scale. At the bigger departments larg-
er averages are in general easier to uphold, a need continuously reinforced by the 
comparable more difficult task at the small departments. The new division of re-
sponsibility has made the management responsible for deciding if the smaller de-
partments are to be ‘subsidized’ to be able to deliver sound services. Albeit it from a 
theoretical point could imply a reduction in efficiency and effectiveness such subsi-
dies are from a managerial point of view such seen as the only option available in 
order to uphold desired education levels.  
- Class averages: By the start of 2013/14 the averages remain stable in three schools, while they 
have respectively increased 0.7 and 1.4 in the two remaining districts.  
- Expected enrollment: Three district foresaw a too high level of enrollment (respectively 59, 
41 and 39 pupils too many) while the other two had to low numbers (respectively 9 and 40) 
- Private school rate: The goal of decreasing the private school rate was not accomplished for 
the school year 2012/13 
- Textbox 14.4   Class averages, expected enrollment levels and private school rate 
beginning of school year 2013/14 source: Result Status 3 2013 (05. 11.13, head 86) 
PART IV   MUNICIPALITY B                                                   PRACTICING SCHOOL MANAGEMENT IN MUNICIPALITY B 
249 
As seen the private school rate remains high. This is despite the fact that the account 
elucidated how private school competition is a main area of focus. The relative high 
level of competitive pressure, created not at least by the choice of funding object and 
the division of responsibilities, brings with it a strong managerial need to ensure 
high enrollments, making it ever so important that at least district pupils are en-
rolled. The adjustments to the budget in September further prompt a need for precise 
estimations inducing the management to be prudent in their pre-planning of the 
school year. Yet, also increasing the local tendency to set aside funds.  
Despite the described focus on enrollments Textbox 14.4 illustrates how the man-
agement for the school year 2013/14 experienced great difficulties in predicting 
enrollment numbers. For one district with a brand new department, deemed the 
‘flagship’ school of the municipality, the prediction of a too low level of new en-
rollments showed itself to be dire. Having expected 922 pupils to be enrolled by 
September 2013 the actual enrollment turned out to be 972 pupils, while it by May 
2014 had increased to 1007 (a 9% increase). Since most of these new enrollments 
were pupils from other public schools the district was only compensated for 21. Yet, 
three new classes were established and in combination with other decisions this led 
to too high operating cost, an increased use of substitutes and too many funds being 
spent on special educational services. Severely affecting the financial situation of the 
district. By 31.05.14 a deficit of 5.9 million had been created. Against the recom-
mendation of the administration the Children’s Committee decided to allocate a one-
off payment of 3.9 million DDK to the district with the expectation that the school is 
to save a million in respectively in 2014/15 and 2015/16 (CC 11.08.14, head 66; 
08.09.14, head 74). It could be argued that the combination of competition and 
budgetary risk actually induced the management to take in as many pupils as possi-
ble, although the immediate budgetary benefit was postponed. 
All in all it can be concluded that the formula funding model of Municipality B 
seeks to affect behavior through a combination of devolvement of funds, specific 
goal setting, accountability for results and the use of specific direct financial incen-
tives. The actual level of fulfillment of the political objectives shows that there is 
still some way to go before the political objectives are met. The fairly high level of 
budgetary risk brings with it incentives for efficiency, albeit it when it comes to 
inclusion and special needs education is hampered by the decoupling of responsibili-
ties which not only affect the local efforts towards inclusion but also the efficiency 
by which funds are used. Further although the competitive level prompts strong 
intensives for high enrollments the decision to only reimburse some enrollments 
complicates this, potentially also affecting the efficiency by which funds are used. 
Finally, the possibility and tendency of the private providers to enter into cream-
skimming behavior may if the increased inclusiveness is not handled, also affect the 
ability of the schools to compete over all types of pupils.  
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The presented account is very much an up-to-the minute-account influenced by the 
actual shape of the model at the time of data collection. The funding model of Mu-
nicipality B is undergoing continuous change. As for general education the number 
of lessons is for the school year 2013/14 expanded from 25 to 30 lessons per week 
(CC 09.11.13, head 89), while the division of responsibilities in terms of special 
needs education is further altered. In order to counter the inexpediencies created by 
the decoupling of responsibilities for pupils enrolled in external special needs ser-
vices the districts are now to be responsible for all budgetary cost associated with 
special educational services given to children in the age 6-15 living in the district 
(except for pupils placed in care). This, it is argued, will enable schools always to be 
able to prioritize the most ‘inclusive’ services possible for all pupils. The model is 
designed so that the district pays a fixed base rate for a pupil referred to a special 
needs service outside the municipality. The rate corresponds to the most expensive 
internally supplied municipal service. If the actual cost exceeds this rate it is covered 
by the administration. The advantage of this, it is argued, is that no district will pay 
more for a specific than if the child instead is enrolled in a local service; thereby, 
reducing further the need to set aside funds. The referral procedures remain un-
changed (CC 13.11.2012, head 99; 08.01.13, head 4) 
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Part V   Discussion & Conclusions  
 
In this, the concluding part of the dissertation, the findings of the dissertation are 
gathered and discussed with the purpose of answering the overall research question.  
Chapter 15 compares and discusses the findings of the two field studies and in 
doing so the chapter addresses the proposed influence of the funding models on the 
local practice from different angles. This is done by firstly discussing the findings in 
the light of the developed framework. The core focus is here directed upon analyz-
ing whether the financial incentives brought upon the two school systems affect the 
practice of school management differently in a way which is consistent with the 
different positions of the models in the given framework. Hereafter the chapter dis-
cusses how the choice of management control strategy affects the local focus and 
practice in the two school systems. This is followed by an analysis of how the im-
pact of the formula funding model design is not at least visible when it comes to the 
more adverse behavioral aspects. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how 
the devolvement of decision-making capabilities in both settings has especially been 
influential in affecting the managerial practice but also of how this practice comes to 
be influenced by political decision-making.  
Chapter 16 finally presents the conclusions and important findings which can be 
derived from this dissertation. This is done under the headings: 
 Does design really matter?  
 Balancing budgetary risk and the competitive pressure 
 Special needs education and inclusion – what to do? 
 Redesigns – if, how and when?  
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CHAPTER 15.    COMPARISON & DISCUSSIONS 
Up until now the field studies have been analyzed separately, presenting firstly the 
components of the formula funding model, discussing next the models in the light of 
the developed framework and finally by presenting how school management is actu-
ally practiced in the two municipalities. In this final part of the dissertation the find-
ings are gathered and discussed with the aim of addressing the dissertation’s overall 
research question of; how do formula funding models in the context of Danish public 
schools affect local managerial practice? 
15.1. DIFFERENT POSITIONS, DIFFERENT PRACTICES?  
The analysis conducted in Chapter 10 and 13 placed the funding models of Munici-
pality A and B in different quadrants of the proposed framework depicted in Figure 
7.3 From a theoretical point of view this should bring forth different managerial 
practices. The question is therefore whether this is reflected in the accounts? That is, 
whether the financial incentives brought upon the two school systems affect the 
practice of school management in a way which is consistent with the different posi-
tions of the models in the given framework? 
15.1.1. PRODUCTIVITY, ACTIVITY LEVELS AND QUALITY OF SERVICE 
Productivity wise the funding models bring with them different incentives. Theoreti-
cally both models prompt a focus on upholding high enrollment levels, although this 
motivation is arguably expected to be stronger in Municipality B due to the schools 
here being exposed to a fairly high level of budgetary risk and an even higher level 
of competitive pressure.  
From the accounts it is clear that the incentive to uphold enrollments is indeed pre-
sent in both municipalities, especially when it comes to counter private school com-
petition. The corresponding attitude towards the existence and effect of public 
school related competition is however more reluctant. Especially in Municipality A 
where even questions are raised on whether local actions in effect will differentiate 
positively the offered services across public schools. In Municipality B such con-
cerns are also present, albeit they mainly address the potential impact of geographic 
locations on the service levels offered, seen in the light of funding being pupil de-
pendent thus affecting heavily schools unable to influence the number of potential 
pupils. There is however a clear understanding that the development of local profiles 
and initiatives for attracting pupils are a natural and inherent part of schools being 
actors on a market. Across both municipalities clear concerns are further expressed 
over how public school related competition may come to affect and make difficult 
the establishment of sound and fruitful relationships between the different public 
schools. Bringing with it a need to focus on how the management teams behave in 
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order to avoid adverse sub-optimization from the part of the individual district at the 
expense of the larger system.  
Yet, when studying the findings more broadly focusing especially on the perceived 
connection between competition, enrollments and quality related matters clear dif-
ferences between the local practices emerge. In Municipality A enrollments are 
understood to be closely linked to financial viability, bringing with them a larger 
scope for managerial action. Quality of education is mainly described as ensuring 
that teachers teach specific age-groups and in their main subjects. Moreover, the 
gathering of older pupils in the same department is identified as important in the 
delivery of sound education services for these pupils. Otherwise the understanding 
of quality as a mean to compete is only scantly identified in connection to enroll-
ments; indicating that there is not a direct coupling between commercialization of 
services and the need to be competitive. Instead enrollments and quality are referred 
to more broadly as parts of wider efforts which also include the establishment of co-
operations with kindergartens, engaging the parents and securing that the school has 
a good reputation. Using e.g. teachers and local media to spread around good stories 
about the school. The account showed how such efforts are becoming increasingly 
important as pupil numbers decrease and the perceived level of competition increas-
es. Thus, suggesting that the need to focus on the quality of services as a competitive 
element is gaining a stronger foothold with the management.  
In Municipality B enrollments are clearly verbalized as indicators of quality and 
satisfaction. As seen there is a fundamental understanding that each school must 
develop education and pedagogical profiles to boost the education environment and 
in the process set the school apart from its competitors. In the pursuit of high enrol-
ment levels the management focuses on being visible and getting stories to the me-
dia, even contemplating to hire in expertise to handle such branding efforts. For the 
older pupils the gathering of these in the bigger towns is emphasized as important 
undertakings for creating exciting environments offering a wider range of electives 
and making possible also that lessons are taught only by teachers with subject-
specific competences. For the younger pupils the efforts include establishing part-
nerships with the kindergartens but also that of using new organization models such 
as flexible school start and age-mixed teaching. The so-called ‘Children’s Villages’ 
are further to bring forth an even stronger bond between kindergartens, schools and 
afterschool services, creating with it coherent, attractive service offers which will 
make the de-selecting of the public school difficult. Thus, there is a strong percep-
tion that service quality is all important for attracting pupils. Elucidating that the 
position of Municipality B’ funding model brings with it quality related incentives in 
the form of making services appealing to users so to enhance the ‘market share’; 
means which are also seen as important for improving the utilization of resources. 
The accounts thus reaffirm that upholding enrollments is a crucial focal point for the 
management in both municipalities. In line with the predicted practice clear differ-
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ences however emerge when it comes to the link between enrollments, service quali-
ty and marketing. As seen, the attempt to ‘commercialize’ services is more pro-
nounced in Municipality B and the school system is here in general further ahead in 
developing and using new organizational models intended not only to bring forth 
higher enrollments but also as potential means for efficiency improvements. This 
supports the theoretical argument that the need to uphold high enrollments is driven 
by the more pronounced competitive pressure but also the higher level of budgetary 
risk forcing the management to be also cost-effective in their delivery of services.  
On the other hand, it is also revealed how the incentive to uphold enrollments for 
one of Municipality B’ schools came to weigh so heavy that intakes from other pub-
lic schools not compensated with additional funds actually harmed the overall budg-
etary viability of the district; illustrating that the identified incentives are so strong 
that they almost become adverse. This suggests that albeit the formula funding mod-
el design is mainly directed towards motivating public schools to focus on counter-
ing private school competition the joint effect of the model components brings with 
it a strong, even harmful, incentive to enroll as many pupils as possible. An incen-
tive which in the specific case jeopardized not only the overall efficiency but also 
the local schools, in that, managerial actions led to severe overspending.  
Finally, the accounts highlighted how the incentive to uphold enrollment levels in 
general is not that strong at the department/teacher level. As the distribution of funds 
across a district is based on managerial decisions and not the actual distribution of 
pupils per se the link between activity and funds is somewhat lost at these levels. 
This puts pressure on the local management to not only ensure that resources are 
spent efficiently and effectively, but also to communicate the fairness of the actual 
distribution to the teachers across the departments. Creating with it a need to focus 
on changing the mindset of the teachers in order to enhance their understanding of 
the link between enrollment and funding. 
15.1.2. PRODUCTIVITY, EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY OF SERVICE 
A central feature of both funding models is that the devolvement of decision-making 
and budgetary responsibilities is understood as the main lever for achieving the 
politically set objectives. With the larger budgetary units the hope is that the man-
agement, through the widened decision-making scope, will be able to establish 
sound solutions to the benefit of the children; creating with it among other things the 
possibility for economics of scale and a more appropriate utilization of resources. 
Linking education and budgetary responsibilities at the same level is further ex-
pected to bring about better decision-making but also improved resources utilizing 
through for example a better matching of services to the needs of the pupils. Flexi-
bility in the type of services offered is thus expected, affecting positively the quality 
of education and the likelihood for services to be delivered as cost-effectively as 
possible. The budget, so to speak, is not to act as a straight jacket on managerial 
actions, but rather as an enabling tool which will encourage the management to use 
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their local knowledge to come up with innovative and creative solutions when run-
ning the school. The question however is whether the positions of the two models 
bring about different approaches to how the utilization of resources is approached?  
The decrease in pupil numbers to which both municipalities is subjected at the outset 
spurs along a long-term budgetary focus reflected in the establishment of larger 
districts. Creating the foundation and conditions needed for economics of scale is in 
this way perceived as a precondition for efficient management. An understanding 
which is also reflected locally as the size of the individual department becomes a 
local focus point and even more so in relation to the individual classes, in that, class 
size optimization is identified as all important for an efficient use of funds. The 
district structure with several departments in one school district is in both municipal-
ities pinpointed as simultaneously a barrier and a mean for achieving desirable aver-
ages. At the one hand, the district structure may bring forward a more holistic, cross 
departmental approach especially in situations where geographical distances are not 
overwhelming; enabling the management to distribute pupils in a way which ensures 
more desirable averages. But in other cases, the geographical distance is so vast that 
this is not an option, resulting in more undesirable averages. Yet, as described by a 
school leader in Municipality B the dilemma is quite straight forward; the budgetary 
freedom associated with retaining a pupil within the overall district budget is greater 
than the alternative of losing that pupil due to dissatisfaction with not being enrolled 
in the school of choice. Even so if it leads to skewed, inefficient averages. The nega-
tive budgetary effect of inefficient averages is therefore preferable compared to the 
more-long term effect of losing the pupil completely. 
Class sizes are however identified as the favored way to ensure a more efficient use 
of funds. Especially in Municipality A where viable class averages are emphasized 
as the main tool for establishing cost-effective solutions; particularly in situations 
where natural transition points in the course of the education process offer opportu-
nities to optimize or re-amalgamate classes. The need to uphold high averages is 
described to be so strong that when more controversial re-amalgamations have to 
take place they often trump the associated opposition from children and parents. 
Requiring in turn a great deal of communication efforts in order to avoid further dis-
enrollments. The account however elucidated that pedagogical driven concerns at 
times can outweigh the budgetary driven need for high averages. In such situation 
the individual department head asking for an exemption must come up with other 
cost-effective solutions in the form of for example co-teaching and group-division. 
Overall however the use of such initiatives seems to be less systematically organized 
compared to how similar efforts are used in Municipality B. 
In Municipality B the optimization of class sizes is also emphasized as the main way 
to utilize funds, albeit educationally driven concerns may also here sometime coun-
ter this incentive. Reflected for example in the situation where the 9
th
 graders were 
left out of the efficiency-enhancing initiatives following the introduction of the new 
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district structure. Such a decision, it is argued, is made with open eyes, acknowledg-
ing that the associated financial cost requires other initiatives to be taken. Varying 
department sizes were further identified as a motivating factor for the management 
to come up with new ways of organizing the teaching. Inducing them to for example 
implement ‘rolling school start’, age-mixed teaching and more broadly supporting 
the new initiative on Children Villages. Such initiatives are, at least verbally, em-
phasized as parts of a broader strive towards cost-effectiveness, that is, they are 
understood to be parts of broader attempts to ensure the overall budgetary viability 
of the school system, the individual district, but more so, also as means to bring 
about improved education quality. As explained by the management these new or-
ganization models ensure that education standards are upheld and potentially further 
improved, thus suggesting that these measures are a more ingrained part of a sys-
tematic effort towards ensuring cost-effectiveness and quality of service.  
Overall the accounts show how the focus on class averages requires the management 
teams in both municipalities to look ahead, taking into account the developments in 
enrollments. A focus which corresponds well to the theoretical prediction that the 
competitive pressures will induce the management teams to concentrate on enroll-
ments. Yet, this immediate similarity in practice is slightly altered when studying the 
local approach to planning. In accordance with the position of Municipality B’ fund-
ing model the coupling between enrollments, class sizes and planning is strong; 
stemming from the fact that the budget is adjusted in September. These adjustments 
prompt a need for precise forecasts in that reliable numbers are all important when 
staff decisions are to be made. Making the ability to predict/control enrollments the 
decisive factor for how reliable the preliminary spending frame is. The budgetary 
risk arising from decreasing enrollments thus bring about a need for prudent practice 
when planning the school year. Entailing for example that the management keeps a 
close eye on whether pupils plan to leave and inducing the management further to 
adopt a more conservative approach when planning. That is, setting budgets on a 
lower number of pupils than otherwise indicated and further utilizing fully the staff 
already employed through for example the use of flexible planning. Overall ensuring 
that the need for substitutes is as low as possible while also prompting a need for the 
management to teach classes. The account thus highlights that the adjustments in-
duce the management not to spend, allocate or earmark all funds up front, motivat-
ing them in turn to set aside more or less large amounts of funds. From an efficiency 
perspective this may lead to a more prudent utilization of funds, ensuring also that 
the schools are able to meet unforeseen challenges. However it is problematic if the 
share of unspent funds becomes too large especially if funds could be better used to 
improve the service quality for pupils already enrolled.  
Nevertheless, the account also elucidated that the management in Municipality B 
despite this profound local attempt to control enrollments still has some way to go 
before being successful. As the adjustments to the budget are confined to particular 
enrollment changes this affects the efficiency by which funds are utilized. The 
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budgetary effect of enrolling too many pupils from other public schools, accompa-
nied further by other educationally driven decisions, brought with it immediate 
budgetary consequences for one district. Whereas for the remaining districts the 
budgetary consequence of planning on a too high level of pupils is postponed to the 
following year when dis-enrollments happen in favor of other local public schools. 
From a broader efficiency perspective this represents an inefficient use of funds as 
these are not spent where the pupils are actually enrolled. The same problem arises 
in Municipality A, even on a much larger scale. Although class sizes are also identi-
fied as crucial for efficient resource allocation the complete lack of downwards 
adjustments to the spending frame means that the effect of decreasing enrollments is 
postponed to the following budget cycle. Bringing with it the mentioned possibility 
that the municipality may come to pay twice for the same pupil. Because as funds 
are not directly tied to the pupil the same immediate need for prudency is not estab-
lished; affecting negatively the overall efficiency by which funds are utilized. This 
means that even though the management focuses on upholding high enrollments and 
efficient averages the overall efficiency by which funds are used is hampered. 
All in all, the accounts show that the managements across the two municipalities 
have quite a similar perception of what constitute the preferred and most effective 
way of ensuring efficient resource utilization; manifested in the pursuit of high class 
averages. Yet, it can be argued that Municipality B is further ahead when it comes to 
using alternative ways of organizing the teaching environment; a tendency which as 
discussed can stem from the fact that the model’s position in Figure 7.3 brings with 
it a need to ensure that service delivery is characterized not only by quality but also 
cost-effectiveness. The coupling between enrollment, class sizes and the immediate 
need for prudency is further different due to funds being more or less directly tied to 
the individual child. In Municipality B this is directly reflected in the adoption of a 
more conservative approach to planning whereas a more ambiguous effect is found 
in Municipality A. Indicating that the two actual model positions do indeed bring 
about somewhat different responses and results when it comes to efficiency. 
15.2. DESIGN, MANAGEMENT CONTROL & PRACTICE 
The above discussion suggests that financial incentives to a large degree do indeed 
affect the practice of management in the context of the Danish public school system. 
In order to examine this further this section discusses how the choice of manage-
ment control strategy affects the local focus and practice. Comparing the political 
objectives of the two municipalities they look quite similar, revolving around an 
improvement of the skills of pupils and teachers, increasing the inclusiveness of the 
general environment and building strong collaborations between schools and parents 
ensuring the general well-being of the children. On top of this, efficient resource 
utilization and budget control are emphasized as important managerial tasks and 
objectives necessary for guiding the delivery of service. There is thus an obvious 
similarity in the choice of goals. A conformity which is also reflected in the design 
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of the two formulae, in that, they are both made up of a quite pupil dependent case 
payment inspired approach for the allocation of general education funds, whereas 
the funding of special educational services to a great extent is allocated through the 
use of capitation payment inspired approaches. The focus and formulae adopted in 
the two municipalities are thus at the outset quite similar. If however studying the 
models through the proposed lens of viewing funding models as a package of con-
trols this immediate resemblance disappears, elucidating that the two municipalities 
in fact have quite different foci or strategies in their management control.  
In Municipality A the overall focus is directed toward the control of special needs 
education, reflected in the comprehensive devolvement of special education funds 
and decision-making capabilities. Conversely the funding of the general education is 
downplayed bringing with it a low level of budgetary risk and a somewhat modest 
level of competitive pressure. Vice Versa in Municipality B the focus is directed 
towards the control and funding of general education, manifested in the high de-
pendency on enrollments stemming from the adjustment of the spending frame, the 
choice of funding object and the division of responsibilities. As for the budget for 
special needs education Municipality B has chosen to proceed more cautiously. 
Keeping a substantial part of the budgetary responsibilities at the hand of the admin-
istration. In one particular area however the municipalities have adopted a quite 
similar approach and strategy namely when it comes to the pursuit of making the 
general environment more inclusive.  
Interestingly it can be argued, that the difference in management control reflects the 
identified challenges facing the two school systems; respectively, in the case of 
Municipality A, the severe socio-demographical challenge and, for Municipality B, 
that of the vast private school rate. These similarities and differences underpin that 
the focus of management control to a great extent is consistent with the identified 
challenges of the two municipal systems, elucidating a clear link between strategy 
and design. The question is however if the choice of management control is reflected 
in the local practice and if it in effect helps meeting the identified challenges? 
15.2.1. GENERAL EDUCATION – THE RETAINING OF PUPILS 
Table 15.1 below compares the overall ability of the two public school systems to 
retain pupils once they have been enrolled in a public school. This is done by listing 
the net decrease/increase in actual pupil numbers as well as percentage wise across 
age grades from one year to the next. The changes are registered at an overall mu-
nicipality level for the entire public school system implying that variations across 
districts are not visible. The table further focuses on the part of the school process 
which is not affected by varying practices surrounding e.g. pre-school start or board-
ing schools which means that the changes from pre-school to 1
st
 grade and from 7
th
 
to 9
th
 grade are left out. Yet, because the table also compares the ability in 2009 to 
2010 with the corresponding net changes from 2013 to 2014 the table further brings 
about an opportunity to detect whether a change in practice has occurred. Bringing 
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with it the possibility to discuss the potential effect of changes to the funding model, 
albeit of course no direct causality can be derived. 
 Municipality A Municipality B 
 
2009 – 2010 2013 – 2014 2009 – 2010 2013 – 2014 
From 1st - 2nd +5 / +2% -2 / -1% +12 / +4% +3 / +4% 
From 2nd - 3rd -18 / -5% -19 / -6% -7 / -2% -3 / -1% 
From 3rd - 4th -16 / -4% -6 / -2% -2 / -0.5% +2 / +0.5% 
From 4th - 5th -26 / -7% +3 / +1% -2 / -0.6% +4 / 1% 
From 5th - 6th -15 / -4% +3 / +1% -9 / -2% -9/ -2% 
From 6th - 7th -14 / -4% -8 / -2% -5 / -1% -23 / -6% 
Average (%) -84 / -3.8% -29 / -1.6% -13 / -0,5 -23 / -1% 
- Table 15.1   Net decrease/increase in actual pupil numbers/percentage wise across 
age grades for the school systems as a whole, October 1st, source:Statistic Denmark 
The pronounced focus on the general education budget brought upon the schools by 
the design of Municipality B’ funding model gives the schools great motivation to 
uphold high pupil numbers. Not at least because of the fairly high budgetary risk and 
an even higher level of competitive pressure to which the schools are exposed. A 
pronounced motivation which is clearly reflected in Table 15.1. As seen, once a 
child in fact is enrolled the public school system is quite successful in retaining 
pupils, reflected by the fact that the net decrease over the two periods is only 13 and 
23 pupils. When compared with the results of Municipality A’ school system it is 
clear that Municipality B in general is more successful at retaining the pupils. Yet, 
as likewise visible, the school system of Municipality A is improving while the same 
cannot be said for that of Municipality B’. A range of explanations can be given for 
this. Since 2009/2010 the funding model of Municipality A has been changed, be-
coming more pupil-dependent. The substantial amount attached to each pupil en-
rolled together with the vast drop in pupil numbers now brings with it a modest 
competitive pressure, making it desirable from a more long-term budgetary perspec-
tive to uphold high enrollments. This development is a possible explanation for why 
the school system of Municipality A has become better at retaining the pupils. 
The converse decrease in net enrollments in Municipality B can, on the other hand, 
be contributed to the fact that the private school related competition in Municipality 
B is not only vast but still growing. As previously described one of the private 
schools has even expanded its capacity without having any difficulties with filling 
up the new seats. Thus, although the funding model is actually designed so that it is 
mainly directed towards countering private school competition the numbers indicate 
PART V DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS                                                                      COMPARISON & DISCUSSIONS                                                                                                                           
261 
that the school system is experiencing difficulties with retaining its pupils. Further 
compared to Municipality A which for many years, if not decades, has been subject-
ed to negative trends in birth rates and socio-demographic conditions Municipality B 
have first within the last couple of years experienced a decrease in the general popu-
lation; not at least due to an increase in migration out of the municipality. This in-
creased migration could also explain the net decrease in pupil numbers suggesting 
that pupils are not only enrolling with private providers but may in fact be moving 
away completely. Despite this the table still illustrates that the school system of 
Municipality B is better at retaining pupils once enrolled in the public school sys-
tem. A result which supports the argument that the different focus in management 
control motivates a more pronounced focus on the general frame in Municipality B 
compared to Municipality A. It is however interesting to note how both municipali-
ties in the crucial transition year from 6
th
 to 7
th
 grade where the majority of children 
is to change school department or have their existing class re-amalgamated, seem to 
have problems retaining pupils. This is noteworthy as the otherwise explanation for 
a decrease in pupil numbers in the older classes, namely that of boarding schools, is 
not applicable for this age group. Suggesting that a renewed focus on retaining pu-
pils is especially needed at this stage. 
15.2.2. SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION – REFERRAL PATTERNS 
The possible effect of a difference in management control is also manifested when 
comparing the municipalities in connection to special needs education. Both munic-
ipalities changed their funding models in 2009 devolving among other things a larg-
er part of the funding to the individual school districts. While Municipality A chose 
an extensive strategy, devolving the major part of the special educational funds, 
allowing also the schools to establish local special needs classes, Municipality B 
chose a more cautious approach devolving only approximately half of the special 
educational funds. Allowing further not individual districts to establish local special 
needs classes. This difference in approaches is indeed reflected in Table 15.2 which 
compares the net development in the use of special needs schools from 2009 to 2010 
and 2012 to 2013 and moreover the net development in the use of special needs 
classes from 2012 to 2013. The numbers are again registered on an overall munici-
pal level thus making variations across districts invisible. It is further important to 
keep in mind the different socio-demographic challenges facing the two.  
 Municipality A Municipality B 
Special needs schools  2009 – 2010 2012 – 2013 2009 – 2010 2012 – 2013 
From preschool – 1st 6 (+6)  2 (+1) 2 (0) 1 (+1) 
From 1st - 2nd  0 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 4 (0) 
From 2nd - 3rd 6 (+6)  7 (+1) 5 (-2) 3 (+1) 
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From 3rd - 4th 9 (+7) 9 (+4) 4 (+2) 8 (+4) 
From 4th - 5th 18 (+9) 2 (-2) 1 (-2) 8 (+6) 
From 5th - 6th 18 (+11)  11 (+6) 6 (+2) 10 (+3) 
From 6th - 7th 14 (+8)  10 (+8) 4 (+1) 15 (+7) 
From 7th -8th 15 (+1)  19 (+1) 3 (-6) 7 (0) 
From 8th -9th 14 (0) 15 (-2) 7 (+3) 8 (-1) 
Total +48 +17 -2 + 21 
Special needs classes in 
the public school system 
2012 – 2013 2012 – 2013 
From preschool – 1st 8 (+6) 7 (+4) 
From 1st - 2nd 11 (-1) 6 (-6) 
From 2nd - 3rd 8 (-1) 7 (-2) 
From 3rd - 4th 6 (-2) 9 (+2) 
From 4th - 5th 7 (+3) 17 (+3) 
From 5th - 6th 9 (-3) 7 (-2) 
From 6th - 7th 11 (-1) 20 (+4) 
From 7th -8th 10 (-2) 4 (-7) 
From 8th -9th 18 (+9) 28 (-7) 
Total +8 -11 
- Table 15.2   Net development in referral patterns across age-groups to special 
needs schools and special needs classes for the school systems as a whole.  
Comparing referral patterns of Municipality A from 2009 to 2010 with that of 2012 
to 2013, it is clear that a new practice has emerged when it comes to referring pupils 
to special needs schools. Where from 2009 to 2010 48 extra pupils were referred the 
corresponding number for 2012 to 2013 is only 17. Representing a steep decline in 
the use of special needs schools. A decline which has occurred simultaneously with 
if not a static but maybe even a worsening of the socio-demographic conditions of 
the children has taken place. As for the use of special needs classes additional eight 
pupils where referred to such services from 2012 to 2013. The design and focus of 
the funding model gives clear suggestions for this, in that, the overall design of the 
funding model gives the schools a strong budgetary motivation to retain pupils local-
ly. The establishment of an ‘inclusive’ practice by for example enrolling the child in 
a local special needs class namely means that funds can be spent at the full discre-
tion of the management. Retaining the child within the overall district budget gives a 
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budgetary freedom which is lost if the child instead is enrolled in a special needs 
school. On top of this, the school also avoids paying the cost of these severe ser-
vices. Studying the table it further reveals that the use of special needs education is 
higher for the older pupils. This was also highlighted in the account of school man-
agement in Municipality A where it was argued that the need for special needs edu-
cation often becomes more pronounced the older a pupil gets. Yet, it can also be 
argued that due to the ethical code it can be difficult to bring back pupils already 
referred to the special needs services. Suggesting instead, as also supported by the 
account, that exclusions now are to be avoided all together in the first place. It is 
again important to note that the highest net increase in referrals to special needs 
schools occurs in the age-groups around the transition from 6
th
 to 7
th
 grade. Indicat-
ing a potentially different and interesting referral practice for these age-groups.  
In Municipality B a different pattern emerges, in that, the number of pupils referred 
to special needs schools has increased with 23 from 2012 to 2013 compared to the 
referral pattern from 2009 to 2010. The corresponding referral level to special needs 
classes have from 2012 to 13 decreased with 11 pupils. As for Municipality A clear 
connections between the design of the funding model and the resulting practice can 
be found. Firstly, in relation to the externally provided services the division of re-
sponsibilities means that if a school is successful in referring a child to a special 
needs school then the associated budgetary responsibility is transferred to the admin-
istration. As described, this may prompt someone to seek an up-coding of pupils to 
these services. Moreover as highlighted by the account, the division of responsibili-
ties makes the home-district school the budgetary liable part bringing with it few 
incentives for the establishment of inclusive-seeking efforts for pupils with more 
severe needs. Giving in general the schools few incentives to counter the increasing 
efforts taken by some special needs schools in attracting potential customers. The 
account further highlights how the choice of funding object and the division of re-
sponsibilities may affect which pupils are being referred to local special needs ser-
vices. Making the common response in relation to home-district pupils that of avoid-
ing exclusions to special needs classes while the opposite tendency could arise in 
relation to non-home-district pupils. Factors which together could explain the de-
crease in pupils being referred to local special needs classes simultaneously with the 
increased use of special needs schools. As in Municipality A the use of special needs 
education is also seen to be more pronounced in the older grades again in accord-
ance to explanations given in the account connected to Municipality B. Yet, it was 
also argued that previous practices to a great extent affect the current level of use, in 
that, the bringing back of pupils is not understood to be a viable option. As ex-
plained this means that the current management may be paying for pupils which 
they would not themselves had referred to such services. In turn, prompting further 
the local focus on avoiding sending pupils away to the special needs classes. Again 
it is also important to observe the sudden increase in referrals for the children in the 
age-group around the transition from 6
th
 to 7
th
 grade, indicating again that something 
extraordinary is happening around this time. 
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All in all, the discussion illustrates how the postulated difference in management 
control has the effect that Municipality A’ schools are much more focused on con-
trolling the cost and use of special needs education compared to Municipality B. 
This is despite the fact that the socio-demographic conditions of Municipality A are 
considerably ‘worse’ than that of Municipality B. However the discussion clearly 
indicates that strategy, management control and managerial practice is linked and 
that the formula funding model design to a great extent affects local practice. 
15.2.3. INCLUSION STRATEGY – RESOURCE UTILIZATION & QUALITY 
The above discussion elucidates that the management control in the two municipali-
ties has a different focus. However a similar choice in strategy and focus has been 
adopted when it comes to the quest of making the mainstream public school more 
inclusive. Inclusion, and with it the need to ensure that fewer pupils are referred to 
and segregated in more specialized, closed teaching environments, is in both munic-
ipalities identified as one of the most vital tasks and challenges facing the public 
school system. Successful inclusion, it is argued, will improve the quality of educa-
tion in that pupils will be able to stay a part of the mainstream school system, close 
to their home-environment. Thereby enhancing the likelihood for these pupils in the 
end to pass their school-leaving examination.  
Another aspect in both models is the scarcity of incentives which are directly cou-
pled to specific political objectives. The devolvement of funds together with the 
effects of being held accountable through publishing and monitoring of results are 
instead implemented as the main levers for motivating the management to focus on 
fulfilling the politically set objectives. The exemption though being that of inclu-
sion. The capitation based approach adopted in both settings brings along strong 
incentives for ‘prevention’ and cost control, in that, the management is given a clear 
budgetary motivation to focus on keeping the children within local services. By 
retaining pupils all funds can be spent at the full discretion of the management 
avoiding thus that funds must be spend ‘out-of-house’ – at the discretion of other 
parties and maybe to the benefit of other pupils. Moreover, the fixed nature of the 
budget means that all needs must be met within the allocated budget motivating the 
management to keep in check the type of services given and the associated effects of 
these. An inclusive practice, in other words, not only brings along a wider scope for 
local actions but also a need for prudency in the level and type of services provided. 
Achieved for example in a better matching of services and needs which in the long 
run is to reduce the danger for needs being upheld and resources used beyond actual 
need. Placing early intervention at the center of attention in the efforts to improve 
the pupil’s ability to cope with the educational process; thereby decreasing the like-
lihood for them being referred to the more severe and expensive special needs ser-
vices because their needs have not been handled appropriately in time. 
Both accounts reveal clearly that a new managerial practice has emerged when it 
comes to inclusion and that of adapting the mainstream environment to a more di-
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verse set of pupils. With the larger decision-making scope the management feels 
themselves better equipped and able to act to the benefit of the children. In contrast 
to the previous strict system where a pupil was allotted a fixed number of extra sup-
port lessons based on for example a diagnosis or an official decision, both of which 
could be quite delayed, the accounts clearly illustrate how a new practice has been 
created. Flexibility and early intervention is now emphasized as key levers simulta-
neously with a change in how resources are being used. Manifested in the fact that 
funds and help are no longer strictly tied to the individual child but rather seen as 
resources which can be coupled to the larger group or class to which the child expe-
riencing difficulties do belong. Thus, bringing about new types of services and ap-
proaches to how support is to be given. This however requires the management to 
focus on explaining to the parents why help is now to be given in a different way 
and also in new settings. A difficult task due to the often deeply-rooted understand-
ing, among parents and also teachers, that diagnoses are triggers of support. Accord-
ingly the management is focused on decoupling the tight connection between inclu-
sion, support and diagnoses.  
A key aspect in this context is how the objective of inclusion is verbalized as being a 
paramount philosophy involving a complete rethinking of how teaching is to be 
conducted. Entailing a confrontation with old traditions and ways of thinking, in 
particular in relation to how needs are understood, handled and met. With the in-
creased focus on flexibility and a more appropriate meeting of needs comes a re-
thinking of the needs themselves. From an understanding where needs are seen as 
somewhat static and unchangeable and where the pupil must be helped to fit existing 
practices, needs are now understood to be more changeable and moreover it is now 
the education setting which must be adapted to the benefit of more pupils. Changing 
with it how the teaching is to be conducted and how the children and their parents 
are approached in such a way that inclusion is seen as a positive thing for all chil-
dren. As visible from the accounts the managements are gradually changing the 
practices of the school. For example in Municipality A where the use of two teacher 
arrangements and group-divisions based on needs and skills are increasingly used 
across the entire school process in order to accommodate better to a more diverse set 
of needs. The same initiatives are taken in Municipality B albeit the management is 
further very focused on establishing a broad, unified pedagogy for their own school 
district which together with a changed mindset towards inclusion is to bring about 
safe and sound practices across the school departments and afterschool care affect-
ing also how the children and their parents are approached.  
That a change in mindset towards the idea of inclusion has transpired at the manage-
rial level is clearly visible in the accounts. However, whether this stems from having 
been made an accountable part of the process or from a broader societal change 
reflected for example in the new legislation on special needs education is difficult to 
say. Nevertheless, it is clear that a change in attitude, at least verbally, towards the 
notions of special needs, inclusion, help, support and special needs education can be 
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detected. At the same time however, the pursuit of inclusion without doubt repre-
sents an educational as well as a budgetary challenge. Not only must the services be 
tailored and adapted to the needs of the pupils, a difficult task in itself, but the teach-
ers must also be equipped with appropriate skills to handle the more diverse set of 
needs. Bringing with it questions of whether a sufficient level of skills for handling 
special needs children is actually present in the mainstream environment.  
Making inclusion profitable for all thus constitutes an enormous challenge under-
stood to affect not only the general environment, the pupils and teachers but in fact 
the entire public school system. If not handled probably the pursuit of inclusion is 
perceived to be a factor which may affect the motivation of the teachers, bringing 
with it an increased counter pressure for more exclusion. Likewise if the parents, 
both those with and without children with more specialized needs, are not included 
in the process or if their concerns or problems are not probably addressed in time 
similar problems may arise. Moreover, inclusion is also perceived to affect the abil-
ity of the public school systems to actively compete with private providers. From the 
accounts it is seen how there is a strong perception that the idea of inclusion is 
something which affects the choice of schooling, scaring away more resourced par-
ents who would otherwise not have chosen private schools. The private schools, it is 
felt, are not contributing or rising to this challenge. Some are even seen to adversely 
cream skim the more academically gifted pupils leaving the rest at the hand of the 
public school system. The pursuit of inclusion is in this way seen and verbalized to 
affect the general teaching environment, how funds are to be spent and also the 
overall ability of the public school to deliver a sound quality of service. 
The potential counter pressure for more exclusion arising from teachers and parents 
places the incentives structures of the funding model at the center of attention. By 
incorporating strong budgetary incentives into the models clear incentives for inclu-
sion is created. Through the devolvement of funds the management is made an ac-
countable part of the decision-making process when deciding whether or not a child 
should be referred or not. Making them thereby aware of the budgetary and educa-
tion-related effects of their choices, requiring them to consider more carefully what 
is needed for a child to be able to thrive in the mainstream environment. One could 
think that the reason why direct financial incentives are given springs from the fact 
that inclusion compared to other goals, e.g. improving the skills and well-being of 
pupils, is much more controversial. While these goals are more closely coupled and 
tied to aspects understood as being the purpose of the public school system, i.e., 
closely related to that of being a teacher and a school manager, inclusion on the 
other hand is a controversial and debated subject. Which if not handled appropriate-
ly may bring about a range of problems including for example dissatisfied teachers 
and parents and not at least the danger that needs of the pupils are not appropriately 
met affecting both the well-being and education-related outcomes for all children.  
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All in all, this once again illustrates a direct link between management control and 
funding design. Yet the accounts clearly illustrate how the pursuit of inclusion at 
times may be hampered by the overall design of the formula funding model or be-
cause appropriate local environments prepared to handle these pupils are not created.  
Successful inclusion is thus a comprehensive task which if not handled in an effec-
tive manner can create an even stronger counter incentive for exclusions, in turn 
again affecting the amount of funds available to be spent in the mainstream envi-
ronment. A vicious circle may therefore be created which will make an appropriate 
meeting of needs in the mainstream environment extremely difficult. In this connec-
tion, the accounts clearly indicate a local tension between that of fulfilling the over-
all municipal strategy of inclusion and the real life practice of school management; 
where the school management is indeed confronted with the more educational driv-
en concerns and pressures from teachers and parents which may go against that of 
inclusion. Thus, albeit clear incentives are given for inclusion it is far from given 
that inclusion happens in reality or that it will be successful. Underlining that alt-
hough a change in mindset at the managerial level can be detected successful inclu-
sion requires much more than a mere verbal change in attitude.    
15.3. FUNDING MODEL DESIGN, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND 
ADVERSE BEHAVIOR  
The above considerations support the claim that formula funding model design in-
deed affects managerial practice in the context of Danish public schools. But as 
revealed by the accounts this is also so when it comes to the more adverse behavior-
al aspects. Illustrated throughout the accounts by a range of examples and situations 
of how also more adverse behavioral responses are triggered in the actual practice of 
school management. The accounts for example illustrate how different approaches 
to carry-overs bring about potentially adverse behavioral responses. In Municipality 
A one school district is induced to spend to the limit in order to ensure that funds 
remain in the district, while some school districts in Municipality B on the other 
hand transfer too much funds across budgetary years as a mean to reduce the high 
budgetary risk. Albeit there in both situations are given clear quality-related reasons 
for why such behavior is prudent it may threaten the overall efficiency by which 
funds are spent and as such the quality of the education given.  
While the above discussion illustrates a link between design and strategy it also 
elucidates the inherent danger that the object and focus of control may become over-
emphasized to the detriment of the overall quality of service. In Municipality A the 
focus is, as discussed, on controlling the cost of special needs education with the 
clear goal being that of including pupils in the local services. But with this comes 
the danger that pupils will be adversely ‘pulled-back’ from the special needs schools 
to the local special needs services or alternatively attempted up-coded to the few 
services where the budgetary responsibilities are held by the administration. Alt-
hough the ethical code may make the most common response that of avoiding send-
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ing pupils away at all, the bringing back of pupils to the general environment is still 
an overriding possibility. Especially because districts are also allowed to establish 
local special needs classes. Whether such behavior is adverse depends on the level 
of quality established in these local services. Since these services so to speak remain 
segregated, albeit being placed locally, the pursuit of inclusion may in reality be 
hampered. Questioning thus not only the overall vision of inclusion but also endan-
gering the actual quality of service provided because the sufficient knowledge and 
competences needed for meeting the needs of these pupils may not be present. Thus, 
regardless of whether the response is to avoid referrals or that of bringing back pu-
pils both responses bring with them the danger that budgetary related concerns 
overweigh the actual meeting of needs.  
In Municipality B the focus conversely is directed upon controlling and steering the 
general education frame. Which as seen in the account may lead to an adverse over-
emphasis placed on enrolling extra pupils.  This strong emphasis further implies that 
the control of special needs education, according to the account, has become some-
what neglected. Albeit the ban on establishing local special needs classes reduces 
the imminent danger that pupils will be adversely brought back to the local educa-
tion environment the decoupling of education and budgetary responsibilities in a 
number of areas create unwanted adverse behavioral responses. Reflected for exam-
ple in attempts to up-code non-home-district pupils to special educational services as 
the budgetary responsibility lies with the home-district. But also in the increasing 
attempts to refer pupils to the externally supplied services where the budgetary re-
sponsibilities is placed with the administration. The model thus gives rise to con-
flicting incentives for inclusion, in that, clear incentives for inclusion are given for 
pupils enrolled in a home district department while for pupils enrolled outside their 
home-district and for the pupils with somewhat severe needs inclusion efforts may 
be impeded. A tendency not at least spurred on by the fairly high level of budgetary 
risk which affects not only the pursuit inclusion but also the overall efficiency by 
which funds are used.  
From the point of view of the municipal administrations there is a clear understand-
ing that budgetary-driven concerns are an important part of the practice of school 
management. The management must thus always take into account the budgetary 
effects of their decisions. Yet, the general agreement is that such concerns must 
never overrule the actual meeting of needs and in relation to this the quest for inclu-
sion does not mean that all pupils can or must be included in the mainstream school. 
A child must accordingly never be brought back to the general environment only 
because of budgetary related reasons. Despite this, the accounts illustrate how there 
are still widespread concerns that budgetary reasoning overweigh the meeting of 
actual needs by for example not referring pupils in need of special services. Illustrat-
ing the overhanging danger associated with capitation funding that services will be 
depressed due to the associated budgetary risk and that the management in the pur-
suit of a larger, stable budget base may refrain from referring due to the associated 
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cost. Whether a decrease in the actual level of referrals is positive again depends on 
whether similar services can be created through the larger budget base because if the 
needs of the pupils are not sufficiently met this becomes adverse in nature.  
Similar concerns are relevant in relation to the inclusive-enhancing services, in that, 
the high level of managerial discretion coupled with the budgetary risk brings with it 
the danger that the inclusive-seeking funds are not spent in the local environment 
but rather used to establish or acquire special needs services elsewhere. Thus, de-
creasing the amount available for inclusion in the mainstream environment. As a 
result local inclusive-seeking services may not be able to appropriately meet the 
needs of pupils with more severe needs but neither that of those with more moderate 
needs. Resulting in inclusion turning into merely that of retaining and pacifying the 
particular pupils in the general environment. At the detriment of the well-being and 
education-related outcomes of all pupils. Since services like additional support and 
group-integrated services are no longer classified as special needs education it is 
difficult to control whether the children are receiving the needed help. The capitation 
based funding utilized in combination with diagnoses of needs no longer being a 
precondition for help namely makes it difficult to track funds and thus to ensure that 
they are actually used in relation to the children for whom these extra resources were 
indeed intended. 
The accounts thus clearly demonstrate that also the more adverse responses are trig-
gered in the practice of school management. Underpinning the argument that albeit 
formula funding on its own may be able to serve contrasting and similar political 
objectives the actual effect on local practice can only be understood if the full fund-
ing model design is considered. The above discussion reflects thus the well-known 
dilemma that ‘what you measure is what gets done’ and that the focus on particular 
goals can lead to adverse behavioral attempts to achieve these at the expense of an 
efficient use of funds and not at least of the overall quality of education.  
15.4. CHANGING PRACTICE AND POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 
An overall theme throughout the field studies is how the devolvement of decision-
making capabilities and funds is to create an accountable and responsible manage-
ment who do consider the effects of their decisions from both education and budget-
ary-related perspectives. The enhanced decision-making scope is greatly appreciated 
by the school managements, who feel themselves, better able to bring forth the de-
sired level of service quality but also a better matching of services and needs; all 
together improving the utilization of resources. The accounts contain illustrative 
examples of how local practices are changing but also of how the larger scope for 
decisions brings about new expectations affecting the options, actions and tasks 
available to the management when performing their job. This is especially reflected 
in the pursuit of inclusion and through the devolvement of resources for special 
needs education and general support, in that, the management is now not only ex-
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pected to be able to create a more inclusive mainstream environment but also to 
ensure that pupils with severe needs will receive the services they need, either 
through the establishment of local services or through acquiring services elsewhere. 
Reflecting the crux of the matter for the management between being accountable for 
ensuring quality of service but also that these services are delivered as cost-effective 
as possible and are given in the appropriate educational settings. It is thus not 
enough to be able to improve the quality of service especially not if this happens at 
the expense of a prudent use of funds. Whether the converse is true is less clear. 
What can be said however is that the few times during the period studied where 
local decisions have led the administrations to pursue a change in local leadership it 
was due to budgetary-related problems. Thus, the accounts illustrate the tension 
between education and budgetary related goals present in the practice of Danish 
public school management.  
At the same time, the accounts also highlight how political decision-making is per-
ceived and verbalized as an important factor which influences and frames how 
school management is practiced. Not only in terms of the content of education but 
more broadly as something which affect the ability of the management to bring 
about desired results measured both in pupil-related outcomes but more so also in 
relation to being able to establish an efficient utilization of funds. The wish for more 
use of IT in the teaching illustrates perfectly this dilemma. The swift decision in 
Municipality B to install E-boards in all classrooms is especially pinpointed as an 
example of political decision-making which is expected to affect greatly how teach-
ing is to be conducted. At the same time, it also represents an example of how such 
decisions at times are perceived to be taken without a deeper analysis into the actual 
cost-effectiveness and overall outcome. More broadly the accounts also elucidate 
how decisions on especially inclusion but also on carry-overs and school structures 
in combination with desires to uphold local services for the younger pupils are per-
ceived to affect the way and setting in which teaching is conducted and with it the 
local ability to ensure efficiency and quality of service. Decisions on school struc-
ture are across both municipalities identified as one of the crucial political issues 
affecting the local management in their practice. Emphasized as both a barrier and a 
mean to create economics of scale the multiple department structure implemented in 
both municipalities is in this way seen to be of vital importance for the daily prac-
tice. The geographical locations of the departments combined with the distance 
between them are here pinpointed as something which affects adversely the ability 
of the management to deliver the desired service levels while still upholding an 
efficient utilization of resources. The department structure, it is argued, prompts the 
need for higher class averages in the large departments. A need not at least rein-
forced by the similar more difficult task at the smaller departments with fewer pupils 
pr. year group. The political wish to uphold local services in also the smaller com-
munities thus motivates the management to allocate a larger share of resources than 
otherwise indicated to the smaller departments. From a theoretical point of view this 
implies a reduction in efficiency and effectiveness; whereas it from the managerial 
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point of view is seen as the only viable option for upholding an acceptable service 
quality at these small departments too. As a result increased intake in one depart-
ment may not benefit that particular department since funds due to managerial dis-
cretion may be spent elsewhere in the district. Similar in cases of other successful 
cost-effective measures, such as higher class averages or a decrease in use of substi-
tutes and in particular in situations where the mainstream environment has become 
more inclusive, these cost-effective efforts may not bring about a corresponding fair 
budgetary advantage. Understood as having these gains in efficiency being reinvest-
ed and spent in the same department as they were ‘earned’. As illustrated this creates 
frustration among the teachers who do not feel that their increased ‘productivity’ is 
being rewarded proportionally.  
Such frustrations among the employees, due to perceptions of unfairness and the 
feeling that the bigger departments suffer from having to subsidize the smaller puts 
pressure on the management to focus on building a strong sense of unity across the 
departments. District management is thus perceived to bring forth a widened scope 
of decision-making but at the same time also new responsibilities and expectations 
that service levels also will be upheld at the more remote located departments, not 
always able to be self-financing. The management is accordingly becoming more 
aware of both the educational but also budgetary consequences of upholding local 
services. Especially in times of a decreasing pupil population. As highlighted in the 
accounts this brings with it a growing agreement among the school managements 
that the small school departments are not desirable – neither from a pedagogical and 
educational perspective nor from a more budgetary-driven perspective. Albeit initia-
tives such as Children’s Villages, ‘rolling school’ start and age-integrated teaching 
may ensure a more efficient use of funds, amending some of the negative conse-
quences associated with having smaller departments, the existing inefficient building 
stock is strongly emphasized as an important reason for why a more efficient use of 
funds cannot be achieved. This is interesting in that the managements to some extent 
disclaim their own liability when it comes to actually ensure efficiency and desired 
service levels. Understood in the sense that the politicians through their role in set-
ting the overall frame in the end also affect the ability and the limit to which effi-
cient resource utilization can be created. 
That the managements themselves disclaim liability is noteworthy in that this is 
exactly what they themselves criticize the politicians for doing. That is, they some-
how question the fairness of the politicians having through the devolvement of funds 
placed the responsibilities for an impossible task at the school level. Impossible as 
the service quality and budget compliance cannot be achieved parallel with the de-
sire to also uphold local services. There is accordingly a local feeling that the man-
agement is becoming responsible for the effects of the political decisions, in that, the 
responsibility for decisions on aggregates are now placed at the local level. In this 
way, the politicians can to some extent decouple themselves from the consequences 
of the formula funding model in place. Creating in turn a bottom-up pressure from 
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the local management and maybe even from the teachers for political actions when it 
comes to the political difficult questions on reorganizations of the district structure 
and perhaps even the closing of particular school departments. This is for example 
reflected in Municipality B where an important managerial tool is that of creating 
separate department accounts to be presented to the employees elucidating problems 
of enrollments and cost structures. Likewise in Municipality A there is created a 
strong sense for the need to change further the structure of the already amalgamated 
school system. Through having been made responsible for a more diverse set of 
departments the managements have become aware of the cost of running these creat-
ing again a bottom-up pressure. Making the managements possible important allies 
for the politicians when tough decisions on school structures have to be made.   
To sum up this chapter has tried to capture the effects of the funding models on the 
local managerial practices elucidating with it the impact of the funding models dif-
ferent positions in the presented framework. The above discussions which address 
the dissertation’s overall research question from different angles clearly show that 
the design of formula funding models indeed do affect the practice of school man-
agement. That is, showing how the actual model positions bring about somewhat 
different responses and results when it comes to efficiency but also in terms of how 
tightly a local link is created between competition, enrollments and quality related 
matters. Yet, the accounts also elucidate how quality-related concerns can over-
weigh the financial incentives of the funding model. Overall however, the above 
discussions clearly illustrate that strategy, management control and managerial prac-
tice are linked and that the formula funding model design heavily affects local prac-
tice also when it comes to the more adverse behavioral aspects. Importantly the 
accounts elucidate how practices are changing as a result of having been made ac-
countable for a larger part of the funds. Reflected in particular in connection to local 
management control efforts where the local budgeting practices are slowly changing 
with more people becoming involved. Turning the budgeting process within the 
districts into a sort of internal negotiation where also department heads and maybe 
even the teachers become included. Illustrating thus how the department heads are 
becoming more involved when the local budgets are to be set requiring them to be 
able to justify and explain their need for resources but also the general results of the 
departments in terms of for example enrollment levels. In this way, these too are 
attempted made aware of the budgetary consequences of their decision in relation to 
matters such as service levels, teacher norms and the use of substitutes and so on. 
Yet, the accounts also show how even the teachers are encouraged to suggest initia-
tives concerning their subject accompanied with budgetary considerations. Illustrat-
ing how the mindset which requires that also budgetary-related concerns are taken 
into account slowly seeps down through the layers of the organization. From the 
municipal administration, to the school management further to the department heads 
and finally all the way down to the individual teacher. 
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CHAPTER 16.     CONCLUSIONS & PERSPECTIVES  
Studying and thereby enhancing the understanding of the behavioral impact of the 
formula funding models used to allocate funds from the Danish municipalities to the 
local public school districts is the aim of this dissertation. Broadening the 
knowledge on this subject is important due to the large amount of public spending 
being used on education combined with the fact that the research literature and the 
praxis-related field literature at the same time is characterized by a lack of well-
documented evidence of the actual effect of such models. Something which has 
resulted in the field being instead largely governed by anecdotal evidence and per-
sonal opinions and preferences on what constitutes best practice and on what can be 
expected from increasing local accountability and competition among public sector 
providers. Circumstances which all together makes this research endeavor important 
from both a theoretical and practice-related point of view. 
In an attempt to address the overall research question of how do formula funding 
models in the context of Danish public school funding affect local managerial prac-
tice the study has combined the two separate sets of discussions that of formula 
funding model design and that of incentives and behavioral responses. Addressing 
thus the subject of study from different angles by firstly presenting central aspect 
important for understanding the context in which public school funding operates, 
including for example an analysis of the development in legislation on public 
schools (Chapter 2) and of the understanding and use of special needs education 
(Chapter 3). The components making up formula funding models were then ana-
lyzed (Chapter 5) together with the associated behavioral responses (Chapter 6); 
findings which in Chapter 7 were combined into a framework based on the theoreti-
cal understanding of viewing a formula funding model as a package of controls. 
Lastly in order to capture the effect of a formula funding model in practice two field 
studies were presented and the subsequent results discussed. The qualitative field 
study methodology made possible a presentation of how school management is 
actually practiced allowing the discussion to move beyond the standard economic 
Principal-Agent perspective which has otherwise been a favored method in the study 
of incentives and public sector governance (see e.g. Oates 1999; Dixit 2002; Burgess 
& Ratto 2003).  
Although the field studies are restricted only to two examples of the relationship 
between formula funding model design and managerial practice they represent a 
unique, in-depth analysis of the effect of formula funding models which otherwise to 
the best of my knowledge is not found in the literature. The findings captured above 
bring forward important insights, also more broadly applicable, into the effect of for 
example different payment types, the advantages and disadvantages associated with 
linking budgetary and education-related responsibilities locally as well as into the 
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effect of the overall formula funding model design. All in all, this brings forth a 
range of contributions related to and captured in the following headings:  
 Does design really matter?  
 Balancing budgetary risk and the competitive pressure 
 Special needs education and inclusion – what to do? 
 Redesigns – if, how and when?  
16.1. DOES DESIGN REALLY MATTER? 
The core question addressed is whether it is actually possible to influence the mana-
gerial practice of school managers through the design of the formula funding model. 
That is, whether the way in which resources are allocated to providers in effect af-
fects the options, actions and tasks available to the local school management when 
performing their job or whether the managerial practice in reality remains unaffected 
by this, governed instead by education-related considerations and half-hearted at-
tempts to and attention directed upon ensuring budget compliance and efficiency? 
The study clearly reveals that the latter is not the case showing instead that the man-
agerial practice of the management under study is in fact strongly affected by the 
specific design of the formula funding model in place. In effect, the dissertation 
shows how the design of the formula funding model comes to determine the deci-
sion-making scope and level of discretion available locally and not at least the types 
of tasks left at the responsibility of the management. The formula funding model 
design in this way influences and determines the scope for action but at the same 
time also the opportunity/danger for the more adverse behavioral responses to be 
triggered.  
On the other hand, the study of practice illustrates how education-related concerns 
are important; at times even countering the financial incentives of the funding mod-
el. Education- related concerns do indeed influence the school managers when deci-
sions are to be made, though in a way where the associated budgetary consequences 
must also be taken into account and counterbalanced locally. Requiring the man-
agement to be able to manage and balance the need for quality and equal access to 
services against the need for prudent practice and budget compliance. Illustrating 
thus how budgetary considerations are not secondary concerns but rather an inter-
twined part of the practice of school management. Nevertheless the study also eluci-
dates that despite the importance of financial incentives these can never eliminate or 
render superfluous the need for a capable management equipped with the needed 
skills for managing and meeting the local tension which potentially may be created 
between budgetary and more education-related concerns. It is, in other words, clear 
that no formula funding model, no matter how it is designed, will be able by itself to 
adjust for an inadequate level of funding or for an incompetence of management. At 
the same time, the study clearly highlights that design and managerial practice may 
be linked in a way so that the municipal administration through the formula funding 
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model can affect the local practice of the school management in a way so that the 
management is more likely to act in accordance with the political objectives while 
being discouraged from engaging into behavior contrary to these goals.  
Overall, this brings forth strong arguments for the importance of understanding the 
full design of the formula funding model in place, as well as the effects of the indi-
vidual components. Whereas Aas (1995) and Barnum et al. (1995) stress the im-
portance of understanding the precise method of payment when studying formula 
funding due to the powerful incentives created by these in terms of prompting pro-
vider behavior in relation to ensure quality, efficiency and equitability, this study 
illustrates that it is not enough to focus solely on the method of payment. Rather, in 
order to understand the full incentive effect on providers the complete set of incen-
tives associated with the formula funding model must be taken into account. Other-
wise, important incentive structures may be over-looked and misspecifications may 
occur. Albeit this may seem as a straight forward argument the importance of this 
kind of approach is emphasized throughout this study as the field studies clearly 
elucidate that the individual components may prompt oppositely directed incentives. 
The field studies in this way constitute illustrative exemplifications of the appropri-
ateness of viewing a formula funding model as a package of control following the 
definition of such as put forward by Grabner & Moers (2013). In particular the stud-
ies illustrate how the components in practice are not necessarily designed so that 
interdependencies and goal congruence among control practices are taken into ac-
count or ensured. Not only may the individual components address different aspects 
or control problems but the studies also describe how new control practices or com-
ponents may be implemented or other redesigned without possible interdependen-
cies or overall goal congruence being taken into account. In fact, the studies show 
that the components are not at all interdependent as the individual components in 
effect may bring about conflicting incentives; potentially triggering behavioral re-
sponses which are not in line with the objectives of the service area. Illustrating 
further that goal congruence is far from given and that the construction of the full 
formula funding model is influenced and affected by decisions made at different 
levels i.e. at the political, administrative and local school level.  
The study thus make plain that while the specific components may be interrelated 
they are not fully interdependent. At the same time however, the field studies illus-
trate how the design of a specific component may increase the importance of anoth-
er. Elucidating in this way Jaworski’s (1988) argument, that the specific mix of 
control may produce negative and positive synergies; the latter to such an extent that 
complementarity may be created. That is, that the presence and design of one com-
ponent increases the ‘value’ and effect of another (Milgrom & Roberts 1992, 1995; 
Ennen & Richter 2010). Designed appropriately a formula funding model may thus 
be able to trigger stronger behavioral responses than otherwise indicated if consider-
ing only the isolated effect of the individual components. Likewise, situations may 
occur where the intended effect of one component is decreased by the presence and 
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design of another. The study in this way illustrates and expands on the theoretical 
argument put forward by Smith (2007a:18) that understanding the associated effects 
of a particular payment method is important, in that, the “precise method of paying 
may have important incentive effects for the recipient of funds, over and above the 
level of funding” (emphasis in the original). That is, if designed appropriately, so 
that positive synergies and complementarity are created, a formula funding model 
may encourage even more strongly behavior in line with the politically set objec-
tives. If however the notion of viewing the formula funding model as a package of 
control is here not kept in mind the opportunities to create such important synergies 
may be overlooked meaning that vital opportunities to affect local behavior may be 
foregone. Creating a situation where the managerial practice may come to be gov-
erned and depend solely on the managerial competences possessed locally. More 
adversely, the fact that the components are interrelated may also bring about situa-
tions where the created synergies are so strong that the associated incentive effects 
become adverse and counterproductive as the providers may become over-
stimulated in relation to certain behavioral responses which from a broader public 
service perspective are not desirable. 
The dissertation clearly shows that formula funding model design may be linked to 
management control and strategy in a way so that specific objectives are more likely 
to be pursued. Management control and strategy can, if the formula funding model is 
designed appropriately, be combined so to encourage even more strongly behavior 
which is in line with the politically set objectives. The impact of the formula funding 
model design may thus appear more or less indirectly. Directly through the incorpo-
ration of specific financial incentives into the formula, which in this dissertation has 
especially been visualized in connection to special needs education and inclusion; 
but also more indirectly through the overall configuration and design of the full 
funding model. The findings thus support and elaborate on considerations put for-
ward by Broadbent et al. (2010) that the transfer of resources and the accompanying 
controls in the context of public sector funding acts as an indirect steering mecha-
nism for behavior. Illustrating further that the need to incorporate more direct finan-
cial incentives into the model may depend upon how closely coupled the specific 
goal is to what is otherwise understood as being the core purpose of the public 
school system and that of being a principal of school.   
16.2. BALANCING BUDGETARY RISK AND THE COMPETITIVE 
PRESSURE 
An important issue of this dissertation has been to identify characteristics able to 
capture the behavioral impact of the overall formula funding model. Adhering in this 
way to the understanding put forward above that it is insufficient to understand and 
focus solely on the separate effects of the individual control components if wanting 
to understand the full behavioral impact of the package of control in place. Based on 
the analysis of control components and that of the associated behavioral responses 
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and incentive structures this study has proposed that the level of budgetary risk and 
competitive pressure are the two central levers of formula funding models affecting 
behavior in the context of Danish school funding. Arising respectively from an in-
ternally and an externally source of uncertainty/risk these two control characteristics 
are identified as the main factors influencing local managerial practice, understood 
as the options, actions and tasks available to the local school management when 
performing their job.  
The two field studies clearly support this point of view. Not only do the studies 
show that the managerial practice in the two municipalities is affected differently, in 
a way which is very much in line with the theoretically predicted practice. But they 
further make plain that the two types of risk or uncertainty are very influential in 
ensuring that the funding model becomes more than a mere reimbursement system, 
making it instead a mean through which providers are encouraged to operate pru-
dently and efficiently ensuring also that the quality of services is upheld. By empha-
sizing the important role that risk and uncertainty play in affecting provider behavior 
the study brings substance to the claim made by Broadbent & Guthrie (2008) that 
understanding the role risk/uncertainty plays in the context of public sector govern-
ance is crucial. Further, by coupling the two particular levers with knowledge on 
behavioral responses and incentives this study presents a framework which hopeful-
ly makes up a relevant tool for understanding the relationship between formula 
model design and managerial practice.  
Importantly, the field studies also contribute with deeper knowledge and insights 
into the actual impact of budgetary risk and competitive pressure on provider behav-
ior. From a theoretical point of view a range of advantages and disadvantages has 
been associated with a widening of local budgetary risk in the form of decentraliza-
tion and the linking of responsibilities at the local provider level; including for ex-
ample improvements in allocative and managerial efficiency (Glennester 1991; 
Pollitt 2005). Similarly, competition is theoretically expected to bring forth ad-
vantages such as decentralization, enhanced user choice, diversity of providers and 
not at least high quality of service (Le Grand 1991; Cutler & Waine 1997). Yet, 
when studying the actual effects of competition the expected merits are questionable 
and not necessarily obtainable (Nannestad 2004). A range of theoretical assumptions 
on the effect of budgetary risk and competition thus exists but there seems to be a 
lack of knowledge on how this manifest itself in the practice of school management. 
The two field studies presented here therefore bring important insights into this 
contributing especially with knowledge on the behavioral impact of linking budget-
ary and education-related responsibilities at the local school level. It is clearly illus-
trated how a decentralization of responsibilities, as for example argued by Pollitt 
(2005), ensures that decisions are made closer to the users. Reflected especially in 
relation to special educational support where decisions on support and help are now 
made closer to the home-environment. With the benefit that the child and its parents 
can become a more active part of the process compared to the prior system where 
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the feeling was that decisions were taken by a distant actor without actual insights 
and connection to the particular child and its needs.  
The devolvement of responsibilities also enables a more flexible approach to be 
adopted leading to a possible better matching of needs and services. Thus, the find-
ings elucidate and correspond closely to the arguments put forward by Ouchi (2003) 
that a decentralization of responsibilities helps to create services which are more 
responsive and better in tune with user needs and demands. The field studies in this 
way represent illustrative examples of the theoretical presumption that flexibility in 
terms of services- and resource use may be created by devolving responsibilities to 
the local level. Elucidating also how the increased room for discretion may act as an 
enabling tool, prompting the management to be innovative in their approach to ser-
vices and to the utilization of resources. The linking of budgetary and education-
related decision-making capabilities at the local school level thus brings forth an 
accountable management, which using knowledge available due to being close to the 
users, is able to establish a better matching of services and needs. Supporting the 
claim made by Glennester (1991) about the general desirability of anchoring deci-
sion-making power at the local level.  
Likewise, in relation to competition the field studies show how an enhanced compet-
itive pressure may motivate the management to focus on the quality of services as an 
element in the competition for attracting pupils. However, it is also made clear that 
enhanced competition may lead to sup-optimization within the municipal system; a 
development which may harm and hamper the creation of cooperation among the 
service providers. The findings thus clearly illustrate the theoretical duality inherent-
ly present in the two proposed levers of managerial practice. At the one hand budg-
etary risk and the competitive pressure may prompt a local focus which ensures 
quality of service, tailored more precisely to the needs of the pupils, while also en-
suring a more efficient use of funds. Furthermore, it may create a local sense of 
responsibility making the management aware of the consequences of not only their 
own decisions but also that of the competitors. But one the other hand, the findings 
elucidate the potential disadvantages associated with a decision to widen the level of 
budgetary risk and competitive pressure. Not only may a particular decision bring 
forward the risk/opportunities for adverse actions to occur but if a too excessive 
level of budgetary risk and competitive pressure is brought onto the providers it may 
further prompt the management to seek actions which are not desirable. Resulting 
for example in particular actions becoming over-emphasized while others may not 
be carried out at all. Underlining again, the importance of not only being aware of 
the obvious dangers associated with a particular design choice but more so also to 
take into account the discussed possibilities of synergies which may enhance the 
behavioral impact of specific and seemingly isolated design decisions.  
This creates a tension which can only be resolved by finding a correct balance of or 
mix between the level of budgetary risk and competitive pressure. That is, finding a 
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combination where neither a too excessive nor a too low level of budgetary risk or 
competition is brought upon the providers. Because if not obtained, the proper level 
and types of incentives may not be created leading to situations where the funding 
model due to a too low level of budgetary risk and competition brings with it no 
behavioral incentives for prudent practice and for upholding the desired level of 
quality; making the subsequent results depend solely on the competences of the 
school management to ensure budgetary and education-related goals. Or to situa-
tions where the combination of budgetary risk and the competitive pressure is too 
strong causing instead to an over-stimulation of particular responses which is not 
counterbalanced by education-related concerns. 
The findings, in other words, extend the theoretical predicted practice as proposed in 
Chapter 7 and further suggest that a correct and prudent balance of budgetary risk 
and competitive pressure must be found; a balance which will be highly context 
dependent especially when it comes to the competitive pressure. Being an externally 
created uncertainty stemming mainly from the prevalence of private schools provid-
ers the specific level of competitive pressure to be induced onto the providers de-
pend on the competitiveness of the actual system. In situations where the school 
system is affected strongly by private school competition it will, from the perspec-
tive of wanting to create opportunities for fair and equal competition, be most feasi-
ble to increase the competitive pressure by improving the abilities of public schools 
to compete over pupils. The specific balance between budgetary risk and competi-
tive pressure is thus very context dependent differing from one municipality to the 
next. As such, if the competitive pressure is enhanced this might mean that the cor-
responding level of budgetary risk must be reduced so to ensure that the incentives 
springing from the formula funding model do not becomes too excessive. Or vice 
versa that the level of budgetary risk must be enhanced if the competitive level in 
effect reduces. Yet, if a municipality is successful in creating an appropriate balance 
between budgetary risk and competitive pressure this may facilitate the creation of 
dynamic tension (Mundy 2010) bringing with it better services and resource utiliza-
tion but also organizational learning which may ensure that the objectives of the 
service area are more likely to be fulfilled. 
16.3. SPECIAL NEEDS EDUCATION & INCLUSION – WHAT TO 
DO? 
That the design of formula funding models has an impact on local practice is espe-
cially prominent in relation to special needs education and the quest for more inclu-
sive practices. The renewed vision of making the public school system more inclu-
sive reducing the proportion of pupils being referred to the comprehensive special 
needs services has brought with it the general perception that the funding models 
must be redesigned to support this. Causing a need for deeper knowledge of how 
this is to be done and not at least of how such changes may affect local practices. 
The two municipalities under study were, following the Structural Reform in 2007, 
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some of the first to incorporate inclusive-enhancing measures in form of devolving 
substantial parts of their special educational funds to the individual school districts. 
Albeit certain similarities between the two approaches exist, the designs still differ 
as well in structure as in the speed by which the devolvement has taken place; mak-
ing them excellent cases for studying the effects of different design choices.  
Common to both is the attempt to link budgetary and education-related responsibili-
ties at the local level. The devolvement of responsibilities and funds has, as seen, 
created a more accountable management who feels themselves better equipped and 
able to act to the benefit of the children; suggesting that anchoring responsibilities at 
the local level is advisable. The increased decision-making scope buttressed further 
by the legislative amendment of 2012 has created conditions for a more flexible 
approach to be developed; an approach where the decision-making capabilities are 
strongly attached locally and where the role of the school manager is vital. In con-
trast to the previous strict system where a pupil was allotted a fixed number of extra 
support lessons based on a diagnosis or an official decision, both of which could be 
quite delayed. With the enhanced decision-making scope a new practice is created 
where flexibility and early intervention is emphasized as key levers affecting how 
resources are being used. Funds and help are no longer strictly tied to the individual 
child but rather seen as resources which can be coupled to the larger group or class 
to which the child experiencing difficulties belongs. The field studies in this way 
illustrate how the devolvement of decision-making capabilities affects the types of 
services created in the mainstream environment and with it how pupils with special 
needs are approached. 
At the same time, the studies reveal the importance of incorporating direct financial 
incentives supporting the vision of inclusion. Inclusion is not a straightforward and 
unproblematic endeavor at times made difficult due to deeply-rooted understandings 
among parents and also teachers that diagnoses are triggers of support as well as 
perceptions of the appropriateness of a particular child being referred to more com-
prehensive services better equipped to address its particular needs. Incentives to 
counter and withstand, when appropriate, such pressure for exclusion are therefore 
needed. The use of capitation funding here brings along strong incentives for ‘pre-
vention’ and cost control giving the management a clear budgetary motivation to 
focus on keeping the children within local services; as retaining means that funds 
can be spent at the full discretion of the management avoiding thus ‘out-of-house’ 
spending – at the discretion of other actors and maybe to the benefit of other pupils. 
Moreover, the fixed nature of the budget means that all needs must be met within the 
allocated frame motivating the management to keep in check the type of services 
given and their effects. An inclusive practice, in other words, not only ensure a wid-
er scope for local actions but also a need for prudency in the level and type of ser-
vices given. Achieved for example by a better matching of services and needs which 
in the long run reduces the danger for needs being upheld and resources being used 
beyond actual need; placing early intervention at the center of attention to improve 
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the pupil’s ability to cope with the educational process and thereby decreasing the 
likelihood of them being referred to more severe and expensive special needs ser-
vices because their needs have not been handled appropriately in time.  
The findings accordingly support the theoretical implications associated with capita-
tion payments. As noted by Smith (2007a) funding localities as a risk pool brings 
about incentives for prevention and cost control and likewise in Dhuhy & 
Lipscompe (2009) where it was shown how the implementation of a ‘state capitation 
reform’ affected the disability- and placement rates as the new capitation funding 
model lowered disability rates. A result which the authors noted indicated that tying 
funds to the individual pupil affected ‘negatively’ how special needs education was 
given. The result presented above similarly show how the use of capitation funding 
in combination with a legislative change to some extend removes the link between 
funding and local decision-making over disability identification and placement; 
reducing thereby the immediate propensity to provide special needs education ser-
vices as a mean to compensate for the extra costs, i.e. the danger of ‘diagnoses for 
dollar’ or up-coding. The above content, illustrated in particular in Chapter 2 on the 
development in use of special needs education, thus support the theoretical argument 
put forward by Marsh (1998:121) that “an allocation system which provides addi-
tional resources to any pupil who can be certified or measured as meeting the crite-
rion for additional resources provides an incentive for parents and the school to 
secure the necessary identification for that pupil”. That is, resulting in a situation 
where such a system over time will be likely to generate an increase in the number 
of pupil eligible for extra funding, with the number of pupil referred to segregated, 
comprehensive settings further increasing (Banks et al.2015). At the same time the 
results also clearly question the simplicity of this statement. Namely, that this is not 
due solely to the payment method but more so to the overall design of the formula 
funding model.  
The two municipalities under study use a capitation funding inspired approach 
which in principle should bring forth incentives for prevention and cost control re-
ducing the use of special needs education. This incentive is strongest in Municipality 
B where a pure capitation approach is utilized whereas the funding model of Munic-
ipality A could prompt up-coding due to the existence of varying payments. Yet, the 
development in use clear shows that the expected decrease in the use of comprehen-
sive special needs education do not occur in Municipality B while it actually sets in 
in Municipality A. Something which may be explained by using the full design and 
strategy employed in the two settings. In Municipality B the division of responsibili-
ties and choice of funding object for example overrule the financial incentives 
stemming from the payment type, motivating instead potential up-coding of non-
home district pupils and the shifting of pupils to services where the budgetary re-
sponsibilities lies with the administration. In Municipality A conversely the exist-
ence of varying payments should theoretically motivate up-coding of pupils. Never-
theless, the overall management control strategy together with the fact that schools 
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are allowed to established local special needs classes actually reduces the use of the 
comprehensive services in special needs schools while increasing the number of 
pupils in the local services. All in all, underlying the importance of viewing the 
formula funding model as a package of control.   
Overall, the findings seem to indicate that linking budgetary and education-related 
decision-making power at the local level make possible the creation of accountabil-
ity, a better matching of services and thereby a better quality of service. Supporting 
the arguments made by Hartmann (2001) and Horn & Tynan (2001) that a separa-
tion of the general and special needs education funding is problematic as it may lead 
to increased spending levels. The devolvement of responsibilities and decision-
making power namely bring forward the establishment of more inclusive services 
while also ensuring that pupils with severe needs receive the services they need, 
either through the establishment of local services or the acquirement of services 
elsewhere. But as seen the capitation based funding may motivate providers to de-
press the use of services as a mean to endure the budgetary risk (Smith 2007a). That 
is, needed services is not established, children may not be referred to needed ser-
vices or others may be re-included in the mainstream environment due to budgetary-
related considerations. The increased flexibility and decoupling of funding and 
needs is thus not unproblematic, in that, it, as predicted theoretically, may endanger 
the creation of local accountability (see e.g. Meijer 1999; Riddell et al. 2006; Banks 
et al. 2015. Because as funds are no longer strictly tied to particular children it be-
comes difficult to control that the allocated resources are used in relation to the chil-
dren for whom additional resources were intended.  
Handling the funding of special needs education in many ways illustrates the core 
dilemma confronting a municipality when designing a formula funding model. 
Namely that between wanting to create local decision-making freedom and the re-
taining of central control; both budgetary wise and in relation to education-related 
decision-making power. If too much freedom is given it may threaten the ability to 
create equal access to services; reflected for example in the distribution of responsi-
bilities for making referrals and deciding upon the types of special needs services to 
be established. Where too much discretion may imply that more comprehensive 
services able to cater to the needs of children with more severe special needs will 
not be established; threatening not only the ability to ensure equal access but also the 
fulfillment of the legal requirement that the needs of all children must be appropri-
ately addressed. To avoid this it may be appropriate to uphold a central decision-
making body responsible for deciding what types of services is to be delivered with-
in the municipality as a whole.  Ensuring that the actual need for services across the 
entire municipality is taken into account and more so when decisions are to be made 
on the type of services given to the individual child. On the other hand, if too much 
central control is imposed, reflected for example in low appropriation levels and few 
funds being devolved this may lead to a large share of the education-related funding 
not coming into play; potentially hampering the creation of proper local incentives 
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and further increasing the likelihood that more adverse and undesirable behavioral 
responses may be triggered.  
The core task when designing a formula funding model is thus that of finding the 
correct mix between budgetary risk and competitive pressure so that proper incen-
tives are given for the entire education process. This may be done in many different 
ways through the use of different types of payments. However it is crucial that this is 
done in a way so that the potentially adverse behavioral aspects, which are inherent-
ly present in any design, are kept in mind; making it important to develop proper 
control systems able to monitor and control that such behavior does not threatening 
the overall service delivery. Design and control however is not sufficient. As noted 
the linking of responsibilities and strives for increased local accountability in the 
two studied settings has happened parallel with a legislative change stressing the 
quest for inclusion and with a detected change in local mindset. That is, a new atti-
tude towards the core understanding of inclusion and special needs education has 
become rooted with the school management. From a situation where the focus re-
volved around integrating pupils and where the deficit or problems recited within the 
individual child the focus is now directed towards changing the general environment 
to better suit the child. Illustrating the difference suggested by Alenkær (2009) be-
tween a pursuit of inclusion instead of integration (see also Reid 2005). The field 
studies in this way illustrate how the local approach to the vision of inclusion has 
changed with successful inclusion now perceived to create better education quality 
to the benefit of all pupils, ensuring further that also special educational needs chil-
dren will be able to stay a part of the mainstream school system, close to their home-
environment; enhancing thereby the likelihood for these to pass their school-leaving 
examination. This change in attitude is all important for successful inclusion in that 
the changing of practice is controversial both among teachers and parents. Without 
their support it is difficult no matter how well-designed a formula funding model is 
to ensure that the objective of inclusion is successfully achieved. Parallel with the 
right attitude the teachers must also be equipped with the skills and competences to 
handle challenges inherent in teaching more diverse groups. Similarly, the manage-
ments must be able to balance the tension invariably arising between budgetary and 
education-related matters. 
16.4. REDESIGNS – IF, HOW AND WHEN? 
The dissertation brings forth a range of practice-relevant findings which are im-
portant to consider when a formula funding model is to be studied or (re)designed; a 
main point being the appropriateness and expediency of considering the formula 
funding model as a package of control. The application of the package-notion moti-
vates a more holistic approach to the understanding of control and behavior and the 
above discussions clearly illustrate that if only parts or specific components of the 
formula funding model are taken into account, e.g. the mere mode of allocation or 
how much funds is devolved, the necessary understanding of the link between fund-
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ing model design and managerial practice cannot be obtained. But combined with 
the proposed idea that the resulting managerial practice is determined by the level of 
budgetary risk and the competitive pressure brought upon service providers through 
the design of the full formula funding model a hopefully relevant tool for under-
standing current practice together with the potential behavioral effects of redesigns 
can be obtained from the content of the dissertation.  
As the formula funding model is made up by a range of different components the 
individual municipality is confronted with a multitude of possible design configura-
tions, each of which through the joint effect of the full set of components determines 
the position of the funding model in the context of the theory developed in Chapter 
7. The framework presented here brings together design considerations and manage-
rial practice and can, as discussed, be used to evaluate how a redesign of specific 
components or the introduction of new ones will influence the actual implications of 
the funding model. The idea is that changing an individual component according to 
the political desire will decrease or increase the level of budgetary risk or competi-
tive pressure and through this the impact of the full model. Accepting thus that man-
agerial practice is determined by the specific mix of competitive pressure and budg-
etary risk a range of design-related questions or considerations can be drawn from 
the content of the dissertation. These are summarized in Table 16.1 and relate to the 
components which have been found to be important for managerial practice. For 
example, the size of the pupil dependent allotment is found to be relevant for deter-
mining both the level of budgetary risk and competitive pressure. Thus, an important 
consideration becomes that of deciding the size of the payment per pupil. Similar, a 
range of other components have been identified to be important for the overall im-
plication of the formula funding model either by affecting one or both of the pro-
posed control characteristics. Albeit the table summarizes the main considerations 
springing from the above study it is important to keep in mind that a specific or even 
a non-listed component may in other situations be just as, if not more, important 
than the ones presented; elucidating once again the importance of studying the spe-
cific formula funding model through the lens of a package of control.  
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Important design considerations   
- The size of the pupil dependent allotment.   
- How much of the special educational funds are to be devolved to the local level? 
And how much of the cost is the individual school district to cover if a child is re-
ferred to comprehensive special needs services? 
- How early is the preliminary spending made final? That is, how contingent is the 
general budget upon enrollment changes throughout the entire school year and how 
definitive is the special education budget once announced?  
- Funding object – pupil enrolled. If the number of pupils enrolled is chosen as the 
object of funding then, how precisely is the funding model to capture enrollment 
changes? That is, how tightly are funds to be coupled to the individual child also in 
relation to special needs education? Will funds for example follow the pupil in case 
of school change?  
- Funding object – district children. Inspired by the idea of making schools aware of 
the cost paid to other providers and the amount of funds allotted to other providers, 
district children as the object of funding, can be a mean to make schools aware of 
how much funds is actually allotted to pupils enrolled elsewhere. Not only in other 
public schools but in particular also in private schools. 
- Are the school districts to be allowed to affect how many pupils are to be enrolled 
locally by developing local enrollment guidelines? Can the devolvement of the 
transportation costs be a mean to motivate the management to become creative in at-
tracting a broader set of potential pupils also those living further away? 
- District structure – is the management to be responsible for multiple departments? 
- How large is the local scope to be in terms of line-item discretion, carry-overs, pur-
chasing agreements or that of establishing for example local special needs classes? 
- How is the referring process to be organized? Who holds the final responsibility for 
deciding the types of services to be given to pupils with lesser but also more severe 
special educational needs? 
- Is it possible to develop control systems which elucidate a needed depth of investiga-
tion into the link between effects, activities and budget size, so that, the control sys-
tems not merely monitor and evaluate whether the ‘correct’ procedures have been 
implemented but rather review the quality of the results produced. 
- Is the overall formula funding model designed so that it encourages a prudent prac-
tice to be created in relation to both the control and steering of general and special 
needs education? 
- Textbox 16.1   Important considerations when designing a formula funding model  
The principle idea across the design considerations relates to the question of how 
much funding and decision-making power and capabilities are to be devolved to the 
local level respectively retained at the municipal level. Reflecting the dilemma illus-
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trated throughout, between local decision-making freedom and the retaining of cen-
tral control. The latter, as discussed, potentially leading to a too large share of the 
education-related funding not coming into play thereby hampering the creation of 
proper local incentives as well as increasing the likelihood for more adverse and 
undesirable behavioral responses to appear. The questions thus reflect the idea that 
holding the local management responsible for both education and budgetary related 
aspects will make them a more accountable part of the education process motivating 
thereby a prudent practice and use of funds. At the same time, the questions do not 
merely relate to how much funding is to be devolved but also more broadly to how 
much decision-making power is in fact to be given locally. Albeit local decision-
making discretion is looked upon as an advantage it may in some situations be more 
feasible to keep the decision-making power at the central level. For example, as 
discussed, when it comes to the distribution of responsibilities for making referrals 
and deciding upon the types of special needs services to be established locally. Here 
a central decision-making body for the more comprehensive services may be an 
advantages to ensure that the actual need for services across the entire municipality 
is taken into account and moreover that this is also the case when decisions are to be 
made on the type and location of services given to the individual child. Likewise, 
albeit the establishment of local special needs classes in principle means that pupils 
may stay part of the local environment such services, so to speak, remain in reality 
segregated services. Questioning the pursuit of the overall vision of inclusion and 
endangering the actual quality of service provided since the sufficient knowledge 
and competences needed for meeting the needs of these pupils may not be present in 
newly established classes. Allowing too much local discretion can thus be problem-
atic as it may end up hampering the vision of inclusion making this more fictive than 
real. 
The questions above reflect the dilemma between wanting to create an accountable 
and responsible management, who takes into account both education and budgetary 
aspects when performing their job, while still being able to ensure that the needs of 
all pupils, including those with special educational needs, are properly addressed. 
An appropriate balance between central and local decision-making power must, in 
other words, be created buttressed by a proper balance of budgetary risk and com-
petitive pressure. This balance is not only important in terms of prompting behavior 
which is in line with the political objective of the service area but also for discourag-
ing behavior which is not. The importance of political objectives has been empha-
sized throughout the dissertation, in that, these are understood to be the guiding 
principles for the process of funding with the formula funding model functioning as 
the all important mechanism for creating behavior which is in-line with these objec-
tives. Although few direct financial incentives in relation to particular political ob-
jectives are found in the two field studies, the study clearly illustrates how design 
and management control strategy together can, if the formula funding model is de-
signed appropriately, encourage even more strongly, behavior in-line with the politi-
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cally set objectives. Even in situations where the objectives may not represent desir-
able choices from the local perspective.  
As the formula funding models must be viewed as a full package of control it is 
indeed important that proper incentives are given so that neither of the two budget-
ary frames (general and special needs education) is overemphasized at the expense 
of the other. The general increase in the cost associated with special needs education 
combined with the growing demands for consolidation and budgetary compliance 
and control has over the last couple of years led to an attempt to control the budget 
for special needs education. Being able to do so is of course important due to the 
large amount of money spent here but also because the funding models, as dis-
cussed, may have created unwanted and adverse incentives in relation to the use of 
special needs education. Yet, despite the often eye-catching amount allocated to 
special needs education it is important to keep in mind that the far largest share of 
the resources set aside for education is spent in the mainstream/general public school 
system where also the majority of pupils is enrolled. Accordingly, it is obviously 
detrimental if an increased focus on the special needs education frame comes at the 
expense of controlling and creating proper incentives for the general education 
frame. Clear incentives for prudent management must therefore also be given for 
this part of the formula funding to ensure the overall efficiency and quality of the 
service provided; underlining the importance of not ‘forgetting’ or overemphasizing 
neither the control of the special needs education frame, nor vise versa that of the 
general education frame.  
To decide if or when a formula funding model should be adjusted or redesigned is 
not unproblematic. A redesign may create new incentives buttressing the political 
objectives and due to possible synergies this can even trigger stronger behavioral 
responses than expected if considering only the isolated effect of the individual 
components. The changing of the interaction between the different parts of the fund-
ing model due to a redesign may however as well create and prompt behavior which 
in a broader sense is adverse and unintended possibly overweighing the aloof and 
potential benefits associated with the particular redesign. Yet, in other situations a 
redesign may only lead to a bare rearranging of incentives affecting not the overall 
behavioral impact of the formula funding model. Thus, if a school system performs 
according to both spending and level and use of special needs education like that of 
comparable municipalities it might not, based on the notion “don’t fix it if it isn’t 
broke”, be advisable or expedient to seek to change or redesign the formula funding 
model. Likewise if the competitive pressure is increased unwanted behavioral re-
sponses may occur. Because the competitive pressure, as discussed, to a great extend 
is determined by the presence and prevalence of private schools the specific level of 
competitive pressure induced onto providers depends on the competitiveness of the 
actual system. In situations where the school system is affected strongly by private 
school competition it will from the perspective of wanting to create opportunities for 
fair and equal competition be most feasible to increase the competitive pressure, 
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though accepting the accompanying possible disadvantages, by improving the abili-
ties of public schools to compete over pupils. Furthermore, in a situation where the 
private schools are engaged in a sort of ‘market segmentation’ catering primarily to 
the needs of specific groups and minorities an enhancement of the general competi-
tive level may bring with it a range of disadvantages in terms of sub-optimization 
and a deterioration of cooperation across the public schools. Potentially even threat-
ening the equal access to services for all types of pupils, making it therefore less 
advisable to enhance the general competitive pressure. Whether a given formula 
funding model therefore needs to be redesign hence depends heavily on the context 
in which the schools are operating as well as their general performance. Because 
from a cost benefit perspective it is not beneficial to initiate a major redesign process 
if the school system is already performing satisfactory both in terms of efficiency 
and quality of service.  
16.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The incorporation of financial incentives into the formula funding models used to 
allocate funds from the Danish municipalities to the school districts is by some con-
sidered to be a contentious issue, in that, the allocation of funds in their eyes should 
be needs-based. That is, driven by actual needs of the pupils with the subsequent 
managerial practice remaining unaffected by other considerations than that of meet-
ing the actual needs of the pupils as appropriately as possible. This concern is espe-
cially prevalent in connection to special needs education and inclusion. That the 
needs of the pupils must be met as appropriately as possible is of course crucial and 
the ideal goal. Yet, it is utopian to imagine a school system where financial consid-
erations never come into play as it is a part of a larger public sector subject to a strict 
budgetary frame. The question is also whether it, in effect, is possible or even advis-
able to seek a design where financial incentives are not present. Because if a formula 
funding model functions as a mere reimbursement system an important tool for 
encouraging providers to operate prudently and efficiently is lost. Threatening not 
only the realizations of the discussed rationales of formula funding models i.e. effi-
ciency, equitability and accountability, but also leading to situations where budget 
holders may be motivated to overstate needs or tasks due to no countervailing incen-
tives to moderate such expenses. Further inherently in all designs is the potential for 
adverse behavior; elucidated already in Chapter 3 by revealing how the distribution 
of responsibilities over time have played a role in determining the setting and the 
types of pupils being referred to special educational services. Reflected further in the 
two field studies by showing how the formula funding model components may cre-
ate different types of incentives; some potentially adverse while others support the 
political objectives of the services area. The question when designing formula a 
funding models should accordingly not be whether it is advisable to incorporate 
financial incentives into the allocation of funds but rather whether the chosen formu-
la funding model design creates the right incentives.  
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The dissertation has shown that funding models indeed do affect the managerial 
practice of the school management under study as that the design of the formula 
funding model is vital for which tasks are left at the hand of the management, for the 
decision-making scope and level of discretion available here and more so also for 
the types of more adverse behavioral responses which potentially may arise. The 
highlighted schism, inherently present when designing formula funding models, 
between wanting to create an accountable and responsible management against the 
desire to uphold and retain central control, makes the core task when designing a 
formula funding model, that of finding the correct, well-balanced mix between 
budgetary risk and competitive pressure so that proper incentives are given for the 
entire education process. This balance may be achieved in many ways through the 
use of different payment types and different component designs. Yet, what however 
remains crucial is that this is done in a way so that potentially adverse behavioral 
aspects are kept in mind; making it important to also develop proper control systems 
able to monitor and control that such behavior is not threatening the overall effec-
tiveness of entire school system. 
The above content show that tensions or splits may arise at multiple levels through-
out the process funding when it comes to decide how must decision-making power 
and funds are to be devolved to the next organizational level. This was elucidated in 
Chapter 2 where the tension between decentralization and centralization was seen to 
exists between the state and the municipalities and more so between the state and 
municipalities at the one hand against the local school districts on the other. Ten-
sions which are rooted in the desire to widen the scope for local actions, with all the 
expected benefits in terms of improved decision-making and resource utilization, 
against the need for a retained or enhanced central control over e.g. education-
related goals and the content of teaching. This schism is, as discussed, not unique for 
the Danish school system but akin to similar international reform processes dis-
cussed by Hood et al. (1999), Broadbent & Guthrie (2008) and Ezzamel et al. 
(2008) who from especially a British perspective have discussed these developments 
under the term ‘modernizing governance’ where the intention has been to create ‘re-
regulated-self-governance’. Yet, a range of other splits are also elucidated, namely 
between the municipal administration and the politicians; between the school princi-
pal and the management team members and potentially between the management 
and the teachers. A core contribution of this dissertation is thus the illustration of 
how the pursuit of the ‘responsible and calculating individual’ as proposed by Miller 
(2001:380) manifests itself in the practice of Danish school management. That is, 
the field studies illustrate how the anchoring of responsibilities locally creates a 
management who “act freely, yet in accordance with the specified economic norms” 
when bringing about desired objective such as improved resource utilization and 
quality of service; but also how the devolvement of budgetary responsibility is seen 
to become an intertwined part of the creation of a new mindset which acknowledges 
the appropriateness of enhanced inclusion. Moreover, it is illustrated how the ‘eco-
nomic norm’ may come to clash with the professional competences and perceptions 
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stemming from the teacher profession itself, requiring the management to be able to 
balance the field of tension created between the two. The study in this way reveals 
how this economic mindset is slowly trickling down through the layers of the organ-
ization from the municipal administration, to the school management, further to the 
department heads and finally all the way down to the individual teacher. Demanding 
these also to act as “responsible and calculating individuals” who not only take edu-
cation-related matters into concern but also more budgetary-related ones. Overall 
emphasizing the central idea of this dissertation that since financial incentives are an 
inherent and essential part of a properly designed formula funding model and since 
these indeed have been found to affect the managerial practice of school managers it 
becomes ever more important to ensure that the management is equipped with the 
needed skills to manage and balance the need for quality and equal access to ser-
vices against the need for prudent practice and budget compliance. With the overall 
goal of ensuring that pedagogy and funding go hand in hand.   
This dissertation has been written during a period where the Danish public school 
system once again has taken the center stage of the political arena, manifested in the 
passing of a new public school reform in 2013, a new working hour agreement for 
teachers followed by a nationwide lockout in 2013 and the 2012’ redefinition and 
demarcation of what constitutes special needs education. Stressing with the new 
Statute the overall vision of inclusion. The data collection for this study in fact end-
ed before the new public school reform came into force in 2014. As a part of the 
reform the decision-making scope of the school management is enhanced with the 
advantages and disadvantages that this may entail. Opening up for further necessary 
research into the subject of enhanced local accountability and decision-making. 
Moreover, parallel with the final words of the dissertation being written the newly 
elected government has announced the need for an expedite examination and over-
haul of the scale and implication of the inclusion-efforts taking place across the 
Danish municipalities. Resulting in a heated discussion on whether the attempts to 
include pupils with special needs in the mainstream classes and environment has 
gone too far and have been forced through all too soon. The renewed debate under-
lines the importance of the research conducted above but brings also with it a need 
for further investigation into the subject to gain an even deeper understanding of the 
initiatives which have to be taken in order to facilitate and ensure that the vision of 
inclusion becomes successful for all parties involved.  
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Studying and thereby enhancing the understanding of the behavioral impact 
of the formula funding models used to allocate funds from the Danish mu-
nicipalities to the local public school districts is the aim of this dissertation. 
A framework is proposed which, based on the theoretical understanding of 
viewing a formula funding model as a package of control, puts forward that 
the joint effects of the funding model components will determine respec-
tively the actual competitive pressure and level of budgetary risk brought 
upon the providers, and therefore with it the resulting managerial practice. 
The framework is applied in two qualitative field studies carried out in two 
Danish municipalities. The studies reveal that the managerial practice of the 
management under study is strongly affected by the specific formula fund-
ing model design; which influences and determines the scope for action but 
also the opportunity/danger for more adverse behavioral responses to be 
triggered. The field studies make plain that the level of competitive pressure 
and budgetary risk are very influential in ensuring that the funding model is 
more than a reimbursement system, making it instead a mean through which 
providers are encouraged to operate prudently and efficiently ensuring also 
the quality of services. A correct balance of or mix between the level of budg-
etary risk and competitive pressure must however be found.
